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The African Crisis and the Political Economy of Development

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Introduction

This paper examines Africa's recalcitrant development dilemma- its origins and the complete oscillation of stratagems that have been evolved to resolve it. The paper addresses the underlying intellectual arguments that directly informed policy prescriptions from the Import Substitution Industrialization strategies of the Sixties to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the prevailing New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) initiative. The paper then discusses the confluence of the two traditions in what is known in development parlance as *development partnerships*, arguing that this is in part a reflection and offshoot of extant global balance of power.

Origins of the Crisis

A motley of reasons and origins have been adduced for the crisis of development in Africa, varying from socio-political to techno-economic factors. To be sure, Africa's economic and subsequently socio-political decline was sparked by the agrarian crisis of the late Seventies. The first post-independence decade was generally speaking a prosperous one for Africa but the crisis in agricultural production that resulted in rising food import bills, acute food shortages and increasing dependence on food aid precipitated the decline of the continent. The oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 and the resultant global economic depression then exacerbated the situation. What eventually brought Africa to the nadir of economic misery and hopelessness was the debt problem that ensued from initial borrowings of recycled petrodollars to finance African budgets, especially unrevised import bills. Onimode classifies Africa's development experience into two broad periods, the pre-crisis period of up to the mid Seventies and the crisis period of the late Nineties and the adjustment years of 1980 and beyond (Onimode, 1993).

But why exactly did the African crisis ensue and why did it deepen instead of stopping? Some have cited the nature and character of the post-independent African elite and urban class as a major cause. This class was not only *praetorian*[1] but it was also predatory, lacked vision and was totally ideologically bankrupt. Its disjuncture and aloofness from the rest of the populace set Africa on the path of self-destruction from very early on (Fanon 1967, Onimode 1988, Ake 1987, 1996, Dudley 1973, 1982, Abubakar 1989, Arrighi and Saul 1968).

Whereas Onimode identified the 'ideological vacuum' of the emergent post-colonial hegemonic class, arising from what he called 'fears of revolutionary pressures', Abubakar (1989) alludes to '…the wrong way the African power

1 A term first invented by Billy Dudley. (1982).

elite perceived independence and the resulting way in which they managed their economies and society'. Ake's vituperations and indictment of the political elite is however by far bolder and more acidic:

> The ideology of development was exploited as a means of reproducing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any purpose as a framework for economic transformation (Ake 1996).

As far as Ake was concerned, the immediate post-independence political class all over Africa paid only lip service to the cause of socio-economic emancipation of the continent, for them, development was only a favourite charade.

However, the sociological-ideological roots of the African crisis are not often considered as salient as the economic dimensions. As the apparent elite-mass disconnection of most post-colonial African societies was damaging and in spite of the overbearing and repressive nature of political power, which engendered what Onimode refers to as a culture of 'silence and passivity', precluding the public debate of national issues; it is the strictly economic matter that dominates the discourse of the origins of the African crisis.

The substantive causes of the African crisis are best addressed by an eclectic approach; methodologies which simply trace an allegory of the very polemical debate and attempt impassioned pontification, not only concludes with a jaundiced narrative but oftentimes fail to synthesise the arguments of the contending traditions. Furthermore, according to Sutcliffe, a non-multidisciplinary, non cross-cultural approach risks missing out 'important aspects of their origins and also fail to understand their specific nature' (Sutcliffe 1986 p20).

What follows presently is an analysis of the intellectual debate as to the origins/ causes of Africa's development dilemma and the contrasting policy prescription arising from the different traditions and articulation of the valid aspects of the contending arguments.

Two Traditions and Trends in Africa's Developmental Process.

The precise period of Africa's most recent impasse would seem to be the late 70s – early 80s as a series of negative developments seemed to coalesce in this period- reverse democratic waves, retard growth, decline commodity prices/ trade and national incomes etc., it can therefore be safely assumed Africa never recovered from the first oil shock of 1974/75. Moreover, the healthy growth rates recorded by African economies suddenly vanished and the golden decade of commodity export evaporated with the emergence of black gold. At about this time also, emigration from the continent in search of greener pastures became increasingly attractive.

