An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity

dc.creator	Laura Sour
dc.date	2004
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-22T16:07:33Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-22T16:07:33Z
dc.identifier	http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/82844
dc.description	Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax compliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this model both moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explain four pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditional model, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses when individuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives for tax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv) individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is a large number of evaders in society.
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	en
dc.publisher	Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
dc.relation	http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=323
dc.rights	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época
dc.source	Economía Mexicana. Nueva Época (México) Num.1 Vol.XIII
dc.subject	Economía y Finanzas
dc.subject	tax compliance
dc.subject	evasion
dc.subject	social norms
dc.subject	honesty
dc.subject	moral values
dc.subject	social interaction
dc.title	An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
dc.type	artículo científico