The object of this essay is to controvert an old topic of symbolic anthropology: that which places symbolic actions as opposed to rational ones. It is argued that this topic assumes a simplifying conception of reason, in other words, all exercise of reason is reduced to austere reason, a type of reason which, by the way, has its own historic framework from where it emerged: that of an illustrated culture of a rigoristic type. An undesirable consequence of this contrast has been the characterization of symbolic actions as non rational, limiting the possibility of opening new and fruitful routes of research for symbolic anthropology. This essay first explores some materials which are constitutive of austere reason and of an illustrated culture of a rigoristic type; further on it makes some comments in regards to the counter-illustrated reaction and the aesthetic of romanticism; and it proposes some conjectures in regards to the influence of symbolism, particularly the type exemplified by Mallarmé- in the configuration of the above mentioned topic. Finally, it defends the emphatic notion of reason and an illustrated culture of an argumentative type.