Several explanations have been supported for Africa's socio-economic quagmire but these can be broadly grouped into two traditions, exogenous-liberal and endogenous-riposte theories. The former tradition is composed of western analytic and prescriptive discourse of the African crisis and apart from being churned out by scholars and observers mainly from the North, it is marked by its ahistoricity, static methodology, eurocentrism and it is invariably teleological. (Barongo: 1983, Toyo: 1983). Barongo especially affirms that these theories refuse to press their enquiries beyond the confines of Africa and were therefore static.

This school according to Mkandawire is:

> …characterized by the casualness with which assertions… are made, and the deterministic and aprioristic nature of the discourse rarely based on analysis of the actual experiences, but merely on first principles, ideological conviction or faith (Mkandawire 1998: 2)

Another very important feature of exogenous narratives of the African crisis is the penchant for its diagnosis to hold Africa totally or at least primarily responsible for the predicament of underdevelopment, i.e. these accounts tend to exonerate non-African actors, especially the mechanism of international economic relations as partially culpable for the African crisis. The vintage relic of this school is probably the World Bank 1981 *Towards Accelerated Development In Africa* otherwise known as the Berg report, which is considered obnoxious throughout Africa but which became the pivot for western and multilateral policy formulation towards Africa and was the immediate progenitor of SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs).

On the other hand, endogenous theories were developed by scholars from South Africa and Latin America especially and developed as reactions to earlier metropolitan scholarship. These riposte theories, especially the earliest ones being little more than angry retorts, were as deficient as the liberal models. In their unbridled radicalism, they laid the blame for Africa's underdevelopment squarely at the steps of the international system and international capital ignoring the obvious detrimental contributions of local factors. This position, however, was progressively revised with the introduction of the argument of culpability of the domestic capital (*comprador*) class in its collaboration with the capitalists of Europe and America epitomized by Raul Prebisch's Centre-Periphery analysis. A further revision of the endogenous models emerged in the argument of the new political economists, who pointed out the grievous neglect by earlier works of class formation and the role of the social relations of production on the African crisis.

Balanced accounts that have not been skewed by ideological prejudice are beginning to emerge (e.g. Mkandawire/ Soludo [1999] and Arrighi [2002]). The essence of the foregoing is to presently demonstrate that there is a solid mechanistic connection between the different developmental paradigms that have been adopted and the ideological interpretation of the African crisis, i.e. developmental strategies proceeded directly from the diagnostic discourse of the crisis. Thus, the western liberal concepts which tend to view the roots of the developmental dilemma totally endemic to Africa have produced blueprints which emphasize domestic readjustments, reconstruction and re-strategizing. The Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are some examples. According to Arrighi, these 'internalist' models, typified by the Berg Report, argue that the African crisis ensued because African governments and elites:

> undermined the process of development by destroying agricultural producers' incentives to increase output and exports. Overvalued national currencies, neglected peasant agriculture, heavily protected manufacturing industries and excessive state intervention. (Arrighi 2002: p2)

The solutions proffered included:

> Substantial currency devaluations, the dismantling of industrial protection, price incentives for agricultural production and exports and the substitution of a private enterprise for a public one—not just in industry but also in the provision of social services. (Arrighi, ibid.)

On the other hand, African and Southern models claimed that Africa's predicament originated from the asymmetrical international capitalist regime, for instance the preamble to the LPA reads inter alia:

> The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed, instead of resulting in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have

made it stagnate and become *more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises experienced by the industrialized countries*.(Emphasis added)

These assessments have inspired developmental paradigms that seek international economic realignment and put the onus for readjustments on western powers. They have at various times canvassed for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), for repudiation or reconstruction of the Breton Woods Institutions, renegotiation of UNCTAD and WTO trading arrangements, greater capital flows, ODAs and DFIs to Africa, debt cancellation/ condonation, abrogation of government subsidies for western farmers, greater access for African manufactures in the markets of the North, better commodity pricing etc.

