This article reflects on one of the challenges Gerald Postema’s account of the autonomy thesis poses to Raz’s pre-emption thesis in judicial practice and precedent. Certain flaws in the pre-emption thesis, as applied to courts, come to light upon analyzing the autonomy challenge, whereas some aspects of the former are better understood from the perspective of the latter. This work shows that, although these two theses seem to clash, the autonomy challenge leads instead to an alternative approach to the pre-emption thesis that allows exploring some disregarded relationships between judicial practical reasoning and precedent. Drawing from this Raz-Postema debate, I argue for an alternative reading of the autonomy challenge by introducing the hermeneutic strategy of courts (HeSCo) as a tool to analyze the role of officials as addressees of exclusionary legal directives and its explanatory force. The HeSCo ultimately unravels the paradox by holding the pre-emption thesis as central to the proper understanding of judicial practice and precedent.
This article reflects on one of the challenges Gerald Postema’s account of the autonomy thesis poses to Raz’s pre-emption thesis in judicial practice and precedent. Certain flaws in the pre-emption thesis, as applied to courts, come to light upon analyzing the autonomy challenge, whereas some aspects of the former are better understood from the perspective of the latter. This work shows that, although these two theses seem to clash, the autonomy challenge leads instead to an alternative approach to the pre-emption thesis that allows exploring some disregarded relationships between judicial practical reasoning and precedent. Drawing from this Raz-Postema debate, I argue for an alternative reading of the autonomy challenge by introducing the hermeneutic strategy of courts (HeSCo) as a tool to analyze the role of officials as addressees of exclusionary legal directives and its explanatory force. The HeSCo ultimately unravels the paradox by holding the pre-emption thesis as central to the proper understanding of judicial practice and precedent.
Este artigo reflete sobre um dos desafios que a tese da autonomia apresenta para a tese da exclusividade no contexto da prática judicial e do precedente. Analisar-se-á o desafio da tese da autonomia para revelar alguns defeitos da tese da exclusividade no contexto judicial. O trabalho procura demonstrar que, além do aparente conflito entre ambas as teses, o desafio do teste da autonomia abre o caminho para uma perspectiva distinta e enriquecida da tese da exclusividade, segundo a qual alguns aspectos desta última podem ser mais bem compreendido desde a perspectiva da primeira. Defender-se-á, portanto, uma leitura alternativa do desafio segundo a qual a tese da exclusividade é central para a adequada compreensão da prática judicial e o precedente.