DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW

Cultural Practices and Grassroots Initiatives in Indonesia

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DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW. CULTURAL PRACTICES AND GRASSROOTS INITIATIVES IN INDONESIA

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INITIATIVES IN INDONESIA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ABOUT THE REPORT

This is a final report of a research project titled 'Democracy From Below: cross-cultural community's initiatives of post-disaster recovery in Indonesia'. This report tries to answer the existing pessimism of democratization in developing countries especially post-the fall down of authoritarian regimes, which turn to create the corrupt governments. This report criticizes current approach that stresses on the promotion of official democracy, but lacks attention to grassroots democracy. Meanwhile, it is clear that grassroots community has potential to be the agent of democratization. Direct observation in two disaster-prone areas in Indonesia reveals that in spite of the hardship of social relationship, there is still space for the community from different social backgrounds to develop democratic culture. The two communities' experiences show us that democracy could live in a very simple way. It is not just of those that are established in public offices. It could live within the grassroots community's daily life. It could present everywhere, in everyday life and in any form. Even, democracy in daily life could be an answer for the stagnancy of democracy in office. This report asserts that community in grassroots level is not a passive actor of democracy that always depends on the political system in supra-structure. Through their cultural and social practices, they could be an active agent that plays crucial roles in the promotion of

democracy.

The report is based on a field research conducted in two disaster-prone areas in Indonesia, namely Sleman, Yogyakarta Province and Padang, West Sumatra Province. In Sleman the fieldwork was focused on Kaliurang, while in Padang it was focused on Chinatown (locally called Pondok). Kaliurang, Sleman, is identical with Javanese culture, while Padang, West Sumatra is identical with Minangkabau culture. The field research tried to elaborate community's experience in dealing with the issues of diversity and differences during the periods of post-disaster recovery. In Sleman, research was focused on Kaliurang and its surrounding villages near Merapi Volcano that becomes one of the prominent tourism destinations in the Province. In Padang, research was focused around Pondok (Chinatown) that becomes the center of economy in the area.

These two areas were chosen because they have different characteristics of society. Kaliurang and its surroundings are rural, while Pondok is urban. Kaliurang depends on farming and volcano tourism, while Padang depends on trading. As Javanese, people in Kaliurang are generally known to be syncretic in their religious belief, while Minangkabau is known to be a strict Moslem. Yet, communities in both areas have similarities in terms of ability to deal with the issues of diversity and differences arose in the midst of recovery processes. They use their daily cultures in that matter. Kaliurang community uses *gotong royong*, *serawung*, and *sengkuyung*, that assert the idea of collectiveness, mutual helps and mutual understanding, while Padang uses cultural values such as *raso pareso*, that contains the idea of tolerance, to build engagement amongst community members from different ethnic/religious groups during the recovery periods post 2010 volcano eruption in Yogyakarta and 2009 earthquake in West Sumatra.

The utilization of cultural practices have in fact helped the community to build and maintain good social relations, especially in post-disaster context, that the community is able to conduct peace keeping, which is useful to hasten recovery processes. Further, those cultural practices are also very healthy for the development of local democracy, which is important in community's disaster governance. Based on the experiences of the two communities in the above-mentioned areas in post-disaster contexts, this report highlights that democracy which is practiced from below every day, is an important seed for the development of democracy in general context. It could be an alternate route for the official democratization, which is commonly done through general elections, legislating processes, and judiciary mechanisms.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The research tries to identify democracy that is built from below by communities in grassroots level, using post-disaster recovery as the context of study. In that purpose, the research is designed to answer the following questions:

1. What are the activities that people across ethnic and religious groups engage in post-disaster recovery processes?
2. What challenges—related to diversity and differences—do the communities have to face in the recovery process?
3. How do the communities use their cultural practices to deal with the issue of diversity and differences?
4. How does the use of communities' cultural practices help develop the culture of grassroots democracy?
5. How are the communities' cultural practices relevant to democratization?
6. How can grassroots democracy as experienced by the communities contribute to the enrichment of democracy?

RESEARCH METHODS

This is a qualitative research and uses case studies in its approach. In-depth interviews and direct observation are the main tools to gather data. The research is based on fieldwork in Kaliurang, Sleman, Yogyakarta, post-the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption, during October 2013 until January 2014 and in Pondok, Padang, West Sumatra, during October 2013 until May 2014. In-depth interviews and direct observation are the main instruments for data collection.

Kaliurang is the name of a tourism region near Merapi Volcano, Sleman, Yogyakarta, consisting of several villages and sub-villages in Pakem and Cangkringan sub-districts. Amongst the villages (*desa*) and sub-villages (*dusun*) being visited for fieldwork are Palemsari, Glagahsari, and Panguk, situated in Cangkringan sub-district. In the fieldwork, were interviewed 23 people that live surrounding the areas. The informants were a mixture of those severely and less severely affected, male and female, lay people and village leaders, Moslem and non-Moslem, and young and old generations.

In Padang, fieldwork research was focused on a city center near Chinatown, which is locally called Pondok, Pecinan, or Kampung Cina. The main attention of the research is on traditional market, namely Pasar Tanah Kongsi, in which inter-ethnic interaction is mostly enabled, and inter-community recovery is happened. In order to gain another insight, fieldwork was also focused on Chinese residential area (Pondok), Catholic School, *kongsi* (Chinese cultural union)

office and another traditional market, which is bigger but relatively homogenous, namely Pasar Raya, as a comparison to Pasar Tanah Kongsi. There are about 30 informants, consisting of Minang, Chinese and Javanese ethnics, *Kongsi* leader, academics, *adat* (traditional) leaders, legislature member, school-teachers, students, and journalists. They are a mixture of male and female, young and old, and rich and not rich people.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

From the fieldworks it is found that, although the two communities have different social characteristics, they share similarities in terms of ability to manage diversity and differences that rose during the periods of post-disaster recovery using their daily culture and social mechanisms. The practices of culture that strongly contain the messages of tolerance, sharing and mutual understanding are the keys of the community engagement in the two areas.

Kaliurang community is, by social characteristics, rural and looks more homogeneous compared to Padang. Javanese is the only ethnic in that area. Most community members are Moslem, and the rest are Christians and Catholics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Kaliurang faces less challenge than Padang in terms of social life. During the emergency and recovery phases, the community, that is mostly Moslem, has to face the issues of religious conversion, especially addressed to those who gained helps from the Church or the other Christian organizations. Besides to the issue of Christianization, in their daily life they also have to deal with the issue of minority within, with the existence of minority Moslem wing, namely MTA (Majelis Tafsir Alqur'an), in addition to the majority ones, namely NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Muhammadiyah. This is not to mention the problem between old and young generations relating to the practices of ritual tradition, which leaves the society with the problems of disagreement.

However, the way the community manages the issues is interesting to discuss as it provides crucial lessons for those who face the similar problems. In Kaliurang, *serawung* (to socialize), *sengkuyung* (to embrace others) and *gotong royong* (collective works) become the keys for the people to maintain community engagement. The community understands well that without tolerance and mutual understanding, recovery process will run very slow. As the works to tackle disaster impacts are huge, people in Kaliurang understand that they need to go beyond their identity borders to build effective engagement and cooperation in village reconstruction and relocation. As a result, in spite of the issues of diversity and differences, Kaliurang community recovers quite quickly.

On the other hand, Padang community is relatively urban with multiple ethnics living there. Minang is the majority one. Chinese is the dominating minority ethnic with the number of population nearly reaches 3% of the total population of Padang. The rest is Javanese, Bataknese, Jambinese, Indians, and Arabians. In Padang, the issues of discrimination against Chinese during 2009 earthquake, referring to the limited assistance to Chinese, were strong. The issue worsened the existing distance between Minang, coined as the native residents of Padang, and Chinese, as new comers. This made the tension between the two got more apparent. Media attention and community pressure, later, had forced the local government to share its resources to assist Chinese to reconstruct its residential areas. However, this remains not to erase social tension between Minang and Chinese for the issues of ethnic and religious differences. In the coming years, both ethnic groups had to deal with a hard relationship due to the controversial case, in which a Chinese figure known as a non-Moslem was given an *adat* title by one of the *adat* leaders.

However, amidst the strong tension between the two ethnic groups in Padang in general, in a traditional market, namely Pasar Tanah Kongsi located in the corner of Chinatown, there is an interesting picture, in which Chinese and Minang are closely engaged, running the local economy through trading, and living side by side in that area. While in Pasar Raya, another market in the city center that is bigger than Pasar Tanah Kongsi, the portrait of relationship between Minang and Chinese is relatively mixed, in Pasar Tanah Kongsi, inter-ethnic engagement looks more striking. Trading collaboration, in fact, is not only crucial for reactivating local economy, but more importantly for lessening the potential of social friction and violent conflict due to ethnic and religious differences. While recovery in Pasar Raya looks quite slow, recovery in Pasar Tanah Kongsi looks more quickly. Apart from the fact that Pasar Tanah Kongsi is smaller than Pasar Raya, the community's role in Pasar Tanah Kongsi should not be undermined. In that area the peaceful face of Padang city could be clearly identified.

Dealing with this, people assert that *raso pareso* influences very much in the way they have relationship with the others. *Raso pareso* is amongst Minangkabau's cultural values that underline rational thinking, tolerance, and mutual understanding. It outweighs long-run orientation than the short one. It prefers negotiation than open conflict and offensive behaviors. Interestingly, *raso pareso* has not only been practiced amongst Minang. It is also popular amongst Chinese and become their value, as well. This tightens the two ethnic groups with mutual understanding and cooperation.

The findings from these two communities clarify us that democracy can live everywhere, in rural and urban areas, in seemingly homogenous and heterogeneous communities, in trading and farming communities, in single and multi-ethnic society, in city center and hinterland, in technologically attached and less attached society, and in various forms of social and cultural practices. Democracy could live in a very simple way and could be very close to everyday life. Democracy from below, therefore, could be an answer for the stagnancy of official democracy in developing countries.

THIS RESEARCH'S CONTRIBUTION

From the findings, this research intends to contribute to the existing concept and practices of democracy by elaborating what is locally practiced in society. This research highlights that cultural practices, which are local in their characteristics, initiated from below, and daily, could be a valuable source for the development of democracy in the wider context of political system, which is usually formal and procedural. Kaliurang and Padang communities' experiences of dealing with the issues of diversity and differences in the context of post-disaster recovery have told us that democracy for grassroots community is not something beyond or out of their reach. It lives within their life. Those communities' experience at the same time answer the existing doubt towards the development of democracy in the third world like Indonesia, which is identical with a corrupt administration, an elitist political system and oligarchic policy-making. They let us know that deep inside the society, there is potential seed of democracy, laying within their daily life, that could be developed to support the promotion of political reform.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

This report is about the practices of democracy from below in two communities in Indonesia, namely Padang (West Sumatra Province) and Kaliurang (Yogyakarta Province). This paper focuses on the contribution of these communities' daily cultural practices to the development of grassroots democracy and its relevance to the promotion of democracy in general in state level. The cultural practice in two communities is mentioned to contribute to the strengthening of grassroots democracy because it contains the principle of deliberation, namely participation, equality and mutual respect that becomes one of requisites for democracy to exist. *Raso pareso* in Padang that is highly influenced by Minang culture, and *serawung* and *sengkuyung* in Kaliurang that is identical with Javanese culture contain the principle of deliberation that is fertile for developing democracy in the grassroots level. *Raso pareso* asserts equality and mutual respect, while *serawung* and *sengkuyung* asserts participation and solidarity.

The two regions have relatively different characteristics, in which Padang is an urban and culturally heterogeneous area, while Kaliurang is a rural and culturally homogenous area. However, the communities in those regions both have to face similar problems in terms of diversity in their daily life. While in Padang it is ethnic and religious difference that potentially lead community into conflict, in

Kaliurang it is tradition, as well as different school of thoughts in religion that cause people to be in tension. Such a problem also arose when both regions were hit by disaster in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Padang and the allegation of Christianization in relation to aid provision in Kaliurang, both in emergency periods, have also crucial tension in communities. In that context, the practices of *raso pareso* and *serawung* and *sengkuyung* have encouraged people to avoid further conflict that the potential of violence was ceased, and therefore, community diversity management could be well operating.

The cultural practices are not only contributing to community-based diversity management, they have also contributed to the development of grassroots democracy through the assertion of participation, equality, self-control, and mutual understanding. *Raso pareso* and *serawung* and *sengkuyung* have also been the basis for community decision-making, like in the context of post-disaster recovery. The experience of community in Kampung Batang Arau in Padang post-2009 earthquake, as well as in Palemsari in Kaliurang post 2010 Merapi volcano eruption, have shown us how these cultural practices have helped community to govern collective recovery (public facilities reconstruction in Kampung Batang Arau and housing resettlement in Palemsari). Given their potentials to encourage community participation and deliberation, these practices will be of great benefit for encouraging the enhancement of democracy in state level. It is clear that the success of democratization in state level does not only depend on state's institution that consists of executive, legislature and judiciary, but more importantly also on community inclusion. Community is one of the important locus where political change and transformation may be begun. As Törnquist (2006: 235) asserts democracy does not only mean the existing rights and institutions as legislature, executive and judiciary, but more importantly of the well performance of these institutions. Grassroots democracy can be a way to strengthen the performance of such a democratic institution by enhancing community's inclusion in governing process. In addition, the improvement of community inclusion in governing processes can be done through strengthening the culture of democracy in their daily environment.

It is realized that the relationship of culture and democracy is not that simple nor natural nor automatic. However, given the underlined values of the cultural practices that are in line with democracy, the potentials of the cultural practices for grassroots democracy strengthening should not be undermined. Further, asserting that such grassroots democracy may contribute to the promotion of state democracy and becomes the alternate route for democratization may sound ambitious,

given, for instance, the small scope of that cultural practice in the state. However, being small never means being not important. Once widely spread, grassroots democracy may be the potential seeds for cultivating state democracy, given required supports were provided.

In dealing with this, it is acknowledged that there are some questions related to the idea of culture and democracy. Weller (2001: 4), for instance, identifies some doubts on the compatibility of Asian culture to democracy for being paternalistic and authoritarian. Weller exemplifies that Huntington (1996) addressed the values of authority, hierarchy, avoidance of confrontation, 'saving face', and the supremacy of state over society and society over individuals (Weller, 2001: 6). Confirming Wong (1996) and Kuo (1996), Weller (2001: 7-8) also sees that some scholars seem to point out economy instead of culture that will encourage Asian countries like China and Singapore to be a democratic country. As Nathan and Shi (1993: 95) argue, those scholars believe that Chinese culture, for instance, that asserts passivity, ignorance of politics and fear of politics will not allow Chinese to advance their democracy.

The similar debate is also specifically found in an academic discussion in terms of the relations of culture and democracy in Indonesia. In Padang, people are strongly tied to their extended family. Property is collectively possessed and decision-making is in the hand of the elderly in the family (*ninik mamak*). Such a situation leads to the question of equality of opportunity and equality of access to the family decision-making that become the core principle of democracy. Similarly, although does not assert explicitly if Javanese culture is compatible or not for democracy, Anderson (1990) argues that Javanese people have different concept of power compared to that of Europeans, which further influences their daily political practices. Anderson, for instance, identifies that Javanese community is strongly tied to their kings for the belief that the kings are the descendants (*titisan*) of God. This results in the demand for total loyalty to the king. Given the development of society, currently, the concepts of king in Javanese community do not only cover those that are literally understood as the king that rules a (physically-established) palace, as the one that exists in Yogyakarta. It has expanded to the local elites, respected figures, and village leaders. Because of the assertion of such a model of community's loyalty, it becomes difficult to believe that democracy will be able to be alive.

In fact, community is not monolithic. They also do not have single face. In Padang, although decision is made by *ninik mamak*, prior execution, there should be approval from *bundokanduang* (the eldest woman in the family that is coined as the mother of all family

members), and thus, access to decision-making between men and women is equally distributed. In daily life, like in neighborhood life, such a practice also exists. In *nagari* (community) level, *bundo kanduang* is also place in the highest position, which is above *tungku tigo sajarangan* (that consists of *ulama*/religious scholar, academics and *adat/custom* leader) in community decision-making. Similarly, in such a 'feudalistic' palace, like in Yogyakarta, the king provides community members a place to protest. Of course, there is no such a 'Western' way of protest, in which people spread brochures containing their message to the rule, or stand in front of the palace yelling to the king to speak up what they want. In Yogyakarta, people could just give sign that they do not agree with the king by sitting in the yard field of the palace under the shining sun without saying anything, called *tapadede*. By doing so, the king would understand that there is something needs to be talked with the community. As such, the king invites them to enter the palace to talk about the matter. Although the practices in Padang and Yogyakarta look simple, it has crucial meaning for gender equality and citizenship recognition.

Given the growing critiques towards the practice of formal democracy in current Indonesia, encouraging democratization through the strengthening of grassroots democracy becomes important. It could be an alternate route of democratization. As Törnquist (2006) argues, Indonesia is currently experiencing (formal) democracy deficit, in which procedural democracy is still far from yielding a strong representation that it still fails to give the highest advantage for community. Politics is still very influenced by oligarchy and operated by a few elites within particular political dynasty, as can be found in Banten, Kutai kartanegara, Bantul, and Madura. Agreeing Törnquist, Von Luebke sees that the improvement in public participation is not balanced with quality improvement in the state's ability to govern. This becomes one of the explanations of why after more than a decade of *reformasi*, Indonesia seems not to experience significant political transformation.

Von Luebke (2011, 2010) also addresses oligarchy and predatory leadership both in national political structure and local governance as a factor that hinders the country from having fair and free economic competition, as well as democratic governance. Based on his finding in some districts in Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra, rent-seeking tendency of the local political is still strong. Accordingly, Diamond (2010a), and MacIntyre & Ramage's claim (2008) that decentralization in government institutions and competitive elections—as part of political liberalization project post-1990s Asian crisis—could be an indicator of the massive progress in Indonesian democratization looks too narrow. In Von Luebke's view, current situation of Indonesia is like a mixture

of progression and obstruction (2011: 2) signified from the remaining massive problems of governance within the agenda of political reform in the midst of the few progress of democratization the country has achieved. Von Luebke's assertion (2010: 80) implies that there is still no balance between elite's and community's role in Indonesian formal democracy. The decision-making elite are still highly dominating through their oligarchy network, despite the fact that they are chosen through democratic election processes. Meanwhile, community's role and opportunity to get benefitted from daily decision-making is limited. Elite's interest collisions then have resulted in the government paralysis (Von Luebke, 2010).

To address such a complexity, it is obvious that there is a need for doing something. In this case, encouraging democracy from below through communities' daily cultural practices could be one of the ways, given the facts that Indonesian communities are still tied with their culture despite experiencing modernity.[1] Democracy from below, as Khan asserts, is an opposing form of formal democracy. Formal democracy is democracy that is promoted by state. Meanwhile, informal democracy, or sometime called grassroots democracy, is a model of democracy that is built and practiced outside the formal political structure, applied in daily life, and becomes the value of society. Learning from the Indonesian experience of *reformasi* in 1998, in which community has played crucial role in changing the regime from authoritarianism to democracy, it is groundless not to believe in community's role in later (formal) democratization. Indeed, this does not mean to disregard other factors, like international organizations.

With regard to this, it remains important to see how informal democracy and formal democracy might be related. How does informal democracy support the promotion of formal democracy? Informal democracy may be an alternate route for promoting democratization in state level, given the fact that currently it is the corrupt elite that mostly dominates decision-making. However, informal democracy may also not bear any influence to the strengthening of formal democracy, once it does not gain sufficient supports that it needs to function, like strengthened representation and improved spaces for community's involvement in decision-making. Nevertheless, what should become our concern is not merely on whether grassroots democracy support or not supports democracy in state level. More importantly, it should be on how to make it supportive to the promotion of state democracy.

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1   Khan, Salman 2012 'Democracy from Below vs. Official Democracy' in *New Socialist Webzine*, November 17. At <www.newsocialist.org/660-democracy-from-below-vs-official-democracy> Retrieved on July 5, 2014 at 10:50 am.

From fieldwork in the two areas, it is known Indonesia has big potential to develop its formal democracy that is supported by its community's informal democracy in the grassroots level. Community might have differences in social characteristics, as presented by Padang and Kaliurang community, but they have the same potential to develop informal democracy through their own way and mechanism, that is also potentially contributive to the promotion of formal democracy. Kaliurang is rather rural and Padang is urban. Kaliurang is known to be syncretic (tend to mix Islamic teaching and tradition), while Padang is strict Moslem. Yet, their experiences in tackling social issues and problems during post-disaster recovery let us know that community, whatever and whoever they are, could be an important agent of democracy promotion. They could manage the issues of ethnic and religious differences that influenced the recovery process. This tells us that in spite of their simple and informal nature, communities have potential to be the locomotive of the development of democracy. Indeed, this does not mean to say that Padang and Kaliurang are perfect examples. In a community, in which the social structure is highly featured with the composition of majority and minority, as happens in Padang, and with strong communalism like in Kaliurang, the question of power relations is unavoidable. However, in spite of the strong culture of collectivism, this does not mean that community members are not aware of their need as an individual to be counted in community decision-making, whatever mechanism the community uses. The challenge now is how to make such a great potential to be an energizer for enhancing democracy in state level that is already dominated by elite, dynasty and particular oligarchy circles. In order to respond to this query, after analyzing research findings with grassroots democracy perspective, this report will identify some ways forward as recommendations.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions of this study include the following: 'how does community across ethnic and religious groups deal with the issues of differences and diversity?', 'in what activities do the communities usually engage?', 'how does the community develop grassroots democracy in that matter through their daily cultural practices?', and 'how is this relevant to the enrichment of Indonesia's promotion of democracy?'.

RESEARCH METHODS
This qualitative research uses the case study in its approach. Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, and Padang, West Sumatra Province were chosen for the relatively strong cases of ethnic and religious issues, but are

relatively successful in terms of diversity management during the recovery processes. Fieldwork research in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, post-the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption, was conducted during October 2013 until January 2014 and in Padang, West Sumatra, during October 2013 until May 2014. Kaliurang is a name of region near Merapi volcano consisting of several villages in several sub-districts. Amongst the villages (*desa*) and sub-villages (*dusun*) being visited for fieldwork are Palemsari, Glagahsari, and Panguk in one sub-district, namely Cangkringan. The fieldwork interviews 23 people that live in Kaliurang and being disseminated in those villages (and sub-villages). The informants consists of a mixture between those severely and less severely affected, male and female, lay people and village leaders, Moslem and non-Moslem, and young and old generations.

In Padang, the focus was on the city center near Chinatown, which is locally called Pondok. Sometime, it is called Pecinan (Kampung Cina). The main attention was on traditional markets, namely Pasar Tanah Kongsi, in which inter-ethnic interaction was mostly enabled. To gain another insight, fieldwork was also focused on Chinese residence, Catholic School, *kongsi* (Chinese cultural union) office, media, and another traditional market, namely Pasar Raya. 30 people have being interviewed, including Minang, Chinese and Javanese ethnics, academics, *adat* (traditional) leaders, legislature member, school teachers, high school students, traditional leaders, and journalists. These informants are a mixture of male and female, young and old, Moslem and non-Moslem, and rich and not rich ones.

The fieldwork research used direct observation and in-depth interviews as a method of data collection. In this process, the researcher interacts deeply with the selected informants to figure out their statements, behaviors and expressions. In the interviews, the main questions that were asked are mainly as the following:

1. What activities do people across ethnic and religious groups engage in their daily lives?
2. What challenges related to diversity and differences the communities do have to face in that context?
3. How do the communities use their cultural practices to deal with the issue of diversity and differences?
4. How does the use of communities' cultural practices help develop the culture of grassroots democracy?
5. How relevant are the communities' cultural practices to democratization?
6. How can grassroots democracy as experienced by the communities contribute to the enrichment of state democracy?

The ata gained from direct observation and in-depth interview will be then analyzed using inductive analysis and creative synthesis strategy to discover important patterns, interrelationships, and themes guided by analytical principles to immerse creative synthesis (Patton, 2002: 41). In this research, an expected pattern is the model of democracy at the grassroots level and provision of relevant policies emerges from the anticipated synthesis.

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
Chapter I is an introduction, which tries to elaborate a justification of the research on the academic side. It also presents the significance of the study and the strategy used to collect information and data during the fieldwork research. Chapter 2 discusses the theory of democracy from below including definitions, context of the rise of the concept, and the significance of concept in the context of democratization in developing countries. Chapter 3 reveals the social settings of Kaliurang and Padang. Chapter 4 elaborates more specifically the situations of post-natural disasters in the two areas, in order to let the readers identify the complexities the communities have to deal with. Chapter 5 discusses problems of social relations that rise during the recovery periods. This is to let the readers know that deep inside the community, problems of post-disaster are more complex than what they usually seem. This could include the overlapping of disaster-related policy with the politics of ethnics and religions. Chapter 6 exposes about the communities' strategies to deal with the problems in their social environment, using their cultures and social mechanisms, and how this has implications on the strengthening of local democracy and disaster governance. Chapter 7 concludes what has been discussed on harnessing democracy from below, as an alternate route for promoting democracy from above, using cultural and social capital is crucial.

CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This part discusses briefly the concepts of democracy from below, being related to cultural practices and the Asian context, especially Indonesia. Of course, before further discussing what is meant by democracy from below, why it is important, in what context the idea of democracy from below rises, and what challenges the concepts might be dealing with, it is important to clarify the idea of democracy and democratization. This chapter is organized as follows. First, it discusses the concept of democracy, democratization, and democracy from below. In addition, the discussion of democracy challenges, and how they relate to democracy from below, is included. Second, it discusses cultural practices and democracy, mainly towards the debates of cultural practices compatibility with democracy. The last, it discusses the idea of community diversity governance and democracy from below.

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW

THE DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Democracy can be thought as an ancient idea of governing, in which the Greek generally is considered as the founder (Wollheim, 1958: 225). As Wollheim (1958: 226) argues, democracy is about the form of governments, and not the form of societies, although, as Held (2006: 1)

asserts, it puts the people at the center of the government processes. Because putting 'the people' in the center of the government, democracy then is seen contrary to monarchies and aristocracies. In Held's words, it is the government by the people, from the people and for the people, and therefore it underlines people's participation in the governing processes. The next term that is very close to democracy is democratization and democratization process. Democratization means the transformation from non-democratic to democratic governments (Grugel, 2002: 6). Democratization process is a process through which a participative and accountable government is promoted.

PROBLEMS RELATED TO DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Although the definition of democracy as 'the rule by the people' has been generally accepted, and even becomes the most widely adopted system of government in current world, this does not mean that it lacks problems. The similar question is addressed to democratization and democratization processes. The main challenge towards the idea of democracy as the rule by the people is mostly seen on application and applicability aspects. Unfortunately, the questions about application are mostly departed from the procedural views, instead of the substantive ones. Held (2006: 1-2), for instance, spotted some questions that lead to the continuing debates, like who are considered to be 'the people'; how would 'the people' participate; how to make conducive participation in such a democratic system; what are the requirements for participating in the government, and whether the participation is coerced or voluntarily; etc. Although these questions are important, it seems that they are still centered in one focus, namely how democracy is going to be practiced, which is procedural in nature. This can be seen for instance from the following debates on what is the best mode of democracy, as direct or representative, unicameralism or bicameralism, voting or consensus, two or multi-party system, and so forth. Consequently, there are many democratization projects in later periods that are directed to renew political recruitment, reform electoral systems, change party system, and establish new institutions supporting for election like election commissions and election monitoring bodies.

Direct election in Indonesia implemented since 2005 replacing representative system, following political reform in 1998, is a clear example of how democratization project has been focused much on democracy procedures and application. Although direct election in Indonesia is seen to enhance citizens' participation for providing them opportunity to directly top executives and legislature members by their own, as well as widening the opportunity for the citizen to get involved

in political party for the increasing number of political parties, compared to those in the New Order, it is criticized not to have significant impact on widening opportunity for the citizen to get involved in daily governing processes. Direct election is seen to be merely a machine that produces and reproduces elites that forms a new mode of oligarchy and political dynasty in decision-making circles. Citizen remains being far from the access to influence the government, while elites are fighting each other to master decision-making areas. Direct election is also regarded to not give significant meaning for the promotion of democracy in Indonesia, except in the enhancement of the demand side of democracy (by citizen and civil society), which unfortunately is not always accommodated by policy makers. It is even coined to mess up political structure for encouraging fragmentation between either elites or masses. This is not to mention problems like money politics, which has been becoming rampant since direct election was introduced. This causes us hard to refuse what Nordholt (2005: 29) proposed as the definition of *reformasi* as the changing from 'order to disorder', instead of the changing from 'non-democratic to democratic government'. Unfortunately, agreeing to Nordholt (2005: 38-42), a change like this—from representative democracy to direct democracy, from centralization to decentralization—is what institutions like the World Bank and the Ford Foundation coin as the indication of democratization success. Indonesia is frequently mentioned as one of the countries that experience the most successful democratization in Asia. Meanwhile, it is clear that as long as the change does not have direct impact on the widening of spaces for citizen to influence and participate in decision-making, it would be meaningless.

Democratization through reforming democracy procedures, like elections, party system, representation system, and so forth, is important. However, it is surely never enough. Democracy is about value (Hiley, 2006: 2), and thus, it may present in any part of the world with different naming and ways of application. Consequently, there should be no Western domination in defining what democracy is, although the term is clearly from the Western world, as well as how it should be practiced. In that regard, Wollheim's argument that democracy is about the form of governments, instead of the form of societies, might need to be reexamined. What does he mean by government and government form? Does he mean by formal government and formal institution, the ones that are established in and by the state? If this is so, therefore, he has failed since the beginning to address the meaning of democracy. Although democracy is related deeply to the governing process, it is actually more about the quality of the governing, namely to be participative and accountable. Moreover, this may exist in the

so-called 'governing system' outside the state institution, like in daily community. Of course, this does not mean to perceive the dichotomy state / non-state as merely something opposed. In many cases, the state and non-state, as well as the formal and informal ones, are often influential and interlinked to each other in forming democratic system (Scalapino, 1996: 227), although it is not rare, too, to find them being in contrary position. Far before the so-called state was established, such a governing system has even earlier established in society. The society might not use the term democracy, but this does not mean that they do not have one. *Raso pareso* in Minang community that underlines mutual respect, for instance, has been practiced far before the state called Indonesia was established in 1945. Similarly, *rembugan,* which means community participation and dialogue, has long been practiced in Javanese society, although they were governed by a kingdom, which in Western perspective is categorized as aristocratic and monarchy.

The second problem, which is still related to the previous one, is a wide tendency for narrowing the meaning of democracy and democratization, including the ones applied in Asia and Indonesia, as liberal democracy and democratization. By definition, liberal democracy imagines free and equal citizens, in which that freedom and equality are guaranteed by formal laws, as well as institutions (Talisse, 2005: 80-81). As individual interest and preference tend to be conflicting, these laws and institutions are also meant to govern them though a fair public policy. The primacy of individuals in liberal democracy has a consequence on the lessening assertion of the state in democratization processes. Further, this also undermines something related to collectivism and communalism, for being seen potentially to deprive individual autonomy, which is the key ingredient of (liberal) democracy. In Bell's view, the equation of democracy with liberal democracy, that is manifested in the US-led promotion of human rights and democracy regardless of local habits, needs, and tradition, is equal with the blind faith. In addition, although criticizing liberal democracy and democratization promoted by the World Bank and its related partners, Nordholt (2005: 31), for instance, also confirms the view that communal culture of Indonesia that is patrimonial in its nature, as well as its history, is very influential to the failing project of Indonesian democratization, which for me sounds liberal, too. If he does not believe in liberal democracy and democratization, I think, he should not put Asian (Indonesian) culture as the main explanation of democratization failure. He rather is better to state fairly that there is a lag between the culture of Western and Eastern communities that coercing liberal democracy in democratization project is not a good idea.

This means that there is another thing that is necessary to be doing to encourage the enhancement of democracy—as a value, not merely as a procedure—in Asian countries like Indonesia.

Although liberal democracy might be one of the crucial practices of democracy, it is surely not the only answer for democracy promotion. Society has their own history that they are formed as they are like now. People in Asia, for instance, are formed by the history that outweighs collectivism than individualism, so that expecting them to adopt successfully such a 'Western' liberal democracy in current politics will look not realistic. Nevertheless, this does not mean that by nature, Asian cultures are not compatible to democracy. Like in Western cultures, there are some parts in Asian culture that are compatible to democracy—even though they are dominantly characterized by collectivism—and there are some others that are not. Aristocracies, for instance, is not exclusive to Asian communities. There are such forms of governments in Western countries, too. Similarly, this does not mean that there is no space for respecting individual autonomy and the separation of public and private sphere in Asian cultures. Religious conversion in Kaliurang community, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, for instance, is considered as a private matter that neighbors, although they see the matter, will not consider taking it as their business. They respect their neighbors' choice by not talking about it in public place, although they will be very intense to see the neighbors in other social activities. Therefore, some critiques pointing out Asian cultures as an explanation of the failure of current democratization, as Nordholt (2005: 31-33), Day (2002), and Harris-White (2003) argue, sound not to make any sense. There is a need for carefulness in seeing cultures and democracy promotion in the cultural contexts other than the ones in the Western.

DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW: AN ALTERNATE ROUTE FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

Responding to the discrepancies in perceiving democracy and democratization, which are procedural in definition, formalistic in terms of approach, and dominantly liberal in nature and ideology as mentioned formerly, it is important to find a way to fulfill the gap. Törnquist (2006: 230), for instance, identifies some ways proposed to respond to the issues. Amongst them is by strengthening strong and liberal middle and/or working classes. However, this might be ending up with the same failure of democratization as currently happens as discussed earlier, for the embeddedness of collectivism in Asian cultures. Another way, that might be useful as an alternative is by strengthening democracy from below.

One of the practices of democracy from below can be found in Latin America. Referring to Latin America experience, the idea of democracy from below rises because people aspire to search for forms of democracy that will allow them to control their lives and livelihood (Kaufman and Alfonso, 1998: 1). Searching by their selves will be likely to help them find a politically and culturally compatible form of democracy. It would be possibly different if other parties, like donors, interfere the process of searching, even directing it. From this assertion, it becomes clear that democracy from below relies on the people to empower themselves to be the promoter of democracy. Of course, Latin American countries have different contexts with those in Asia. They have a long history of community struggle. However, this does not mean that developing democracy from below in Asia is impossible. Asian communities have great potential of collective actions, as a basic form of democracy from below, for their strong collectivism, to be the seeds for building democracy from below. Indeed, collectivism does not automatically create collective action because it requires collective consciousness. At the very bad situation, collectivism can end up with democracy weakening, like in the forms of patrimonialism and clientelism, for being trapped in collective unconsciousness. Asian collectivism, therefore, can be a good and, of course, bad locus of collective action depending on how it is supported with collective consciousness.

From the above-written argumentation, it can be underlined that democracy from below is democracy that is initiated by, in and for community, supported by their daily cultural practices, and encouraged by their own political contexts. Such an understanding, however, should not be messed up with direct democracy, although Schmid (2003), for instance, asserts that the two are associated. Direct democracy can be very formalistic, and therefore, not matches with the understanding of democracy from below. In formalistic view, direct democracy is contrasted with representative democracy, defined as a democracy procedure, in which people grant a mandate to their representative, who is usually selected through general elections, to make a decision on behalf of them in the governing processes (Schumpeter, 2003: 250). In democracy from below, community is the agent for their own selves, and they develop democratic system in an informal way.

By term, democracy from below can be equated with grassroots democracy, informal democracy, or daily democracy. It is contrasted with official, formal, or state promoted democracy. John Keane (2004: 15) and Liebert and Trenz (2008) clarifies what is called 'from below' as something related to the field of civil society—a space other than market and the state, meanwhile what is meant by 'from above' is the

field of government or laws—the state. Considering the above-written understanding of democracy from below (see Tao, 2005: 64; as cited above), and the reflection gained from Latin American experience, by definition, democracy from below can be said as community's self-empowerment to promote participation, equality and accountability in the governing processes based on their respective cultural and political contexts. This definition answers Liebert and Trenz (2008: 1) that defines democracy from below as, 'the process that translates democratic norms and practices into citizen's practices'. Although the definition is said to put citizen in the center of democracy processes both as actor, agent, and beneficiary (Lister, 1999), it is still unclear who does, 'the translation of democratic norms and practices into citizen's practices'. If democracy from below is defined that way, there is a possibility that the state may do so, and if it is the case, it is no longer democracy from below rather, it is democracy from above. Therefore, I underlined the definition of democracy from below as *self-empowerment* to address community as the main actors, and in *governing process* to broaden the scope of democracy from below's practices. Just to make clearer, what I meant by governing processes in this context is either in the scope of internal community environment, village environment, as the smallest representation of the state, or the state in general. Internal community environment can refer to neighborhood context that is daily in the nature. Meanwhile, the state environment is more formally featured. Given such an understanding, democracy from below therefore does not limit its understanding of governance only in the scope of formal institutions—directly related to the state, but more importantly in informal sphere, that is not related to the state's laws, or if related it is happened in indirect way.

Of course, the differentiation of formal and informal democracy does not merely imply the categorization of democracy ideas. It is also deeply related to the political context that circumscribes the two concepts to arise. In most communities, what is coined as formal usually is identical with coercion. This also works for democracy. When democracy is formalized, it usually ends up with formalistic manners, instead of with embedded behaviors. Informal democracy imagines that democracy becomes the culture of society in governing their daily decision-making. In addition, in Indonesian context, people have long distrusted in formal democracy. The mechanisms of formal democracy through elections and legislation processes are believed to have been contaminated with elite's money politics (Ziegenhain, 2009: 42-46). Expecting formal democracy in current Indonesian politics will only result in desperation. Although informal democracy does not cure all deficiencies related to formal democracy, it is expected to

boost optimisms towards democratization in Indonesia. Sometime, informal democracy even could be an effective way to influence decision-making in formal sphere, which in formal mechanism of democracy may take longer time. Having personal relations with legislature members, for instance, could help citizen to make a contact with the minister, once they find out particular problems that need for quick response. Nihayatul Wafiroh, for instance, is known to be a very active legislature of the 2014-2019 in Indonesia that allows her Facebook friends to report anything related to labor policy to be delivered to the Minister of Labor, who is from the same political party with her. Some other ministers in Indonesia also use twitters to communicate with the citizens. Somehow, this can overcome barriers in formal democracy in which making a contact through a formal way needs longer bureaucratic procedures.

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW

Despites its advantages, there are some problems with democracy from below from both theoretical and practical views. Firstly, as democracy from below uses to be informal, there is no guarantee of its sustainability. Formality, which asserts law as a binding rule of everybody, in spite of its strictness, may offer certainty, compared to informality. Still related to the first point, secondly, democracy from below assumes too much that culture will be relatively stable. Meanwhile, communities in globalized world generally face great challenges of changes in cultural practices. Although Padang remains matrilineal, and Kaliurang remains being identical with Javanese culture, somehow, its practices experience shifting and squeezing, being replaced with a new, economical and practical ones. On the other hand, thirdly, there is a wide tendency in which informal democracy strengthening is equated with changing communities' cultures. Meanwhile, it is widely believed that changing communities' culture may take very long time to happen, and therefore, promoting democracy from below may take longer time, too. Fourthly, there is a need to be aware of the issue of power. Democracy from below imagines communities to be fully conscious and aware of their political circumstances. Meanwhile, some parts of the communities might be not interested in politics. They might not yet be fully conscious of politics that they withdraw themselves from political discussions, but conversely, they may also be very conscious that they could even read the complexities of power relations within their internal environment, and thus, they choose not be active, simply for maintaining social relations. Given the context of Asian communities that underpin collectiveness, such circumstances are also sensible.

Another important issue that needs to take into account is democracy from below in order to operate somehow is said to require active citizenship. Brannan, John, and Stoker (2006: 993) define active citizenship as engaging people in decision-making processes to have say in the planning and delivery public service, and involving them in their communities to improve outcomes of that political engagement. However, this may bear some dilemmas. Some people criticize that citizenship is actually not to make citizen stronger. It is rather to support the state. Meanwhile, state is never neutral. Sometime it is even used few elite. In the name of the state, elite tries to pursue their interests. Indonesian experience during New Order has proven that the policy of citizenship strengthening was not more than about the state's effort to strengthen the state's hegemony. Therefore, rather than asserting citizenship, it might be helpful to underline community consciousness. The concept requires community to be aware of the state policy and the politics behind, i.e. how they are counted and taken into account, which is a requisite for self-empowerment in grassroots democracy.

Although democracy from below is not free from problems, the option it offers to be an alternate route of democratization remains worth considering, so that the distance between community and formal democracy will be shortened. It is expected that democracy from below will be more accommodative for different cultures to endorse democracy principles, especially given the critique that state-led democracy adopted by the government is generally donors-minded. Although not easy, building democracy from below sounds more promising than seemingly simply adopting liberal democracy for democratization. In that instance, what the promoters of grassroots democracy do is clearly not to change their culture to be compatible to democracy, but to collect some aspects of their cultural practices that suit with democracy principles and make them as the seeds for further democracy promotion.

CULTURAL PRACTICES AND DEMOCRACY (FROM BELOW)

The relationship of culture and democracy has always been a big question in political science discussions. The main questions that include, whether cultural practices have positive contribution to the development of democracy, or not? and whether it is democracy that contributes to the development of civic culture?, have always been difficult to answer. However, some scholars have made some efforts to reveal the puzzle. Bebbington et al. (2004: 188) argue that culture may affect the structure of governance and resource allocation through the social structure it entails, as well as social capital it contains. Cultural

practices that are embedded in networks of social relationship, as Bebbington et al. assert, could be the crucial ground for the growth of social action, political participation, and political pressure that could expand the access of community to the available resources (pp. 190-191). Cultural practices collect people that have the similar political interest that it could harness social movement (p. 191). Based on their field research in Java and Jambi, Indonesia, Bebbington, et al. (p. 202) found that culture might be engaged with social mechanism in co-producing services and governance, as well as in creating strategies to tackle social tensions.

A decade prior Bebbington, et al. study, Putnam published his work, *Making Democracy Work* (1993), and has been seen as a cornerstone for the study of culture and democracy using mixed methodology (the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods). Putnam has addressed crucial points on the relationship of culture and democracy, in which civic culture has been significantly important to enable democracy to work. What he means by civic culture is trust, network, and reciprocity, which he term as social capital. In his study, Putnam compared North and South Italia; the region that has different culture of community associations, and found that region that has better civic association, namely North Italy, has built better democracy than the other one. His later work, *Bowling Alone* (1995), strengthens his previous claim on the positive relationship of culture and democracy. In *Bowling Alone,* Putnam addressed the reverse situation of North Italy in North America, in which society has experienced the weakening of social capital, and thus potentially weakens American democracy. Based on these studies, Putnam means to assert that the higher civic culture, the better democracy, and the weaker civic culture, the worse democracy.

However, some other scholars challenge the argument that asserting culture may contribute to the development of democracy. Koelble (2003: 204-210) asserts that Putnam's work contains some crucial flaws in methodology, in which dependent and independent variables were mistakenly specified, that its conclusion, namely the positive contribution of culture to democracy, becomes questionable. Citing Laitin, Koelble (p. 207) argues that Putnam mixed the definition of democracy with effective governance. Koelble (p. 206) adds, Putnam is too romantic at heart towards community. In his view, Putnam looks to look at culture as static and passive entity, while for him culture is activity and changing practice. Muller and Seligson (1994) also see the same, in which the claim of the positive contribution of culture to democracy is not that convincing. Using statistical methods, they rather see that instead of influencing democracy, culture is influenced

by democracy. Trust, for instance, increases following democracy strengthening, identified from the better law enforcement. Strengthening this argument, Koelble (2003: 210) asserts that trust is a product of rational examination, instead of by nature a cultural product. Considering these, Koelbe, Muller and Seligson at last come up to the conclusion that socio-economic structure is more striking to influence democracy development than culture.

Responding to this, I have to agree to some points Koelble has highlighted, but also pose some questions to the other points. Koelble's point of culture as a dynamic instead of static, active instead of passive, fluid instead of solid, and changing instead of unchanging activity and practice does make sense. However, just because culture is a changing practice, does then it mean that culture could not contribute to the development of democracy? Socio-economic and power structure also always change. Why is the same objection not addressed to them? I think, culture is not only a changing activity. It is also a complex entity. It is not monolithic, in addition to its changing nature. There is power relations and structure in cultural practices. The culture of speaking *halus* in Javanese community, which means to speak politely to the older or those who are prominent in society, is clearly a token of how political is a cultural practice. So, cultural practices should not be perceived as neutral. Symbol and rituals as practiced in speaking *halus*, which look static in Koelble's view, contain the similar sense of politics (Adeney-Risakotta, 2005). Speaking *halus* in Javanese community is seen not only to represent power structure between the elderly and the young, and between elite and laypersons. It is also a political tool for lay community to build an access to elite to influence decision-making. In some instances, it is even an effective way to cooling down social tension. Speaking *halus* also experiences some changes in diction and expression. Yet, the changes do not always mean to erode the political sense it entails.

Secondly, related to the relationship of culture to democracy, I agree with Koelble, Muller and Seligson's argument that it may be too far to claim that culture that is practiced in daily life will influence the development of democracy—provided what they mean by democracy is formal democracy/state-led democracy that is liberal in the nature. However, will it be the same if it is informal/grassroots democracy, or as I state previously democracy from below? Meanwhile, it is clear that community participation in collective decision-making in neighborhood environment is highly related to their daily cultural practices. *Rembugan* is a cultural practice in Javanese community, in which people get together to make decision related to common good. However, it is also a practice of community participation and equality

in collective decision-making. As such, not only do we need to be critical in seeing culture and democracy, we also need to be very careful.

In the big discussion of cultural practices and democracy (from below), the rule of looking at culture and democracy not only critically but also carefully is obviously crucial. Otherwise, this will lead us to the same generalization flaws of Huntington (1993) that sees the Western culture is more compatible than the Eastern to promote democracy. It is admitted that democracy is a Western construct. Therefore, it should not be a surprise should Huntington views that Western culture that is open, liberal, equal between people, and impersonal is more likely to match with the principles of (for sure, what he means is *liberal*) democracy. However, asserting that the Eastern cultures, like Asian cultures, that are communal, hierarchical (feudal), and identical with violent may bear generalization flaws. Moreover, as we believe in the idea that democracy is about value, principle, and political conduct, instead of procedures and forms, we should be very flexible in seeing the ways community practicing democracy, albeit the fact it is originally a Western construct. In this context, I agree with Neher (1991: 51) that, 'Real democracy was not destroyed by a traditional culture but by corrupt, power-hungry politicians who initiated repression and authoritarian institutions to retain their positions'.

Because communities throughout the world are varied, there will be no same uniform in practicing democracy, even though they endorse the same democracy principles, namely community participation, equality and accountability. What about individual autonomy? Of course, this is very tricky. Collectivism in Asian communities will easily trap scholars to judge them not supporting for democracy. The question is, whether Asian collectiveness is always coercive—which obviously means an interruption to individual autonomy? The answer is not. In Javanese community, the key is laid in *rembugan*, a communicative process in which community deliberation is allowed. Although collectiveness is more valued, individual choice remains respected, as long as there is *rembugan* (dialogue; discussion) that highlights individual reasoning prior choice making. And more important questions are, whether it is always impossible to promote democracy in collective community? What is valued in democracy, the idea of autonomy, or the idea of individual autonomy? If we say the idea of individual autonomy, we will automatically come up with the conclusion that Asian communities do not suit with democracy. Although there is always a strong issue of power relations in collectiveness, this does not mean that collective community could not be autonomous. When autonomy is seen only to match with individuals, rather than to collective unit of community, does that automatically mean that those

individuals are free from power structure? The answer is not. Thus, it becomes clear that what are striking in democracy are the principles, not the procedures to endorse the them. Getting used to live in individualist or collective world will not reduce community's opportunity to develop and enjoy democracy. Therefore, instead of convincing, Huntington's argument pointing out Asian cultures as the constraints for developing democracy sounds groundless. This reflects his lack information towards the details of what he calls as the Asian cultures.

Nevertheless, I have to admit fairly that sometime responses proposed to Huntington's argument, especially from Asian political leaders, also look reactionary. Instead of becoming alternatives, the arguments somehow sound ideological. The idea of Asian values that is proposed by Mahathir Muhammad (Malaysian former Prime Minister), and is supported by Soeharto (late Indonesian former President), and Lee Kuan Yew (late Singapore former Prime Minister) to rebut Western scholars' view of Asian cultures' incompatibility to democracy, is seen to lack of academic ground, although, agreeing with Bell (Bell, 2006: 52-53), expecting politicians to be academic is also unfair. Recalling my previous argument about culture, Asia is also not monolithic. Although Asian countries are generally featured with aristocracies in their past, and, therefore, it is believed that this is still influential to the current cultures, it has other detailed parts of cultures and social relations that are practiced in daily life. Although similarities of detailed practices with the general ones are possibly found, differences might also exist.

Unfortunately, the generalization flaws in defining cultures and Asian cultures are not exclusively found in Western scholars and Asian politicians. It is a classic problem of international relations and political economy. War against communism led by the United States in the Asian countries that were considered leftist, like Indonesia, Vietnam, and People Republic of China during the 1950s to 1980s can be said as one of fatal result of the flaws. International development agencies, which are generally Western-minded, like the World Bank, Ford Foundation, and so forth, following the wars against communism, also become the other pioneers of 'one-size-fits-all' perspective in democracy promotion. Massive democratization projects after Asian crisis in the late 1990s that is not yet succeeding is believed to some extent to have relations with these institutions' frameworks about Asian culture and politics. Instead of empowering, their democratization programs are seen not to be more than a shortcut for liberalization, which unfortunately historically and culturally insensitive. In Indonesian context, the firing of authoritarian leader—Soeharto—that was followed with radical changes in party system, from three-party system to multi-party

system, and the change in top executive election system from representative to direct election, the issuance of decentralization law, massive reforms in regulations like in terms of foreign investment, oil and mining governance, and extractive contracts, that they sound more liberal—but were introduced as if they are for promoting transparency, openness, and free and fair competition, regardless of national interests, and so forth are amongst the examples of liberalization projects during the democratization phases. Approaches like this, besides leave an impression of cultural and historical insensitivity of donors, also imply donors' impatience in facilitating the programs, generally called result oriented, instead of process oriented. Of course, the introduction of NPM (New Public Management) in development agencies that demands for high efficiencies should also be mentioned as another explanation. From this assertion, we can see that it is not simply the culture that is problematic in democratization, but more importantly the ways we promote it, the approaches we use; the framework we have; the perspective we build; and the methods we apply.

In that regards, the idea of democracy from below is proposed to provide alternatives. It tries to recognize culture comprehendingly together with its complexities. As culture varies, it understands that the ways people use to express the idea of democracy also vary. Apart from the social structure that tends to be hierarchical, *gotongroyong* (solidarity, social cooperation, and mutual help), *rembugan* (discussion or dialogue), *serawung* (to be open in social life), and *sengkuyung* (to embrace others) are seen to help community to enhance participation and equality, as well as building trust, cooperation, and sensitiveness amongst each other. They are also very rich in expressions. '*Menang ora umuk kalah ora ngamuk*' (those who win should not be arrogant, and those who lose should not get angry) is an instance of Javanese proverb asserting the rule of games, like in election, negotiation and dialogues. Democracy from below could also take place in various venues. Neighborhood, village, traditional market, *kampung* and school environment, are an instance of the space, where democracy from below operates in society. *Panchayats* in Kerala, India, is an instance of the practice of village democracy, which interestingly is still rich with the local value, culture, and tradition (Mohanty, 2007: 18). Sekolah Tumbuh is another instance of elementary and junior high schools in Yogyakarta, Indonesia that practices democracy not merely as a procedure of teaching and learning, but also as value in building social relations amongst the school's elements (head master, teachers, students, canteen owners, and so forth) that is enriched with Javanese culture (Udasmoro et al., 2011). Indeed, by asserting this, it does not mean to against Western cultures and practices. Some

practices offer crucial lessons for Asian communities' promotion of democracy. Citizen Report Card (CRC) in Australia surely inspires public monitoring. However, it is the sense of public involvement in monitoring process—in whatever level of governance, as well as in formal and informal ways—that should be the center of attention, instead of merely the utilization of Report Card as a means for citizen to conduct monitoring. Because Asian communities, including Indonesia might have different culture, experience and constraints of using card in monitoring processes.

Reflecting from the above-written arguments, this explains us that what should be firstly born in mind in democracy/democratization is that it is about value, not about procedures. This is not saying that procedures are not important. It is procedures that follow the values in order to be endorsed, and not the other way around. Democracy from below does not see complexities of cultural practices as constraint to promote democratic values; rather it underlines cultural richness that may contribute to the development of democracy.

COMMUNITY DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW

Amongst the daily issues communities in Padang and Kaliurang have to face, including in the context of post 2009 earthquake in Padang and 2010 Merapi Volcano eruption in Kaliurang, which is the time frame when this research was conducted, is related to diversity and diversity governance. After discussing democracy, democracy from below and its relationship with cultural practices, therefore, it is crucial to discuss the idea of diversity, community diversity governance and its possible relations with democracy from below.

By concept, diversity refers to differences in society, which could be of religions, ethnicity, traditions, races, gender, and beliefs (Lehning, 1997: 222). Banks et al. (2005: 17) describes diversity as, 'The wide range of racial, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious variation that exists within and across groups that live in multicultural nation-states (See Figure 1)'. Banks et al. add, in smaller society, differences remain exist but in narrower range at least involving gender and social status. Banks et al. mention that colonialism, migrations, and international trading encourage the increasing diversity in a nation through cultural amalgams and hybrids. Although generally known as a Muslim country—in which Muslim is the majority in it—Indonesia is diverse. By religion, besides Islam, there are Christianity, Hindhu, Buddhist and other local religions in Indonesia. By ethnicity, there are Java, Sunda, Batak, Minang, Ambon, Flores, Dayak, Papua, and so forth. By race, there are Malay, Chinese, Papua, and so forth.

Diversity is not a problem. However, it remains in need for being managed. Once diversity fails to be managed, the impact could be very serious. Not only physical lost, this may also let to the separation of the states. Besides secession, war, conflict, discrimination against minority, and even genocide are amongst the worst risks the communities may have to bear because of failed management of diversity. The problem is the state is not always present to overcome anything happens in diversity-related issues in communities. And, if they may do, they may be in the side of majority, which is clearly not healthy for democracy. It is too easy to mention the example of the state's absences in diversity management or the state's diversity miss-management in Indonesia. The kicking out of Shi'a followers in Madure, East Java two years ago, so they are no longer staying at their own homes, and must reside in sport stadium in another district; violence against minority Ahmadi Muslim in some regions in Indonesia; repression against ethnic Chinese since colonial era to *reformasi* and post-*reformasi*, horizontal wars in Sampit (Kalimantan), Poso (Sulawesi), and Ambon (Moluccas) are amongst the pictures of unmanaged or miss-managed diversity. Losing family members, materials, and opportunities to gain education and employment are of direct impacts the communities have to overcome.

Since the state is not always present, or if they were present, they were present wrongly due to biased policy, getting community able to govern diversity by their selves in their own environment is necessary. Interestingly, in some communities in Indonesia, there are actually mechanisms created by their ancient ancestors to tackle social tensions and conflicts that may be caused by sentiments against tribes, ethnicities, religions, geographical origins, and so forth. It is acknowledged that some of these cultural practices eroded for the policy of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* ('unity in diversity') imposed by the state during New Order, which is actually no more than about uniformization of Indonesia—make all communities in Indonesia to be like Javanese and to adopt Javanese culture and social system in communities' social and local political system, and some others are changing. Yet, in some others, the practices remain existing, like *bakar batu* in Papua. In Ambon, people try to revive *pela gandong* after years of erosion, and in Java, people remain practicing *rembugan*. Cultural practices like this need to be developed to equip community's ability to manage diversity.

In relation to democracy from below, community diversity governance enriches some basis needed to promote it, in addition to the practical advantage it offers like the lessening of conflict potential. Firstly, it encourages equality between community members

regardless of their ethnicity, religion, and geographical origins (Enslin, Pendlebury, and Tjiattas, 2001: 118). Secondly, it promotes inclusion, in which all community members are allowed to take part in community dialogues (Young, 1996: 122), which is a fertile ingredient to develop democracy from below. Thirdly, it encourages communities to build mutual understanding referred as willingness to deliberate together in a certain common focus (Isin, 2002: 125).

Community already has networks ranging from family webs to neighborhood. Furthermore, in the community some places connect between community members. Schools, traditional markets, mosques, churches, community security post, rice fields, cattle product fields, sport field, forest, and community meeting house (*balai kampung* in Javanese are important places where community members use to meet up. Daily community issues like road building, bridge fixing, mosque establishment, rice field cultivation, daily trading, children education, art performance, and so forth are also spotted in these areas. The use of these networks as a space and resource for endorsing democracy principles can be so strategic. *Rembugan* in Java, *musyawarah* in Padang, *bakar batu* in Papua, and *pela gandong* in Ambon, happen in these places. In that occasion, *sengkuyung* (in Java) and *rasopareso* (in Padang) fulfill the processes to enable community members to share their ideas, participate in community discussion, and make collective decision related to community issues.

CHAPTER III
SOCIAL SETTINGS OF PADANG AND KALIURANG

This chapter discusses the social characteristics and post-disaster situations of Padang community, West Sumatra Province and Kaliurang communities in Sleman, Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia, which are relatively different. In general, Pondok community in Padang city consists mostly of Minang and Chinese ethnic living in urban area, while Kaliurang community consists of Javanese people living in rural area. However, both have similarities in terms of the risks to natural disasters. The presentation of social characteristics post-disaster situations of the communities being studied is aimed to give the readers the background information of the practice of democracy from below, discussed in next chapters.

Picture 1
Map of Indonesia*

1. West Sumatra Province | 2. Indonesian capital, Jakarta | 3. Special Province of Yogyakarta | 4. East Timor State

Source: <http://www.maars.org/news/chronicles/05-02/wildside01.jpg> Retrieved on September 30, 2013 at 12.55.

*The word 'Papua' is deliberately used to replace the word 'Irian Jaya' mentioned in original version of map. The author also informs that East Timor is the new state formed in 1999. Previously it was part of Indonesia.

PADANG

Padang city is the capital of West Sumatra Province. It consists of 11 sub-districts, including Bungus Teluk Kabung, Lubuk Kilangan, Lubuk Begalung, Padang Selatan, Padang Timur, Padang Barat, Padang Utara, Nanggalo, Kuranji, Pauh, and Kototengah. Its total population is 833,584 in 2010. Most population of Padang is Minangkabau ethnic, usually shorted as Minang, but a significant number of ethnic Chinese minority, Javanese, Bataknese, Indians, and Arabians also comprise the demography of the city. In spite of the minor number of the population in Indonesian demography, Minangkabau is known to be one of the ethnics in Indonesia for their contribution of its central figures to the making of Indonesian nation state (Hadler, 2009: 1-2). Some Minang figures have been known to be the founding fathers of Indonesia, as Mohammad Hatta, who is the first vice president of Indonesia, Tan Malaka, who is the lead figure in Indonesian leftist movement and Buya Hamka and Haji Agus Salim, who are the great *ulama* (Moslem scholar) and are Moslem politicians in Indonesia. Their roles are mentioned as prominent as Javanese politicians' roles.

As an old city, Padang has an interesting portrait of city planning, which later contributed to the structure of ethnic politics. Netherland colonial government left a big sea port, which played important role in international trading in the past, and involved mostly Chinese traders in its activities. This made area surrounding the port as the center of economy with Chinese as the main actor. Based on the colonial policy, for economic purpose, Minang ethnic were placed in *kampong* (neighborhood environment), and lived separately from Chinese. Similarly, in New Order era, for political motive, Chinese were prohibited to stay at *kampong*. This is later believed to cause ethnic segregation in the social life of Padang.

Sociologically, ethnic Minang, that comprises mostly Padang population, is matrilineal. It means that the genealogy of a family member is drawn from the

Picture 2
Map of Padang City in West Sumatra Province, Indonesia

1. West Sumatra Province | 2. Padang

Source: <http://bto.depnakertrans.go.id/kad/peta/pic/Padang%20 Hilalang.jpg> Retrieved on September 30, 2013 at 13:36.

line of mother. The role of the oldest mother in Minang family that is called *Bundo Kanduang,* is supreme. She becomes the protector of the whole family and the owner of the family property. As *Bundo Kanduang* is the mother of everybody, her property is also accessible to everybody, not in the sense of possessing, instead in the sense of taking the advantages, like harvesting the farming production for marriage celebration, financing education, curing those getting sick, and so forth. Indeed, what is coined as a matrilineal society in Minangkabau is not a pure matrilineal one, in which female is the only center in community. There is still men's role. However, his role remains oriented for female family members. The oldest brother of mother is called *ninikmamak*. *Ninik mamak* is responsible for the welfare of all *kemenakan*, which are the daughters of his sisters. *Ninik mamak* have to take over the responsibility of his nieces' parents, including to take care of their daily needs, education and safety, should the parents are no longer able to do so, like because of having died, losing job, and so forth.

Therefore, unlike Javanese that is very dependent on neighbors, Minang tends to rely mostly on extended family. In spite of the transformation of the form of Minang extended family to the nuclear one, the function of extended family does not significantly erode. Although family members do not stay at one big family house any longer, the obligation to take care of extended family does not automatically disappear. *Bundo Kanduang*'s house (the oldest woman in the extended family) is still the place of everybody in the family. *Ninik mamak* (the oldest brother of mother) is still obliged to be taking care of their *kemenakan* (the daughters of *ninik mamak's* sisters). This causes familial bonding in Padang—and in the other West Sumatran districts—is still strong. Further, the sense of neighborhood becomes rather spatial in Padang especially, instead of social. In this sense, their relationship with neighbors that is out of family lines is mostly functional, or encouraged by needs. Therefore, categorizing Padang community simply as *gemeinschaft* or *gesellschaft* (Tönnies, 2001), as we mostly can apply with Kaliurang community, is never easy. It does not count social collectiveness as

Picture 3
Map of Padang's Sub-Districts

Source: <kpud-padangkota.go.id> Retrieved on September 30, 2013 at 1:15 pm.

primary as in Kaliurang community, Sleman, Yogyakarta. This has resulted in somewhat distancing relations in Padang neighborhood.

Nevertheless, this does not mean there is no binding instrument in Padang neighborhood. In this regard, religion, trading, and sports play crucial role. *Pengajian* (qur'anic studies) is the space that collects community members from different ethnic and social backgrounds in neighborhood environment. Javanese, for instance, becomes easily accepted as they use to be Moslem. In neighborhood environment, Javanese migrants are also known to be active attending *pengajian*. This seems to be the explanation of why Javanese are mentioned to be easy adjusting with Minang culture, at least being compared, for instance to Chinese and Bataknese, who are usually Protestants and Catholics. Trading and sports are the other important space that could meet up Minang and the other ethnic groups. However, to what extent these kinds of activities could make ethnic blending effective to the strengthening of social cohesion still needs for further scrutiny.

Moreover, at the same time, Padang community is known to be very strict in terms of religion. It is widely recognized that Padang and West Sumatra with their Minangkabau culture generally are identical with Islam. *Adat basandi syarak, syarak basansi kita bullah* is a common value that is accepted in Padang (and West Sumatra) community. This means that tradition is rooted from Islamic law, and Islamic law is rooted from the holy book. Such an idiom, in fact does not end up merely as an idiom. It is practiced in daily life. In wider social context, it is even noted that being Minang also means being Moslem. Losing Islam means also losing Minang identity. Marriage, for instance, is an institution, in which the importance of religion is apparent. Unless the couple is Moslems, marriage proposal will not be approved. Otherwise, the couple will be 'thrown away' (*dibuang*) from their Minang clan, and is not regarded as the part of the clan anymore. They even will be deemed as not to be a Minang anymore and will lose their rights of inherited property.

This kind of rule is also happened in daily life, in which the way the people treat their religion is the same as the way they treat their identity. Sometime, not fulfilling religious obligation is one thing, but advocating for religion when it is humiliated is another thing.[1] In grassroots political life, religion also becomes the reference of the community to decide their political support in general election and in regional development. The defeat of Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla in Presidential Election 2014 in West Sumatra, amidst the great victory in almost all Indonesian provinces, is believed to have correlation with

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1   Interview with Zainal Arifin on May 10, 2014, in Padang.

smear campaign being blown up by Prabowo Subiyanto-Hatta Radjasa's team that said Joko Widodo as Christian and being backed up by Chinese businesspersons. Meanwhile, it is clear that Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla are pious Moslems. Similarly, the failure of Lippo Group to invest in mall, hotel and hospital development in Padang due to mass protest is also linked with the issue of evangelization.

In terms of social life, referring to Durkheim's idea of organic solidarity (1994), social relations in Padang is known to be very need-driven. In that case, interest plays crucial role and having relations with the others must have rational purpose. Social relationship that is very family-oriented unlike Javanese that is very neighbor-oriented has contributed to the shape of such an endogamous society. Indeed, urbanization might also play crucial role in forming such a social relations. However, the factor of tradition seems to play more important role than urbanization itself that equating this with the western concept of individualism is quite improper. For most Minang, social relation is not for the sake of collectiveness itself, as Javanese community uses to practice. Social relation is built for the purpose of economy, knowledge, and information accesses.[2]

Relationship with the other ethnics, like Chinese and Javanese, for instance, is not defined as merely for social harmony, as Javanese people use to define social relations. It should bring some things, like skills in trading, access to goods supply, and so forth. As Chinese is seen to be the source of knowledge, especially in trading, and a good partner in local economy, Minang relatively looks not interested in confronting Chinese, at least openly. That is why, as Erniwati (2011) argues, Chinese could relatively survive in Padang, in spite of the issues of religious differences and social segregation they have to encounter.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that problems related to religion in daily life have decreased. In some occasions, this also triggers social tensions. As Olszewska (2010) sees, although Chinese ethnic has entered Padang since the colonial era, ethnic blending remains difficult to happen. Religious difference is kept to be the distancing wall between Minang and Chinese. Chinese is not allowed to live in Padang, but in specific areas, like Pondok and particular *perumahan* area (real estate). Pondok includes some areas in Padang Barat, Padang Selatan and Padang Timur sub-districts. They live together with Nias, and the other minority Minang ethnic.[3]

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2   Interview with Montosori, editor in chief at *Padang Express*, on November 22, 2013, in Padang.

3   The number of population in each sub-district is 59,895; 61,003, and 84,231.

The complexities of social relations in Padang are not only related to Minang and Chinese. It also deals with Javanese, Batak and Nias. It is interesting to view how people like look at the others differently. Dealing with inter-ethnic relations in Padang, A female trader C in Pasar Raya said, 'Never try with Chinese. They are mean. We are not allowed to enter their houses'.[4] Sirmis, a Minang man that works as a coffee shop owner, said that,

> Javanese people like to have dispute very much. When something is a bit not right, he will easily get angry. This causes dispute between individuals. For instance, when pick up our vehicles after parking, Javanese used to get mad if we say we do not have any money. This is different with Padang (Minang). They will say it is not a problem. Chinese has different nature. They are individual. Minang tends to blend with everybody. Some Chinese are willing to blend some are not. Some other Chinese are also very kind, like always saying thank you after shopping. Sometime, there are also Chinese that are rude, like being not grateful after getting helped to get out from parking area. Chinese will make contact (with the others) if only they have particular interest and need. So, we also respond like how they act; as long as it does not lead to further dispute. I am rare having communication with Chinese, but we greet each other. Chinese is very rigid in terms of money. Minang is relatively flexible.[5]

Faizal, a Minang male trader, on the other hand, admits that language becomes the crucial factor. He said it is easier to have transaction with Minang because of the similarity in terms of language. Sometime, for him, it is difficult to understand Chinese. However, he also shares his view about Chinese. For him, Chinese is identical with prosperous life. In his opinion, Chinese limits their interactions only with their fellow Chinese. They are afraid to interact with Padang (Minang), because Padang (Minang) is equally intelligible (with Chinese). He sees, Chinese is often suspicious with Minang, and they only make connection with security officers to buy safety. That is why, in his opinion, Chinese is not open in social interaction.[6]

The relationship with Chinese also gets hard currently for the issue of Lippo Group that enters Padang to invest in hospital, hotel and supermarket development. People believe that Lippo Group hides their Christianization agenda behind this investment projects. In the

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4   Interview on November 13, 2013, in Padang.

5   Interview on November 18, 2013, in Padang.

6   Interview on November 14, 2013, in Padang.

case that is known widely as Siloam case (the name of the hospital Lippo Group would like to build in Padang), Yeyen Kirab, a Minang woman who is also a mosque activist, said, the project is merely to muddle through Minang religious life. She does not believe in the development Lippo Group would conduct in Padang.[7] She identifies James Riyadi, the owner of Lippo Group, as a dangerous man that has an ambition to Christianize 50% of Indonesians.[8] The claim of the government that Lippo Group project will absorb about 3 thousands of unemployed citizens of Padang is not good news for her. She rather worries about the impact of this on Minang religiosity. She feels sure that those workers would merely be employed in blue-collar sectors. Moreover, the area where Lippo Group supposes to develop includes 9,000 acres. This is unbearable for her.[9]

Contrary to this, Suwarni, a Javanese female trader in Pasar Raya, said that Minang is generally hypocrite. She sees that unlike Chinese, Minang are not honest in trading. She admits, this does not apply to all Minang, as some of them are also honest. Yet, she feels that Minang is hard in negotiation in trading, especially when they bargain the price of a good. Based on her experience, this is different with Chinese, who is negotiable, as long as they like the quality of the goods.[10] Susi, a female Chinese, confirms Suwarni. She said that Chinese does not like to tell a lie in trading. She also sees that Minang tend be demanding, in which they like receiving what they already have it.[11] On the other hand, Ines, a female Chinese, also said, she feels not comfortable when Minang undermines the way she prays.[12]

Albert, a Chinese politician, said that it is not easy to identify what is the root of the problematic relations between Minang and Chinese. It is like chicken and egg cycle, he says. He says that Chinese is actually open to social relations. Therefore, saying Chinese as exclusive is not proper. He admits that some Chinese limit their social relations. However, for them, this is not always the case. The important question for him is whether, is Chinese exclusive or is excluded? He underlines mutual understanding as a necessary strategy to deal with this issue.[13]

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7 In an interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.

8 In an interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.

9 Interview on November 16, 2013, in Padang.

10 Interview on November 13, 2013, in Padang.

11 Interview on November 15, 2013, in Padang.

12 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.

13 Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.

Responding to this, Montosori said sometime what happens between Minang and Chinese is misunderstanding and miscommunication. He exemplifies, in Chinese view, gambling, for instance, is an ordinary thing; meanwhile, for Minang it is a sin as it is prohibited based on Islamic teaching. Somehow, he adds, Minang also lack of discipline in business. He sees Chinese focus on one particular business field, while Minang follow the trend of market. Therefore, in Padang, in his opinion, Chinese business is more sustainable. In fact, given their experience and knowledge during their migration in the other islands, Minang should be as skillful as Chinese in Padang business.[14] In addition to Montosori, Amir, editor in chief of Padang Today, said that the limited support of the government to harness inter-ethnic relations, including in the post-disaster recovery, is also influential to the hard relationship of Minang, Chinese and the other ethnic groups. In his opinion, the government focuses too much on physical matters, but rather ignorant to the issues, which are very strong during emergency and recovery periods in Padang.[15] Sometime, the government even becomes part of the problem of inter-ethnic relations. The banning of gate building in Pondok worsens the relations between Minang and Chinese, although it is clear, it is originally about misunderstanding on the gate building permission letter.

In addition, Padang is actually known for their strong culture of *raso pareso*. Literally, *raso* means feeling, assumption, or taste, while *pareso* means evidence, checking tool, and rationality. This is close to what Javanese people usually call as *sungkan* (hesitation, to consider the others' feelings, or to take into account the others' thoughts). No matter how strongly they resist the Chinese, for instance, because of religious difference, they will not kick them out, unless they do want to go out by their own selves. Similarly, no matter big the problems they have to deal with the other ethnic groups, as long as it is not about humiliation, and hurting their self-esteem, they will not get tempted to frontal offending.[16]

A male Minang trader in Pasar Raya (Raya market) said, although within the bottom of his heart he does not like Chinese (especially because of their religion), he will not reject them when they want to have economic transaction. He said, he will behave well, as long as the Chinese people also behave well.[17] He said, his cultural value, namely

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14 Interview on November 22, 2013, in Padang.

15 Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.

16 Interview with Zainal Arifin, May 10, 2014, in Padang.

17 Interview on October 15, 2013, in Padang.

raso pareso requires him as a Minang to behave well to the others. Maskota Devi, an Anthropologist of Andalas University, defines *raso pareso* as an ability to check always our own feeling with the others' feeling, as well as to check assumption with proven evidence, and to balance emotion with rationality. [18] In her perspective, this explains why Minang is hardly involved in open conflict. Nevertheless, she underlines that this does not mean there is no potential of social violent conflict in Padang. Inter-ethnic relation is an area she addresses that seems to be prone to such a social tension. In that regards, she asserts, *raso pareso* is a social practice that functions to be conflict prevention mechanism.

KALIURANG

Kaliurang is a tourism destination is in Sleman district, Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia. Based on Sleman Statistical Bureau, in 2011 the total number of population in Sleman district is 1,125,369. Kaliurang is one of the most significant tourism areas in Sleman district. It is situated in Hargobinangun village, Pakem sub-district. However, volcano tour business in Merapi area are getting expanded time to time, not only including several villages in Hargobinangun, Pakem sub-district, but also reach some tourism areas in Cangkringan and Turi, which are geographically close one another. If Pakem and Cangkringan are known to have volcano tourisms, Turi sub-district is known to have successful agriculture tourism, which is a combination of farming activity with tourism business. Unfortunately, tourism areas in several villages in these three sub-districts also become the first risky zone to Merapi volcano eruption for the very close distance to the volcano's peak, which is less than 5 km.[19]

In Pakem sub-district, the villages that are categorized as the first zone include Purwobinangun (consisting of *Dusun* Turgo, Kemiri, and Ngepring) and Hargobinangun (consisting of *Dusun* Kaliurang Barat, Boyong, Kaliurang Timur, and Ngipiksari). They have 8,579 and 8,289 population respectively (2010). In total, Pakem sub-district's population was 38,361 in 2011. Villages in Cangkringan sub-district that are very near to the volcano include Umbulharjo (consisting of *Dusun* Kinahrejo, Pangukrejo and Gondang), Kepuharjo (consisting of *Dusun* Kaliadem, Petung, Jambu, and Kopeng), and Glagaharjo (consisting of *Dusun* Kali Tengah Lor, Kali tengah Kidul, Srunen, and Singlar). The

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18 In an interview on May 11, 2014, in Padang.

19 *MNC TV News 'Lintas Petang'* 2010 '*Status Naik Jadi Awas, Warga Diungsikan* [As the Status (of the volcano) Turns to be 'Watch Out!' the Community (surrounding the volcano) are moved out]'.

total population in Cangkringan sub-district is 33,162 (2011). Meanwhile, in Turi sub-district the villages that are categorized as the first zone include Wonokerto and Girikerto (consisting of *Dusun* Ngandong, Tritis, and Ngangring) with 8,904 and 7,712 population respectively in 2010. The total population of Turi in 2011 is 40,183.

Most of people in Kaliurang and its surrounding villages work in farming areas or producing cattle. Kaliurang farmers are known as one of the best producers of cow milk. Meanwhile, Turi and Cangkringan communities are known to be successful snake-fruit farmers. Some of them focus on vegetable farming. However, currently, farming and cattle production have not yet been optimally active due to the Merapi volcano eruption impact. Both the farming and cattle production areas were mostly burnt with almost nothing to be left post the eruption. Nowadays, some of the people in Kaliurang and its surroundings try to survive through running a new profession in local tourism as jeep drivers or *ojek* (motorcycle) drivers, while preparing for agriculture and cattle production reactivation. Vegetable farming, home industry, and logging plantation are what currently being developed in society.

Living as farmers in rural areas have shaped the community to have close relations with one another. As many other rural Javanese in Yogyakarta (and other regions in Javanese Island), people in Kaliurang are highly attached to their neighbors. There is *Rukun Tetangga/ RT* (literally means neighborhood harmony) that collects households in one neighborhood environment association. It is the smallest collective unit in community, in which daily neighborhood activities are conducted, like *ronda* (daily neighborhood security activity), *kerja bakti* (weekly collective environment cleaning activity) and *yasinan* (monthly collective prayings). Women also have collective activities, like in *arisan* (collective saving) and *pengajian* (Qur'anic study). For youth, there is *paguyuban muda-mudi* (informal youth association) that focuses on social and art activities, like *kerja bakti* and art performance. In teh situation of post natural disaster, collectiveness can be clearly seen in evacuation as well as in reconstruction phases. Almost all infrastructure reconstruction, that includes road, mosque and bridges involve collective participation of the community. Collectiveness, as Durkheim (1994) conceptualizes, is an important mode of social relations, which will rise more strongly in the situation of crisis and disaster (Durkheim 1984: 77). For Javanese community, including Kaliurang community, collectiveness is not only about to organize people. It is also about social tie. Therefore, respecting for neighbors and maintaining social harmony between community members is a must. They said that 'family' is those living in the closest areas, which means neighbors, instead of relatives that are connected by the same

Picture 4
Map of Special Province of Yogyakarta

Picture 5
Map of Sleman District and Kaliurang Region

1. Sleman district

Source: <www.pip2bdiy.org/sigperkim/peta.php> Retrieved on August 5, 2014 at 16:55.

1. Kaliurang areas

Source: <www.slemankab.go.id/profil-kabupaten-sleman/geografi/peta> Retrieved on August 5, 2014 at 17:02.

genealogy, but residing in distance areas. It can be said, borrowing Tönnies's concept of social relations (2001), people in Kaliurang are *gemeinschaft*, in which the relations among the community members are relatively personal (in contrary to professional/impersonal), collective (in contrary to individual), and intimate.

By ethnicity, people living in Kaliurang region and the surroundings are mostly Javanese. As Javanese people, they put traditions and rituals prominent in their lives. Javanese traditions as *selametan* (offerings for peace and grace seeking) and *nyadran* (praying for the dead family), are amongst the regularly practiced rituals. All of these rituals are done collectively. It could be done in neighborhood environment level, sub-village level, and village level. Sometime, *selametan* and *nyadran* are not only comprised of offerings and prayers, but also added with the sacred art\show, like *wayang* (wooden-made puppets show). People conducted *nyadran* at least one a year prior and during Ramadhan, while *selametan* is conducted in particular months during the Javanese year. Traditions that are conducted collectively are seen to be able to unify people as one community because it binds people in collective rituals could enclose the members of society to forming the social solidarity between them, for people share the same interests, goals, and responsibilities.

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In terms of belief, although most of the community members remain in with keeping their Javanese tradition, they also embrace Islam as their official religion at the same time. Other than Islam, some of them are embracing Christianity and Catholicism. Since embracing one of the formal religions (amongst the five official religions, namely Islam, Christianity, Catholics, Hindu, and Buddha) is set compulsory by the state, combination of traditional religion and official religion sometime becomes a choice. In the case of Kaliurang community and its surrounding neighbors, Javanese tradition and Islamic teachings are practiced together, creating what scholars call as syncretism.

Somehow, tension rises because tradition and Islamic teaching sometime are contradictory. For instance, while tradition allows people to pray under the tree or in the river, Islamic teaching prohibits this as it only teaches to pray only to Allah (Almighty God). Mosque or house is then mentioned as an alternate place to pray. Tension amongst community members between those, who obey more the tradition and more on Islam, is unavoidable. Yet, so far, it does not create violent conflict as people see having good relationship with neighbors is more important than blindly advocating for their faith. As a result, tradition and religion becomes inseparable. Such a model of religious belief is known to be typical in Javanese society.

In terms of social life, religious and village leaders are equally important in the community. Religious leader is more than a leader in prayer. They are also the place, where questions about life will be addressed. Similarly, village head is not merely official leader of village government. They are the parent (*orang tua* in Indonesian, or *wong tuwa* in Javanese) of society. Somehow, village head does not only have to handle businesses related to public service, but also those related to social life, ranging from taking care of one of the family members in his society that is sick, handling the legal matters of his community member that is involved in a traffic accident, and mediating families and community members that are involved in conflict. Therefore, the relationship of the community and their village head is beyond professional matters, unlike the Western concept of formal leadership. Village head's responsibility reaches personal areas (based on unwritten consensus). Consequently, those who are appointed or elected as village head are usually those with good characteristics, like having good attitude and sharp knowledge, and being wise and charismatic. This also applies to community leaders under village-head coordination, like neighborhood and sub-village leaders (*Ketua RT—Rukun Tangga*—and *dukuh*).

Another interesting aspect to discuss relating to Kaliurang community is their culture. As Javanese people, Kaliurang communities

are known to be *halus* (soft, sincere, or tender)*, sopan* (polite), but-notassertive. They are very indirect in expressing what they are thinking, feeling and wanting. They try their best not to commit something thought as *saru* (*tidakpantas* in Indonesian, and 'improper' in English), and to say something *kasar* (rude). In wider social life, this has implication on the relatively minimized conflicts between neighbors.

People do like harmony (*kerukunan* in Javanese and Indonesian language) and unity (*persatuan*). Therefore, *serawung* and *sengkuyung* in society is very common. *Serawung* is to socialize, unite with the other community members, and close or narrow down the social distance. Blending with the other neighbors in *ronda* (community safety guard) and social gathering is something common to find. *Sengkuyung* is to embrace the other community members, who are in difficulties, to lift up the burdens of our neighbors, to give them necessary helps, and to include them in social activity. People also get involved in collective activities like *gotong royong* and *arisan*. *Gotong royong*, which means collective works that is identical with mutual help and cooperation, uses to be practiced regularly. *Arisan* is collective saving activity, in which people meet together to devote their money and the other agreed belonging periodically. When it comes to their turn after being randomly drawn, they can take back the collected savings.

Interestingly, Javanese culture as such influences much the daily politics of the people, which is also very indirect and soft (*halus*). In the case of people's protest to the king, as underlined previously, for instance, people do not directly state their rejection to particular policy of the king. They rather sit and being quiet in the palace yard. As such, the king will understand there is something that needs to be talked. The king then will call the people to enter the palace and let the people express what they are thinking. This seems to influence the way people, in the villages, express their protests. People hardly express their rejection to village government head directly. They usually try to show their loyalty first, then following it with trying to find a way to insert their aspiration usually in the midst of informal conversation. This also works the other way around. When a village government head has a policy, which is potentially resisted by the community, he usually approaches someone, usually a prominent figure in village, to persuade the community members. For them, direct expression is seen rude—the opposite of soft. *Lobi meja makan* (dining table lobby) as President Joko Widodo practiced when he was still becoming Surakarta's mayor in 2005-2010 is a very popular example in this matter. Instead of directly instructing street vendors to relocate to another designated place, Mayor Joko Widodo chose to talk to the traders in lunch session. At first, the mayor did not talk at all about

the relocation. He understood well that this is not going to work. After a series of lunch session with the traders, he bit by bit touched the issue to talk with. And, after more than 50 sessions of lunch, the traders could no longer reject what the mayor wanted. Of course, this is not without conditions. The relocation is designed to provide other necessary facilities for the traders that it would help them adjust with the new trading area. In Hudayana's perpsective (2011), this is what in Javanese society called as*glembuk*, referring to a political strategy to influence others by pleasing them first, either in positive or negative sense, instead of by assertive and open argumentation, either for good or bad purpose. The core substance of *glembuk* is actually to win the heart of others. This is a very indirect diplomacy, as people do not say explicitly what they want. Sometime, they do it with jokes, instead of coercion. Leaders and masses both use *glembuk* to exert their influence and to address their demand amongst each other, for open expression is counted *saru*.

From the above-written explanation, it becomes clear how different Padang and Kaliurang communities are. By ethnicity, Padang is heterogeneous, while Kaliurang relatively looks homogeneous. Padang is an urban area, while Kaliurang is a rural one. Padang community relies mostly on trading and small-scale industry, while Kaliurang community relies mostly on farming, cattle production and volcano tourism. They also have different perspective on social relationship and religion. Padang community is relatively family-oriented and very strict in Islam, while Kaliurang community is very neighbor-oriented and outweighs Javanese tradition than religion. Nevertheless, both the communities have similarities in terms of having relationship with the others. While Padang community has *raso pareso*, Kaliurang community has what is called as *sungkan*, *serawung*, *sengkuyung* and *gotongroyong*, of which meanings are similar, namely to take into account the others' feeling and thinking in social relationship. These aspects will be explored later on community mechanism to deal with the impact of disasters, and how they contribute to the strengthening of local democracy in society.

CHAPTER IV
POST-DISASTERS SITUATIONS
AND SOCIAL RELATION COMPLEXITIES
IN PADANG AND KALIURANG

Both Padang and Kaliurang are prone to natural disaster risks. However, both regions face different risks of disaster. Padang is prone to earthquake, tsunami, and flood, while Kaliurang is prone to Merapi volcano eruption, storms, and earthquake. This part discusses briefly post-disaster situation in the two communities, which specifically being related to earthquake in Padang in 2009 and Merapi volcano eruption in Kaliurang in 2010. Interestingly, both regions have also similar problems in terms of social relations, although it is widely known that Padang is relatively heterogeneous, while Kaliurang is homogeneous, either by ethnicity or by community religious beliefs. This part presents the general picture of post-disaster situation and social relation complexities the communities have to face during the emergency and recovery periods. Some problems have existed prior disaster, but then persisted, or even aggravated in recovery periods, and influence daily relations of community in collective recovery. This is found, for instance, in the case of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese tension in Padang, which was heightening during emergency phases, and inter-generational friction in Kaliurang in terms of local tradition practice, which remained influential during recovery periods. The discussion of post-disaster situations and complexities is meant to be the context information for further discussion on cultural practices and

grassroots democracy strengthening. The discussion is important as disaster does not only have impact on physical buildings but also the daily social relations and functions, which sometime are more complex than we used to imagine, and of course, need for being governed. The discussion of such an issue is aimed to give a deeper portrait of post-disaster dynamics of diversity in society.

In the first part, this chapter discusses post disaster situation in Padang, and social relations complexities related to discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese follow afterward. The second part discusses post-disaster situation in Kaliurang, and social relations complexities related to tensions between Muslim and Non-Muslim, as well as between young and old generation follow afterwards. This chapter is closed with the reflection on Padang and Kaliurang communities' experiences of dealing with daily social relations issues, being related to the idea of diversity and democracy from below.

PADANG

POST-DISASTER SITUATION

The geographical location of Padang in the west coast of Sumatra has made it as one of the most risky areas for earthquakes and tsunamis in Indonesia. The disaster issue has been very crucial in Padang, especially because of the administrative status of Padang as the capital city of West Sumatra Province that also becomes the center of economy, education, government and resettlement. And, Pondok, as the Chinatown of Padang that becomes the focus of this research, is an area in Padang that has high population density and becomes the center of local trading, which is also the most prone to earthquake and tsunamis. It is noted that the functioning of Pondok as the center of economy in Padang has occurred since the colonial era, based on the city planning set up of the colonial government. The policy is economic in orientation, for Pondok is very near to Padang sea port, named Teluk Bayur.

Finding out that Pondok has been very risky to earthquakes, albeit its strategic potential for developing local economy, currently, people start to develop the eastern area, which is hilly and far from the coast to avoid the risk. Yet, the economic magnet of Pondok has not yet disappeared, mainly because the main economic actors, who are mostly Chinese, still reside in Pondok. Post-2009 earthquake, hotels and supermarkets development in Pondok get more intense and it turns to be not only the center of Padang economy, but also Padang local tourism. Fast and vast development of Pondok surprises everybody, as in 2009, when earthquake attacked Padang in the afternoon on September 30,

Pondok was collapsing and its community, especially ethnic Chinese, was known to bear the worst impacts of disaster.

The 2009 earthquake itself caused an impact of 383 death tolls and made the massive destruction of public facilities buildings, government offices, and community residence (detailed information of earthquake victims per sub-districts can be seen in Table 1. Pondok, which includes some areas in Padang Barat, Padang Timur, and Padang Selatan sub-districts, has the highest number of death toll, as can be seen from table 1. This is where most Chinese ethnic reside. Another high death toll is found in Lubuk Begalung and Kuranji sub-district. Not only having the highest number of death toll, Pondok also became the most destroyed area. For people in Pondok, emergency and the first periods of recovery are noted to be very hard for the very slow response of the government (Alfirdaus, 2010). They finally could access to assistance in the second or third year, when reconstruction phases has been started. Gradually, they could restart their business activity. In the fourth year (2013), the sense of what is called as 'normal' life start to regain. Below part discusses a more detailed description on post-disaster situation in Padang.

Table 1
Number of Victims of Padang Earthquake, 2009

Sub-districts		Lost	Death	Severe Wound	Light Wound	Being Internally Displaced (IDPs)
1	Bungus Teluk Kabung	0	8	0	38	0
2	Lubuk Kilangan	0	5	31	32	0
3	Lubuk Begalung	1	40	24	60	0
4	Padang Selatan	0	35	42	43	0
5	Padang Timur	0	41	109	113	0
6	Padang Barat	0	81	110	264	0
7	Padang Utara	1	28	52	31	0
8	Nanggalo	0	27	10	59	0
9	Kuranji	0	36	29	38	0
10	Pauh	0	13	1	32	0
11	Kototengah	0	19	23	61	0
Others	Unidentified Address	0	11	0	0	0
	Outside Padang	0	39	0	0	0
Total		2	383	431	771	0

Source: Local Disaster Management Board (BPBD, 2009).

Emergency situation (up to 6 months post earthquake; September 2009-early 2010). It can be said, in emergency situation, Padang relatively looked chaotic or not well managed. The action of some people that tried to take benefit from the hard situations in emergency period made the situation got worse. Just hours after the earthquake, people found a number of young traders sold mineral water four times than the usual price to their fellow Padang survivors. This happened in the middle of traffic jams when people were in queue to get to the hills to save their selves and their family members. On October 8, the national newspaper *Kompas* reported that a glass of mineral that used to cost Rp. 500 was sold Rp. 2,000. Cigarettes were sold Rp. 15,000 to Rp. 20,000, while it usually cost Rp. 10,000. The price of fuel reached about Rp. 20,000 while the regular one used to be Rp. 4,500 to Rp. 5,000. Some people in the streets even sold it at Rp. 40,000. Cab driver charged up to Rp. 500,000 per route, which is about ten times than the ordinary days. Chili price that becomes the main ingredient for cooking rose up to Rp. 100,000 per kilogram.[1]

On the other hand, the local government performance was seen to be very slow. Some police officers were not in their office when earthquake happened. The head of provincial police office admitted that his staffs were busy to save their selves. Some even got back to *nagari* to their family. Due to limited resource, the local government's rescue team was absorbed to save victims in Hotel Ambacang that victims in other areas, like in Pondok were handled well. Public service did not work. Electricity was off for more than a week,[2] while water supply ceased for about a month.[3] In that regards, people relied much on external aids. Up to about a week after the earthquake, in Chinese *kampung*, plundering was also found quite frequently. About three Chinese informants I interviewed also mentioned that some people lost their property, like stoves, gold that was saved in houses that were ruined at the time, radiators, some tools and machines for car reparation business, and so forth. Some household utilities, like televisions, fridges, and air conditioners, were also lost.[4]Economy at the time was slowing down. In addition to the price rocketing, Padang also experienced goods extinction. Fuel, woods, rice, vegetables, sugar, cooking

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1   See <www.lipsus.kompas.com/grammyawards/read/2009/10/08/04012656/Gempa. Enggak.Gempa.Cari.Untung.Jalan.Terus> Retrieved on April 20, 2015 at 09:17.

2   Interview with a Minang electricity contractor on June 2010.

3   See <http://m.padangmedia.com/1-Berita/57742-Distribusi-PDAM-Pulih-Dalam-Satu-Bulan.html> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 07:43.

4   See <http://mahakam-news.blogspot.com/2009/10/kampung-pecinan-dijarah-belum-dapat.html> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 07:49.

oils, and so forth are amongst the goods that became very expensive. Local traditional market also ruined and people could not run their trading activity. Dealing with this, Bayu said,

> Not only losing houses, people also lose jobs. The most difficult thing is losing hope. The women who have their husband working as tailor in traditional market felt a great hardship because there was no income for the destroyed stalls. The government's aid is only Bulog rice (the National Logistic Board's rice assistance) that is not good to consume. Earthquake is the initial death for the real death.[5]

Padang scenery became very messy. Traffic jams were an everyday and every hour phenomenon. Ruined houses in *kampung* were not yet to get managed. Until about 10 months after teh earthquake, when I firstly visited Padang for my first research, some messy buildings were still not yet cleared up. In this case, NGOs, student volunteers, religious organizations, humanitarian organizations, and Chinese cultural organizations (*kongsi*) became the key for tackling the situations. They helped the people by providing foods, clothes, medicine, and assistance for cleaning up the ruined buildings.

First phase of recovery (from 6 months to 1 year post earthquake; 2010). Entering the first phase of recovery life was still very hard. The government assistance had not yet been well organized. City spaces were not well managed. Padang looked very messy. Traffic jam got worse. Amidst the unmanaged city, people still had to struggle with life for the limited assistance from the government, as well as with the unmanaged ruined buildings. The cleaning up and reconstruction of traditional market, which becomes the center of local economy, was very slow, not only because of the ruined shops and roads, but also because of the bad handling of the dead bodies of the earthquake victims within the market. Consequently, the sense of returning to 'normal' life was also not yet to arise. Up to 1 year post-the earthquake, the atmosphere was still within disaster situations. The following impacts of this are the slowdown of economic growth. The religious and humanitarian organizations and voluntary activists remained the main actors for helping the people dealing with their hardship. Chinese organization (*kongsi*) is amongst the most crucial one to help people provide basic needs and assistance to reconstruct house buildings.

Second phase of recovery (1-2 years post earthquake; 2011-2012). In this phase, housing reconstruction was started. The government

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5   In the transcript of *Perhimpunan Aksara* (2010).

also started to execute its policy of post-disaster reconstruction. As an initial execution, the government formed what they called 'pilot project', in which a village was chosen as an example of the first reconstruction project. People started to busy with forming reconstruction groups in their neighborhood environment to access to financial supports from the government to fix their houses. Yet, the government's focus on reconstructing the city seemed to be lacking. Pasar Raya market reconstruction as the center of the city economy had not yet been managed well. Traditional market traders opened their stalls along the main roads surrounding the market and in front of the market gate. This caused severe traffic jam surrounding the city. Public transportation's drivers even enter the market area to pick passengers more easily. This worsens the situation in the market. The local economy that started to rise up on the one hand, seems to leaves an excess on the problem of messy city management.

Third phase of recovery (3-4 years post earthquake; 2013-onwards). Entering the third year of post-2009 earthquake, recovery has not yet finished. The government still carried out its housing reconstruction program. Pasar Raya traditional market reconstruction was still not yet fixed. Trading stalls setting get more unorganized creating more traffic jams inside the city. Smaller markets in the sub-urban grew rapidly. The city still looks very messy. Tanah Kongsi traditional market, conversely, recovered very quickly. It turned to be the cleanest market, as well as the market that could provide the best quality goods in Padang. In Pondok, the development of new and bigger hotels than those prior earthquake grows rapidly. Some spots in Pondok become new tourism destination area. Nevertheless, the number of ethnic Chinese residents slightly decreases. They migrated to other cities, as Jambi, Pekanbaru, Jakarta, and Bandung. Yet, they still become the core actor of Padang local economy. The sense of returning to 'normal' has been found in that area.

POST-DISASTER COMPLEXITIES: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITY ETHNIC CHINESE

In addition to messy management of post-disaster situation, Padang also experienced some problems in social relations that are also very influential to the recovery processes. This includes mainly the issue of discrimination against minority Chinese that was seen not only by ethnicity different to common Padang residents but also by religious beliefs. The issue of discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese was blown up after a text message became viral amongst the people. The text message, as reported by *Jawa Pos* on October 5, 2009, said as the following,

> Tell the world; stop the donation to West Sumatra!!! Primordialism and racism are happening there. Chinese people are not allowed to have food and were forced to buy food aid. Family of mine was there!!! Please send out this massage to the world so they know the truth!!!

At first, discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Padang after the September 2009 earthquake was believed to be merely a rumor. However, media response to the issue was massive, that it became the public concern. A Netherland radio, broadcasted its interview with Rina, a female Chinese resident saying that,

> We are safe but our house is severely destroyed. It needs for major reconstruction because it is not safe anymore to stay within. However, until now there is no assistance being allocated. They (the apparatus) evacuated (the victims) outside China town surrounding company (and hotels). (Meanwhile) there are many people killed in the (Chinese residential) area, which they did not handle. [6]

In fact, Rina is not alone. Another Chinese man admitted that there was no help distributed to Chinese *kampong* that the Chinese to take of their own selves, although they were clearly bearing the greatest impacts of the earthquake.[7]

From this, it becomes clear that the limited aid is the main reason of the widespread issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese. The aids include the need to rescue the victims in Chinese *kampung*. Secondly, it includes aids for daily survival. Related to the rescuing policy, ethnic Chinese saw that rescue team came very late to Pondok in spite of the massive impacts of the earthquake, and focused rather on the victims in Ambacang hotel. Based on an interview with a Chinese man,[8] if only the rescue team could come in Pondok timely, the number of death might be less (Alfirdaus, 2010). He added, there were still people that could survive until 3 days after the earthquake, but finally were died, because they did not get immediate help. He asserted, while calling for the rescue team to take action, what ordinary people could do is only to throw away foods and drinks in the midst of ruining building, hoping the dying people could access to it. In fact, the limited number of the rescue team was centered on Ambacang hotel, and when they were available for tackling people in Pondok, the

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6   As can be seen at <cdn.radionetherlands.nl/bahasa-indonesia/article/penduduk-kampung-cina-padang-didiskriminasi> published on September 30, 2009.

7   Metro TV on October 6, 2009.

8   On June 2010, in Padang.

people already died. Meanwhile, for basic needs aids, people felt that the ones distributed to ethnic Chinese were very limited. This included the distribution of staple foods and medical facilities in Pondok, of which the people were mostly affected. Some of them gained side-dish money of Rp. 5,000/day for about a month, but some others did not. People understood that stigma that ethnic Chinese was rich played very much in this case. Even, the government alleged that Chinese were too dependent and spoily, since they were actually already rich and did not need for help.

The ethnic complexities surrounding emergency periods had caused the political climate got heated. This issue also heightened the existing social tension between Minang and Chinese for years for the issues of religious differences. Indeed, Minang people generally rejected to be alleged as discriminatory. They said the root of problem was laid on the slow performance of the local government. A Minang woman, who is active in an NGO, said the government faced the problem of performance, transparency and accountability (Alfirdaus, 2010). Therefore, it is more about the slow performance of the local government than about the ethnic politics issue. She even asserts that the issue of discriminations against ethnic Chinese was blown up by the media to boost the oplah. The issue was not seen important by most Padang residents. To figure highlight more clearly the view, another Minang woman said that disaster is a disaster for lay people, but not for the politicians. It is because, when a disaster hits Padang, they are the first to access to the aids. An informant argues, instead of tackling the impact of 2009 earthquake, the aid distribution for post-2007 earthquake had not yet been totally tackled due to the complexities in local bureaucracy. Therefore, saying the messy governance of post-2009 earthquake in spite of the huge amount of money the local government received as a sign of discrimination against ethnic Chinese rather than as a portrait of bureaucracy's performance is questionable (Alfirdaus, 2010).

The social complexity in emergency period also arose for the rare collective works (*gotong royong*) amongst neighbors. Instead of helping the victims, people visited the destroyed areas merely for looking around. Because of this, the term 'disaster tourism' was then popular. People near Pondok then related it with the issues of ethnic difference, in which not helping the fellow Chinese was something deliberative. However, a Minang woman said that acting like this—not directly helping the others—is the typicality of Padang residents. Based on an interview with this woman, typically Padang residents relied on individuals and nuclear family's assistance during the emergency situation. She added, it is considered awkward to offer helps to those

personally unrecognized.[9] That is why collective works like the one found in Yogyakarta was not much happened, for each community member focused on his or her own family. Moreover, there was similar number of non-Chinese residents (Minang, Javanese, Batak, and Jambi) that were suffering a lot from disaster impact.

The problem get more complicated because the government officers rather shown their reactionary statement instead of responsive actions. Sudarto, an NGO activist, remembered that Fauzi Bahar, the mayor of Padang city, expressing frontally his disappointment towards ethnic Chinese. He did so because he felt the government already helped the Chinese through evacuating the victims in Ambacang Hotel and helping Yayasan Prayoga (Catholic school foundation), which are located in Pondok area. In fact, as Sudharto identified, although the hotel owner is a Chinese, most of the victims are Minang. As Sudharto explains, the real Chinese victims is in Chinese *kampong* (residential areas), and not in the hotel. Unfortunately, those who were trapped under the ruined houses in Pondok were mostly left unassisted. As a Chinese man argues, should the government act very quickly, the number of death toll might be less than what is now listed.[10] Dealing with Yayasan Prayoga, Sudharto asserts, although Yayasan Prayoga is a Catholic-based school, and its students also include Chinese, it is not affiliated to Chinese. Therefore, as Sudharto argues, it is awkward to claim assisting the Chinese by evacuating people in Ambacang Hotel and Yayasan Prayoga schools, while they actually did nothing with the people in Chinese *kampong*.[11]

What makes the problem looks worse than what it actually happened is the mayor's action in Chinese kampong as if he was helping the Chinese residents. Elisa, a Chinese student, said, 'Fauzi Bahar's action is just too much. What for is acting to carry out a sack of rice in his back in Pondok and broadcasted by TV station. For me, it is just exaggerating. As a matter of fact, there is no crucial follow up after this action to assist people in Pondok'.[12] Until almost 9 months after the earthquake, there were no many Chinese, who could access to the government's aids for staple foods and medical facilities. The Chinese mostly gained it from their fellow Chinese and *kongsi*.

Dealing with this Veridiana, a Chinese woman, added, 'I was informed that there is no government's assistance at all. Once more,

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9   On June 2010, in Padang.

10 Interview on June 25, 2010, in Padang.

11 Interview on June 20, 2010, in Padang.

12 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang.

the government assumes ethnic Chinese will work by their selves to get everything done'.[13] Veridiana clarifies that Chinese would clearly do by their selves, but this does not mean they do not need for help. A Chinese shop owner strengthened Veridiana said that 'Chinese deserve the government aid because they are also citizen, and the pay for taxes even more expensive than the other citizens'.[14] Another Chinese shop keeper said that there was already a government officer that visited her to collect data from her. However, she never knew what the government did next responding to data collection. After 10 months, there had been no aids distributed to Chinese residents. Dealing with this, Bayu, a Minang man, added,

> The condition in Pecinan (Chinese *kampong*) is severe, especially because there are many Pondok residents that have not gain any help, as they are coined to be already rich enough. (Fortunately), they have a cultural organization called HBT (Himpunan Bersatu Teguh). Many Chinese that wound and trapped in the collapsed houses are left unassisted. And, this has been a sensitive issue, here (in Padang). [15]

Strengthening Bayu, Mohd Nur, a male Moslem Chinese juice seller, said that the government assumes Chinese is already rich. This makes the government insensitive towards the complexities in Chinese environment.[16] As Mohd Nur, there are thousands Chinese residents that need for helps. While Mohd Nur sells fruit juice in cart, his neighbor sells cold sugar crane juice.[17] Mohd Nur clarifies the point that not all Chinese is rich, and there are many of them who live in poverty, and as many other people in the world, also there is a problem between the rich and the poor Chinese in terms of social relations. Confirming Mohd Nur, Albert, a Chinese man, said that the social life of Chinese is like the life of many other Indonesians. Some of them are rich, but there many of them that are poor.[18] Albert exemplifies, there are Chinese who worked as a parking guard, street newspaper seller, and house maids. There are many poor Chinese that did not have any ability to reconstruct their ruined houses after they cleared it up.

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13 Interview on June 25, 2010, in Padang.

14 Interview on June 21, 2010, in Padang.

15 Transcrip of Perhimpunan Aksara, 2010.

16 Interview on June 26, 2010, in Padang.

17 An estimation of income for juice sellers is Rp. 20,000 - 50,000 (US$ 1.8 - 3.5) a day.

18 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.

Interview with a Minang woman reveals that what Mohd Nur and Albert's concerns happen in society. The woman confirms that there was no aid being distributed in Chinese *kampong*. However, she added that,

> […] the ethnic Chinese is already covered with insurance. They are covered with big insurance. Therefore, when the earthquake hit Padang, they could move around (leaving Padang and then come back again when Padang is already safe). Once they come back, they quickly could rebuild (their shops and houses). They all live in Pondok and there is no one that lives in *kampong* (with Minang residents). There are few of them that live in Cendana area, which is a real estate. They are different. Chinese has distance with Minang. They could not do anything in Padang. If they were asked for charity, they used to protest. They are not sincere. They are not accepted to live in *kampong*. They have a lot of money. Their insurance is big.[19]

She added, in terms of insurance Chinese is not like Minang. She admits that she does not have any insurance that will cover her risks. She said,

> Our salary is just right. We, who work in the government office, remain unable to speak up. If we were critical, we will lose opportunity to advance our careers. Moreover, we are heading to direct governor election. This applies to post-disaster policy as we now are facing. We could just receive what the government would like to give. If the government gives the aids, we appreciate it. If not, we could just accept it.[20]

The interview with this Minang woman reveals that the stigma about ethnic Chinese as being rich is not nonsense. It exists in society.

Nonetheless, not all people agree with the opinion that the social issue that arose during the emergency period is mainly about discrimination against ethnic Chinese. Those people rather see that the post-disaster complexities are about the usual bureaucratic problem.[21] This view is commonly rose up by Minang residents, who feel that those who suffer from the absence of aids are not only Chinese; it included Minang as well. Erniwati, a Minang woman, admitted there were crucial problems in post-disaster recovery. However, she refuses if this is mentioned as a form of discrimination. She rather sees this

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19 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang.

20 Interview on June 29, 2010, in Padang.

21 As Febrin and Erniwati said in an interview on June 25 and 26, 2010, in Padang.

as the typical pathology of local government.[22] Confirming Erniwati, Ratna, a Minang woman, said that she experienced the very slow response of the government. She asserted, 'If only the government were quick in spreading the aid, we might be able to recover soon. We need almost 6 months to smile again. The first three months was still very scary. Things get slowly better just afterwards. Currently, Padang is more managed. Previously, it is just like a dead city.[23]

Ratna clarifies it is not easy to access to the aids from the government. She knew there were many financial aids from the outside institutions. However, aid distribution in Padang is never an easy issue. There is problem in government management, including the aspect of data collection and follow-up policy. She explains,

> We are not brave enough to protest (the government). We could only submit required documents. This is because our leader is not transparent. They also did not good data collection. There are things that are miss-managed. We can look at the death victims in Pasar Raya traditional market. They said they already gathered the data. In fact, several days afterwards, there were still dead bodies found within the building of the market, including bones and skeleton. Now, Pasar Raya area is divided into smaller stalls from plywood. Instead of getting good, this makes the market messier than it was in previous time. The provided stalls do not cover all the traders. Meanwhile, if the traders want to open stall along the sidewalk, the government always prohibits it. The government asks the traders to trade in stalls, but the number of stalls is limited. The stalls also close the access to the traders inside the market. Everything is messed-up. Instead of managing post-2009 earthquake, the government does not yet even get post-earthquake reconstruction done.[24]

Moreover, as she said, 'ethnic Chinese is mean, not kind and not sincere. They are exclusive. They are not Moslem. They will never be accepted in *kampong*. If they were praying, they used their offering, which is smelly. People in *kampong* cannot stand with the smell, so they are forced to leave *kampong*'.[25] What she tries to underline is, instead of Chinese—that is new comers and minority, Minang—that is coined as the native and majority of Padang residents—are not that easy to access to the government's aids.

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22 In an interview on June 27, 2010, in Padang.

23 Interview on June 29, 2013, in Padang.

24 Interview on June29, in Padang.

25 Interview on 29 June 29, 2010, in Padang.

Given such a condition, it is understandable should community collective work was rare during emergency and recovery periods in Padang. Mohd Nur clarifies his fellow Chinese that people looked not to care of one another. Chinese, especially, could only help their own selves, instead of hoping the others to help them, although they clearly needed for the help. Being Indonesian Chinese and minority ethnic, for Mohd Nur, is a cause of why Chinese rarely got assisted. Arifin Salim, confirming Mohd Nur, asserts that in his opinion the absence of collective works to assist ethnic Chinese seems merely to have relationship with the fact that Pondok residents are mostly Chinese.[26] Religion, including Islam that is embraced by few Chinese seems not to have significant influence to the way Chinese is seen. Ethnic Chinese remained being looked as if they are rich, and had wider network to overcome the disaster impacts, and, thus, did not need for help from outside. Therefore, confirming Salim, it is not a surprise that in the 2009 earthquake, inter-community collective works in Padang did not happen to rise.

KALIURANG

POST-DISASTER SITUATIONS

The most threatening natural disaster in Kaliurang is Merapi volcano eruption, which is predicted to occur at least once every four years. Merapi volcano is located in the middle of Central Java and Yogyakarta Provinces' borders, crossing four districts in the two provinces (Magelang, Klaten and Boyolali in Central Java and Sleman in Yogyakarta). Its eruptions are noted to happen in 1872, 1994, 2006, 2010, 2012, and 2013. Amongst the periods, 2010 eruption is the biggest with the significant number of loss in society. The 2010 eruption occurred on October 26 and 27 and on November 6, with the death toll of 353, and around 400,000 people in both Yogyakarta and Central Java Provinces were moved out from their residential areas. Its pre-eruption activity had been started since September 2010, and its post-eruption volcanic activity remained until the late November 2010. Less intensive Spiro plastic floods followed until several months afterwards.

In the emergency and early recovery periods, the role of NGO and humanitarian organizations is crucial, in addition to the role of the local government. People also relied on their neighbors. The helps of those less affected to those who were more affected by the eruption that mostly had nothing to leave in their homes, except the land that

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26 Interview on 25 June 25, 2010, in Padang.

turned to be unproductive, were very useful during survival periods in shelters.[27] Some other helps also came from other institutions like the churches, the mosques, universities, and so forth. However, in order to return to 'normal' life, namely to reactivate farming and cattle production, people relied much on the government. Around 300 acre of farming areas destroyed due to the volcano ashes,[28] and almost 2,000 cows were dead due to the burning fire post the eruption.[29] All of these aids helped people pursue their initiatives in rebuilding their houses, agriculture and public facilities. A more detailed explanations on the situation of post-disaster from emergency phase until recovery phases based on field research conducted on December 2013 and January 2014 are presented below.

Emergency (up to 3 months post-the eruption; October-December 2010). In Kaliurang, at the phase of emergency, neighbors played crucial roles, in addition to family, in helping people to survive. Actions by neighbors were usually spontaneous and unorganized. The role of the government was crucial, but not optimal.[30] Siren was being turned on by the government did not reach wide areas surrounding the volcano. Some informants admitted, they even knew about the eruption from television broadcast. The facilities being provided by the government to transport people to temporary shelters were not enough. This is one of the explanations of why people looked not well prepared during emergency periods. Yet, the roles of neighbors complemented the roles of the local government. Some people said that their local leaders and some youth organizations in their villages were very helpful. They made coordination with private company and military officers to provide cars and trucks to transport the people out of the villages.[31] The other young men in *dusun* (sub-villages) cooperated with their fellow neighbors that owned cars or motorcycles to carry out women, the elderly, and children from their homes to the safer places.[32] There were also some others who offered space in their vehicles spontaneously to those who fled their homes.[33] Temporary

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27 To get the land back to its normal, the people need at least three-four years post the eruption.

28 See <www.politikindonesia.com/index.php?ctn=1&k=nusantara&i=20622> Retrieved on February 24, 2014.

29 Source <peternakan.litbang.deptan.go.id> Retrieved on February 24, 2014.

30 Concluded from several interviews during December 2013 and January 2014, in Kaliurang.

31 Interview with Ahmad Syarif on January 8, 2014 in Kaliurang.

32 Interview with Sutarno on December 22, 2013, in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.

33 Interview with Ny. Sulistiyo on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta.

shelters were the main destination of most people. For months people stay at shelters provided either by the local government in sport stadium, school building and *hunian sementara* (temporary house), by university at their buildings, or by the nearby church. They visited their villages only to make sure their remaining living cattle were sufficiently fed.

First phase of recovery (up to a year after eruption; 2010-2011). As described earlier, during the first months of post-Merapi eruption, most of Kaliurang residents stayed at shelters, either provided by the government, religious organizations (like Islamic boarding schools and churches), and universities. Sport stadiums, village offices, university buildings, boarding schools' rooms, and churches' building were amongst the places to stay. Sometime, they had limited water supply and bad public toilets. In some other places, they were treated well with enough foods and decent sleeping rooms being provided. It can be said i this phase people were still reliant on the helps of the others because people were still unable to return to their burnt houses, nor earn income to run their daily life. Those, who had their houses partly destroyed, were busy to clean them up from the volcano ashes or to fix the destroyed parts. *Gotong royong* (collective works) was still rare in this phase because people were focusing on their own family and houses to get cleaned.[34] After cleaning and fixing their houses, they used to come back to shelters. Meanwhile, those, who had their houses totally destroyed and were no longer able to stay within, were forced to remain staying at the shelters until reconstruction aid was distributed, which was a year later.

While staying at temporary shelters, they also tried to earn money by being *ojek* driver (motorcycle drivers) and small-scale traders. Those, who still wanted to continue their farming, had to mobile from their shelters to the garden near their original houses, and then came back when the day was heading to afternoon. Despite of technical difficulties, people did not cease their efforts. They realized that at this phase, having a permanent occupation was a crucial issue. Therefore, for those, who were unable to cultivate land, being an *ojek* driver is a possible option. Although they usually earned Rp. 40,000 - 50,000 (US$ 3.5 - 4.5) a day, which is far below their daily income as a regular farmer and cattle producer, they kept this choice until they could return to their own houses.[35] For those, who had their houses less destroyed could leave the shelters and start a 'normal' life, as well as run their new business generally after three or four months. Those,

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34 Interview with Sarah on January 8, 2014 in Kaliurang.

35 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.

who had their houses fully destroyed usually, could return after one to two years.

Second phase of recovery (1 to 2 years after eruption; 2011-2012). In the transition period between the first and second year of post-eruption, resettlement policy by the local government was executed. Focus was mostly given on those who had their houses totally destroyed, their farming land totally burnt, and their cattle were totally dead. The local government combined the policy of reconstruction and relocation. Reconstruction was for those that had their settlement was partly destroyed. Relocation was for those who had their land was no longer possible to live in due to the high risk of volcano eruption. People in the shelters started to be relocated in the new areas with the assistance mainly from the local government. Some community members that rejected to be relocated and rather chose to stay at their own land were threatened not to be given any assistance by the government. This indeed triggered big protests. The government, however, insisted not to make any negotiation unless the community was willing to be relocated. The very high risk of the location to Merapi eruption was the main consideration of the government. Meanwhile, those who insist to stay argue that they already have their earning source in that area (farming). They did not see they could do so in new location. Some other people, who similarly live in the most risky area, made a strategy to propose *bedhol desa* relocation (relocating all the village members in one place in order not to significantly change the neighborhood structure) to the government.[36] The others just accepted what the government set up for them. In this phase, social organizations, which were mainly meant to be the media of social consolidation for responding recovery policy in the village level, started to be active again.

With the relatively quick response from the government, entering the second year post-the eruption, most people already returned to their own homes or new houses in the relocation area. After getting settled, people started to reorganize their selves through reactivating RT organization (*Rukun Tangga* or neighborhood organization), *dusun* (sub-village government), and *desa* (village government). Monthly meeting was started to be reactivated in order to re-order social activities. In addition to individual activity in the respective households, people also conducted activity in community level. Activities in community level were particularly aimed at fixing public facilities as bridge, public road, mosques, meetinghouses, and so forth. In relocation area, people also started to learn about community waste

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36 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang

management. The role of NGO, in addition to the role of the local government, was crucial for providing technical and organizational trainings of waste management.[37] Gradually, people started to recover.

Third phase of recovery (starting in the third year post eruption; 2013-onwards). Entering the third year of the recovery period seems that life started to be 'normal'. For those, who live in relocation area, challenges generally come from the obligation to change habit within new social environment. Previously, they used to live in their own house that was large and a bit separated from their neighbors, which let them enjoy 'personal freedom', like to turn their television aloud. Now, they had to adjust with their new small houses and their closest neighbors, who sometime have their infants crying, and make their environment a bit noisy.[38] Nonetheless, they feel that now they are more organized. Some women also started to get used with collective home-industry activities sponsored by the district government. In this phase, people also seemed to get accustomed with their new professions in tourism sector either as jeep drivers, *ojek* drivers, tourist guides, and *warung* (small shop) owners. They admitted that life is surely more difficult.[39]

POST-DISASTER COMPLEXITIES: RELIGIOUS AND TRADITION DIFFERENCES

It is known that Merapi Volcano eruption in 2010 in Kaliurang is amongst the worst eruption ever identified with relatively high death toll and the severe level of destruction. However, going more deeply into society, the problems in fact are not merely about those tangible things. One of the issues that ever heat the social climate in Kaliurang and Yogyakarta in general is related to religion. This problem strengthens the existing problem due to bureaucratic constraints in disaster management during the emergency and recovery phases. Although Kaliurang community in the surface looks homogeneous with most of the population are ethnically Javanese and Islam believers, in fact problems dealing with social issues like religious differences and traditional beliefs are quite strong. Firstly, it deals with the issue of evangelization. Secondly, it is about the social tension between old and young generation, especially relating to the practices of tradition and rituals. Below is the description of the problems one by one.

Evangelization (or in local language is used to be mentioned as Christianization) has been a contentious issue in Kaliurang long

37 Interview with Sumarni on October 13, 2013, in Kaliurang

38 Interview with Sumarni on October 13, 2013, in Kaliurang.

39 Interview with Ramijo on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.

before the 2010 eruption.[40] The issue strengthened when the church situated in the safe zone nearby Kaliurang, a Christian university, namely Duta Wacana Christian University (Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana—UKDW) and the other Christian organizations provided shelters, staple foods, medicine, and clothing for Merapi survivors.[41] The issue was firstly blown up by the Yogyakarta's hard-liner Moslems by alleging the Churches and the other Christian organizations trying to persuade the evacuees to convert to Christianity with some material compensation. Those, who got evacuated in the Church, were being intimidated and forced to leave the Church. Because of this, situation during the first days of emergency phase was very stressing.

Responding to this, some respondents argue that the allegation of Christianization is not true. Some evacuees in UKDW, for instance, admitted that the university provided better place for temporary stay.[42] The room was comfort living, the toilet was clean, water supply was sufficient, medical needs were well provided, and students were available there for assisting the Merapi eruption survivors.[43] Similarly, those who stayed at the Banteng Christian church admitted that the place was decent enough to live, at least compared to the sport stadium in Meguwa, the neighboring sub-district of Pakem and Cangkringan, provided by the government. However, what is more important is, those respondents acknowledge that in these places, they were free to conduct prayers five 5 times, as a Moslem usually practices. They were allowed to use water for *wudlu* (cleaning the body with water before praying) and room for praying. Dealing with this, Nyonya Sulistiyo, a Merapi eruption survivor that was evacuated at Duta Wacana Christian University, said,

> (After looking for decent shelter) At the last, we stayed at Duta Wacana (Christian University), (of which direction is) Bethesda Hospital to the south. We were in group. I stayed there for almost a month, and I got sick, afterwards. (In those periods) I also got some aids from Duta Wacana. It consisted of cooking oil, rice, bread, and so forth. While staying there, I, as a Moslem, was free to conduct *shalat* (5 times prayers in Islam). Those who want to pray in the mosque or in the church were fine. Even, a colleague

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40 As Ahmad Syarief said in the interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

41 As said in interview with Isparmi on January 2, 2014, in Kalirang; with Mbah Gito on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang; and with Ny. Sulistiyo on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang.

42 As Budi Susanto said in the interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

43 Interview with Budi Susanto on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

gave me a praying cloth because I did not bring anyone. Alhamdulillah... (Praise to Allah).[44]

Another experience is shared by Mrs. Marwan. She said, 'I stayed at, what is called? (Asking her female fellow, who was cutting collecting grass in front of her), Banteng Baru. It is Banteng Baru Church. In the Church, we used to use the room for *shalat*'.[45] Responding to the action of Moslem hardliners forcing those staying at the Church to leave, Marwan added, 'It is awkward to say if we were forced or persuaded to convert to Catholics. How could people tempt us to embrace Catholics while at the same time they provided us a room for *shalat* in the Church during our stay there?[46]

Although Nyonya Sulistiyo and Mrs. Marwan assert that Christianization during evacuation is merely a rumor, it had triggered social tension in Yogyakarta. In Central Java this was even responded quite strongly Indonesian Ulama Assembly (MUI—Majelis Ulama Indonesia Jawa Tengah).[47] Some media mentioned the allegation of Christianization did not only happen in Yogyakarta, but also in Muntilan (Magelang district), Boyolali and Klaten (in Catholic Church Kebunarum) in Central Java Province that were also affected by Merapi eruption.[48] Not only created tension between Moslem and Christian believers, the issue of Christianization also triggered tension amongst Moslem leaders. Moderate Moslem leaders from Nahdlatul Ulama organization, like Abdullah Muhaimin and Said Agil Siraj, as hardline Islam media alleged, were said to allow Christianization happened, just because they visited the Merapi survivors regularly in the churches to make sure that they were comfortbale enough to stay.[49] Meanwhile, it is clear that, based on Muhaimin's experience in Catholic Church Ganjuran, Bantulan, the issue of Christianization is non-sense.[50] In

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44 Interview on Janury 22, 2014, in Kaliurang.

45 Interview on 8 January 2014, in Kaliurang.

46 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

47 *Republika* 2010 'Astaghfirullah, Pengungsi Merapi Dikristenisasi [*Forgive us Allah! Merapi Evacuees were Christianized*]' December 29.

48 Voa-Islam (online news), 15 November 2010, 'Ribuan Pengungsi Merapi Ditampung di Gereja, Akidah Terancam Dimurtadkan [*Thousands of Evacuees were Collected in the Chruches, the Faith is Threatened to be Converted*].'

49 *Eramuslim (online news)* 2010 'Kristenisasi Korban Bencana Merapi Didukung Petinggi NU [*The Christianization of Merapi Evacuees was Supported by NU—a Moderate Moslem Organization in Indonesia*]' December 6.

50 Kompas 2011 'KH Abdul Muhaimin: Merangkai Keberagaman [*KH Abdul Muhaimin: Crafting Pluralism*]', January 13.

order to cooling down the situation, Muhaimin cooperating with a Catholic priest made an agenda to visit the churches day-to-day to lead the prayer and preach to the evacuees.

Another tension is also present between the young and old generation, especially relating to the practices of rituals that rooted in Javanese tradition in daily social life. This includes, for instance, the practices of *nyadran* and *selametan*. *Nyadran* is an activity prior and during Ramadhan (fasting month in Islam) to send the dead family prayers, but it is usually also followed with offerings and food distribution. Meanwhile, *selametan* is (anytime) ritual to seek for God's blessings, either as an expression of grateful feelings to God or as a praying to God's grant for savior. Wuriyanti said,

> Tension between the old generation and the young one remains to exist. You know, it is a difficult issue. (The old men) often persuade the young men to attend *kenduri* (*selametan*). If the members of the community are ten, they want those ten people attending. Although those ten young people are silently rejecting the invitation, they at last fulfill it just to respect to the old one. Therefore, they actually attend with different *niat* (intension). The young men (who used to be educated in *Muhammadiyah* waythat rejects *kenduri*) believe that in their religion, *kenduri* is not compulsory. It is the social life that makes it compulsory. Meanwhile, there are many *kenduri* here. There are four during Ramadhan (not to mention the other months). Yesterday, we just attended *kenduri* for commemorating (newborn) cow.[51]

In the context of recovery phases, the religious activities as *kenduri* or *selametan* are inseparable from the daily life of Kaliurang community, to pray for those being killed by the eruption, as well as to ask for grace and savior for those who are still granted life by God during the hard periods of the eruption. In Kaliurang (and Javanese society in general), both *nyadran* and *selametan* require the participation of a number of people, therefore the rituals are collective in the nature. The root of problem between young and old generation's relations stems from the different perception about the practices of *nyadran, kenduri* and *selametan*. The old generation feels that it is still very important, while the young one feel that it is not relevant to the people's needs. First, it takes a lot of money—and off course, time. Second, it is close to *syirik* (betraying God) because it uses particular materials that are identical with Javanese religion, like flowers and offering foods. However, sometime the young generation could not resist the

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51 Interview on October 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

old one. As a result, although such a tension is not yet cleared up, the practices are still preserved until today.

Indeed, many other problems influence the way the community members build their social relations one another. However, so far, those problems, namely Moslem-Christian relation, majority and minority Moslem, and old and young generation's relation—are amongst the prominent ones in Kaliurang community dealing with religion and cultural practices. From this, it becomes clear that even in society that seems to be homogeneous, problems remain exist. These problems are outside the issue of physical destruction, but remain influential in the way people dealing with disasters. Therefore, considering these issues in disaster management is as important as handling the problems of physical reconstruction.

ISSUE WITHIN ISSUE: DIVERSITY WITHIN POST-DISASTER SITUATIONS

The rise of the issue of diversity in the context of post-disaster situations as Padang and Kaliurang communities experience has shown us its impact on the doubling burdens for community to recover. Diversity itself is not a problem, unless someone makes it as a problem so that it omits the rights of those called as 'the others'. Moreover, when diversity is problematized during the context of disaster, it will surely worsen the situations that have already been hard due to post-disaster destruction and lost. In the context of Padang, for instance, ethnic Chinese that comprised the most victims in 2009 earthquake have been pressed by the problems of destroyed buildings, public facilities, and inflation. People were in high need for assistance. However, just because they are Chinese, which are identified as being rich—but unfortunately also stigmatized as being mean and greedy at the same time—their rights to gain assistance in emergency periods were neglected. They could only access to aids in reconstruction phases after a series of media pressure and political lobby were imposed to the local government.

Meanwhile, it is clear that not all Chinese in Padang are rich. There are many of them that do not pursue their education into university after high school. There are also many of them who work as laborer, instead of entrepreneurs, a profession that is perceived identical with ethnic Chinese. If so, there are a lot of them who run only a small of shop (*warung*) that will help them to survive in the daily life. It is also not difficult to find out Chinese women that work as housemaids in their *kampung* in Pondok. These poor people of course are in strong need of help when disaster hit. Unfortunately, these facts are not seen by those who are trapped in ethnic sentiment. Sitgma works

better than facts. Whatever it is, ethnic Chinese remains being seen as the one mostly contributing to the non-Muslim statistics in Padang, in spite of the increasing number of Chinese conversion to Muslim. They are also as the most important competitor for Minang to develop their economy.

Purdey (2002) identifies that ethnic sentiment addressed to ethnic Chinese, which seems to persist until currently, cannot be separated from the issue of nationalism and political economy. Ethnic Chinese is identified to be in the side of the colonial government during the colonial era. When Indonesia was busy with anti-communism under the support of the United States during New Order, ethnic Chinese was made to be the target of cleansing for being identical with the People Republic of China (PRC) that is communist in ideology. Their success in economy has been made to be an issue to provoke violence against ethnic Chinese prior *reformasi* era in 1998. Some ministers at the time asserted that ethnic Chinese domination had caused economic crisis in Indonesia, although it is clear that the state's inability to manage and develop economy due to huge corruption of Soeharto's family and crony played the most portion for Indonesian economic failure. Based on Purdey's argument, from the experience of ethnic Chinese in Padang, it becomes clear that Cheesiness is not a problem. It is problematized because there are politics, blown up either by the state or non-state actors, behind, so that it looks that being Chinese is a problem. In disaster context, the problematization of Cheesiness bears impacts on the omission of ethnic Chinese's rights as a citizen to access to government aids for rescuing their families and fulfilling their basic needs.

Similarly, there is nothing wrong when the Churches and a Christian university offering help to Merapi eruption survivors in Kaliurang. Just because they are affiliated to Christianity, and the survivors are mostly Muslim, the offer then is perceived as problem. A participant of a discussion in my presentation session in a seminar asserts that there seems to be a lag in the idea of 'service' in Christianity that is not well understood by those committed church sweeping, although the politics of number across religion is also not a trivial problem. Suspicion that the survivors would be persuaded to convert to Christianity has motivated the Muslim hardliners to force the survivors to leave the churches. The same is found in terms of different perception about tradition, although happens in relatively soft and non-frontal modes. The young people believe that tradition is merely about status quo—of the old generation, while for them practicality is more important. For old generation, the young men are just like to rebel because of their young blood. Understanding is the only one that connects these differences.

From the above-written explanation, it clarifies us that diversity is an unavoidable social fact for society. Yet, it is not a social problem. It becomes a problem when people play it as political commodity and fail or do not have willingness to govern it. Referring to Reilly (2006: 11-13), diversity becomes political because it is constructed so. Reilly mentions the politicization of religion and ethnicity is one of the most common phenomena that contribute to the political sense of diversity, as commonly in Asia and Pacific, like in the issue of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia and Muslim conflict in Southern Thailand that involves Thai and Malay ethnic groups. Dealing with this, what should be counted more is then not the diversity *per se*—how many ethnic groups, religious beliefs, and racial groups comprise a community—but more importantly is how it is governed. In this case, Reilly (2006: 21-22) concerns on political engineering that he defines as, 'the conscious design of political institutions to achieve certain specified objectives'. In this regard, I took different start from that of Reilly. While Reilly concerns his ideas of political engineering on the formal institutions, i.e. on electoral system, in this research I focus more on how community 'engineers' their diversity governance using their daily cultural practices. As such, what I mean by 'engineering' in this case is not in the formal sense, but in informal, as I have addressed earlier. The discussion of community diversity governance in post-disaster context using their daily cultural practices is discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V
GOVERNING DIVERSITY WITHIN: COMMUNITY CULTURAL PRACTICES AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW

This chapter discusses cultural practices in community diversity governance, especially in the context of post-disaster situations. This reveals community initiatives across the cultural (and somehow religious) beliefs and backgrounds to deal with the problems of social relations during the periods of emergency and recovery in Padang post-2009 earthquake and in Kaliurang post-2010 Merapi eruption, as the previous chapter has addressed. In Padang, the use of cultural practice on community diversity governance is traced from the idea of *raso pareso*, while in Kaliurang it is from the idea of *serawung, sengkuyung* and *gotong royong*. Further, this chapter discusses the use of cultural practices in community diversity governance and its contribution to the promotion of democracy from below. Some challenging issues in this case are also discussed, because it is realized that the practice is not always going very easily.

CULTURAL PRACTICES AND GRASSROOTS DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: *RASO PARESO* IN PADANG AND *SERAWUNG, SENGKUYUNG* AND *GOTONG ROYONG* IN KALIURANG
Before further discussing how cultural practices as manifested in the idea of *raso pareso* in Padang and *serawung, sengkuyung* and *gotongroyong* in Kaliurang it is important to discuss their meaning for

communities. The meaning underlined in this part is identified from literature review and interviews with local communities during the fieldworks. Although there is not yet a consensus amongst scholars about what exactly these ideas mean, the identification of the meanings at least will be helpful for understanding further discussions of the building of democracy from below through the governing of diversity issues in communities.

THE MEANINGS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Literally, *raso* means feel. *Pareso* is the same with the Indonesian word, namely *periksa*, which means to check or to clarify. Referring to Nusyirwan (2011), *raso pareso* (in Bahasa is *rasa-periksa*) is a balance between feel and rationality, in which feel needs to be checked with rationality, that it will sound logic, evidence-based, and having long term orientation. And, conversely, rationality should be checked with the feeling that it will sound context-sensitive and is able to avoid hurting others. In *raso pareso* an individual should support his/her argument with sufficient evidence, as well as listening carefully when the others delivering their views in decision-making (Yulika, 2012: 165).

Referring to Latief (2002: 65), Minang culture identifies the application of *raso pareso* thatincludes two main principles, namely the principle of *raso dibao naik* and of *pareso dibao turun. Raso dibao naik* literally means lifting what is laid on the heart (feeling) up to the brain (rationaility). *Pareso dibao turun* means lifting what is laid on the brain (rationality) down to the heart (feeling). Ratio examines the feeling. Equally, feeling examines the ratio. Therefore, as Erniwati explains, it is not a surprise should community dialogue (*musyawarah*) in *kampong, nagari, village,* and so forth, could last very long, because people consider carefully what others talk about. Although the community members get equal freedom to deliver their aspiration, they also have obligation to listen to the others.[1]

In wider Minang context, *raso pareso* is closely linked to the idea of *alam takambang jadi guru*, which literally means, 'the nature that develops to be the teacher for the people'. This emphasizes the need to be sensitive to the social and natural environment that always gives signs and a source for learning. In the application of *raso pareso* and *alam takambang jadi guru* some ethical teachings have been described, which culminates in the concept of modesty (*sahaja*; *sederhana*). Modesty is broken down into the following values, in which:

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1   In an interview, November 18, 2013, in Padang.

1. The strong ones are prohibited to commit to war;
2. The rich ones are not allowed to ask for help and;
3. The poor ones are not necessary to feel undermined.

In addition to this, there is also the idea of 'kato nan ampek', which means the four-word rule that asserts social adjustability in social environment. 'Kato nan ampek' consists of four words of 'mendaki', 'menurun', 'mendatar', and 'melereng'. 'Mendaki' (to step up) is to speak and behave politely to the olders. 'Menurun' (to step down) is to speak with love to the younger. 'Mendatar' (to step ahead) is to respect those that are equal in age or in social status. 'Melereng' (to step like getting along the roads in the mountain) is to speak implicitly, like to daughter/son's mother/father-in-law. Amongst the four, 'melereng' is the most popular, as can be seen in Minang *pepatahpetitih* (proverbs) for being considered the most polite way to communicate. *Pepatah petitih* (all sorts of proverbs) is seen important to represent *raso pareso,* because it is very close to the idea of modesty. Through *pepatah-petitih* a person will not be too much in expressing the feeling of anger—and of course happiness—to avoid physical dispute when two parties are disagreeing or jealousy when sharing good news.

While *raso pareso* deals with modesty in personal and social life, *serawung, sengkuyung* and *gotongroyong* in Kaliurang mostly deal with social environment. Literally, *serawung* means to socialize with the other community members in order to unite with the community in the nearby environment. Blending with the other neighbors in *ronda* (community safety guard) and social gathering is something common to find. *Serawung* is a clear representation of what Tönnies (2001) conceptualizes as *gemeinschaft,* in which collectiveness could also be the objective of the social activity, instead of merely as the means. Being selfish is not an option in community, and people are obliged to be care of the others. *Serawung* is seen important in Java because people believe that they could not live without their neighbors. They believe in the nature of interdependency of human beings. Ramijo, the *dukuh* head in Kaliurang said that social unity that is built through *serawung* is needed to manage and solve social hardship.[2] Therefore, having good social relations is a requirement to have good mutual helps.

Sengkuyung is understood as a way to embrace the other community members, who are in difficulties, in order to lift up their burdens (to care of), to give them necessary helps (to share), and to include them in social activities (to engage). *Sengkuyung* for Javanese

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2   Interview on October 12, 2013, in Kaliurang.

community is an expression of welcoming and open-minded way of thinking. Individualism is something avoided in society. Ahmad Syarief, a new comer and a student of an Islamic Boarding school in Kaliurang said, 'So, we apply a term called as *sengkuyung* in society when we participate in community collective works. It is similar to lift up one another's burden. We are new comers here. It would be impolite if we do not want to (participate in social life). In Javanese (he repeats again), it is termed as *serawung*'.[3] Strengthening this, Maman said, '(If there is *hajatan*—similar to *selametan*), it is just the same. We visit each other. It is applicable to funeral, death commemoration, and marriage. No problem. In Eid Al-Adha, all the community members are given (meat). It is just usual, people getting involved in *dusun* to meet and chat. It is not a new thing. People get used with *sengkuyung*'.[4] Sarah describes *sengkuyung* by giving an example as the below statement:

> During Christmas, our Moslem neighbors also participate in safety guarding. Similarly, when Moslem neighbors celebrate Eid Al-fithr, the Christian fellows also join in safety guarding surrounding Kaliurang. So, we share the social tasks.[5] In Eid Al-adha, Christian neighbors are also there (in the mosque). The meat is distributed evenly.[6] If we hear one of our neighbors dead, we also visit them. If the dead neighbor is Christian, the Christian fellow is responsible for handling (the funeral). Our Moslem neighbors also come to express their gratitude, but they do not participate in handling the matters. They only handle the commemoration of the fellow Moslems. However, the Moslem neighbors accompany us until in the cemetery.[7]

Finally, *gotong royong* means collective works that is identical with mutual help and cooperation. The difference of *sengkuyung* and *gotong royong* is, in *sengkuyung* the purpose of the inclusion of the community members in taking care of the others' burdens or problems is more individual, while in *gotong royong,* the purpose tends to be more collective. In *gotong royong,* what the community use to collectively handle includes building, fixing, and maintaining public facilities. The nature of *sengkuyung* usually is accidental, while *gotong royong* is usually scheduled periodically, may it be weekly, monthly, and so forth.

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3   Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
4   Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
5   Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
6   Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.
7   Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

People, however, in practice do not strictly differentiate the term. Sometime they mix it. What is more important is the essence of helping the others. *Serawung, sengkuyung* and *gotong royong* reflect what Geertz (1957: 32) underlines when discussing Javanese society that Javanese society, 'emphasizes the manner in which belief and particularly ritual reinforce the traditional social ties between individuals'.

CULTURAL PRACTICES IN GRASSROOTS DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

As underlined in the preceding chapter, ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese relationship in Padang has long been in a distance. Differences in ethnicity and religion are mentioned to be the main causes. However, as Purdey (2002) argues, differences in ethnicity and religion are only happened in the surface. Sometime, these cultural attributes are only politicisized like through the wide spreading of stigmas and labeling to mobilize ethnicity or religious sentiments of the crowd to gain some political benefits. If we trace further, in the context of Padang the contrasting political views since the colonial era, as well as long-lived economic competition between ethnic Minang that is counted as *pribumi* (native residents) and ethnic Chinese as *pendatang* (new comers) significantly explains the problems. Besides, during the emergency and early recovery periods, ethnic and religious sentiment was lifted up again causing the aggravating tension between ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese.

Interestingly, although the issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese post-2009 earthquake was strong, it fails to expand to be a violent social conflict. This is surely helpful for the next processes of recovery. Dealing with this, some people relate this with the economic interdependency between ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese (look for instance Erniwati, 2007, 2011). In my interview, Erniwati also says that Minang feels ruining Chinese will mean ruing their own economy. Small shop owners in Minang community have been very dependent to ethnic Chinese's supply and distribution in machineries and the similar goods gained from outer cities. Similarly, ethnic Chinese is also dependent on ethnic Minang in supplying local farming products.[8] Therefore, when the issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Padang arose, both Minang and Chinese tried not take it seriously in their daily relationship. However, if economy is the only explanation, why did people in Medan do not do so? When entering political transition in 1998, unlike Padang, Medan was firing due to violence against ethnic Chinese, although clearly ethnic Chinese and

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8   Interview on November 23, 2013 in Padang.

the native residents of Medan have similarly interdependent economic relations.

Dealing with this, looking at Minang daily cultural practices might be helpful in addition to some explanations from economic perspective. In that regard, focusing on *raso pareso* becomes very crucial. Some informants—from ethnic Minang and Chinese, affirm that *raso pareso* have helped people to function their self-control. Based on interviews, there are at least three strategies both the ethnic groups were taking, figuring out how the idea of *raso pareso* is manifested in diversity management in daily practices. The strategies include the following.

The first is to admit the problem (limited aids and slow response to the earthquake victims and survivors), but not to exaggerate the cause that is generally mentioned (discrimination against ethnic Chinese). Based on my interview with Erniwati, instead of denying, ethnic Minang generally admits that there is a big constraint of aid distribution during emergency and early recovery phases. However, they generally pointed out bureaucracy as the main cause of slow emergency response, rather than discrimination. In order to strengthen their view, they also asserted that in addition to ethnic Chinese, they, who are actually native residents in Padang, are also part of those experiencing the difficulties.[9]

Although it looks simple, this response is strategic. It sounds less reluctant to respond the problems of aids distribution, but remains being careful to allege the cause (discrimination). As such, they share their recognition with ethnic Chinese, but, by pointing out something else other than discrimination, they reject that discrimination exists. This is quite different with the other ethnic groups in Indonesia in general that tend to act very *primordialistic* when negative allegation is attributed to them, although politicization may take a role in it.

Some interethnic violence in Indonesia is known to have partly a root in such a thing. Dayak-Madurese conflict in Kalimantan and Poso conflict in North Sulawesi, for instance, happened because of this ethnic and religious sentiment. Through such a response, we can see quite clearly how *raso pareso* is working. By admitting the problems, Minang has shown us that they try to feel what ethnic Chinese feels—getting refused, excluded and marginalized in aids distribution. But, by pointing out another thing other than discrimination as a cause, Minang has shown us their awareness of social and, possibly, political consequence of this to their fellow ethnic Minang, like the rise of

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9   Interview on November 23, 2013, in Padang.

negative stigma about Minang, as well as the worsening relationship of Minang citizen with the local government that is also comprised mostly by ethnic Minang.

The second is to conduct a meeting with prominent figures. Responding to the widespread issue of discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese, prominent figures from both ethnic groups tried to meet one another for clarification. Ethnic Chinese was represented by the prominent *kongsi* leaders from HTT and HBT. They met with Padang *mayor*, representing either the local government or Minang community. Although the meeting involved Padang city mayor, the meeting ran in a informal way, conducted in mayor's own house and outside working hours. In the meeting, the participants agreed not to prolong the problem, and chose rather to focus more on rehabilitation. The meeting, of course, is criticized to be very political. It is because; it is ethnic Chinese that was required to apologize for the spreading rumors of discrimination against them, instead of the other way around. Ethnic Chinese in this instance clearly remained hard to sit equally with Minang as Padang citizen.

Interestingly, instead of resisting the demand, they agreed to do so, as Erniwati explained.[10] Although this impresses us that ethnic Chinese then looks weak before ethnic Minang and Padang local government, this actually part of political tactic, which in De Carteu's term is contrasted with strategy. Referring to De Carteu, tactic is a way of the object of power to take advantage amongst the difficult situations imposed by the power holders. Meanwhile, strategy is a way of the subject of power to create and retain status quo in economic and political relations. As such, tactic is a bit opportunistic. In the case of ethnic Chinese and ethnic Minang meeting, this tactic is read well. Therefore, although this might sound unfair, this actually reflects ethnic Chinese's political awareness.

As a result, this has successfully ceased the social tension to continue, and ethnic Chinese was later listed as the recipients of the reconstruction aids as the other Padang residents. For the houses that were destroyed, the government distributed about Rp. 15 millions/household. For those who have their houses modestly destroyed, the government provided about Rp. 10 millions/household. In addition, for those who had their houses lightly destroyed, the government provided Rp. 1 million.[11] Indeed, meeting with Padang city mayor is not

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10 Interview on June 27, 2010 in Padang.

11 See <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/161597/bantuan-rekonstruksi-rumah-rusak-berat-rp15-juta-jauh-dari-cukup> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 09:05.

the only one. In several occasions, Padang city mayor also tried to visit Pondok during recovery periods. In addition, ethnic Chinese and ethnic Minang also conducted some informal meetings with prominent figures of *nagari*—traditional community unit in Minang society to cooling down the situations. In this case, *nagari salapan suku*, of which office is situated in Pondok, plays crucial role in succeeding the meetings.

The third is to make a concrete contribution in recovery processes. When people were stuck during the emergency periods for the absence of the government aids (in early 2010), it is Chinese organizations (e.g. HTT and HBT)[12] that helped them survive, in addition to some other aids distributed by company, donors, NGOs, and other humanitarian organizations. Through their *kongsi* organization, Chinese collected aids from their fellow Chinese throughout Indonesia, and even foreign countries. Albert, a central figure of one of the Chinese organizations, said, his organization allocated some amount of money to help non-Chinese residents. The total amount is about one fourth of the total charity Albert had collected. The non-Chinese receivers included Javanese, Batak, Jambi, and so forth. The other three fourth was used to help the members of his organizations reconstruct their houses and reactivate their businesses. This was based on the mandate of the donators.[13] A Minang male trader in Pasar Tanah Kongsi confirms Albert by saying,

> Yes, there was aid distributed by HTT, HBT. Minang community members also gained some. There is no difference between Chinese and Minang. Both Chinese and Minang are given a package of aid. There are also aids from the Church in which Moslem victims of earthquake could also gain it. In Tanah Kongsi, all the traders and residents gain aids from HTT. There is no difference at all.[14]

Another crucial contribution of Chinese in Padang is in terms of the renovation of Tanah Kongsi traditional market, Goan Hoat traditional market and Gantiang Grand Mosque. The renovation is a result of the significant contribution of a Chinese businessperson, namely Ferryanto Gani, who is also known as the leader of HTT.[15]

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12 HBT is Himpunan Bersatu Teguh. HTT is Himpunan Tjinta Teman. Both are a kind of cultural organizations.

13 Interview on November 20, 2013, in Padang.

14 Interview on November 21, 2013, in Padang.

15 Wempi, Yohanes 2012 *Obral Geral Sangsako Adat [Selling Down Adat Title]*, *Singgalang*, February 15.

For HTT's big contribution, *nagari* leader of which territorial area is in Pondok granted Ferryanto Gani *adat* (traditional) title, which later triggers a controversy. By those who disagree with *nagari salapan suku*'s policy, the entitlement is seen to make *adat* title granting looks like a great sale. Meanwhile, for the *nagari* leader said that it is part of the gratitude of Minang community to Ferryanto for his big contribution to develop Padang. A person I met in the *nagari* office said that what ethnic Chinese did for helping ethnic Minang, not only in Padang, but also in the other regions of West Sumatra, has been great. For him, it will look too arrogant if ethnic Minang refuses to thank to what ethnic Chinese has been doing. Moreover, the relationship with ethnic Chinese will not last as long as they still reside in Padang. Therefore, for him, maintaining good relationships will always be crucial to keep peace and social harmony.

Apart from the political sense of ethnic Chinese and ethnic Minang's meetings, as well as ethnic Chinese's action to help people in Padang and West Sumatra, and *nagari salapan suku*'s entitlement to ethnic Chinese's prominent leader, this has shown us of both ethnic groups' awareness of what should be doing in responding to the problems. Ethnic Minang chose to share their awareness of the problem of aid distribution, but pointing out bureaucracy instead of discrimination against ethnic Chinese as the cause of problem. Similarly, ethnic Chinese chose to initiate the meetings and agreed with what requested to them—to apologize, to cease further clash with ethnic Minang, as well as to take part in aid distribution in Padang and West Sumatra. This kind of practices reflect quite clearly what Minang means by *raso pareso*, namely to consider what the others' thinking and feeling of particular problems, in order to avoid direct friction, and maintain social harmony.

A rather different strategy is practiced in Kaliurang, in which people, as previously argued, characterized by their strong collectiveness in social relations. Therefore, in responding social problems like the allegation of Christianization and social tension due to different perception about *adat* (tradition), people tend to choose resolution that enables them to remain maintaining social harmony, which is manifested in the practice of *serawung, sengkuyung*, and *gotong royong*.

As Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University, has reported in 2011, amidst the strong social solidarity between communities and social organizations, including religious organizations in post-Merapi eruption 2010, there is still some clashes caused by religious issue in the evacuation area. A group of people entered the churches, where some Merapi survivors were evacuated, and forced them to leave the churches. Unfortunately, in

this case police and military officers were seen unable to manage the tension. Instead of encouraging the parties to meet and talk, the police and military officers chose to instruct the survivors to leave the churches. This is of course a saddening phenomenon for the community.

Yet, this kind of event was responded quite differently by the Merapi survivors, as well as by some moderate Muslim leaders. Some survivors remained staying at the churches until they were ready to return to their homes, while some moderate Muslim leaders gave their supports to this humanitarian action by building dialogues with related parties. Meanwhile, in the case of social friction due to different perception about *adat* (tradition), people chose not involve the informal mechanism to resolve. They use their mechanism of *serawung, sengkuyung,* and *gotong royong* to cool down the situation, and to maintain social relations remain conducive. Below parts discusses a more detailed pictures of how *serawung, sengkuyung,* and *gotong royong* are practiced in community diversity management in their daily life.

The first is to take the problem as if it is not a serious thing. People actually know that sweeping the churches when they were evacuated is a serious problem. It is a kind of religious violation. There is no right of any religious group to ban another particular religious group to offer help during emergency and recovery periods. It is awkward to force Muslim survivors of Merapi eruption to receive only aids from Islamic organizations. First, people are not certain whether aids from Muslim organizations are enough to help them survive. Second, when people started to recover and return to their homes, there were many religious organizations, not only Islam, that stayed at Merapi (Kaliurang) to help the survivors. The question is, why not banning Muslim organizations to help Merapi residents that are non-Muslim, because it is clear that not all residents are Muslim. Community knows exactly that humanitarian action should not be limited by religious belief.

Dealing with this, community, however, chose to regard the problem as if it is not a serious problem. Isparmi makes the statement clearer by asserting that, 'In evacuation, people do did not really take into account the issue of religion. Religion is not a big deal. The most important thing is people got place to stay for a while. I am serious. Many people were evacuated in the Islamic University of Indonesia (UII, in Kaliurang Street). Many of them also stayed at some churches, like in Banteng. They were all mixed. There is no rule that says only Christian allowed to stay at the churches and Islam at the mosques or Islamic universities'.[16]

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16 Interview on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang.

Marwan that stayed at a church when being evacuated asserts that, 'There was nothing happened (during evacuation). So, why should be bothered? Even, if you find any problem, you can talk (*dirembug; rembugan* in Marwan's term.' In order to give evidence of her statement, Marwan told her story about praying when she was staying at the churches, 'We were not constrained to pray, to take *wudhu* and *shalat* (five times praying in Islam)'.[17] Budi Susanto explains that Kaliurang people were treated well in the churches and Christian university. Besides being facilitated to conduct *shalat,* the churches also provided staple, water supply and health facilities.[18] Responding to this, Sulistyo, a Muslim resident of Kaliurang asserts that, 'We're all God's creature. The fellow Christians are also God's creature. We are the same. Therefore, helping each other is encouraged. All is God's creature. Allah's Almighty'. She does not feel different as the God's creature from that of Christians by being Muslim.[19]

The second is to ask some prominent moderate Muslim and Christian/Catholic figures to take part in interreligious problem resolution in post-disaster context. In this case, the role of Kyai Abdullah Muhaimin, a leading figure in Islamic Boarding School 'Nurul Ummahat', is significant. When I met him in an interview in May 2012, he said after the sweeping issue arose, he tried to visit the churches where people were evacuated, one by one almost every evening. In total, there were 13 churches, which provided shelters for Merapi survivors, and the location of each church is quite far. In each church, he led the evacuees in *shalat maghrib* (becoming *imam* for evening prayer) and conducted a short qur'anic study (*pengajian*). He asserts there was no refusal from the churches to the evacuees that wanted to pray, and the allegation of Christianization is just non-sense. His activity to visit the churches one by one is to let society know that Christianization is merely a groundless fear. He adds that the Christianization issue had made life more difficult provide that the survivors had been burdened with the impacts of Merapi eruption. People also became more stressful.

Not only visiting the churches one by one, Kyai Muhaimin was also very active in building communication with the priests in the churches. Kyai Muhaimin is known to have a close relations with *Romo* Yatno (Priest Yoseph Suyatno Hadiatmojo, Pr), a pastor in a Catholic Church, in Somohitan, Girikerto, Turi, Sleman, which is

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17 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

18 Interview on January 8, 2014, in Kaliurang.

19 Interview on January 2, 2014, in Kaliurang.

quite close to Kaliurang area. These two figures are an active leader in FPUB (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman—Interfaith Brotherhood Forum).[20] While Romo Yatno was active in mobilizing volunteers to help evacuees fulfill their basic needs in the churches, Kyai Muhaimin was active in peace campaign during evacuation periods. His relatively good relationship with several key figures in Muslim hardliner organization is also useful to build communication with them. Their action is not always easy to get handled, but that connection could be a crucial path for further communication.

As a follow-up of this interreligious communication, Kyai Muhaimin and Romo Yatno also cooperated in helping Merapi community to build water pipe to support water supply and to plant some trees involving children from different religious backgrounds surrounding Boyong River area in Kaliurang to support reforestation. The involvement of religious leaders like Kyai Muhaimin and Romo Yatno is clearly helpful for the community to get through the hard times in evacuation periods.

The third is to remain involving community from different religious beliefs in collective recovery processes after returning to their homes. This strategy was done in internal environment of the community. Community in Kaliurang realizes that no matter what, Christianization remains a sensitive issue. Therefore, in addition to the involvement of religious leaders in interreligious peace campaign, in their internal environment the community also tried to keep the situation conducive by building good relationship with their neighbors after their returning to their homes. They realized that not all Kaliurang community is Muslim. There are some of them, although minority, that is Christians (Protestants and Catholics). The issue of Christianization during emergency and early recovery periods surely made them feels uncomfortable with their neighbors, who are Christians.

In order to maintain their good relations with their neighbors from different religious beliefs, upon their return to their homes, the community conducted collective works regardless of the community's religious belief. After the community members finished cleaning their respective houses from volcano dust, the chief of neighborhood environment (*Ketua RT*) usually coordinated his neighbors to have meetings to discuss collective works. On the weekend, he also coordinated community to clean and rebuild public facilities. This may include cleaning the roads from growing grasses and bushes, rebuilding the

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20 See <http://romoyatno.info/mainmessage.php?entry=entry100727-122856> Retrieved on April 21, 2015 at 12:01.

destroyed roads, mosques, and bridges, as well as reactivated community collective sport activities, like jogging.

When a family member of a neighbor gets sick or died community in the surrounding environment then quickly comes to share their sympathy. They also help the neighbors prepare for commemoration for their dead family members, although they do not get involved in the religious rituals. When Muslims commemorate Eidil Fithr and Eidil Adha, Christian neighbors are busy helping to manage motorcycles and cars parking in the mosque. Similarly, when Christians commemorate Christmas, Muslim neighbors help them manage security and parking. From these activities, people develop again their social bondings. In addition to helping community build good relationship with their neighbors, such interreligious activities also help community to build mutual understanding, as well as social resilience for dealing with interreligious complexities as they had faced during evacuation periods. Otherwise, they will also get easily provoked with a rumor that may ruin their social relationship.

Finally, responding to intergenerational differences on practicing *adat* like *nyadran* (to give offering to the dead family members) in cemetery prior Ramadhan (fasting month), *tahlil* (praying the dead family members in houses or mosques), and *yasinan*, the young generally choose to remain obey what the older generation advising. While the older generation practices these for respecting cultural and religious values, in addition to building social bondings amongst neighbors, the young generation usually practices it for the sake of respecting the older generation. This also happened when the community had to deal with the burying of dead family members due to Merapi eruption. They generally avoid having direct clashes and disputes with older generation, although for them it is a bit complicated.

From the above written-explanation, we can see how the practice of *serawung* (maintaining social harmony), *sengkuyung* (mutual helps), and *gotongroyong* (collective works) are very strong in the context of Kaliurang community. The asertion of *rembugan* (to have dialogue with neighbors) as Marwan highlights, responding to the Christianization allegation complexity, shows us her concern on the importance of *serawung*. This is similar to Kyai Muhaimin and Romo Yatno activism in building communication exchange and cooperation responding to the pressure from Islam hardliner supporters. This reflects their belief in the primacy of *serawung* in dealing with social relations complexities.

Further, the community's willingness to help their neighbors that have difficulties in recovery processes as practiced in road building clearly reflects mutual sharing, as asserted in *sengkuyung* and

gotongroyong. Some activities are conducted directly to cooling the heated situation after the rise of the Christianization issue, as well as the disputes on traditions in recovery periods. Some others are conducted to build the resilience of the community in dealing with issues like interreligious differences.

CULTURAL PRACTICES AND DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW
From the above-written explanation, it can be seen that cultural practices either as found in Padang or Kaliurang diversity governance are in line with democracy principles, namely participation, equality, and deliberation, and therefore, can be said to support the development of democracy from below. In principles, *raso pareso* is very accommodative to community deliberation and dialogues, while *serawung*, *sengkuyung* and *gotongroyong* are also close to community mutual sharing, mutual help and mutual understanding. Below parts discusses how and why the cultural practices as discussed above intersect with democracy principles.

Firstly, what is interesting in the cultural practices and community diversity governance that is being linked with the promotion of democracy from below according to Padang and Kaliurang communities experience is, it raises in the middle of the absence of the state (and its formal democracy). In the case of Padang, it is very clear that the state is reluctant to resolve the problems. There is no clear response offered by the state to overcome it, for instance to provide spaces for ethnic Chinese to voice what they experienced during emergency phases. In several occasions, the state, represented by the city mayor, even asserted that ethnic Chinese, basically, did not need for help for already being rich, which clearly underpins the existing negative stigma on ethnic Chinese. Ironically, this seems to be done just to deny the discrimination alleged to his institutions. Of course, such an action is not contributive to the bettering of diversity management. Instead of being part of solution, the state rather acts as part of the problem.

It is admitted that the city mayor had shown his willingness to meet with ethnic Chinese leader. However, it should have been known that the mayor could not be said to represent the state because in fact he did not issue any (formal) policy that is supposed to support truth seeking in that matter. The mayor did not encourage the local police to investigate the root of the issue, for instance, from short message being spread in Padang and the world wide, as well as media news publishing on discrimination. His willingness to invite ethnic Chinese leaders is no more than the politics to force ethnic Chinese to disregard the fact that discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese in aid distribution exists.

Similarly, when the allegation of Christianization arose during evacuation periods in Kaliurang, there is no clear resolution offered by the state to deal with the issue. Evacuation, basically, is the state's responsibility. Moreover, it is quite ironic when the state apparatus instructed the evacuees to leave the churches just using the reason that the evacuees needed to avoiding public suspicion. In that case, we can see very clearly the irony in the state's response. While the state was still unsure about to will overcome with evacuation problem given the limited facilities and resources the state (local government) had, it had discouraged a non-for-profit-and-for-politics institution like the churches that voluntarily provided the services. Instead of 'feeding' the hardliners supporters by instructing the evacuees to leave the churches, it might be better for the state to manage the issue so as much that it does not muddle through the evacuation processes. This is part of fulfilling the state's responsibility.

Of course, by asserting the absence of the state as the political context of the rise of the practices of community diversity governance both in Padang and in Kaliurang, this does not mean to explicitly contrasting the idea of the informal democracy and formal democracy imposed by the state. However, it is not rare to happen that community initiatives to promote democracy from below that is generally informal in the nature is motivated by the fact that formal democracy does not work properly. Referring to Kaufman and Alfonso (1998: 1), based on Latin America experience, the idea of democracy from below rises because people aspire to search for forms of democracy that will allow them to control their lives and livelihood. When the provided institutions supposed to pursue democracy principles do not work as they are supposedly functioned, community will surely find a way as an alternative.

Secondly, both cultural practices as found in Padang and Kaliurang communities look to enabling the work of deliberation processes in communities. *Raso pareso*, for instance, has encouraged community members from ethnic Chinese to have a dialogue with some prominent figures from ethnic Minang. It might be running not in an entirely equal way, because ethnic Chinese is still treated as minority that is (informally) obliged to be the subordinate of ethnic Minang in decision-making, but it has at least expanded the spaces and opportunity to have a talk with fellow neighbors. Further, in the context of Padang, *raso pareso* has also encouraged people to control of what they talk about and what they do in order to prevent community members from different ethnicity and religious backgrounds from direct clashes. With the cultural practice like this, community from different backgrounds may live peacefully, but remain unable to be strongly

engaged one another. Ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese are so far noted to be very rarely involved in violent conflicts, but they also noted not to have strong engagement to particular extent.

This is quite different from what happens in Kaliurang. *Serawung* in Kaliurang, for instance, has not only encouraged community to get engaged one another in a relatively equal mode, it has also enabled them to build communication and cooperation across religion. This is supported with the practices of *sengkuyung* and *gotong royong* that underline mutual sharing and understanding in daily community life. Some might argue that in such a practice there is possibility that community do participate for the sake of groupthink. Lunenburg (2010: 2) defines groupthink as the groups' decision-making that prioritizes groups' consensus instead of realistic consideration based on political and economic evaluation. Therefore, in groupthink, the groups' cohesiveness outweighs any other thing. Therefore, if we compare again with what we call as democracy principles, this tendency is actually deteriorating (the democracy principles). In the context of Kaliurang, this might be happened to some extent. It has been known that Kaliurang community, as Javanese, do value much good social relationships. However, as argued earlier, in addition to *serawung, sengkuyung,* and *gotong royong*, community still has what they call as *rembugan*. In that mechanism, people are allowed to have an opportunity to speak what they are thinking. Through *rembugan*, community may propose some excuses for particular things they are unable to undertake. The fact that Padang is comprised by two different ethnic groups and Kaliurang is relatively homogenous might explain this.

What might also be important to note, there are, however, still some parts of these cultural practices that are not optimally contributive to the development of democracy from below. *Raso pareso* across ethnic and religious groups in Padang, for instance, is still operating in a minimalist mode, namely to control the potential of violence. Although it has encouraged interethnic dialogues, it is still very political. Interethnic relation is still framed with majority-minority perspective than with an equal idea.

In the context of Padang willingness across ethnic groups to have dialogues, however, is a kind of progress. During New Order, such kind of thing would not happen. Provided the New Order government finding discrimination allegation spread widely and publicly, there must be the state apparatus that sanction ethnic Chinese very hardly. Thanks to *reformasi* era in 1998. Nevertheless, reciprocity that is built through *raso pareso* should not also be undermined. It has contributed much to the building of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese's resilience to ethnic sentiment provocation. The fact that the issue of

discrimination against ethnic Chinese did not escalate to wider violent conflict is found to have strong relations with the sense of reciprocity both ethnic groups have built. This repeated the same experience in *reformasi* 1998, in which Padang is amongst the few cities that did not experience mass violence against Chinese in Indonesia, although problems related the two ethnic groups are not simple. Although this might be minimalist, the absence of violence is surely not a simple progress.

Conversely, in the practices of *serawung, sengkuyung*, and *goyong royong* in Kaliurang, participation and equality is not a crucial issue. Community has accustomed with collective works and mutual sharing. Differences in religious beliefs and perceptions about tradition do not lead the community members to subordinate each other. However, this may incur the risk that the community becomes not critical to their inner social and political structure. Meanwhile, there might be some members of the community that are benefitted from formal decision-making in village level for having close relations to village government head and officers. In recovery process, for instance, there might be some community members that could access to aids earlier (and easier and more) than the other community members. Besides getting not critical, hesitancy may also explain the situation. In spite of hesitancy that may obscure community's criticism towards unfair decision-making in villages, consciousness towards equality amongst community members remain critical in developing democracy from below. This should not be undermined.

LINKING DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW WITH FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION AGENDA: SOME WAYS FORWARD

Apart from some shortcomings entailed, community cultural practices as found in Padang and Kaliurang, consisting of *raso pareso* and *serawung*, *sengkuyung*, *gotongroyong*, and *rembugan*, remain becoming crucial seeds for building democracy from below. Deliberation they try to underline, participation they assert and equality they promote are in line with the basic principles of democracy. However, the crucial issue in this matter is not only about the use of these cultural practices in the enhancement of democracy from below, which in this case is done through grassroots diversity governance, but also about the promotion of these practices in wider democratization agenda, let say in the state level.

Of course, this must not be an easy task. Politics in the state level is much more complex and contentious. There is also challenge from status quo that is benefitted from the existing political system, and does not prefer reform, because it clearly treats their well-beings

(Beckman, 2005: 168). In addition, community in the grassroots also often, 'do not have ready-made means to change either their lot in life or the societies in which they live. They do not have access to effective means of political power. They do not have access to sufficient means of economic production. They do not have the education, the training, or, in many cases, the self-esteem and self-confidence to engage in a successful process of change [...] In some cases any attempt by these individuals and groups of individuals to bring about change is met with harsh repression' (Kaufman, 1997: 5). All of these constraint, although sound overwhelming, have reminded us about the challenges to promote wider democratization agenda using democracy from below practices as a seed.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that pushing democratization from below is impossible. There have been some experiences in some countries that show us the facts that grassroots democracy can be of power to enrich democracy in the state level. Participatory governance in Brazil, expanding deliberative forums in China, and the wide spreading grassroots democracy in India are a clear example of this (Cornwall, 2008: 1). In Brazil's participatory budgeting, community is engaged in decisions over priorities for public expenditure investment (p. 14). In India's expanded grassroots democracy, quota and reserved seats help much because they enhance opportunity of those previously excluded from politics to enter the governing arena (p. 15). Both are not happened suddenly from above. There is a long history of the community's politics in below level to push the system in the above level to be accommodative to community's aspiration and their contexts.

Dealing with this, the experiences of Padang and Kaliurang communities have shown us that Indonesians, basically, have had the ingredient to promote democracy from below level. By regulation, there is also an already existing requirement for policy makers to take into account public participation in designing policy and development planning. The problem that constrains this to happen is the area of formal decision-making is often co-opted by elite (politicians), which tend to orient policy for their oligarchy circle, and technocrats (bureaucrats), who claim to master the technicality of policy implementation and evaluation. Given the facts that the communities already have ingredient, and regulations have supported to do so, the challenge is then about to make community involvement in decision-making is more than a rule, rather as a concrete practice. In Cornwall's term (2008: 33), it is called as institutionalizing participation.

Dealing with this, making the efforts of connecting democracy from below with wider democratization agenda as realistic as possible is important. The first strategy to institutionalize community

participation is by involving the mediating and mobilizer actors, like NGOs (Cornwall, 2008: 35). Although NGOs involvement in Indonesian governance is not free from critiques, like being donor-oriented and has crucial problems in terms of human resources, in some cases, it has helped community to be counted more in decision-making. The involvement of WALHI, an environment NGO in Indonesia, in the case of mining conflict in Pati, Central Java, for instance, has encouraged decision makers in the Province to listen more to the indigenous community's aspiration to postpone the cement factory. This also works quite effectively in the case of iron sand mining in Kebumen, Central Java, in which some local NGOs have contributed much to the enhancing of community's knowledge, awareness, network and confidence in pushing the local government to postpone its extractive policy planning.

Secondly, the mobilization of social media might be the effective way to encourage some changes in policymaking. The wide use of social, however, has raised politicians' awareness of the importance to remain being popular and acceptable by public. Some crucial issues in Indonesian decision-making have been successfully ceased after a series of protest were addressed because the policy looks to disadvantage public. The case of Budi Gunawan appointment as the Indonesian police chief recently is a clear example. Budi Gunawan is known to be a not-clean figure in police office. He is also identified to have close relations with the center of oligarchy circle in Jakarta. Public was afraid that if the President continues his policy to appoint Budi Gunawan, the future of corruption eradication will be in a big question. Given the fact that currently social media is only accessible to those living in urban areas and by those from middle class societies, expanding its use might be very helpful.

Of course, there are many things that can be done to encourage the promotion of democracy from below level. However, so far, it seems that these two strategies that are currently feasible. Firstly, in almost all regions in Indonesia, some local NGOs already concern on politics and local decision-making. Secondly, the use of social media in Indonesia is now getting wide and wide. Mobilizing what community have had and is possibly to having is a realistic way to promote further democratization from below level.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The practices of democracy in Indonesia that counts more ballot boxes than the real voices of community have widely been the object of criticisms. Disconnectedness between democracy conducted in elections periods and in daily governing practices have rose the scholars and practitioners' attention on democracy from below, which is also called grassroots democracy and informal democracy. They believe, while formal democracy, or in another occasions is called state-led/promoted democracy or democracy from above, has not yet resulted in the pursuance of substantive elements of democracy, enhancing democracy from below might be an alternate route for democratization. Interestingly, this research found that in the two areas the widespread practices of democracy from below arose because of the absence of the state in interfering issues of diversity that need for the state's response. In Padang the case relates to discrimination against minority ethnic Chinese in aid distribution. In Kaliurang, the problems relate to the allegation for Christianization in aid distribution and intergenerational friction due to tradition during recovery processes. This research portrays the experiences of Padang and Kaliurang communities in using their cultural practices to harness grassroots diversity management as identified above in the context of post disaster situation to be a seed for promoting democracy from below.

From the discussion in the previous chapters, it can be seen that Padang and Kaliurang community's experience of post-the 2010 Merapi volcano eruption and 2009 earthquake recovery highlights some crucial lessons of grassroots diversity governance. *Raso pareso* and inter-ethnic solidarity, as well as *serawung* (to socialize to enhance community engagement), *sengkuyung* (mutual sharing and mutual helps to assist neighbors) *gotong royong* (collective work) and *rembugan* (community dialogue), are amongst the cultural practices that are crucial in maintaining community peace, in addition to tolerance and volunteerism that are useful for recovery phases. Culturally and locally based practices as such have let the mechanism of community collaboration as well as conflict resolution in disaster recovery work.

The use of community cultural practices in grassroots diversity governance in the context of post-disaster situations in fact has contributed much to the development of democracy from below. *Raso pareso* has been very crucial in allowing both ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese to practice community deliberation. This is manifested from the willingness of ethnic Minang and ethnic Chinese to meet and talk about the wide spreading issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese in post-disaster aid distribution. Although the dialogue has not yet totally erased the gap between ethnic Minang that acts as majority and ethnic Chinese as the minority (new comers), it has widened the opportunity for the two ethnic groups to agree each other to cease the tension caused by the issue.

Similarly, *serawung*, *sengkuyung*, *gotongroyong* and *rembugan* in Kaliurang have been seen to contribute to the strengthening of mutual understanding, mutual sharing, mutual help, tolerance, participation, equality and dialogues in their daily recovery processes. In responding to the Christianization alleged to the churches providing shelters for evacuees by those included in hardliner Muslims, for instance, the communities use *serawung* strategy by allowing moderate Muslim leaders to visit the churches one by one and led *shalat* together, as well as conduct a short qur'anic study. This is to cool down the heated situations, and to prove that Christianization issue during evacuation periods is a non-sense. This strategy is also helpful in enclosing Muslims and Christians' relationship. Upon their returning home, the community also tried to embrace the minority Christians in their daily collective recovery processes to lessen the social distances. By doing so, they have enacted the principles of mutual understanding, equality and participation as the basic principles of democracy.

As such, the practices of *raso pareso* and inter-ethnic solidarity in Padang, West Sumatra and *serawung*, *sengkuyung* and *gotongroyong* in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta have shown us the local values that are positive

for peace keeping and democratic building. This clarifies us the sense that in local areas the roots of democracy is strong, practiced through daily activities, and becomes the daily values of life (Mohanty, 2007: 18). With their attachment and engagement with their fellow neighbors and environment, people are encouraged to build tolerance, mutual understanding and self-control. Collectivity that features their social relations has enforced them to be a responsible, yet helpful, individual, challenging the skepticism of Huntington (1993) on Asian democracy.

Indeed, this is not to claim that Padang and Kaliurang are the perfect example of peacekeeping and democratic strengthening in local level. There is still potential friction especially due to religious differences and differences in perception about tradition between old and young generation that might be influential to the way they handle the daily social needs and issues, as well ethnic differences in Padang, including those in the phases of emergency and recovery. Equality between different ethnic groups that is dichotomized into majority and minority, as well as native and new comers, remain a challenge in Padang context. Similarly, the community priority on maintaining good relationships has created some barriers for being critical in their village environment in the case of aid distribution.

However, the community's experience in Padang and Kaliurang in responding to the potentially fragmenting issue, as well as the social hardships post-the disaster recovery through giving and sharing has reminded us that there is still potential for building democracy from the grassroots level (Isaac and Heller, 2003: 87). The wide spreading NGOs in Indonesian regions, as well as the wide use of social media, are beneficial to encourage the promotion of democratization through the practices of democracy from below. Some successful experience of NGOs' involvement in guiding public participation in policy-making, as well of public pressure using social media in particular critical issue in Indonesia, has raised expectations of the possible widening of democratization agenda using daily cultural practices and democracy from below experience as a seed. This raises our optimism, amidst the big pessimism towards the development (procedural and formal) democracy, in countries like Indonesia, which is hijacked by few elite through the operation of political oligarchy (Von Luebke, 2011: 2). This clarifies us that Indonesia could develop their democracy through their own roots and traditions, in addition to their political learning from the developed countries' experiences of democratization.

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South-South PROGRAM

The utilization of cultural practices have in fact helped the community to build and maintain good social relations, especially in post-disaster context, that the community is able to conduct peace keeping, which is useful to hasten recovery processes. Further, those cultural practices are also very healthy for the development of local democracy, which is important in community's disaster governance. Based on the experiences of the two communities in the above-mentioned areas in post-disaster contexts, this report highlights that democracy which is practiced from below every day, is an important seed for the development of democracy in general context. It could be an alternate route for the official democratization, which is commonly done through general elections, legislating processes, and judiciary mechanisms.

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