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| dc.creator | Morando, Juan Martin | |
| dc.date | 2022-08-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-15T20:06:15Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-15T20:06:15Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/465 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.26807/rfj.vi.465 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/180653 | |
| dc.description | ABSTRACTWhen the Rational Choice model reveals itself insufficient to explain why parties in judicialized Labor disputes in the Provincia de Buenos Aires prefer to settle over waiting for a final decision, the Prospect Theory provides a sound explanation: as Labor Law and Procedural Rules become applicable, they produce a visible cost-shift to the employer, so parties expect judges to decide in favor of the workers. In this scenario, the employer’s perception of what is to be considered a cost and a benefit become altered, incentivizing her risk-aversion and leading her to bargain settlements that she wouldn’t even consider otherwise. KEYWORDS: Labor Law; Labor Procedure; Settlements and Decisions; Prospect Theory; Cost-Benefit Analysis. RESUMENCuando el modelo de Decisión Racional resulta insuficiente para explicar por qué las partes de un conflicto laboral judicializado en la Provincia de Buenos Aires prefieren acordar antes que esperar una decisión judicial, la Prospect Theory nos brinda una buena explicación: cuando las leyes laborales y las normas procesales laborales resultan aplicables, se produce una traslación de costos hacia el empleador, por lo cual las partes esperan que los jueces resuelvan favoreciendo a los trabajadores. En este escenario, la percepción del empleador acerca de qué debe considerar como costo y como beneficio se ve alterada, incentivando su aversión al riesgo y llevándolo a negociar acuerdos que, de otro modo, no hubiera considerado. CÓDIGO JEL: J23, J81. | es-ES |
| dc.description | When the Rational Choice model reveals itself insufficient to explain why parties in judicialized Labor disputes in the Provincia de Buenos Aires prefer to settle over waiting for a final decision, the Prospect Theory provides a sound explanation: as Labor Law and Procedural Rules become applicable, they produce a visible cost-shift to the employer, so parties expect judges to decide in favor of the workers. In this scenario, the employer’s perception of what is to be considered a cost and a benefit become altered, incentivizing her risk-aversion and leading her to bargain settlements that she wouldn’t even consider otherwise. JEL CODE: J23, J81. | en-US |
| dc.description | Lorsque le modèle du choix rationnel se révèle insuffisant pour expliquer pourquoi les parties à des conflits du travail judiciarisés dans la province de Buenos Aires préfèrent régler plutôt qu'attendre une décision finale, la théorie de la perspective fournit une explication solide : à mesure que le droit du travail et les règles de procédure deviennent applicables, ils produire un transfert de coûts visible pour l'employeur, de sorte que les parties s'attendent à ce que les juges tranchent en faveur des travailleurs. Dans ce scénario, la perception de l'employeur de ce qui doit être considéré comme un coût et un avantage est modifiée, ce qui l'incite à aversion pour le risque et l'amène à négocier des règlements qu'elle n'envisagerait même pas autrement. CODE JEL: J23, J81. | fr-FR |
| dc.description | When the Rational Choice model reveals itself insufficient to explain why parties in judicialized Labor disputes in the Provincia de Buenos Aires prefer to settle over waiting for a final decision, the Prospect Theory provides a sound explanation: as Labor Law and Procedural Rules become applicable, they produce a visible cost-shift to the employer, so parties expect judges to decide in favor of the workers. In this scenario, the employer’s perception of what is to be considered a cost and a benefit become altered, incentivizing her risk-aversion and leading her to bargain settlements that she wouldn’t even consider otherwise. JEL CODE: J23, J81. | it-IT |
| dc.description | Quando o modelo da Escolha Racional se revela insuficiente para explicar por que as partes em disputas trabalhistas judicializadas na Província de Buenos Aires preferem se contentar com a espera de uma decisão final, a Teoria da Perspectiva fornece uma boa explicação: à medida que o Direito do Trabalho e as Normas Processuais se tornam aplicáveis, eles produzir uma mudança de custo visível para o empregador, de modo que as partes esperam que os juízes decidam a favor dos trabalhadores. Nesse cenário, a percepção do empregador sobre o que deve ser considerado custo e benefício se altera, incentivando sua aversão ao risco e levando-a a acordos de barganha que ela nem consideraria de outra forma. CÓDIGO JEL: J23, J81. | pt-BR |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador - PUCE: Centro de Publicaciones y Dirección de Investigación | es-ES |
| dc.relation | http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/465/252 | |
| dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2022 Juan Martin Morando | es-ES |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; Núm 13. Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia | es-ES |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ´(Journal Faculty of Jurisprudence); No 13. Faculty of Jurisprudence Magazine | en-US |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; Numéro 13. Magazine de la Faculté de jurisprudence | fr-FR |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; Numero 13. Rivista Facoltà di Giurisprudenza | it-IT |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; Número 13. Revista Faculdade de Jurisprudência | pt-BR |
| dc.source | 2588-0837 | |
| dc.source | 10.26807/rfj.vi | |
| dc.subject | LABOR LAW | en-US |
| dc.subject | labor law | en-US |
| dc.subject | derecho del trabajo | es-ES |
| dc.title | Acuerdos versus sentencias: un análisis de la teoría prospectiva | es-ES |
| dc.title | Settlements v. Judgments: A Prospect Theory Analysis | en-US |
| dc.title | Règlements contre jugements : une analyse de la théorie des perspectives | fr-FR |
| dc.title | Insediamenti v. Sentenze: un'analisi della teoria del prospetto | it-IT |
| dc.title | Acordos vs. Julgamentos: Uma Análise da Teoria Prospectiva | pt-BR |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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