INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

CHEDIAK, Karla

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dc.creator	CHEDIAK, Karla
dc.date	2016-06-03
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-21T18:07:01Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-21T18:07:01Z
dc.identifier	https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014
dc.identifier	10.1590/S0101-31732016000200005
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/73509
dc.description	In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experience in order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object of perceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate the disjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncing the common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the concept of biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.	pt-BR
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	por
dc.publisher	Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências	pt-BR
dc.relation	https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014/4020
dc.rights	Copyright (c) 2016 TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia	pt-BR
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0	pt-BR
dc.source	TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol. 39 No. 02: April-June/2016	en-US
dc.source	TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 02: Abril-Junho/2016	pt-BR
dc.source	1980-539X
dc.source	0101-3173
dc.subject	Perceptual intentionalism	pt-BR
dc.subject	intentional object	pt-BR
dc.subject	hallucination	pt-BR
dc.subject	disjunctivism	pt-BR
dc.subject	biological function	pt-BR
dc.title	INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION	pt-BR
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion