Merger Policy and Efficiency Gains

dc.creator	Marcos Ávalos Bracho
dc.date	2010
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-22T16:07:39Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-22T16:07:39Z
dc.identifier	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32315831005
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/82872
dc.description	This paper provides a discussion on mergers and the role played by efficiency gains. By introducing a capacity-constrained Cournot model, we show that one way to extract useful information from merging firms is to design a scheme (requiring that the firms divest some of their assets) that leads to self-selection of the more socially worthwhile mergers.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
dc.relation	http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323
dc.rights	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época
dc.source	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.2 Vol.XIX
dc.subject	Economía y Finanzas
dc.subject	Efficiency gains
dc.subject	merger policy
dc.subject	structural remedies
dc.title	Merger Policy and Efficiency Gains
dc.type	artículo científico