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The Power of Preferences: Economic Elites and Light Taxation in Mexico

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dc.creator Gabriel Ondetti
dc.date 2017
dc.date.accessioned 2022-03-23T19:20:23Z
dc.date.available 2022-03-23T19:20:23Z
dc.identifier http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=42152785003
dc.identifier.uri http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/115406
dc.description In recent years Mexico has had the lightest tax bur - den in Latin America. Using qualitative, historical analysis, this paper argues that a crucial cause of this phenomenon is the resistance of an exception - ally politically mobilized economic elite, which has resulted in the defeat or dilution of repeated attempts at reform. The intensity of elite resistance reflects, in turn, a strongly anti-state ideology con - structed through conflict with the state, especially during the 1930s. This emphasis on the historical construction of preferences clarifies a central par - adox of the literature on Latin American taxation: the fact that a number of authors agree that elite cohesion and political connections are important, but disagree on whether they hinder or facilitate revenue-raising reform.
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language en
dc.publisher Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
dc.relation http://www.redalyc.org/revista.oa?id=421
dc.rights Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales
dc.source Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales (México) Num.231 Vol.LXII
dc.subject Política
dc.subject Taxation taxes Mexico economic elite
dc.title The Power of Preferences: Economic Elites and Light Taxation in Mexico
dc.type artículo científico


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