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**GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT: SOME ASIAN PATTERNS
AND THE PHILIPPINES' EXPERIENCE**

I CONSIDER IT a rare honor and privilege to participate in this South-South workshop. The great distance that separates our continents prevents us from engaging in as much dialogue and exchange as we probably should and reflect better on the social and intellectual issues facing our countries whether in Latin America, Africa, or Asia. I hope I can do justice to representing an Asian perspective in this workshop but let me say at the outset that the workshop topic itself is quite vast and the Asian region is so diverse that it is not easy to capture and much less to generalize about Asia's experience on the topic at hand.

But allow me to begin first with a few observations about the workshop theme –globalization, democracy and development–, and then proceed to describing some of the patterns regarding these processes as they have unfolded or are unfolding in countries of our (Asian) region. I end my presentation with a somewhat more focused examination of the impact of globalization on the educational profiles of Filipinos and on the nature of their employment and thereby, on the Philippines current state of development.

**GENERAL OBSERVATIONS: GLOBALIZATION, DEMOCRACY
AND DEVELOPMENT**

Most countries and most peoples desire democracy and development. Democratic tendencies or the yearning for freedom are human and

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universal, as are development aspirations to be lifted up from economic backwardness and material want. Beyond these general tendencies and aspirations however, countries differ considerably in their notions and/or concepts of what is democracy and what is development and hence, also in the manner they pursue and express these within their borders. One recalls for example, that some years back, the then Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew forcefully argued that Asian democracies should not be judged by Western values and standards of democracy (which put a premium on personal freedoms) as the region embodies Asian values quite different from the West (e.g., as communitarianism and respect for and deference to government authority). Likewise, countries differ in the importance they put on the preservation of their national cultures and identities while in the process of development, with many adhering to the view that economic progress which erodes native cultures and values or which does not address issues of poverty and social justice is not development at all.

Along with the country-to-country differences and ambiguities in prevailing notions and expressions of democracy and development, is also the tension between the pursuit of democracy and development. In many countries, practices and measures taken to uphold and/or advance democracy do not always redound to development or to the good of the national economy. Some other countries on the other hand, have found it more expedient to put a cap on the so-called “democratic freedoms” while aggressively pushing measures for economic growth and development.

Globalization –taken to mean the complex of changes occurring today owing to improved travel and communications technology and giving rise to transnational flows of goods, services, people, and capital–has opened new spaces for the exchange of local, national and regional experiences and ideas on democracy, development and related social processes beyond the conventional structures and relations set up by governments/nation-states. All these in turn are engendering an ethos of freedom and mobility among countries worldwide, and are exerting pressure on nation-states to open up and liberalize their economic and political systems. Here, we note that given their unique histories and cultures and varying temperaments and circumstances, countries respond differently to globalization pressures and influences.

SOME PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCES IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

Bearing in mind the general observations above, I now turn to some of the patterns that have been cited on how Asian countries have pursued and/or managed their national development objectives as well as their political systems and democracy/democratization goals.

One pattern is exemplified by India and the Philippines, the earliest countries in the region that gained independence from colonial rule and embraced republicanism upon independence. India is reputed as the world's "largest democracy" being the most populous country with a working parliamentary system, while the Philippines too is seen as displaying unique "democratic characteristics", e.g., exhibiting the "freest" press in Asia and being the first country ever to topple a dictatorship by "people power". Both India and the Philippines have pursued national economic development within the framework of their respective constitutions and have chosen a democratic path to development. In previous decades however, both countries were better known for their high rates of poverty and glaring social and economic inequalities that for their economic performance. But recent developments show that India and the Philippines are now benefiting economically from globalization. India in particular is being hailed (together with China) as the world's next economic giant, while the Philippine economy appears to be picking up, growing at higher rates than previously.

Another pattern emerges from the experience of Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan (and to some extent also Thailand). These countries of the region hold the distinction of having rapidly modernized their economies over the last 35 to 40 years and liberated vast numbers of their populations from poverty, under one-party or military government or political system that were less than democratic. Some have pointed to the economic miracle of these countries as countering the liberal notion that rapid economic growth is possible only in a liberal democratic environment, with others in fact arguing that the limitations imposed on individual freedoms and civil rights by authoritarian regimes greatly aided the economic transformation of these countries.

Still another pattern is shown by China and Vietnam, two of the three countries in the region (the third being India) which are making dramatic entries and advances into the global economy or the world market. Both China and Vietnam remain politically communist and continue to curtail individual freedoms but have liberalized and opened up their economies to market forces. Both countries currently exhibit the highest annual GDP growth rates in the region (around 10% for China and 8% for Vietnam in 2005).

In general, country experiences in the region lend support to the proposition that the opening up of national economies to global market forces (through trade liberalization, privatization, opening up of capital accounts, etc.) puts pressure on societies to also liberalize their political systems. Democracy movements pressing for greater freedoms and various human rights therefore, have sprung up in an increasing number

of Asian countries. In recent years, democracy movements have openly erupted into street protests and demonstrations even in Communist China and in other places as South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Indonesia.

Finally, it is interesting to note that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional body composed of 10 countries in the region has been exerting pressure on its members to democratize and pursue free market policies and reforms. Even as ASEAN upholds the principle of non-interference with regard its members' own internal affairs, the alliance is in the process of including in its charter the establishment of a human rights commission for its members. ASEAN, of course, has been more aggressive in pursuing its economic goal of regional integration -and forming itself into a single market and investment and production base- to then negotiate better as a block vis-à-vis China, India, Japan, and other trading partners. For the most part, ASEAN members have moved in concert along economic and political liberalization lines but to date, the alliance has not been as successful in enjoining fellow-members, like Myanmar, to democratize and allow its citizens greater political freedoms.

GLOBALIZATION AND PHILIPPINE DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Against the foregoing regional background, I thought of examining more closely the impact of globalization on the Philippines' attainment of its avowed democratic and development goals and ideals, specifically by looking into how ongoing globalization forces are impinging on the country's employment structure and on the educational profiles of Filipinos.

It should be mentioned that since the mid-1990s, under its last three Presidents, the Philippines has been trying to open up its economy and pursue various "free market" reforms as well as sociopolitical ones, to make the country so-called "globally competitive" (as a place of investments, a trading partner, a supplier of quality goods and services, a tourist destination etc.). It has not been very successful however, in attaining rapid economic growth, and although some observers now think that the Philippines is poised for an economic take-off (and many hope, also for sustainable growth), it continues to grapple with significant problems of poverty and social inequalities. These problems, which have historically beset the Philippines, are also at the root of the country's two major insurgency movements (the communist insurgency led by the New People's Army and the Moro National Liberation Front in Muslim Mindanao) and which are the longest running insurgencies in Asia. Issues arising from the economic divide between the rich and the poor and between the country's major cities and its regions likewise

continue to be used or exploited by military adventurists, politicians, and other groups opposed to government to topple it.

But because Philippine democracy –considered to be among the region’s freest– has had a long history of allowing and upholding human freedoms and civil liberties, it has not been easy for the country’s national leadership to resort to autocratic rule in order to quash insurgencies, and more single mindedly pursue national development goals. Consequently, the Philippine government, then as now, has had to deal with threats to itself and to national political stability. In turn, this lack of political stability is known to have stymied national efforts at economic development and related measures for addressing the country’s poverty and inequality problems. Seen this way, the Philippines desire to consolidate its democratic elements and strengthen its democratic tradition *and* to develop economically and equitably, have remained rather elusive goals.

An examination therefore of some of the employment and education-related data from recent rounds of the country’s Labor Force Surveys (LFS) and Family Income and Expenditure Surveys (FIES) may help us gauge how the Philippines is progressing towards becoming more economically vibrant and egalitarian and more politically stable and democratic.

The employment data in Table 1 are taken from the January 2001 Labour Force Survey (LFS) and are presented by sector or type of industry (e.g. agriculture, fishing and forestry; industry; and services) and by cohort or the decade when members of the labor force were born. One can look at the members of each cohort (e.g., those born in the 1930s vs. those born in the 1960s) as mirroring their time and thus embodying unique histories and biographies. Comparing the employment profiles of older cohorts with those of younger ones should provide us a sense of how the Philippine economy has shifted over time, from being more agrarian and rural-based to being more industrial and modern. Moreover, data on the employment profile of the youngest cohort –those born in the 1970s and aged 22 to 31 years at the time of the survey in January 2001– may be taken to reflect in part current-day globalization influences on employment and the economy.

As expected, we note from Table 1 a significant drop in the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture and a shift of the country’s employment structure to the industry and services sectors over time. While the majority (53%) of older workers (or those born in the 1930s) were engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry work in 2001, only around a fourth (21.8%) of their youngest counterparts (those born in the 1970s) were in similar work. Most of this latter group (56.4% of them) had found employment in industry or services.

Table 1
Philippines: Employed by Decade Born Industry*

INDUSTRY	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	NUMBER
<i>Unemployed</i>	6.1	8.2	5.7	7.6	17.7	2,874,737
Not Elsewhere Classified	1.6	2.4	3.0	3.2	4.0	8,050
<i>Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry</i>	53.2	37.7	32.6	29.0	21.8	9,015,838
Mining and Quarrying	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	113,445
Manufacturing	5.7	7.0	8.6	9.9	11.8	2,704,601
Utilities	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.3	112,652
Construction	2.1	3.9	5.7	6.4	5.4	1,509,187
<i>Industry</i>	8.1	11.6	15.3	17.2	17.9	4,439,885
Wholesale and Retail Trade	17.6	17.2	17.1	16.7	14.6	4,728,589
Transportation, Storage, and Communications	2.2	5.4	7.5	8.5	7.5	2,028,137
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Services	1.7	1.5	2.5	2.9	3.8	800,586
Community, Social, and Personal Services	9.4	15.9	16.2	14.9	12.6	5,007,579
<i>Services</i>	30.9	40.1	43.4	43.0	38.5	12,564,891
Absolute Number	2,547,362	4,103,082	6,630,643	7,585,226	8,037,086	28,903,401

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001

*Includes those born before 1980 only.

That the modernization of the Philippine economy favored more the non-poor than the poor is also readily supported by the data in Tables 2 and 3. Among the non-poor (defined as those belonging to families in the top seven income deciles), the shift in the labor force from agrarian to modern occurred more rapidly than in the general population. By 2001, only some 12.3 percent of the youngest cohort of the non-poor (aged 22 to 31 years) remained in agriculture, with over two-thirds (or 68.7%) of them having found jobs in industry or the services sector. In contrast, among the non-poor (defined as belonging to the lowest 30 income percentiles), the majority of the youngest cohort (53.8%) continued to be found in agriculture, fishing and forestry, with only about a third (33.7%) finding jobs in the modern sector. Further comparing the non-poor and the poor, we

note that the latter consistently exhibits lower unemployment rates across cohorts, testifying to the poor classes' greater need for income and for work.

Table 2
Philippines Non-Poor: Employed by Decade Born Industry***

INDUSTRY	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	NUMBER
<i>Unemployed</i>	6.2	8.9	6.3	8.6	19.0	2,296,733
Not Elsewhere Classified	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	7,539
<i>Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry</i>	45.3	26.7	19.6	16.0	12.3	4,128,943
Mining and Quarrying	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.3	83,021
Manufacturing	5.7	7.7	9.7	11.9	13.7	2,254,893
Utilities	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.4	106,166
Construction	2.3	4.2	6.1	6.4	5.8	1,147,482
<i>Industry</i>	8.4	12.8	17.0	19.6	20.2	3,591,561
Wholesale and Retail Trade	21.7	20.3	20.6	19.4	16.2	3,973,263
Transportation, Storage, and Communications	2.7	6.6	9.1	10.1	8.1	1,699,530
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Services	2.3	1.9	3.3	3.9	4.8	754,860
Community, Social, and Personal Services	13.4	22.7	24.0	22.4	19.4	4,407,352
<i>Services</i>	40.1	51.6	57.0	55.8	48.5	10,835,005
Absolute Number	1,797,199	3,038,789	4,633,464	5,201,428	6,188,899	20,859,780

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000

*Includes those born before 1980 only

**Poor is defined as belonging to the bottom 30 percent of the families in terms of per capita income.

The transformation of the employment structure expectedly came with related improvements in the educational attainment of Filipinos, generally demonstrating the relationship between higher levels of skills, knowledge and education with modern- sector jobs. Mirroring the changes in the country's employment structure, Tables 3, 4 and 5 reveal substantial improvements in educational profiles between the older cohort of workers and their younger counterparts. Of those in the labor force, fewer than 10% of the generation of the 1930s had attained some or completed a college education. Among the youngest 1970s generation on the other hand, the proportion reaching college had quadrupled to 38.4%.

Table 3
 Philippines Poor: Employed by Decade Born Industry^{**}

INDUSTRY	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	NUMBER
Unemployed	6.0	6.0	4.4	5.5	13.4	578,004
Not Elsewhere Classified	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	511
Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry	72.3	69.0	62.7	57.2	53.8	4,886,895
Mining and Quarrying	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	30,424
Manufacturing	5.7	5.0	6.2	5.3	5.6	449,708
Utilities	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	6,487
Construction	1.6	2.9	4.7	6.2	4.1	361,705
Industry	7.5	8.3	11.3	12.0	10.3	848,324
Wholesale and Retail Trade	7.9	8.4	9.0	10.7	9.2	755,326
Transportation, Storage, and Communications	0.8	2.0	3.9	5.1	5.5	328,607
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Services	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	45,726
Community, Social, and Personal Services	5.1	5.9	8.0	8.8	7.0	600,227
Services	14.1	16.6	21.6	25.3	22.4	1,729,886
Absolute Number	750,163	1,064,293	1,997,179	2,383,798	1,848,187	8,043,365

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000

*Includes those born before 1980 only

**Poor is defined as belonging to the bottom 30 percent of the families in terms of per capita income

Again, the improvements in educational levels are most marked among the non-poor. By January 2001, closer to half (46.3%) of the youngest cohort of workers had gone to college as against a much lower 11.6 percent of their poor counterparts. Hence, owing to their much improved educational backgrounds, younger people from the non-poor classes are obviously in a much better position to seize the job opportunities brought about by modernization and further opened up by globalization. In contrast, with only 0.9 percent to 11.6 percent of poor workers of all ages attaining some college education, the poor cannot benefit equally since their lack of skills and education prevents them from competing for the better-paying occupations in the job market.

Table 4
Philippines: Labor Force by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment*

Highest Grade Completed	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	Number
No Schooling	10.0	4.3	2.2	1.6	1.3	802,625
Elementary						
Undergraduate	39.2	25.9	17.6	12.3	8.9	4,877,362
Elementary Graduate	23.5	26.2	22.6	17.0	11.7	5,400,874
High School						
Undergraduate	8.4	9.1	11.9	13.0	12.5	3,374,276
High School Graduate	9.2	14.3	21.2	26.1	27.2	6,394,470
College Undergraduate	3.7	7.8	11.3	14.6	17.5	3,676,261
College Graduate	5.9	12.3	13.2	15.4	20.9	4,373,963
(not classified)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3,570
Total	2,547,362	4,103,082	6,630,643	7,585,226	8,037,086	28,903,401

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001

*Includes those born before 1980 only

Table 5
Philippines: Philippines Non-Poor: Labor Force by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment*

Highest Grade Completed	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	Number
No Schooling	6.8	2.1	1.0	0.7	0.7	309,731
Elementary						
Undergraduate	34.3	19.6	9.9	6.1	4.5	2,269,281
Elementary Graduate	25.0	25.5	19.1	12.6	8.6	3,298,272
High School						
Undergraduate	9.4	9.3	11.7	10.9	10.9	2,236,892
High School Graduate	11.3	17.0	25.0	29.2	28.9	5,187,777
College Undergraduate	5.0	9.9	14.8	18.7	20.3	3,306,647
College Graduate	8.2	16.5	18.5	21.7	26.0	4,247,610
(not classified)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3,570
	1,797,199	3,038,789	4,633,464	5,201,428	6,188,899	20,859,780

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001 and FIES 2000

*Includes those born before 1980 only.

Given the foregoing trends in 2001, there are reasons to expect that ongoing globalization influences on employment and education may

be further worsening the state of the Philippine socioeconomic inequalities in the post 2001 period. This is so because at present, the occupational category that is registering dramatic increases in employment is that of “financial, real estate and business services” as a result of the great demand for call center services and employees in the Philippines. While there were only four call centers operating in the country in 2003 and employing some 2,000 workers, the industry has since grown phenomenally to more than 100 call centers in 2006 employing 200,000 personnel.

Seeing the potential of this “sunrise industry”, the private sector and the government are now devising and fast-tracking programs to increase the Philippines’ competitiveness in call center and business process outsourcing (BPO) operations. To push the industry forward, local and foreign businesses and investors and government are moving to expand IT outsourcing jobs to beyond the usual customer care and medical transcription services being done in the country at present, to include other IT work in administration, accounting and finance, and human resources and consulting work for various commercial firms and government clients. The next few years therefore will likely witness a surge in employment opportunities for Filipinos in IT-enabled services which in turn are known to require not only a college degree but high levels of proficiency in English (and other foreign languages) and computer operations.

The bright job prospects in IT work then, will once more favor (younger) Filipinos from richer or non-poor households who are able to obtain college degrees and train in the skills required by call centers and BPOs. With less than a college education, most of the poor will not be able to penetrate this sector and benefit from global IT outsourcing businesses. Already, in 2001, a full 50 percent of employees in the “finance, real estate and business services” category to which call centers and BPOs belong, were college graduates - making this employment category the most demanding of education and skills preparation.

The other employment area in the Philippines that has been affected most by globalization developments is overseas work/employment, statistics of which are maintained separately from those of the national/domestic labor force. As is widely known, the Philippines is one of the world’s largest exporter of labor and in 2005, close to 8 million Filipinos were estimated to be working/living overseas. The predilection of Filipinos to work abroad has its roots in the country’s migration history which began 100 years ago and which peaked in the 1960s as a result of the liberalization of US immigration laws, and then again in the 1980s, following the construction and development boom in the Middle East. Since then, there has been no let up in the numbers of Filipinos leaving the country for temporary or permanent work abroad.

The continuing demand for foreign workers in the world (particularly among developed countries, the Middle East and rapidly industrializing China) has also diversified Filipino overseas labor migration, so that today, Filipino workers and immigrants are found in all world regions (from Africa to Oceania) and in almost all countries. In terms of occupations too, while waves of Filipino worker migration earlier consisted of agricultural and plantation workers to Hawaii and the US West Coast, nurses and doctors to the US, maids and entertainment workers to Hong Kong and Japan, and construction and domestic workers to the Middle East, recent waves include not only all these, but increasingly also computer programmers, pilots, sales and marketing people, managers, teachers, accountants and other professionals. One notes that this diversification trend also suggests that overseas employment, very much like employment in call centers and BPOs in the country is becoming more selective of Filipinos with high educational attainment.

That such is the case can be seen from the data in Tables 6 and 7 which show that the job requirements for overseas employment favor the younger cohorts (i.e., those born in the 1960s and 1970s) and those with higher educational attainments (at least a high school graduate but more often, a college graduate). It is of course the younger cohorts who also exhibit the highest educational attainments and so they are the most ready and able to migrate. More than two-thirds of the youngest (1970s) generation of Filipino overseas workers have attained some college education or graduated from college.