An Excursus of Africa's Economic Policies and Stratagems

The earliest economic strategy progeny of neo-liberal intellectualism, which received the widest patronage from the new states, embraced at some point or the other by most developing countries, was the Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and Export Promotion or Export-led Growth.
ISI was aimed at fostering a national economy fairly independent from the rest of the world, it was, however, not a de-linking strategy only to reduce the import of finished goods, whilst concentrating on plants and equipment. The growth of the national economy was to be sustained by the expansion of the domestic market, because at the initial stages, industries would be adequately protected against external competition and production would initially be for the home market.

ISI was also supposed to engender the conservation of foreign exchange that would otherwise have been spent on banned imports, which are afterwards diverted to local investments. A component of the strategy was the imposition of a relatively high tariff wall or total restrictions on imported substitutes to domestic manufacture.

Krueger explains that a variety of factors induced the preference for this strategy in developing countries. According to her, the infant industry argument- that an economic activity with perceived external economies on the long run could be incubated from competition in the formative years provided the developing world 'a rationale for imposing high levels of protection for domestic manufacturing industries' irrespective of whether the case was valid or simply motivated by a desire to industrialise and be self-sufficient. In her opinion, the other conditions that dictated the choice of ISI were the pessimism arising from the Great Depression due to the in-elasticity of the prices of commodity products and Arthur Lewis' theory of surplus labour[2]. Lewis (1954) assumed that developing countries needed to raise their profits from national incomes in order to develop and that this was only possible through industrialisation. Industrialisation in these societies in turn could only survive through protection.

The Harrod-Domar model was also influential in the choice of these strategies. Roy Forbes Harrod an Oxford economist and his Swedish counterpart, E.D. Domar advocated a growth theory linking income, savings and investment. The implication for African and developing countries in general was that their lack of growth was as a result of poor incomes, which resulted in poor savings and led to poor investment. Therefore, in order to grow these states needed to boost their incomes, the levels of their savings and consequently investments.

Export promotion strategy was contrived to create a specialised role in the global economy for the developing country. The developing economy was encouraged to concentrate attention and resources in the area of the world economy

2 Krueger, A. Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press, 1993).

where it had the greatest comparative advantage. If properly implemented the strategy was supposed to generate considerable inflow of foreign capital.

Both of these strategies failed to foster the economic growth envisaged by African governments for many reasons. Firstly, there was too much emphasis on capital-intensive activities and basic industries such as chemical and especially agro-allied industries were neglected, the result was that there was often no backward and forward economic linkage. The strategies were very dependent on importation of especially equipment and spare parts. In the case of Import substitution, success was limited by internal demand and the 'narrow domestic base' as ISI tended to focus on the urban centres, an additional detriment of this was the massive rural-urban drift to most African cities. Furthermore, there was a huge need of limited foreign exchange to drive the strategy.

In his assessment of ISI Turok makes the following observations:

> There has been relatively little utilisation of local materials in the total production process and therefore, little savings in foreign exchange…. Perhaps the biggest failure of the policy has been the failure to develop linkages backwards and forwards between agriculture and the rest of the productive economy[3].

In the case of Nigeria, ISI was preferred rather than other strategies such as Export Promotion and Basic Needs, but the implementation of the strategy achieved only ephemeral success and remarkable failure to transform the Nigerian economy into the fairly self sufficient model that was imagined, even in food production. The major features of Nigeria's Import substitution, which is typical of most sub-Saharan African countries include the Nigerianisation of labour in the final stages of production, setting up local Assembly Plants to ostensibly make substantially finished products, packaging and licence manufacture[4]. Both ISI and Export Promotion were huge failures in Africa and probably everywhere else, except in South East Asia, where they were implemented with grievous syncretism to the classical theory and the principles of free international trade in general. For instance, the infant industry rationale was exploited to the point of making the Asian Tiger economies totally closed to the rest of the world and of promoting export-led growth. Local manufactures, which were inferior to global standard, were produced at exorbitant, non-competitive costs by inefficient labour and technology and were hugely subsidised to below world market prices and exported as cheaper brands. This sort of sharp practice, anomalous as it was, was condoned and ignored by the North.

The successor policies to the failed ISI and Export Promotion strategies, in part dictated by a Marxist scholarship, were the Basic Needs and 'redistribution with growth' models. Both were short-lived and applied in subservience to the dominant neo-liberal paradigms.

The policy-based lending of the 1980s and early 1990s marked the next significant phase of policy prescriptions and adoption in Africa. There were two components; the IMF program was known as Stabilisation Policies and the World Bank's as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The difference between the programs is that while the former was aimed at reducing short-term dis-equilibrium, especially budget deficits, balance of payments deficits and inflation, the latter was devised to restructure economies towards greater efficiency in the medium term[5]. These sets of policies represent the compre-

3 Turok, B. What Can Be Done? (London: Zed Books Ltd.,1987) p15.

4 See Graf, W. The Nigerian State: Political Economy, Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era. (Portsmouth: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1988).

5 Stewart, F., Lall, S. and Wangwe, S. Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: Macmillan, 1992) pp4-5.

hensive prescription of the North for development in the LDCs, a World Bank program is hardly implemented without an IMF program already in place.

The avowed objectives of World Bank Adjustment programs include:

i. Reduction in the size and better financial performance of the public sector.
ii. Improving the efficiency of resource utilisation in the economy, promotion of domestic savings in both public and private sectors.
iii. Trade liberalisation and dismantling of artificial tariff walls, etc. This must be pursued in tandem with export promotion, institutional support and incentives for export/ exporters.
iv. Institutional reforms and elimination of price distortions in various sectors of the economy[6].

According to Gana, "the main features of the Structural Adjustment Program are well known", they include:

a. Adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy
b. Rationalisation and restructuring of tariffs
c. Strengthening of demand management policies
d. Adopting measures to stimulate domestic production and to broaden the supply base of the economy
e. Adoption of appropriate pricing policies
f. Commercialisation and/or privatisation of government para-state
g. De-regulation of the economy through the reduction/elimination of complex administrative controls, with greater reliance on market forces
h. Increased trade and payment liberalisation[7]

According to Adedeji, 'Because of their excruciating debt servicing obligations and the near-permanent need to have them rescheduled, they (African countries) … abandoned their own developmental strategy in favour of SAPs, seeing these programs as the price to be paid for a sympathetic hearing from their creditors' (Adedeji ibid. p138).

stabilisation and SAPs have been variously denounced not only in Africa but the Third World as a whole. The greatest deficiency of these liberal prescriptions is their grievous neglect of the political context of Africa, where socio-economic problems especially thrive and have deep roots. A strictly economic recipe could only produce a cosmetic and very short-term relief, which disguises more fundamental structural problems; temporary reprieves purchase time and diverts attention whereas the structural dislocations and distortions get more complicated.

On Malawi notes, Harrigan stated that 'a significant sustained macro-economic improvement failed to materialise because the SAL (Structural Adjustment Loan) program refused to deal with fundamental structural requirements"[8].

Generally, these programs are regarded as the kinds of programs destined to fail in a social context like Africa's and the whole of the South or Third World for that matter. Firstly, the programs are not identified with the aspirations and goals of Africa, the emphasis was on short-term financial symmetry and concern was for the stability of the international system. Onimode submits that, 'even if these programs succeeded in meeting their own performance targets, we would

6 Stewart et al. op. cit. pp6-7, AAF-SAP p17.

7 Gana, A. *Reflections on the Structural Adjustment Program* in Olaniyan, R.O & Nwoke, C. (eds.) (1989).

8 Harrigan, J. *Malawi* in Moseley, P., Harrigan J. and Toye, J. Aid And Power, Volume 2 (London, New York: Routledge, 1991) pp201-264.

still regard them as having failed, because they have not satisfied the objectives that African countries have set for themselves'[9].

The most reiterated critique of SAP was its prescription by the 'mad doctor' as an elixir for all ailments and all peoples, the program did not take into account the specificities in the experiences of sometimes vastly different economic formations, whether it was Argentina or Burundi, India or tiny Togo, the prescription was the same.

Olukoshi observed the Bretton Woods duo continued to be impenitent even after it became obvious SAPs had failed woefully, 'blaming implementational slippages by African countries and less in questioning the validity of the assumptions that underpinned the adjustment package in the light of the observed reality' (Olukoshi, 1999, p3).

The linear policy successor to the SAPs is the extant New Partnership for Africa's Development Framework, introduced in 2002.

The avowed objective of the initiative is basically to tackle poverty all over the continent by promoting economic growth, NEPAD is also committed to pursuing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The initiative reckons that by achieving an average growth rate of 5% continent-wide, poverty levels would be stabilized for up to 2015 and that, by achieving an average growth rate of 7% it would be halved by the same time. Analyses of the NEPAD strategy are already robust and still burgeoning, in less than four years of its launch, it must be the second most popular subject of African social science research in the past fifteen years or so after the SAPs. For our present purposes, a comprehensive assessment of NEPAD is not required, but suffices to say that:

> Whilst the overall vision and goals of NEPAD are very commendable, copious aspects of the initiative and principally its philosophy and assumptions are severely flawed, … it needs to be stated that the blueprint is unlikely to take Africa through the woods to the path of sustainable development[10].

Mbaye[11] refers to NEPAD as 'repackaged SAP', Olukoshi remarks it bears uncanny semblance to the 'political conditionalities and governance reforms of Western donors'[12] and Muammar Ghadaffi calls it 'a racist tool of neo-colonialists'.

The first comprehensive and well articulated African blueprint for development is known as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), it was adopted by the OAU Heads of States and Governments second extraordinary meeting at Lagos, Nigeria in April 1980. LPA continues to be the benchmark for indigenous development policy formulation in Africa, the strategy is especially notable for its call for a sustainable, self-reliant and long-term development strategy. LPA lists Africa's long-term development objectives as:

a. the alleviation of mass poverty and the improvement of people's standard of living
b. self-sustained development
c. national and regional self-reliance

9 Onimode, B. (ed.) Alternative Development Strategies For Africa, Volume 1: Coalition for Change (London: Institute For African Alternatives, 1990) p48.

10 Aderemi, A. (2004) *The Post-Bipolarity, Terrorism And Interpretations For Africa* (paper presented at the AISA-DPMF Conference on Africa & Global Governance in The Aftermath of 9/11, UN Conference Centre, Addis Ababa, December 6-7, 2004).

11 Mbaye, S. (2002) NEPAD: The Wrong Plan? In West Africa Issue 4333, 8th 14th July, pp29-31.

12 Olukoshi, A. (2002) Governing The African Development Process: The Challenge of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Unpublished paper delivered at Nigeria Institute for International Affairs, July.

The salient features of LPA are as follows:

The Final Act of Lagos (FAL) was an adjunct to LPA. It strongly urged sub-regional economic co-operation and integration. FAL incorporates clear suggestions for regional integration and proposed the establishment of an African Community by the year 2000.

Since LPA there have been several colloquia on fine tuning or reviewing the implementation of LPA; the significant ones being APPER (1986), UNPAAERD (1986) and AAF-SAP (1989). AAF-SAP is central to any contemporary discussion of development strategies in Africa; it was put together under the auspices of ECA.

A critical study of AAF-SAP reveals an in-depth appreciation of the historical, socio-political and economic milieu within which the development dilemma is situated. The theme of 'Adjustment with Transformation' is an apt summation of the main complaint of the document about orthodox policies- African development and growth need not be sacrificed for short term fiscal and monetary stability.

The essential features of African political economy, detailed by the resolution, have been restated accurately elsewhere as 'deep-seated disarticulation or distorted structural linkages, lopsided development, excessive external dependence, undue reliance on exchange activities, lack of democracy and social tension'[13]. The framework concludes that, 'one principal corollary of this structural reality of the African economy is that left to itself, it has an inherent tendency to generate crises from within and to assimilate others from abroad'[14].

The fivefold strategy proposed by AAF-SAP is based on three *macro-entities,* namely:

i. The operative forces, i.e. the overall African atmosphere: political, economic, scientific, technological factors; environmental, cultural and sociological aspects. These could be positive or negative, internal or external, permanent or temporary
ii. Available resources including human and natural resources, domestic savings and external financial resources and
iii. The needs to be elaborated: these are the vital (basic) goods and services and the ability to acquire them[15].

The strategies of the framework are as follows:

a. committed pursuit of human centred and self-sustaining development
b. transformation of the African economy from an exchange to a production economy
c. democratisation of the development process through popular participation and accountability in public affairs
d. vigorous mobilisation of domestic resources and the revamping of institutions
e. serious and vigorous pursuit of regional economic integration[16].

A Synthesis of Paradigms- The Development Partnership Era

The introduction of NEPAD marks a watershed in the annals of development thinking and planning in Africa. Several other partnership models have been

13 Onimode, B. A Future For Africa: Beyond the Politics of Adjustment (London: Earthscan, 1992) p78.

14 ECA op. cit. p28.

15 Ibid. pp26-27.

16 Onimode, B. (1992) p79.

enunciated on the continent[17], reflecting the 'globalization' regime of the world economy but it is the celebrated inauguration of NEPAD both domestically in Africa and in the North by the G8 that heralds the new era of development planning in Africa. The deal was for Africa to own responsibility both for its recalcitrant crisis and development dilemma and also to take pole position in its resolution by pledging to good governance which among others imply democratic political systems, accountability and disciplined administration of state power. They must adopt market economies and stem corrupt practices, promoting investment-friendly economic climates. On its part, Africa's development partners will provide both technical and financial assistance to ensure sustainable development and specifically achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The operational framework for implementing the partnerships, however, differ; Cotonou Agreement for instance adopts what is referred to as Economic Partnership Agreements.

It emerged in the throes of the massive socio-political and economic reconfiguration of the continent and marked the era of development partnerships in a formal and definitive sense. However, to make sense of this new confluence of strategies, the development must be located within the context of international political economy and its abruptly nuanced analysis in the post-bipolarity balance of power.

Conclusions

The post-cold war period had a significant impact on Africa, which was positive and negative. The first one was what Huntington has referred to as the Third Wave, the massive re-democratization of the continent, the abrogation of prolonged military rule in Nigeria and the disassembly of apartheid in South Africa. This process also includes the dubious mutation of the uniformed military autocrats to civilian dictators in several African countries. This development led to the emergence of a more progressive and rather determined body of African political leadership, including Presidents Obasanjo, Bouteflika, Mbeki and Wade in Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa and Senegal respectively. All of these emerged between 1998 and 1999; Kofi Anan also emerged in the same period as Secretary–General of the United Nations.

The major signposts of the new global dawn- the collapse of the Soviet Union, the re-unification of the two Germany states, amazing techno-biological breakthroughs and the implosion of financial capital all paved the way for the emergence of the United States as a global colossus of almost unprecedented dominion, the resultant of this again was the emergence of capitalism and democracy as the universally dominant market and political ideologies in respective terms.

Africa suffered from the demise of the USSR in two ways, namely:

The loss of bargaining leverage against the neo-liberal North and secondly, through the loss of mainly Official Development Assistance now deployed to the new CIS states of the former Eastern bloc or what is better known as aid fatigue.

This is the context for the emergence of development partnerships, the NEPAD initiative is denounced severally as a capitulation to Northern neo-liberalism but, being so strategically and financially weakened, Africa was in no position to dictate the terms of engaging with the North especially if the relationship was still one of donor-recipient.

Will development partnerships deliver for Africa whereas both endogenous and exogenous models have failed? There is little evidence to summon in sup-

17 Cotonou Agreement, the Tokyo International Conference on Africa's Development (TICAD), US´ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are subsisting models of development partnerships.

port of the general rhetoric of development partnerships; the brief history in fact indicates the contrary. Since 2002, it has become a ritual for African leaders, especially the foursome helmsmans of the NEPAD- Obasanjo, Bouteflika, Mbeki and Wade to attend every G8 summit, but in spite of lavish financial pledges, little redemption of these commitments have taken place. Secondly, partnership development agreements are little more than ploys to gain strategic advantages in Africa by the contending major economic powers, sometimes illegitimately. AGOA for instance was supposed to facilitate access for African manufacture, in particular textiles, into the American market through massive tariff concessions but this was already supposed to have been covered by the WTO phasing out of Multi-Fibre Agreements beginning from January 2005, a concession for the endorsement of Trade-Related Intellectual Properties (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). EPAs on their part tie ODAs to the privileged access for their exports to the markets of their lesser development partners contrary to the spirit of multilateral trade. On current trend, therefore, development partnerships may not meet the developmental aspirations of Africa.

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