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dc.creatorStanciu, Cezar-
dc.date2021-06-15-
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-15T20:37:14Z-
dc.date.available2023-03-15T20:37:14Z-
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/HPOL/article/view/76594-
dc.identifier10.18042/hp.45.08-
dc.identifier.urihttps://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/181699-
dc.descriptionThe CSCE process was regarded by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to settle unresolved issues of the Second World War such as the recognition of its Western borders as victorious power. Romania too saw the conference as an opportunity but in another sense: to put an end to a world of victors and losers replacing it with the equality of all states. Moscow’s status as victor was the source of its hegemony in Eastern Europe, as the regime in Bucharest understood it, which is why challenging the relations and bipolarity originating from the war was Romania’s primary aim. As the regime in Bucharest claimed to pursue an independent course towards Communism and refused subordination to Moscow, Romania had reasons to presume that its security was threatened by the Soviet Union. This article explores Romania’s approach to the CSCE, the ideas it advanced and the rhetoric it used trying to undermine the bipolarity and hegemony which placed the country in the Soviet sphere of influence and explained the Brezhnev doctrine. Undermining the principles which offered Moscow such power and also promoting instruments (both legal and institutional) to limit superpower domination, Romania hoped to secure its independence and gain protection against the Soviets.en-US
dc.descriptionLa Unión Soviética consideró el proceso de la CSCE una oportunidad para resolver problemas que pendientes tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial; por ejemplo, el reconocimiento de sus fronteras occidentales como potencia victoriosa. Rumania también vio la conferencia como una oportunidad, pero en otro sentido: el de poner fin a un mundo de vencedores y perdedores, reemplazándolo por la igualdad de todos los Estados. El régimen de Bucarest entendía que el estatus de Moscú como vencedor era la fuente de su hegemonía en Europa del Este y por eso su objetivo principal fue desafiar las relaciones y la bipolaridad originadas en la guerra. Debido a su intento de seguir su propia vía hacia el comunismo y no subordinarse a Moscú, Rumania tenía razones para creer que su seguridad estaba amenazada por la Unión Soviética. Este artículo explora el enfoque rumano de la CSCE: las ideas que propuso y la retórica que utilizó para tratar de socavar la bipolaridad y la hegemonía que colocó al país en la esfera de influencia soviética y explicó la doctrina Brezhnev. Rumanía esperaba asegurar su independencia y obtener protección frente a los soviéticos minando los principios de los que procedía el poder de Moscú y promoviendo instrumentos (tanto legales como institucionales) para limitar el dominio de las superpotencias.es-ES
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dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherCentro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionaleses-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/HPOL/article/view/76594/4564456557516-
dc.relationhttps://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/HPOL/article/view/76594/4564456557517-
dc.relationhttps://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/HPOL/article/view/76594/4564456557518-
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2021 Historia y Políticaes-ES
dc.sourceHistoria y Política; Vol. 45 (2021): El trienio liberal español, modelo transnacional de pedagogía política; 205-234en-US
dc.sourceHistoria y Política; Vol. 45 (2021): El trienio liberal español, modelo transnacional de pedagogía política; 205-234es-ES
dc.source1989-063X-
dc.source1575-0361-
dc.subjectCSCEen-US
dc.subjectRomaniaen-US
dc.subjectSoviet Unionen-US
dc.subjectbipolarityen-US
dc.subjecthegemonyen-US
dc.subjectWestern Europeen-US
dc.subjectCold Waren-US
dc.subjectCSCEes-ES
dc.subjectRumaniaes-ES
dc.subjectUnión Soviéticaes-ES
dc.subjectbipolaridades-ES
dc.subjecthegemoníaes-ES
dc.subjectEuropa Occidentales-ES
dc.subjectGuerra Fríaes-ES
dc.titleRomania, the CSCE and the legacy of World War IIen-US
dc.titleRumanía, el CSCE y el legado de la Segunda Guerra Mundiales-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
Aparece en las colecciones: Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología - UCM - Cosecha

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