Table 8
Overseas Contract Workers by Decade Born*

Decade born	No.	% share
30s	15,219	1.4
40s	71,300	6.6
50s	255,694	23.7
60s	375,145	34.7
70s	363,678	33.6
Total	1,081,036	100.0

Source: Labor Force Survey January 2001

*Includes those born before 1980 only

**The figures do not include permanent emigrants,

***Tan (2006) puts the figures of temporary overseas workers at

4.5 M which is a way above the figure here from the LFS.

Table 9
Overseas Contract Worker by Decade Born by Highest Educational Attainment

Highest Grade Completed	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	Total
No Schooling	1.5	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Elementary Undergraduate	0.8	1.5	1.6	1.0	0.3	0.9
Elementary Graduate	28.2	8.9	4.9	3.1	2.3	4.0
High School Undergraduate	0.0	5.3	5.2	6.3	4.5	5.3
High School Graduate	41.3	29.9	30.6	27.2	24.5	27.5
College Undergraduate	4.7	20.4	27.1	28.4	30.4	27.9
College Graduate	23.5	34.1	30.5	33.7	38.0	34.3
(not classified)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001

*Includes those born before 1980 only

Table 10
Overseas Contract Workers by Poverty Status by Highest Educational Attainment

Highest Grade Completed	Poor	% share	Non-poor	%share	No.	% share
No Schooling	1,002	2.6	1,036	0.1	2,038	0.2
Elementary Undergraduate	3,768	9.7	9,077	0.9	12,845	1.2
Elementary Graduate	3,589	9.3	39,829	3.8	43,418	4.0
High School Undergraduate	5,500	14.2	56,941	5.5	62,441	5.8
High School Graduate	11,303	29.2	283,246	27.2	294,549	27.2
College Undergraduate	9,506	24.6	291,704	28.0	301,210	27.9
College Graduate	4,030	10.4	360,181	34.6	364,212	33.7
(not classified)	0	0.0	323	0.0	323	0.0
Total	38,698	100.0	1,042,338	100.0	1,081,036	100.0
% share in total migrant workers	3.6		96.4		100.0	

Source: Labor force Survey January 2001

*Includes those born before 1980 only

Since overseas work is selective of those with much education and skills, it is also not surprising that the country's overseas contract workers disproportionately come from families that are not poor. Table 7 shows the educational profile of Filipino overseas workers to be

much better than the national education profile of Filipino in-country workers cohort by cohort; and Table 8 shows that only a minimal 3.6 percent of overseas contract workers come from poor families (or the bottom 30% income-wise) while the overwhelming 96.4 percent majority are from non-poor families.

Income from overseas worker remittances has been increasing (amounting to some \$10.7 billion or the equivalent of half the national budget in 2005) but they evidently go to non-poor families. Remittances from overseas employment therefore cannot be expected to alleviate the poverty conditions in the country, and this in fact, may be exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequalities.

In summary, this brief look into the impact of globalization on Philippine development and democracy reveals emerging trends that seem to be uplifting the national economy, although not always in ways that also adequately address issues on poverty and inequalities. As mentioned earlier, these issues along with bureaucratic ineptitude, poor governance, and graft and corruption, have historically threatened democratic practices and institutions in the Philippines.

Nonetheless, after years of economic stagnation and uncertainty since the Martial Law years in the 1980s, the Philippines' currently improving prospects for economic recovery and sustained growth may yet help the country solve its age-old economic and political problems. At this point, the national effort should perhaps focus on:

- raising further the economic growth rate beyond the 4% to 5% per annum mark and sustaining higher rates of growth in coming years. For economic growth to contribute to poverty reduction, the experience in other Asian countries indicates that annual growth rates in GNP should be in the order of 8 or more percent;
- mobilizing the new income or wealth that is created (e.g. as improving worker income and remittances from among the non-poor classes of Philippine society) for raising savings and investments rates and supporting businesses and enterprises that can generate new and additional jobs for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy;
- and aggressively pursuing social and economic programs and affirmative actions in favor of the poor, as among others, and investing more in agricultural-rural infrastructure and development will generate more jobs and livelihood opportunities in agriculture and the countryside where the poor are found. In-

vesting more in programs and/or areas to improve the access of children and the youth from poorer families to basic education and to other forms of training will also improve their ability to land jobs and compete in the labor market.