Price Transparency and Tacit Collusion in the Gasoline Industry in Mexico

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Campo DC	Valor	Lengua/Idioma
dc.creator	Paolo Riccardo Morganti	-
dc.date	2020	-
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-22T18:49:28Z	-
dc.date.available	2022-03-22T18:49:28Z	-
dc.identifier	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41365966010	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/94870	-
dc.description	Despite the introduction of new retailers in the Mexican gasoline industry in 2018, retail margins remain high regardless of the low international oil prices. This article introduces a theoretical model in which price transparency reinforces tacit collusion among retailers rather than favoring a competitive environment. Counterintuitively, the government should strive to implement price Obfuscation rather than Transparency, in order to promote socially beneficial price wars.	-
dc.format	application/pdf	-
dc.language	en	-
dc.publisher	Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Unidad Azcapotzalco	-
dc.relation	http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=413	-
dc.rights	Análisis Económico	-
dc.source	Análisis Económico (México) Num.90 Vol.XXXV	-
dc.subject	Economía y Finanzas	-
dc.subject	Transparency	-
dc.subject	Tacit Collusion	-
dc.subject	Competition Policy	-
dc.subject	Cartels	-
dc.subject	L13	-
dc.subject	L40	-
dc.title	Price Transparency and Tacit Collusion in the Gasoline Industry in Mexico	-
dc.type	artículo científico	-
Aparece en las colecciones:	División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades - DCSH/UAM-A - Cosecha

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