Some Morals from the Physico-Mathematical Character of Scientific Laws

Soto, Cristian

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dc.creator	Soto, Cristian
dc.date	2021-08-30
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-21T18:08:02Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-21T18:08:02Z
dc.identifier	https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/7009
dc.identifier	10.1590/0101-3173.2020.v43n4.04.p65
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/73626
dc.description	This article derives some morals from the examination of the physico-mathematical view of scientific laws and its place in the current debate. After revisiting the expression scientific law, which appears in scientific practice under various names (laws, principles, equations, symmetries, and postulates), I briefly assess two extreme, opposite positions in the literature on laws, namely, full-blown metaphysics of laws of nature, which distinguishes such laws from the more mundane laws that we find in science; and the no-laws thesis, which ultimately contends that we should dispense with laws in science altogether. I argue that both positions fail to make sense of the laws that we find in scientific practice. For this, I outline the following twofold claim: first, most laws (in physics) are abstract mathematical statements; and second, they express some of the best physical generalisations achieved in this branch of science. Thus understood, a minimal construal of laws suggests that they are in principle intended to refer to those features of phenomena whose salience and stability are relevant for specific scientific tasks.	en-US
dc.description	This article derives some morals from the examination of the physico-mathematical view of scientific laws and its place in the current debate. After revisiting the expression scientific law, which appears in scientific practice under various names (laws, principles, equations, symmetries, and postulates), I briefly assess two extreme, opposite positions in the literature on laws, namely, full-blown metaphysics of laws of nature, which distinguishes such laws from the more mundane laws that we find in science; and the no-laws thesis, which ultimately contends that we should dispense with laws in science altogether. I argue that both positions fail to make sense of the laws that we find in scientific practice. For this, I outline the following twofold claim: first, most laws (in physics) are abstract mathematical statements; and second, they express some of the best physical generalisations achieved in this branch of science. Thus understood, a minimal construal of laws suggests that they are in principle intended to refer to those features of phenomena whose salience and stability are relevant for specific scientific tasks.	pt-BR
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências	pt-BR
dc.relation	https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/7009/7859
dc.rights	Copyright (c) 2020 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia	pt-BR
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0	pt-BR
dc.source	TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 43 No. 4: October-December/2020; 65-88	en-US
dc.source	TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4: Outubro-Dezembro/2020; 65-88	pt-BR
dc.source	1980-539X
dc.source	0101-3173
dc.subject	Scientific laws	pt-BR
dc.subject	laws of nature	pt-BR
dc.subject	mathematics	pt-BR
dc.subject	metaphysics	pt-BR
dc.subject	ontology	pt-BR
dc.subject	Scientific laws	en-US
dc.subject	Laws of nature	en-US
dc.subject	Mathematics	en-US
dc.subject	Metaphysics	en-US
dc.title	Some Morals from the Physico-Mathematical Character of Scientific Laws	en-US
dc.title	Some Morals from the Physico-Mathematical Character of Scientific Laws	pt-BR
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion