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# CIÊNCIA TROPICO





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# CIÊNCIA TROPICO

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## SUMÁRIO

|                                 |         |  |
|---------------------------------|---------|--|
|                                 | 327-350 | Apresentação   |
|                                 | 351-368 | Introdução   |
| Clarisa GIACCAGLIA<br>Argentina | 369-418 | El rol de IBAS (Índia, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en el sistema internacional contemporáneo: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?<br>O rol de IBAS (Índia, Brasil e África do Sul) no sistema internacional contemporáneo: Que tipo de desenvolvimento e para quem?<br>The role of IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) in the contemporary international system: What kind of development and for whom?  |
| Fatoumata KEITA<br>Mali         | 419-462 | Toward an Africa-ecological education: an alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries<br>Educação Africo-ecológica uma estratégia alternativa para o desenvolvimento de países da África Subsaariana<br>Hacia una educación ecológica africana: una estrategia alternativa para el desarrollo de países de los países de África Subsahariana                           |
| Gérard TCHOUASSI<br>Camarões    | 463-504 | How political regime and trade liberalization help to rethink development in Central Africa: empirical evidence<br>Como os regimes políticos e a liberalização do comércio ajudam a repensar o desenvolvimento na África Central: uma evidência empírica<br>Cómo los regímenes políticos y la liberación del comercio contribuyen a repensar el desarrollo en África Central: una evidencia empírica |
| Luciano BORGOGLIO<br>Argentina  | 505-546 | Los desafíos de una agenda regional para El desarrollo. Hacia um sistema social de innovación em El Mercosur: El caso Del diseño industrial<br>Os desafios de uma agenda regional para o desenvolvimento até um sistema social de inovação no Mercosul: o caso do desenho industrial<br>The challenges of a regional agenda for development towards a social system                                  |

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|                   |        |       |      |            |           |      |
|-------------------|--------|-------|------|------------|-----------|------|
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|-------------------|--------|-------|------|------------|-----------|------|

|                                   |         |   |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---|
|                                   |         | of innovation in Mercosur: the case of industrial design  |
| Mark Stevenson CURRY<br>Filipinas | 547-600 | Market-led agrarian reform in the Global South: histories, issues and prospects<br>Reforma Agrária conduzida pelo mercado no Sul Global: histórias, problemas e perspectivas<br>Reforma Agraria impulsada por el mercado en el Sur Global: historias, problemas y perspectivas  |
| Mathias Valdez DUFFAU<br>Japão    | 601-652 | Linking development with security in the Global South? An introduction to the security sector reform<br>Unindo o desenvolvimento com a segurança no Sul Global? Uma introdução para a Reforma do Setor de Segurança (RSS)<br>¿Asociar el Desarrollo con la Seguridad en el Sur Global? Introducción a la Reforma del Sector de la Seguridad (RSS)   |
| Ron Bridget VILOG<br>Japão        | 653-696 | The Dekasegi and Pinoy descendants: labor conditions and migrant dynamics of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijin workers in Japan<br>Os dekasegi e os descendentes Pinoy: as condições de trabalho e a dinâmica dos trabalhadores brasileiros e filipinos Nikkeijin migrantes no Japão<br>Los dekasegi y los descendentes Pinoy: las condiciones de trabajo y la dinámica de los trabajadores brasileños y filipinos Nikkeijin migrantes en Japón          |
| Victoria MUTTI<br>Argentina       | 697-748 | Los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur: El caso del Mercosur y las perspectivas del Alba y la Unasur<br>Os condicionantes hegemônicos sobre as alternativas regionais de desenvolvimento no Sul. O caso do Mercosul e as perspectivas da Alba e da Unasur<br>The conditioning factors on regional alternatives of development in the South. The case of Mercosur and the prospects of Unasur and Alba |
| José Maurício DOMINGUES<br>Brasil | 749-776 | Revisiting dependency and development in Latin America<br>Revisitando dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina<br>Revisitando la dependencia y el desarrollo en América Latina   |

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1973 - Semestral

Continuação do Boletim do Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais (v.35-2), 1952-1971. A partir do volume 8 que corresponde ao ano de 1980, o Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de Pesquisas Sociais passou a se denominar Fundação Joaquim Nabuco.

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## APRESENTAÇÃO

Os artigos incluídos nos três volumes da *Revista Ciência & Trópico* foram feitos na Quinta Escola de Verão Sul-Sul cuja temática focalizou *Repensar o Desenvolvimento: Alternativas Regionais e Globais para o Desenvolvimento no Sul*, que ocorreu no Recife, em maio de 2012, no contexto do Programa de Colaboração Acadêmica entre África, América Latina e Ásia. A Escola de Verão, coordenada pela Associação de Estudos Políticos e Internacionais da Ásia (Apisa), pelo Conselho Latinoamericano de Ciências Sociais (Clacso) e pelo Conselho para o Desenvolvimento da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais da África (Codesria) e com o aval da Agência Sueca para o Desenvolvimento e a Cooperação Internacional (Asdi), foi organizada conjuntamente com a Fundação Joaquim Nabuco (Fundaj). Um dos eixos principais de trabalho foi o desafio de formar jovens acadêmicos apesar dos diversos problemas que afrontam os países do Sul.

Os artigos selecionados para a *Revista Ciência & Trópico* foram apresentados na Fundação Joaquim Nabuco e representam as contribuições originais para repensar o desenvolvimento e os dilemas que o Sul atualmente enfrenta. É um tema crucial que suscita novas

análises com o propósito de encontrar várias soluções e críticas para situações sociais.

Os anos de ajuste estrutural se caracterizaram por uma fixação de indicadores macroeconômicos estabelecidos pelos dogmáticos neoliberais como eixos centrais para a construção do bem-estar econômico e para fortalecer a confiança dos investidores. Além disso, a planificação sistemática nacional, após o crescimento econômico e o desenvolvimento, foi substituída pela confiança no livre mercado que, segundo insistiam as instituições de Bretton Woods, era o único caminho viável para a transformação econômica no Sul. Vale acrescentar que o Estado era implacavelmente atacado e se realizavam esforços audazes para deixar de legitimá-lo como agente no processo de desenvolvimento econômico. Ainda mais preocupante foi a erosão sistemática do desenho de políticas e das capacidades políticas no Sul, assim como a colocação da tomada de decisões econômicas, fundamentais nas instituições financeiras internacionais ou, no caso de permanecer dentro do território, fora do alcance das estruturas democráticas. O desenvolvimento era inconcedível, já que devia ter lugar nas prioridades e estratégias políticas definidas de fora ou na ausência de um Estado que fosse capaz de liderar o processo de elaboração de estratégias coerentes.

Em termos gerais, as Instituições Financeiras Internacionais cumpriram um papel importante na reprodução de assimetrias de um sistema internacional desigual, dando lugar a uma grande transferência de recursos naturais, utilidades, ingressos e riquezas do Sul para o Norte, e, com isso, pondo em risco as possibilidades de alcançar o tão desejado desenvolvimento.

Em face da evidente injustiça predominante no sistema internacional e da ruína econômica das organizações multilaterais existentes, como os países do Sul podem impulsionar suas estratégias



de desenvolvimento contra a pobreza e a exclusão num contexto global adverso?

No que respeita aos países do Sul, o resultado decepcionante de duas ou mais décadas de ajuste estrutural do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI)/Banco Mundial, junto com a apreensão sobre os efeitos dos fundamentos neoliberais dos acelerados processos de globalização, foram o contexto (e deram como resultado uma reavaliação) do interesse no tema do desenvolvimento e de como assegurar-lo sobre uma base (social, económica, política e ecológica) autossustentável. As questões estabelecidas nesse contexto são relativamente concisas e poderiam se resumir a uma grande pergunta: Qual é o marco político requerido para reencaminhar os países do Sul rumo ao desenvolvimento? Que tipo de esquema de desenvolvimento esses países deveriam gerar com o propósito de alcançar o crescimento em um contexto que assegure as possibilidades e perspectivas de manutenção da cidadania? Além do dever de redefinir o cenário global com uma ordem mais democrática e igualitária, talvez a resposta mais adequada a essa pergunta se associe ao nível regional, conjuntamente com acordos e processos de cooperação e integração entre os países do Sul. É por essa razão que, no passado, durante o curso dos programas de ajuste estrutural (energicamente promovidos na África, Ásia, América Latina e no Caribe), os projetos de integração e cooperação regional eram reprovados como opção de política estratégica, em particular para os países em desenvolvimento.

As fontes políticas e geoestratégicas de oposição aos programas de integração e cooperação Sul-Sul eram claras: desdobrou-se todo um repertório de novos argumentos técnicos para complementar a hostilidade política pré-existente para a cooperação entre os países do Sul. Desse modo, os esquemas regionais Sul-

Sul não só eram considerados ineficientes e insuficientes, como também eram acusados de desviar o comércio e distorcer o mercado. Segundo se argumentava, o bem-estar econômico global seria mais acessível a partir da estrutura da Organização Mundial de Comércio e dos esquemas de cooperação Norte-Sul estruturados em torno de um modelo de rede radial (*hub-and-spoke*).

A desaprovação da cooperação regional Sul-Sul, durante os anos de 1980 e 1990, serviu como um fervente impulso para programas de ajuste estrutural em todo o Sul. No entanto, o pobre desempenho dos mesmos programas de ajuste estrutural, junto aos realinhamentos econômicos e geopolíticos internacionais, provocados pelo fim da Guerra Fria entre o Leste e o Oeste, combinaram-se para impulsionar a ideia de regionalismo e incentivar o emprego de renovadas energias nos diversos tipos de esquemas de integração e cooperação em todo o sistema internacional, Norte e Sul. Este ressurgimento se manifestou no Sul global por meio da renovação e/ou racionalização de processos de cooperação e integração existentes, assim como o lançamento de novas iniciativas. Algumas delas foram tentativas de reviver o espírito do regionalismo de Bandung e esforços para alcançar o padrão de desenvolvimento no Sul. Os exemplos mais notáveis se centram no movimento do Fórum Social Mundial e sua campanha por uma globalização alternativa, centrada no povo, a alternativa contra-hegemônica bolivariana de Hugo Chávez para as Américas (Alba), a atual entusiasta União das Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasur) e a busca de uma coordenação estratégica tri-continental, como no caso de IBAS (Índia, Brasil e África do Sul).

Com base nas questões anteriormente mencionadas, mais de quarenta acadêmicos, participantes da Escola de Verão, refletiram e examinaram algumas das vastas contribuições existentes sobre as alternativas globais e regionais para o desenvolvimento do Sul.

Professores e especialistas de 22 países (Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Camarões, Colômbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egito, Etiópia, Filipinas, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Malawi, México, Nigéria, Senegal, África do Sul, Tailândia, Uganda, Venezuela e Vietnã) debateram sobre os seguintes eixos temáticos: relações internacionais e cooperação Sul-Sul; repensar as estratégias de desenvolvimento e os movimentos sociais; democratização, educação e religião; diversidade cultural, práticas culturais e mudança política; o papel do Estado e as políticas industriais e comerciais; processos de integração regional entre os países do Sul; e direitos políticos e migrações.

Esses temas foram debatidos com profundidade na referida Escola e, hoje, são expostos nestas publicações por meio das seguintes contribuições: Reconhecendo a religião nos processos de democratização na África Subsaariana: um caso da Nigéria (Abdoulaye Sounaye, Nigéria); O biocarvão: uma energia alternativa para o desenvolvimento nos países do Sahel (Abibatou Banda Fall, Senegal); Diversidade cultural, sistema de conhecimento endógeno e aprendizado para o desenvolvimento africano: múltiplas visões do Sul (Asasira Simon Rwabyoma, Uganda); O papel de IBSA (Índia, Brasil e África do Sul) no sistema internacional atual : Que tipo de desenvolvimento e para quem? (Clarissa Giaccaglia, Argentina); O declínio do neoliberalismo e a ascensão do neokeynesianismo: uma análise conceitual (Dedy Permadi, Indonésia); Perspectiva africana sobre a crise do capitalismo global (Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal); Dos agentes à agência (Estefanía González Vélez, Colômbia); Educação Afro-ecológica: uma estratégia alternativa para o desenvolvimento de países da África Subsaariana (Fatoumata Keita, Mali); Como os regimes políticos e a liberalização do comércio ajudam a repensar o desenvolvimento na África Central: uma evidência empírica (Gérard Tchouassi, Camarões); Desenvolvimento

participativo na sociedade cubana atual: repensando os governos municipais como principal agente para o desenvolvimento a partir de um estudo de caso (Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba); Uma breve história do antineoliberalismo: economia política da América do Sul e os paradigmas de desenvolvimento no século XXI (José Francisco Puello-Socarras, Argentina); Revisitando dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina (José Maurício Domingues, Brasil); A diplomacia dos povos, relações internacionais alternativas a partir do Sul (Karla Días Martinez, Venezuela); Os desafios de uma agenda regional para o desenvolvimento. Para um sistema social de inovação no Mercosul: o caso do desenho industrial (Luciano Borgoglio, Argentina); Ampliação dos direitos políticos dos imigrantes: caminhos para uma cidadania desnacionalizada na Cidade de Buenos Aires (Maria Virginia Bonora, Argentina); Reforma Agrária conduzida pelo mercado no Sul Global: histórias, problemas e perspectivas (Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas); Unindo o desenvolvimento com a segurança no Sul Global? Uma introdução para a Reforma do Setor de Segurança (RSS) (Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japão); Política Industrial: a experiência boliviana (Roberto del Barco Gamarra, México); Os dekasegi e os descendentes pinoy: as condições de trabalho e a dinâmica dos trabalhadores brasileiros e filipinos nikkeijin migrantes no Japão (Ron Bridget Vilog, Japão); Perspectivas dos terrenos em litígio da África: intelectualismo, desenvolvimento e movimentos sociais (Siphesihle Dumisa, África do Sul); Política econômica e social na América Latina pós-liberal: analisando o impacto na pobreza, desigualdade e bem-estar social (Tara Ruttemberg, Costa Rica); Os condicionantes hegemônicos sobre as alternativas regionais de desenvolvimento no Sul. O caso do Mercosul e as perspectivas da Alba e a Unasur (Maria Victoria Mutti, Argentina); Repensando o desenvolvimento: a necessidade

da ética no desenvolvimento teórico e prático (Workineh Kelbessa, Etiópia).

Assim como foi vivenciado durante a Quinta Escola de Verão, estes artigos expressam um esforço para promover o ressurgimento e a expansão do pensamento comparativo e das redes interregionais entre jovens acadêmicos do Sul. Os debates entre mais de quarenta participantes da África, América Latina e Ásia ampliaram as perspectivas analíticas e a qualidade dos compromissos científicos. Os artigos presentes nestas publicações da Revista são um reflexo de dita experiência, demonstrando uma grande diversidade de disciplinas, temas, perspectivas metodológicas e representatividade, em termo de países.

O valioso debate e intercâmbio acadêmico expresso nos artigos foi possível graças ao democrático e alto nível acadêmico demonstrado pelos colegas da Fundaj, em especial Fernando José Freire, Alexandrina Sobreira, Cibele Rodrigues e Zarah Lira.

Finalmente, gostaríamos de manifestar nossa profunda gratidão a todos quantos contribuíram para esses números, assim como aos professores e aos colegas que enriqueceram o debate. Eles contribuíram com a qualidade desta publicação. Assim, esperamos que essa seja uma contribuição significativa para se repensar o Sul integrado globalmente. Desejamos fazer uma menção especial à Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, que possibilitou a difusão da produção científica resultante da Escola de Verão, por meio da *Revista Ciência & Trópico*.

Carolina Mera (Clacso)  
Carlos Cardoso (Codesria)  
Julio Teehanke (Apisa)



## PRESENTATION

The articles included in three volumes of the *Ciência & Trópico Journal* have been produced in the frame of the Fifth South-South Summer Institute on Rethinking Development: Global and Regional Alternatives for the Development in the South which was held in the cadre of the Africa/Asia/Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Program, in Recife, May 2012. The Program, coordinated by the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), and supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), was co-organized with Foundation Joaquim Nabuco (Fundaj). The challenge of training to younger scholars on the diverse problems facing the countries of the South has been a main axe of work.

The articles selected to be included to the *Ciência & Trópico Journal* were presented at the Institute and they are original contributions to an understanding of the Rethinking Development: Global and Regional Alternatives for the Development in the South. Rethinking development and the dilemmas confronted by the South

in contemporary times is a current crucial issue to create new thoughts in order to find solution for many vulnerable and critical social situations.

The structural adjustment years were characterized by a fixation with the macro-economic indicators defined by neo-liberal doctrinaires as being central to the construction of economic well being and to build investor confidence. Furthermore, systematic national planning for economic growth and development was discarded in favor of a reliance on the magic of the free market which, the Bretton Woods institutions insisted, was the only viable path to economic transformation in the South. Needless to add, the state was relentlessly attacked and spirited efforts were made to de-legitimize it as an actor in the economic development process. Perhaps even more disturbing was the systematic erosion of policy making and policy capacities in the South and the location of key macro-economic decision-making levels in the international financial institutions or, if some of them remain at home, beyond the reach of democratic structures. In this framework it was inconceivable that development can ever proceed on the basis of externally-defined policy priorities and strategies or in the absence of a state that was able to lead the process of formulation of coherent strategies.

In a global context, it can be asserted that the International Financial Institutions fulfilled an important role in reproducing the asymmetries of an extraordinarily unequal international system, facilitating a huge transfer of natural resources, rents, incomes, and riches from the South to the North, and therefore, compromising the possibilities to reach the so required development. In the face of the blatant injustice prevailing in the international system and the bankruptcy of the existing multilateral organizations, how can



the Southern countries promote their development strategies against poverty and exclusion in an adverse global context?

Insofar as the countries of the South are concerned, the disappointing outcome of two decades or more of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment, coupled with apprehensions about the effects of the neo-liberal underpinnings of the accelerated processes of globalization, have both provided a context for – and resulted in a revival of – interest in the question of development and how to secure it on a self-sustained – social, economic, political and ecological – basis. The issues which are posed in this context are fairly straightforward and can be summarized in one grand question: what policy framework is required in order to return the countries of the South to the path of development and what type of development agenda do these countries have to generate in order to achieve growth in a context that secures the livelihood opportunities and prospects of the citizenry? Besides the call to redefine the global scenario into a more democratic and equitable order, maybe the most suitable answer to that query is coupled to the regional level, along with the cooperation and integration agreements and processes among the countries of the South. That it is why, in the past, in the context of the structural adjustment programs –vigorously promoted across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the regional integration and cooperation projects were distinctly discouraged as a strategic policy option, particularly for developing countries. The political and geo-strategic sources of opposition to South-South integration and cooperation schemes were clear enough: an array of new technical arguments was deployed to complement pre-existing political hostility to regional cooperation among the countries of the South. In this way, South-South regional schemes were not only considered to be inefficient and sub-optimal, they were also treated

as trade-diverting and market-distorting; global economic welfare, it was argued, would be better served by the World Trade Organization framework and mixed North-South cooperation schemes structured around a hub-and-spoke model.

The discouragement of South-South regional cooperation during the 1980s and 1990s went hand-in-hand with the vigorous promotion of structural adjustment programs across the South. However, the poor record of the structural adjustment programs themselves, together with the international geo-political and economic re-alignments arising from the end of the old East-West Cold War combined to revive the idea of regionalism and to spur the investment of new energies in various kinds of integration and cooperation schemes across the international system, North and South. This revival was manifested across the global South through the revamping and/or rationalization of existing cooperation and integration schemes, as well as the launching of new initiatives; some of which attempts at the revival of the spirit of Bandung regionalism and efforts to accomplish the pattern of development in the South. The most prominent of these are centered on the World Social Forum movement and its campaign for an alternative, people-driven globalization, Hugo Chavez's counter-hegemonic Bolivarian alternative for the Americas (Alba), the currently vigorous South American Nation Union (Unasur) and the pursuit of tri-continental strategic coordination as in the case of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa).

