RESUMENEl presente ensayo formula, a partir de mecanismos de corte analítico-estructuralista, un examen concreto sobre la compatibilidad entre la existencia de una regla de reconocimiento, entendida como un mecanismo de identificación de un derecho operativo, con la presencia de principios aplicables al interior de los ordenamientos jurídicos únicamente por su contenido ético-moral. A partir de dicho estudio se proponen claves analíticas que constituyen una nueva vía metodológica para el estudio de los problemas de la filosofía del derecho. Dicha metodología se sustenta en la comprensión renovada de los elementos sociológicos, psicológicos, económicos y políticos que subyacen a los postulados primarios de la teoría ius filosófica, a partir de herramientas propuestas por la escuela estructuralista de la filosofía.
ABSTRACTThis paper introduces, based on analytical-structuralist mechanisms, a concrete examination of the compatibility between the existence of a recognition rule, understood as a mechanism for identifying an operational right, with the presence of principles applicable to the interior of legal systems only for their ethical-moral content. Based on this study, analytical keys are proposed that constitute a new methodological path for the study of the problems of the philosophy of law. This methodology is based on the renewed understanding of the sociological, psychological, economic and political elements that underlie the primary postulates of philosophical ius theory, based on tools proposed by the structuralist school of philosophy.
KEY WORDS: Philosophy of law, mechanisms of identification of law, rule of hartian recognition, moral principles in legal systems, law and structuralism.
JEL CODE / CLASIFICACIÓN JEL: A14, D01
This paper introduces, based on analytical-structuralist mechanisms, a concrete examination of the compatibility between the existence of a recognition rule, understood as a mechanism for identifying an operational right, with the presence of principles applicable to the interior of legal systems only for their ethical-moral content. Based on this study, analytical keys are proposed that constitute a new methodological path for the study of the problems of the philosophy of law. This methodology is based on the renewed understanding of the sociological, psychological, economic and political elements that underlie the primary postulates of philosophical ius theory, based on tools proposed by the structuralist school of philosophy.
KEY WORDS: Philosophy of law, mechanisms of identification of law, rule of hartian recognition, moral principles in legal systems, law and structuralism.
JEL CODE: A14, D01