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| dc.creator | Marotta-Wurgler, Florencia | |
| dc.date | 2017-12-05 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-29T18:53:26Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-03-29T18:53:26Z | |
| dc.identifier | http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/31 | |
| dc.identifier | 10.26807/rfj.v1i2.31 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/155282 | |
| dc.description | Regulators often address the potential for onesided standard form contracts by requiring extra disclosure of the terms. Despite its ubiquity, for a disclosure regime to be effective, it must increase readership of contracts beyond a nontrivial rate, and, in addition, individuals must be willing to change their decisions conditional on what they read. I follow the clickstream of 47,399 households to 81 Internet software retailers to test whether those who shop for software online are more likely to read the license agreement when it is more prominently disclosed. I find that the degree of disclosure has almost no impact on the rate at which consumers read license agreements. Moreover, those who do read are equally likely to purchase the software product regardless of the onesidedness of the contract. The results suggest that mandating disclosure online is unlikely, on its own, to put pressure on sellers. KEYWORDS: market failures, information disclosure, market, technological products, consumers. JEL CODE: E65, D46 | en-US |
| dc.description | RESUMENLos reguladores a menudo abordan el potencial de los contratos de formulario estándar unilateral requiriendo una divulgación adicional de los términos. A pesar de su ubicuidad, para que un régimen de divulgación sea efectivo, debe aumentar el número de lectores de los contratos más allá de una tasa no trivial, y, además, las personas deben estar dispuestas a cambiar sus decisiones condicionadas a lo que leen. Sigo el flujo de clics de 47,399 hogares a 81 minoristas de software de Internet para probar si quienes compran software en línea son más propensos a leer el acuerdo de licencia cuando se divulga de manera más destacada. Encuentro que el grado de divulgación casi no tiene impacto en la tasa a la que los consumidores leen los acuerdos de licencia. Además, aquellos que sí lo hacen tienen la misma probabilidad de comprar el producto de software, independientemente de la parcialidad del contrato. Los resultados sugieren que exigir la divulgación en línea es poco probable, por sí solo, para presionar a los vendedores. ABSTRACTRegulators often address the potential for onesided standard form contracts by requiring extra disclosure of the terms. Despite its ubiquity, for a disclosure regime to be effective, it must increase readership of contracts beyond a nontrivial rate, and, in addition, individuals must be willing to change their decisions conditional on what they read. I follow the clickstream of 47,399 households to 81 Internet software retailers to test whether those who shop for software online are more likely to read the license agreement when it is more prominently disclosed. I find that the degree of disclosure has almost no impact on the rate at which consumers read license agreements. Moreover, those who do read are equally likely to purchase the software product regardless of the onesidedness of the contract. The results suggest that mandating disclosure online is unlikely, on its own, to put pressure on sellers. KEYWORDS: market failures, information disclosure, market, technological products, consumers. JEL CODE / CLASIFICACIÓN JEL: E65, D46 | es-ES |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.language | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador - PUCE: Centro de Publicaciones y Dirección de Investigación | es-ES |
| dc.relation | http://www.revistarfjpuce.edu.ec/index.php/rfj/article/view/31/25 | |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ´(Journal Faculty of Jurisprudence); No. 2: Journal Faculty of Jurisprudence | en-US |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; Núm. 2: Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia | es-ES |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; No. 2: Revue Faculté de Jurisprudence | fr-FR |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia; No. 2: Revista Facoltà di Giurisprudenza | it-IT |
| dc.source | Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia ; No. 2: Revista Faculdade de Jurisprudência | pt-BR |
| dc.source | 2588-0837 | |
| dc.source | 10.26807/rfj.v1i2 | |
| dc.subject | market failures | en-US |
| dc.subject | information disclosure | en-US |
| dc.subject | market | en-US |
| dc.subject | technological products | en-US |
| dc.subject | fallas del mercado | es-ES |
| dc.subject | divulgación de información | es-ES |
| dc.subject | mercado | es-ES |
| dc.subject | productos tecnológicos | es-ES |
| dc.subject | consumidores | es-ES |
| dc.title | Disclosure as a Mechanism to prevent Market Failure | en-US |
| dc.title | Divulgación como mecanismo para prevenir la falta de mercado | es-ES |
| dc.title | Divulgação como mecanismo para prevenir la falta de mercado | fr-FR |
| dc.title | Divulgazione come meccanismo per prevenire il fallimento del mercato | it-IT |
| dc.title | Divulgação como mecanismo para prevenir falhas de mercado | pt-BR |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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