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| dc.creator | Béjar, Luisa | |
| dc.date | 2009-04-28 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-16T15:17:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-16T15:17:55Z | |
| dc.identifier | https://revistas.usal.es/cuatro/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/1369 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.14201/alh.1369 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/187814 | |
| dc.description | The main argument of this paper is that the heterogeneity of the institutional framework that prevails in Latin America’s electoral field (Carroll y Shugart, 2005), also reproduces itself in the parliamentary one. This is proved by the morphologic profile of each Congress’ commission system and the place that the law assigns to the system. While some legislative frameworks clearly intend to delegate to parties the decisions entrusted to this bodies; in other cases, this takes place in a less important way. In the cases formally related with a party logic, on the other hand, diverse delegation schemes are encouraged. In this article we analyze the institutional framework of the commission systems of the low chamber in: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Chile; Mexico; Paraguay; Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In this sense, this work examines the importance given to their job and some aspects of its morphology that affect the structure of incentives that narrows the development of the legislative process. We also analyze the procedures used by each Congress to solve its problems of collective action. Lastly, some ideas for the elaboration of a future taxonomy on the relationship between parties and permanent commissions in the region are presented. | en-US |
| dc.description | RESUMEN: El principal argumento de este escrito es que la heterogeneidad de los diseños institucionales que prima en el campo electoral en América Latina (Carroll y Shugart, 2005) también se reproduce en el parlamentario. El perfil morfológico del sistema de comisiones propio de cada Congreso y el lugar que la ley les asigna en el proceso legislativo son prueba evidente de ello. Mientras el marco normativo de algunas legislaturas no deja lugar a dudas en cuanto a la intención de delegar en los partidos las decisiones encomendadas a estos cuerpos; en otros casos, ello ocurre en menor medida. En los casos formalmente ceñidos a una lógica de partido, por otra parte, se alientan esquemas de delegación de corte muy diverso. En este escrito se revisa el acomodo institucional del sistema de comisiones de la Cámara Baja en: Argentina; Bolivia; Brasil; Colombia; Chile; México; Paraguay; República Dominicana y Uruguay. En este sentido, el estudio examina tanto la importancia concedida a su trabajo, como algunos aspectos de su morfología que afectan la estructura de incentivos que acota el desarrollo del proceso legislativo. Asimismo, se analizan los procedimientos utilizados en cada Congreso para enfrentar los problemas de acción colectiva. Por último, se presentan algunas ideas para la elaboración de una futura taxonomía sobre la relación que guardan en la región los partidos y las comisiones permanentes del Congreso.ABSTRACT: The main argument of this paper is that the heterogeneity of the institutional framework that prevails in Latin America’s electoral field (Carroll y Shugart, 2005), also reproduces itself in the parliamentary one. This is proved by the morphologic profile of each Congress’ commission system and the place that the law assigns to the system. While some legislative frameworks clearly intend to delegate to parties the decisions entrusted to this bodies; in other cases, this takes place in a less important way. In the cases formally related with a party logic, on the other hand, diverse delegation schemes are encouraged. In this article we analyze the institutional framework of the commission systems of the low chamber in: Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Chile; Mexico; Paraguay; Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In this sense, this work examines the importance given to their job and some aspects of its morphology that affect the structure of incentives that narrows the development of the legislative process. We also analyze the procedures used by each Congress to solve its problems of collective action. Lastly, some ideas for the elaboration of a future taxonomy on the relationship between parties and permanent commissions in the region are presented. | es-ES |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad de Salamanca | es-ES |
| dc.relation | https://revistas.usal.es/cuatro/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/1369/1439 | |
| dc.source | América Latina Hoy ; Vol. 47 (2007): Ensayos sobre cultura, intelectuales y poder | en-US |
| dc.source | América Latina Hoy ; Vol. 47 (2007): Ensayos sobre cultura, intelectuales y poder | es-ES |
| dc.source | América Latina Hoy ; v. 47 (2007): Ensayos sobre cultura, intelectuales y poder | pt-BR |
| dc.source | 2340-4396 | |
| dc.source | 1130-2887 | |
| dc.source | 10.14201/alh.2007470 | |
| dc.subject | Congreso | es-ES |
| dc.subject | comisiones | es-ES |
| dc.subject | América Latina | es-ES |
| dc.subject | proceso legislativo | es-ES |
| dc.subject | partidos políticos | es-ES |
| dc.subject | Congress | en-US |
| dc.subject | commissions | en-US |
| dc.subject | Latin America | en-US |
| dc.subject | legislative process | en-US |
| dc.subject | political parties | en-US |
| dc.title | Parliament representation in Latin America. The permanent commissions and the parties in Congress | en-US |
| dc.title | La representación parlamentaria en América latina. Las comisiones permanentes y los partidos en el congreso | es-ES |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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