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Apportionment Laws and Constitutional Seats: Mathematics vs. Politics

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dc.creator Corres-Illera, María
dc.date 2020-07-01
dc.date.accessioned 2022-03-22T19:56:29Z
dc.date.available 2022-03-22T19:56:29Z
dc.identifier https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259
dc.identifier 10.15446/frdcp.n18.79259
dc.identifier.uri http://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/102534
dc.description Apportionment laws have both mathematical and political components framed by law. In order to conduct an appropriate analysis, it is necessary to examine how apportionment laws are negotiated, passed and turned into legally binding documents. The reason for choosing the United States of America’s current apportionment legislation as the object of this study, is due to the fact that in the process of discussion and passing of said legislation we can observe a great dichotomy between mathematics and politics. While the aim of mathematics is to find the most equitable form of seat apportionment, the political justification for choosing this or another solution will be simply based on furthering political interest. Additionally, in this particular case, the legislative processes are mirrored by academic discussions on the subject matter, that influence the decision-making process. This inquiry also focuses on how constitutional techniques can interfere in the proportional representation system, thus producing an inherent bias in the applied method of apportionment, whichever this may be. These findings can be extrapolated to any modern democracy. en-US
dc.description Las leyes electorales tienen un contenido matemático y político delimitado por el derecho, y para su correcto análisis es necesario examinar cómo se llega a la aprobación de dicha legislación. Para ello, se ha seleccionado la legislación electoral vigente en los Estados Unidos de América como objeto de este estudio, puesto que, en su tramitación parlamentaria, y en el caso que nos concierne, también académica, puede observarse una gran dicotomía entre argumentos matemáticos sobre el reparto más equitativo de escaños, contra explicaciones políticas que justifican la aplicación de otras alternativas para el beneficio de intereses partidistas que, de un modo u otro, forman parte de toda ley electoral. También este estudio se fija en cómo la aplicación de técnicas constitucionales extrapolables a la mayoría de las democracias modernas, con independencia del método de prorrateo escogido para el reparto de escaños de su cámara, suponen una injerencia de la representación igualitaria en la representación proporcional, y por ende producen un sesgo en el método de prorrateo aplicable. es-ES
dc.format text/xml
dc.format application/pdf
dc.language spa
dc.publisher Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Medellín - Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Económicas - Departamento de Ciencia Política es-ES
dc.relation https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259/81421
dc.relation https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259/76734
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dc.rights Derechos de autor 2020 Forum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Política es-ES
dc.rights https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 es-ES
dc.source Forum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Política; No. 18 (2020): July-December, 2020. Migration: Old and New Patterns, Old and New Discourse; 166-195 en-US
dc.source Forum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Política; Núm. 18 (2020): Julio-diciembre de 2020. Migración: viejos y nuevos patrones, viejos y nuevos discursos; 166-195 es-ES
dc.source 2216-1767
dc.source 2216-1775
dc.subject apportionment en-US
dc.subject elections en-US
dc.subject electoral system en-US
dc.subject electoral reform en-US
dc.subject proportional representation en-US
dc.subject democracy en-US
dc.subject participation en-US
dc.subject politics en-US
dc.subject leadership en-US
dc.subject electoral studies en-US
dc.subject electoral laws en-US
dc.subject apportionment methods en-US
dc.subject prorrateo es-ES
dc.subject elecciones es-ES
dc.subject sistema electoral es-ES
dc.subject reforma electoral es-ES
dc.subject representación proporcional es-ES
dc.subject democracia es-ES
dc.subject participación es-ES
dc.subject política es-ES
dc.subject liderazgo es-ES
dc.subject estudios electorales es-ES
dc.subject leyes electorales es-ES
dc.subject métodos de prorrateo es-ES
dc.title Apportionment Laws and Constitutional Seats: Mathematics vs. Politics en-US
dc.title Leyes electorales y escaños constitucionales: matemática vs. política es-ES
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type Estudo de caso es-ES
dc.type Case study en-US


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