Environmental Policies and Mergers¿ Externalities

dc.creator	Rafael S. Espinosa Ramirez
dc.creator	M. Ozgur Kayalica
dc.date	2007
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-22T16:07:44Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-22T16:07:44Z
dc.identifier	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32316102
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/82878
dc.description	A Cournot oligopolistic setting model of trade is characterized by local and foreign firms competing in the presence of pollution quota and tax. Local firms are foreign-owned (FDI) and repatriate their profits. First, we analyze the impact on welfare given by the merger of the local firms, as a response to external firms' competition and pollution abatement costs. Second, when merger is welfare decreasing, we study the best response of the government in order to compensate this negative externality. Finally, we compare the pollution quota and tax in order to determine their efficiency as a policy instrument.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
dc.relation	http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323
dc.rights	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época
dc.source	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XVI
dc.subject	Economía y Finanzas
dc.subject	environmental policies
dc.subject	mergers
dc.subject	emission permits
dc.title	Environmental Policies and Mergers¿ Externalities
dc.type	artículo científico