Desempeño de la defensorí­a pública del Ecuador desde el modelo principal-agente

Gálvez Delgado, René Antonio

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dc.creator	Gálvez Delgado, René Antonio
dc.date	2018-07-09
dc.date.accessioned	2022-03-29T18:53:28Z
dc.date.available	2022-03-29T18:53:28Z
dc.identifier	http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/56
dc.identifier	10.26807/rfj.v1i2.56
dc.identifier.uri	http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/155299
dc.description	RESUMENEn este artículo se efectúa un análisis del desempeño de la defensoría pública del Ecuador con el objetivo de identificar factores administrativos que afectan la eficiencia de esta institución para proponer soluciones que permitan una mejora en su rendimiento ya que, en los últimos años, se ha evidenciado la falta de productividad en este organismo. Esto resulta pernicioso si se considera que de su actuación depende el ejercicio de los Derechos de muchas personas en el país. En este documento, a través de la introducción del modelo principal-agente se explica la trascendencia de los costos de agencia en los resultados de la labor de la defensoría pública, como gestor, y los perjuicios que recibe la ciudadanía como principal. Además, se analizan algunos incentivos para combatir el problema de agencia en instituciones públicas y finalmente, se llega a la conclusión que el desempeño ineficiente de la defensoría pública, radica en un problema estructural de la administración ecuatoriana. ABSTRACTIn this article an analysis of the performance of the public defense of Ecuador is carried out with the objective of identifying administrative factors that affect the efficiency of this institution to propose solutions that allow an improvement in its performance since in recent years there has been a lack of productivity In this body, which is pernicious to consider that the exercise of the rights of many people in the country depends on their actions. In this project, through the introduction of the principal-agent model, the importance of the costs of agency in the results of the work of the public defense, as manager, and the damages that the citizenship receives as principal is explained. Some incentives to combat the problem of agency in public institutions are analyzed and finally the conclusion is reached that the inefficient performance of public defense lies in a structural problem of the Ecuadorian public administration. KEYWORDS: productivity, costs of agency, public defense, administrative litigation, incentive. JEL CODE / CLASIFICACIÓN JEL: L44, L51	es-ES
dc.description	In this article an analysis of the performance of the public defense of Ecuador is carried out with the objective of identifying administrative factors that affect the efficiency of this institution to propose solutions that allow an improvement in its performance since in recent years there has been a lack of productivity In this body, which is pernicious to consider that the exercise of the rights of many people in the country depends on their actions. In this project, through the introduction of the principal-agent model, the importance of the costs of agency in the results of the work of the public defense, as manager, and the damages that the citizenship receives as principal is explained. Some incentives to combat the problem of agency in public institutions are analyzed and finally the conclusion is reached that the inefficient performance of public defense lies in a structural problem of the Ecuadorian public administration. KEYWORDS: productivity, costs of agency, public defense, administrative litigation, incentive. JEL CODE: L44, L51	en-US
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language	spa
dc.publisher	Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador - PUCE: Centro de Publicaciones y Dirección de Investigación	es-ES
dc.relation	http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/56/53
dc.rights	Derechos de autor 2018 Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia RFJ	es-ES
dc.source	Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ´(Journal Faculty of Jurisprudence); No. 2: Journal Faculty of Jurisprudence	en-US
dc.source	Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; Núm. 2: Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia	es-ES
dc.source	Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; No. 2: Revue Faculté de Jurisprudence	fr-FR
dc.source	Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; No. 2: Revista Facoltà di Giurisprudenza	it-IT
dc.source	Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; No. 2: Revista Faculdade de Jurisprudência	pt-BR
dc.source	2588-0837
dc.source	10.26807/rfj.v1i2
dc.subject	productivity	en-US
dc.subject	costs of agency	en-US
dc.subject	public defense	en-US
dc.subject	administrative litigation	en-US
dc.subject	incentive	en-US
dc.subject	productividad	es-ES
dc.subject	costos de agencia	es-ES
dc.subject	defensa pública	es-ES
dc.subject	litigio administrativo	es-ES
dc.subject	incentivos	es-ES
dc.title	Desempeño de la defensoría pública del Ecuador desde el modelo principal-agente	es-ES
dc.title	Performance of the Public Defense of Ecuador from the Principal-Agent Model	en-US
dc.title	Performance de la défense publique de l'Équateur à partir du modèle principal-agent	fr-FR
dc.title	Prestazioni della difesa pubblica dell'Ecuador dal modello principale-agente	it-IT
dc.title	Atuação da Defesa Pública do Equador a partir do Modelo Principal-Agente	pt-BR
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion