Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried?

dc.creator	Alfonso Mendieta
dc.date	2005
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-22T16:07:33Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-22T16:07:33Z
dc.identifier	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/82848
dc.description	Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidumping measures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interaction between a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importing market, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce and sustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that price distortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achievement of the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are altered relative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firm's propensity to collude and prompting foreign firm's.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
dc.relation	http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323
dc.rights	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época
dc.source	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIV
dc.subject	Economía y Finanzas
dc.subject	price competition
dc.subject	repeated interaction
dc.subject	tacit collusion
dc.subject	antidumping
dc.title	Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried?
dc.type	artículo científico