Taking into account the above mentioned issues, more than 40 scholars participating in the Summer Institute reflected on these matters and examined some of the copious existing inputs about the global and regional alternatives for the development in the South. Professors and specialists coming from 22 countries (Argentina,

Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, The Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malawi, Mexico, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Uganda, Venezuela and Vietnam) participated debating in the following thematic axes: international relations and South-South cooperation; rethinking development strategies and social movements; democratization, education and religion; cultural diversity, cultural practices and political change; the role of the State and the industrial and trade policies; regional integration processes among countries of the South; and political rights and migrations.

These themes were discussed deeply in the Institute and are offer today in this publication through all contributions: *Recognizing Religion in Democratization Processes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case from Niger* (Abdoulaye Sounaye, Niger), *The Biochar: an alternative energy for the development of the Sahel countries* (Abibatou Banda Fall, Senegal), *Cultural Diversity, Endogenous Knowledge Systems and Learning for African Development: Multiple Views from the South* (Asasira Simon Rwabyoma, Uganda), *El rol de IBSA (Índia, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en El sistema internacional contemporáneo: ¿ Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?* (Clarisa Giaccaglia, Argentina), *The Decline of Neo-Liberalism and the Rise of Neo-Keynesianism: A Conceptual Analysis* (Dedy Permandi, Indonesia), *African perspective on the crisis of global capitalism* (Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal), *De los agentes a la agencia* (Estefania Gonzalez Velez, Colombia), *Toward an African-ecological education: An alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries* (Fortoumata Keita, Mali), *How political regime and trade liberalization help to rethink development in Central Africa: Empirical evidence* (Gerard Tchouassi, Camaroes), *Desarrollo participativo en La sociedad cubana actual: repensando*

los gobiernos municipales como principal actor para El desarrollo, desde um estúdio de caso (Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba), A brief history of anti-neoliberalism: South American Political Economy and Development Paradigms in the XXI Century (Jose Francisco Puello-Socarras, Argentina), Sociological theory, history, global modernity (Jose Mauricio Dominguez, Brasil), La Diplomacia de los Pueblos, relaciones internacionales alternativas desde el Sur Karla Dias Martines, Venezuela), Los desafíos de una agenda regional para el desarrollo. Hacia un sistema social de innovación en el Mercosur: el caso del diseño industrial (Luciano Borboblio, Argentina), Ampliación de los Derechos Políticos de los inmigrantes: caminos hacia una ciudadanía desnacionalizada en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Maria Virginia Bonora, Argentina), Market Led Agrarian Reform in the Global South: Histories, Issues and Prospects (Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas), Linking Development with Security in the Global South? An introduction to the Security Sector Reform (Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japon), Política industrial, La experiência boliviana (Robertodel Barco Gamarra, México), The Dekasegi and Pinoy Descendants: Labor Conditions and Migrant Dynamics of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijin Workers in Japan (Ron Bridget Vilog, Japón), Perspectives from the Contested Terrains of Africa: Intellectualism, Development and Social Movements Siphesihle Dumisa, Sudafrica), Economic and Social Policy in Post-Neoliberal Latin America: Analyzing Impact on Poverty, Inequality and Social Wellbeing (Tara Ruttemberg, Costa Rica), Los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur. El caso del MERCOSUR y las perspectivas del Alba y la Unasur (Victoria Mutti, Argentina), Rethinking Development: The Need for Ethics in Development Theory and Practice (Workineh Kelbessa, Etiopia).

As it was the experience in the Seminar, these articles show the effort to promote a revival and expansion of comparative thinking and cross-regional networking among a younger generation of Southern scholars. The debates between more than 40 people from Africa, Latin America and Asia have broadened the analytical perspectives and the overall quality of the scientific engagements of them. The articles of the book are mirror of that experience, showing a greater diversity of disciplines, themes, methodological perspectives and representativeness in terms of countries.

This rich debate and academic exchange reflected in these articles was possible thanks to the democratic, plural and high quality academic level offered by the colleagues of Fundaj, specially Alexandrina Sobreira (Scientific Coordinator), Cibele Rodrigues (researcher) and Zarah Lira (Coordinatin of Institutional Sector).

Finally, we would like deeply thanks to all the contributors of this publication, and also professors and colleagues who enriched the debate. They made possible the quality of the volume of this journal that we expect will be an important contribution to rethink the South integrated into the global world. In this sense we would like to make a special recognition to Fundaj who make possible to disseminate the production of the Seminar in the *Ciência & Trópico Journal*.

Carolina Mera (Clacso)  
Carlos Cardozo (Codesria)  
Julio Teehankee (Apisa)



## **PRESENTACIÓN**

Los artículos incluidos en estos volúmenes de la Revista *Ciência & Trópico* fueron generados en el marco de la 5ta. Escuela de Verano Sur-Sur sobre Repensar el Desarrollo: Alternativas Regionales y Globales para el Desarrollo en el Sur que tuvo lugar en Recife, en mayo de 2012, en el contexto del Programa de Colaboración Académica entre África, América Latina y Asia. La Escuela de Verano, coordinada por la Asociación de Estudios Políticos e Internacionales de Asia (APISA), el Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) y el Consejo para el Desarrollo de la Investigación en Ciencias Sociales de África (CODESRIA), y avalada por la Agencia Sueca para el Desarrollo y la Cooperación Internacional (ASDI), fue organizada conjuntamente con la Fundação Joaquim Nabuco (FUNDAJ). Un eje principal de trabajo ha sido el desafío de formar jóvenes académicos en los diversos problemas que afrontan los países del Sur.

Los artículos seleccionados para la Revista *Ciência & Trópico* fueron presentados en la Escuela y representan contribuciones originales hacia un entendimiento sobre Repensar el Desarrollo: Alternativas Globales y Regionales para el Desarrollo en el Sur.

Repensar el desarrollo y los dilemas a los que actualmente se enfrenta el Sur es un tema crucial a la hora de generar nuevos análisis con el propósito de encontrar soluciones a las múltiples y críticas situaciones sociales.

Los años de ajuste estructural se caracterizaron por una fijación con los indicadores macro-económicos establecidos por los dogmáticos neoliberales como ejes centrales para la construcción del bienestar económico y para fortalecer la confianza de los inversores. Asimismo, la sistemática planificación nacional en pos del crecimiento económico y el desarrollo fue reemplazada por la confianza en la magia del libre mercado que, según insistían las instituciones de Bretton Woods, era el único camino viable hacia la transformación económica en el Sur. Resta agregar que el Estado era implacablemente atacado y se realizaban denodados esfuerzos en torno a deslegitimarlo como actor en el proceso de desarrollo económico. Quizás aún más preocupante era la erosión sistemática del diseño de políticas y de las capacidades políticas en el Sur, así como la colocación de la toma de decisiones económicas fundamentales en instituciones financieras internacionales o, en el caso de permanecer dentro del territorio, fuera del alcance de las estructuras democráticas. El desarrollo era inconcebible, ya que debía tener lugar sobre la base de prioridades y estrategias políticas definidas desde afuera o en ausencia de un Estado que fuera capaz de liderar el proceso de elaboración de estrategias coherentes.

En términos globales, las Instituciones Financieras Internacionales cumplieron un rol importante en reproducir las asimetrías de un sistema internacional extraordinariamente desigual, dando lugar a una enorme transferencia de recursos naturales, utilidades, ingresos y riquezas desde el Sur hacia el Norte, y, con



ello, poniendo en riesgo las posibilidades de alcanzar el ansiado desarrollo.

De cara a la evidente injusticia predominante en el sistema internacional y a la bancarrota de las organizaciones multilaterales existentes, ¿cómo pueden los países del Sur impulsar sus estrategias de desarrollo contra la pobreza y la exclusión en un contexto global adverso?

En lo que concierne a los países del Sur, el decepcionante resultado de dos o más décadas de ajuste estructural del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI)/Banco Mundial, junto con la aprensión en torno a los efectos de los fundamentos neoliberales de los acelerados procesos de globalización, fueron el contexto (y dieron como resultado una reaparición) del interés en el tema del desarrollo y de cómo asegurarlo sobre una base (social, económica, política y ecológica) autosustentable. Las cuestiones planteadas en este contexto son relativamente concisas y podrían resumirse en un gran interrogante: ¿Cuál es el marco político requerido a fin de reencauzar los países del Sur hacia la senda del desarrollo? ¿Qué tipo de esquema de desarrollo deberían generar estos países con el propósito de lograr el crecimiento en un contexto que asegure las posibilidades y perspectivas de manutención de la ciudadanía? Además del imperativo de redefinir el escenario global con un orden más democrático e igualitario, tal vez la respuesta más adecuada a esta pregunta se pueda asociar al nivel regional, conjuntamente con acuerdos y procesos de cooperación e integración entre los países del Sur. Es por esta razón que, en el pasado, durante el transcurso de los programas de ajuste estructural (enérgicamente promovidos en África, Asia, América Latina y el Caribe), los proyectos de integración y cooperación regional eran manifiestamente reprobados como opción de política estratégica, en particular para los países

en desarrollo. Las fuentes políticas y geoestratégicas de oposición a los programas de integración y cooperación Sur-Sur eran claras: se desplegó todo un repertorio de nuevos argumentos técnicos para complementar la hostilidad política preexistente hacia la cooperación entre los países del Sur. De este modo, los esquemas regionales Sur-Sur no sólo eran considerados ineficientes e insuficientes, sino que, además, eran acusados de desviar el comercio y distorsionar el mercado. Según se argumentaba, el bienestar económico global sería más asequible desde la estructura de la Organización Mundial de Comercio y los esquemas de cooperación Norte-Sur estructurados en torno de un modelo de red radial (*hub-and-spoke*).

La desaprobación de la cooperación regional Sur-Sur, durante los 1980 y 1990, fue de la mano con el ferviente impulso de programas de ajuste estructural en todo el Sur. Sin embargo, el pobre desempeño de los mismos programas de ajuste estructural, junto con los realineamientos económicos y geopolíticos internacionales, provocados por el final de la Guerra Fría entre el Este y el Oeste, se combinaron para reflatar la idea del regionalismo y para incentivar el empleo de renovadas energías en diversos tipos de esquemas de integración y cooperación en todo el sistema internacional, Norte y Sur. Este resurgimiento se puso de manifiesto en el Sur global por medio de la renovación y/o racionalización de procesos de cooperación e integración existentes, así como el lanzamiento de nuevas iniciativas. Algunas de ellas fueron intentos por revivir el espíritu del regionalismo de Bandung y esfuerzos por alcanzar el patrón de desarrollo en el Sur. Los ejemplos más prominentes se centran en el movimiento del Foro Social Mundial y su campaña por una globalización alternativa, centrada en el pueblo, la alternativa contra-hegemónica Bolivariana de Hugo Chávez para las Américas (ALBA), la actualmente entusiasta Unión de Naciones

Sudamericanas (UNASUR) y la búsqueda de una coordinación estratégica tri-continental, como en el caso de IBSA (India, Brasil y Sudáfrica).

Con base a las cuestiones anteriormente mencionadas, más de 40 académicos participantes de la Escuela de Verano reflexionaron y examinaron algunos de los vastos aportes existentes acerca de las alternativas globales y regionales para el desarrollo en el Sur. Profesores y especialistas de 22 países (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Camerún, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egipto, Etiopía, Filipinas, India, Indonesia, Japón, Malawi, México, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudáfrica, Tailandia, Uganda, Venezuela y Vietnam) debatieron acerca de los siguientes ejes temáticos: relaciones internacionales y cooperación Sur-Sur; repensar las estrategias de desarrollo y los movimientos sociales; democratización, educación y religión; diversidad cultural, prácticas culturales y cambio político; el rol del Estado y las políticas industriales y comerciales; procesos de integración regional entre los países del Sur; y derechos políticos y migraciones.

Estos temas fueron debatidos en profundidad en la Escuela y, hoy, son expuestos en la presente publicación por medio de las siguientes contribuciones: Reconocer la Religión en los Procesos de Democratización en África Subsahariana: el Caso de Níger (Abdoulaye Sounaye, Níger); El Biocarbón: energía alternativa para el desarrollo de los países del Sahel (Abibatou Banda Fall, Senegal); Diversidad Cultural, Sistemas de Conocimiento Endógeno y Aprendizaje para el Desarrollo Africano: Múltiples Visiones desde el Sur (Asasira Simon Rwabyoma, Uganda); El Rol de IBSA (India, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en el sistema internacional actual: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién? (Clarisa Giaccaglia, Argentina); La Decadencia del Neoliberalismo y el Auge del Neo-keynesianismo: un Análisis Conceptual (Dedy Permandi, Indonesia); Una Perspectiva

Africana sobre la Crisis del Capitalismo Global (Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal); De los agentes a la agencia (Estefanía González Vélez, Colombia); Hacia una educación ecológica africana: una estrategia alternativa para el desarrollo de los países de África Subsahariana (Fatoumata Keita, Mali); Cómo el régimen político y la liberación del comercio contribuyen a repensar el desarrollo en África Central: evidencia empírica (Gerard Tchouassi, Camerún); Desarrollo participativo en la sociedad cubana actual: repensando los gobiernos municipales como principal actor para el desarrollo, desde un estudio de caso (Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba); Una breve historia del anti-neoliberalismo: la Economía Política Sudamericana y los Paradigmas de Desarrollo en el Siglo XXI (José Francisco Puello-Socarras, Argentina); Revisitando la Dependencia y el Desarrollo en América Latina (Jose Mauricio Dominguez, Brasil); la Diplomacia de los Pueblos, relaciones internacionales alternativas desde el Sur (Karla Dias Martínez, Venezuela); Los desafíos de una agenda regional para el desarrollo. Hacia un sistema social de innovación en el MERCOSUR: el caso del diseño industrial (Luciano Borgoglio, Argentina); Ampliación de los Derechos Políticos de los inmigrantes: caminos hacia una ciudadanía desnacionalizada en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Maria Virginia Bonora, Argentina); Reforma Agraria Impulsada por el Mercado en el Sur Global: Historias, Problemas y Perspectivas (Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas); ¿Asociar el Desarrollo con la Seguridad en el Sur Global? Introducción a la Reforma del Sector de la Seguridad (RSS) (Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japón); Política Industrial: la experiencia boliviana (Roberto del Barco Gamarra, México); Los Descendientes de Dekasegi y Pinoy: Condiciones Laborales y Dinámica de las migraciones de los trabajadores Brasileños y Filipino Nikkeijin en Japón (Ron Bridget Vilog, Japón); Perspectivas desde los Territorios en disputa en África:

Intelectualismo, Desarrollo y Movimientos Sociales (Siphesihle Dumisa, Sudáfrica); Política Económica y Social en una América Latina Posneoliberal: Análisis del impacto sobre la Pobreza, la Desigualdad y el Bienestar social (Tara Ruttemberg, Costa Rica); Condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur. El caso del MERCOSUR y las perspectivas del ALBA y la UNASUR (María Victoria Mutti, Argentina); Repensar el Desarrollo: La Necesidad de la Ética en la Teoría y la Práctica del Desarrollo (Workineh Kelbessa, Etiopía).

Tal como se vivenció durante la Escuela de Verano, estos artículos expresan un esfuerzo por promover el resurgimiento y la expansión del pensamiento comparativo y de las redes interregionales entre jóvenes académicos del Sur. Los debates entre más de 40 participantes de África, América Latina y Asia ampliaron las perspectivas analíticas y la calidad de los compromisos científicos. Los artículos comprendidos en esta Revista son un reflejo de dicha experiencia, demostrando una gran diversidad de disciplinas, temas, perspectivas metodológicas y representatividad en términos de países.

El valioso debate e intercambio académico expresado en los artículos fue posible gracias al democrático, plural y alto nivel académico demostrado por los colegas de la FUNDAJ, en especial Fernando José Freire, Alexandrina Sobreira, Cibele Rodrigues y Zarah Lira.

Finalmente, quisiéramos manifestar nuestra profunda gratitud a todos aquellos que contribuyeron con esta publicación, así como a profesores y colegas que enriquecieron el debate. Ellos contribuyeron a la calidad de esta publicación. Así, esperamos que este sea un aporte significativo para repensar el Sur integrado globalmente. Deseamos

hacer una mención especial a FUNDAJ, que posibilitó la difusión de la producción de la Escuela a través de la Revista Ciência & Trópico.

Carolina Mera, CLACSO  
Carlos Cardoso, CODESRIA  
Julio Teehankee, APISA

## INTRODUÇÃO

Uma vez apresentado o contexto geral na Quinta Escola de Verão Sul-Sul sobre o tema Repensar o Desenvolvimento, cabe uma reflexão sobre a coerência temática dos artigos apresentados nestes três números da *Revista Ciência & Trópico*. Aliada à compreensão da trajetória e dos temas da Conferência: Alternativas Globais e Regionais para o Desenvolvimento no Sul, segue breve análise sobre as diversas abordagens que vão de perspectivas teóricas a estudos de caso na África, Ásia, América Latina e Caribe.

A busca pelo desenvolvimento tem sido um dos elementos centrais que caracterizam a história moderna do Sul Global. Paralelamente às transformações políticas e sociais que ocorreram como processo secundário, a história de muitos desses países pode ser resumida como uma construção em busca do desenvolvimento econômico. A base de tais afirmações vem sendo constantemente desafiada. Os próprios conceitos em que se baseiam são frequentes temas de debate, por isso trazemos uma perspectiva diferente sobre esses os teóricos e as análises que deles derivam.

O próprio conceito de desenvolvimento tem sido objeto de discussão, como argumenta Workineh Kelbessa – *Rethinking*

*development: the need for ethics in development theory and practice* – ao afirmar que “teóricos do desenvolvimento têm se preocupado com questões sociais e econômicas e ignorado o bem-estar humano e ambiental”. Da mesma forma, o artigo de Rogério Giugliano – *Space and development: a non-hegemonic view* – questiona a validade do conceito tradicional de desenvolvimento como “o fluxo hegemônico que tem suas origens no ator do Norte”. Argumenta, nesse sentido, que progresso e mudança também podem ser o resultado de relações e fluxos não hegemônicos.

O conceito de desenvolvimento não somente tem sido objeto de controvérsias, como também o presumido caminho para diversos procedimentos. Tanto acadêmica quanto empiricamente, a trajetória para o desenvolvimento abrangeu uma vasta gama de teorias, ideologias e empreendimentos coletivos. Globalmente, podemos considerar essa busca pelo desenvolvimento como um dos motivadores para as experiências coletivas que foram vistas em suas mais peculiares formas no Sul global. Alguns desses tópicos são abordados em trabalhos como o de Dedy Permadi, *The decline of neo-liberalism and the rise of neo-keynesianism: a conceptual analysis*, bem como no de José Francisco Puello-Socarrás, *A brief history of anti-neoliberalism: South American political economy and development paradigms in the XXI Century*.

O debate sobre tais perspectivas para o baseia-se numa discussão teórica que permeia os três volumes da *Revista Ciência & Trópico*, seja como uma matéria subjacente, ou como um elemento constante nas análises elaboradas. Essas considerações vão além de paradigmas teóricos, que emergem das preocupações pragmáticas de decisões governamentais e relações sociais. É justamente para resolver essas particularidades que os artigos mesclam teoria e empiria no cenário internacional.



Os trabalhos de análise mais amplas, tais como *La diplomacia de los pueblos, relaciones internacionales alternativas desde el Sur*, de Karla Dias Martinez, Venezuela; *African perspective on the crisis of global capitalism*, de Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal; e “*El rol de IBSA (Índia, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en el sistema internacional contemporáneo: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?*”, de Clarisa Giaccaglia, Argentina, contribuem para a construção um novo quadro analítico baseado na perspectiva do excluído Sul Global. Eles revisitam diferentes áreas do conhecimento por meio da incorporação de atores excluídos e de casos que introduzem uma nova perspectiva sobre as verdades aceitas.

A diversidade geográfica dos autores e dos estudos de caso também foi uma variável importante na conformação de todo o debate. Foi feito um esforço não apenas para incluir uma grande variedade de países e regiões, mas também para enfatizar repetidamente os locais excluídos do debate global. A perspectiva africana, em particular, sobre o desenvolvimento, também foi destacada por meio de artigos, como: *Toward an African-ecological education: an alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries*, de Fatoumata Keita, Mali; *How political regime and trade liberalization help to rethink development in Central Africa: Empirical evidence*, de Gerard Tchouassi, Camarões; e *Perspectives from the Contested Terrains of Africa: Intellectualism, Development and Social Movements*, de Siphesihle Dumisa, África do Sul.

A integração regional foi um dos temas de destaque na Escola de Verão pela dimensão que a territorialidade representa na agenda global Sul-Sul. Há uma grande variedade de perspectivas: desde revisitando a teoria da dependência clássica, que orientou grande parte dos processos de integração regional na América Latina, até documentos que discutem a relação entre os novos paradigmas

econômicos e do conhecimento estabelecido na integração. A experiência latino-americana é particularmente enfatizada em artigos como *Los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur. El caso del Mercosur y las perspectivas del Alba y la Unasur*, de Victoria Mutti, Argentina; e *Los desafíos de una agenda regional para el desarrollo. Hacia un sistema social de innovación en el Mercosur: el caso del diseño industrial*, de Luciano Borgoglio, Argentina.

Outros temas como segurança, religião, democratização, desigualdade e cultura e sua relação com o conceito de desenvolvimento, estão incluídos, não apenas por meio da diversidade dos casos abrangidos, mas também pela gama de expressões assumidas nas regiões do Sul global. Alguns desses dados surgem em artigos como *Desarrollo participativo em La sociedad cubana actual: repensando los gobiernos municipales como principal actor para el desarrollo, desde um estudio de caso*, de Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba; *Market Led Agrarian Reform in the Global South: Histories, Issues and Prospects*, de Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas; *Linking Development with Security in the Global South? An introduction to the Security Sector Reform*, de Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japão; e *Política industrial, La experiencia boliviana*, de Roberto del Barco Gamarra, México, quando permitem, mediante experiências específicas, um novo olhar sobre as construções teóricas do debate sobre o desenvolvimento.

A presente edição especial da *Revista Ciência & Trópico*, com três volumes dedicados ao diálogo Sul-Sul bem como a Escola de Verão que a originou, estabelecem uma base teórica para subsidiar a discussão dos acontecimentos atuais e dos casos empíricos sobre os assuntos propostos por professores e alunos Clacso, Codesria e Apisa. Assim, três principais linhas temáticas podem ser identificadas. A

primeira estabelece uma abordagem plural para as bases da teoria do desenvolvimento, sempre adotando uma perspectiva alternativa do Sul. A segunda apresenta artigos voltados para análise internacional e estabelecimento de generalizações, a partir do diálogo Sul-Sul e, finalmente, uma terceira linha que apresentam especificidades do Norte Global, frequentemente ignoradas no Sul.

Embora, nem todos os artigos contidos nestes volumes tenham sido mencionados, é pertinente salientar que todos contribuíram para construir um espectro mais amplo de debate Sul-Sul. Cabe, portanto um agradecimento aos respectivos autores e ao Clacso, a Apisa e Codesria que instituíram com maestria o Programa de Colaboração Acadêmica entre África, Ásia, América Latina e Caribe.

Para finalizar, é relevante destacar que, para a Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, este evento foi de extrema importância para uma instituição que vem contribuindo para a disseminação do conhecimento plural, científico e interdisciplinar no contexto internacional.

Alexandrina Sobreira de Moura  
Editora da Revista Ciência & Trópico  
e Coordenadora Científica da Fundação Joaquim Nabuco  
(Fundaj)  
na Quinta Escola de Verão Sul-Sul



## INTRODUCTION

Once presented the general context in which the Fifth South-South Summer Institute about Rethinking Development occurred, as well as the trajectory of some the South-South debate and particularly of the present initiative, one last word must be said about the thematic coherence of the articles presented here. Along with our shared understanding of the trajectory and last developments of our conference's theme: Global and Regional Alternatives for the Development in the South, previously presented, we can now proceed to an explanatory note on its relation with the articles which compose the present volume. We expect to explain some of the rationale used to select, group and guide the debates over the papers presented in the conference and regrouped here.

The search of development, or at least of the path of development has been one of the central characterizing elements of the modern history of the global south. Concomitant with political and social transformations which occurred as secondary process, the history of many of these countries can be summarized as a societal enterprise in search of economic development. Nevertheless, the basis of such affirmations are constantly challenged. The very

concepts on which they rely are matters of frequent debate. Here we have tried to bring a different perspective on these theoretical frameworks and on the analysis which derive from them.

The very concept of “development” has been subject to much debate, as argues the article by Workineh Kelbessa – Rethinking Development: The Need for Ethics in Development Theory and Practice – which states that “development theorists have been preoccupied with social and economic concerns, and ignored human and environmental well-being”. In the same way, the article by Rogério Gimenes Giugliano – Space and development: a non-hegemonic view – questions the validity of the mainstream concept of “development” as “the hegemonic flux that has its origins in the northern actor” arguing that “progress and change can also be the result of non-hegemonic relations and fluxes”.

Not only the concept of development has been subject to controversies, but the presumed path that leads to it has assumed the form of various procedures and recipes. Both academically and empirically the so-called path for development has known all kinds of theories, ideologies, and collective enterprises. Globally, we can call this quest for development one of the motivators for collective experiments and many of its most exotic forms were seen in the global south. Some of these paths are addressed in pieces such as Dedy Permadi’s “The Decline of Neo-Liberalism and the Rise of Neo-Keynesianism: A Conceptual Analysis”, as well as in ‘Jose Francisco Puello-Socarras’ “A brief history of anti-neoliberalism: South American Political Economy and Development Paradigms in the XXI Century”.

The debate over these so-called paths for development is discussed through a southern perspective, and serves as a preparatory theoretical debate for the following agenda of discussion contained in

the three volumes of the *Ciência & Trópico Journal*. This discussion integrates most of the papers, either as a secondary or underlying matter, or as a constant theme. Those considerations also go much beyond theoretical paradigms. It all happens in the midst of the pragmatic concerns of governmental decisions and human relations that permeate the academic debates. It is precisely to address these particularities that the selection of articles goes beyond theoretical discussions, bringing about a number of empirical cases of the international scenario.

Broader analysis papers such as “La Diplomacia de los Pueblos, relaciones internacionales alternativas desde el Sur” (Karla Diaz Martinez, Venezuela), “African perspective on the crisis of global capitalism” (Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal), and “El rol de IBSA (Índia, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en El sistema internacional contemporáneo: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?” (Clarisa Giaccaglia, Argentina), help build a new analytic framework based on the perspective of the excluded global south. They bring important contributions by revisiting different established pieces of knowledge through the incorporation of excluded actors and cases which introduce a new perspective on accepted truths.

The geographical diversity of the authors and of case-studies was also an important variable in conforming the whole of the debate. An effort was made, not only to include a great variety of countries and regions, but also to emphasize on locations repeatedly excluded from the global debate. A particular African perspective on development was also emphasized through articles such as: “Toward an African-ecological education: an alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries” (Fatoumata Keita, Mali), “How political regime and trade liberalization help to rethink development in Central Africa: Empirical evidence” (Gérard

Tchouassi, Camaroon), and “Perspectives from the Contested Terrains of Africa: Intellectualism, Development and Social Movements” (Siphesihle Dumisa, Sudafrica).

Finally, a theme that could not escape our discussion is related to regional integration. One of the main controversies in development theories, regional organizations and common-market initiatives are a recurring subject in many of the articles presented at the Summer Course Fifth South-South Summer Institute. There is a wide range of perspectives: from revisiting the classical dependency theory which guided much of the regional integration processes in Latin-America to papers that discuss the relation between the new economic paradigms and the established knowledge on integration. The Latin-American experience is particularly emphasized in articles such as “Los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur. El caso del MERCOSUR y las perspectivas del ALBA y la UNASUR” (Victoria Mutti, Argentina) and “Los desafíos de una agenda regional para el desarrollo. Hacia un sistema social de innovación en el MERCOSUR: el caso del diseño industrial” (Luciano Borgoglio, Argentina).

Other themes, as security, religion, democratization, inequality, culture and their mutual dialogue as well as their relation with the concept of development are included, not only through the variety of cases covered, but also through the variety of expressions they assume in the diversity of regions of the global south. Some of these subjects emerge in pieces such as “Desarrollo participativo en la sociedad cubana actual: repensando los gobiernos municipales como principal actor para el desarrollo, desde um estúdio de caso” (Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba), “Market Led Agrarian Reform in the Global South: Histories, Issues and Prospects” (Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas), “Linking Development with Security in the Global South?



An introduction to the Security Sector Reform” (Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japon), and “Política industrial, La experiência boliviana” (Roberto del Barco Gamarra, México) when they present through specific experiences a new look at the theoretical constructions of the development debate.

The present edition of the *Ciência & Trópico Journal* tries to establish some theoretical ground to subsidize the discussion of current events and empirical cases on the matters proposed by the Fifth South-South Summer Institutes. Bearing that in mind, three main sets of articles can be identified. First, it is established a theoretical approach to the bases of development theory and to many of its marginal but inseparable subjects, always adopting an alternative southern perspective. A second group of papers can be classified as aiming at broader international analysis and generalizations, also trying to convey the international scenario through the south’s standpoint. Finally, the last set of articles deals with specific case-studies to identify the particularities of dynamics which are well known so often studied in the global north, and frequently ignored in the south.

Even though many, if not most, of the articles contained in this journal were not mentioned in this brief foreword, once all of the three numbers of the *Ciência & Trópico Journal* contributed to build a broader spectrum of the south-south debate. We never meant any statement on the quality or importance of any of the works that were, or were not, mentioned. All the papers were carefully chosen for their academic quality and relevance to the overall debate. Nevertheless, it was beyond the objectives of this explanatory note to detain itself in the particulars of each paper, but rather try to draw the picture of how they fit in the broader debate as well as how they discuss with each other.

Concluding this foreword, we expect to attain the objective of composing a piece in which different views were introduced into the broader mainstream of the South-South. It is relevant to highlight that, for Joaquim Nabuco Foundation, this event was extremely important for an institution that contributes to the dissemination of scientific, plural and interdisciplinary knowledge for the international context.

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## INTRODUCCIÓN

Presentado el contexto general en el cual el Quinto Instituto de Verano Sur-Sur, con el tema Repensando el Desarrollo, una última palabra debe ser dicha sobre la coherencia temática de los artículos presentados en estos tres números de la Revista *Ciência & Trópico*. Junto a nuestra comprensión sobre la trayectoria y los dos últimos desarrollos del tema de nuestra conferencia: Alternativas Globales y Regímenes para el Desarrollo en el Sur, presentados anteriormente, podemos avanzar para una nota explicativa sobre su relación con los artículos seleccionados.

La búsqueda por el desarrollo ha sido uno de los elementos centrales que caracterizan la historia moderna del Sur Global. Simultáneo a las transformaciones políticas y sociales que ocurrieron como procesos secundarios, la historia de muchos de esos países puede ser resumida como una empresa social que busca el desarrollo económico. Sin embargo, la base de tales afirmaciones es constantemente desafiada. Los propios conceptos en que se basan son frecuentes asuntos de debate. Por eso, intentamos traer una perspectiva distinta sobre esos cuadros teóricos y los análisis que derivan de ellos.

El propio concepto de desarrollo ha sido objeto de muchos debates, como argumenta el artículo de Workineh Kelbessa – Rethinking development: the need for ethics in development theory and practice – que afirma que “teóricos del desarrollo se están preocupando con las cuestiones sociales, ignorando el bienestar humano y ambiental”. De la misma forma, el artículo de Rogério Gimenes Giugliano – Space and development: a non-hegemonic view – cuestiona la validez del concepto tradicional de desarrollo como “el flujo hegemónico que tiene sus orígenes en el actor de Norte”, argumentando que “progreso y cambios también pueden ser el resultado de las relaciones y flujos no hegemónicos”.

No solamente el concepto de desarrollo está siendo objeto de controversias, sino que, además, el presumido camino que lleva a lo que asumió la forma de diversos procedimientos y recetas. Académica y empíricamente, el camino para el desarrollo conoció todos los tipos de teorías, ideologías y emprendimientos colectivos. Globalmente, podemos considerar esa búsqueda por el desarrollo como una de las motivaciones para las experiencias colectivas que fueron vistas en sus más exóticas formas en el Sur global. Algunos de esos caminos son abordados en trabajos como el de Dedy Pernadi, “The decline of neo-liberalism and the rise of neo-keynesianism: a conceptual analysis”, bien como en el de José Francisco Puello-Socarrás, “A brief history of anti-neoliberalism: South American political economy and development paradigms in the XXI Century”.

El debate sobre esos caminos para el desarrollo es discutido a través de una perspectiva y sirve como un debate teórico para el siguiente orden de las discusiones que están en los tres volúmenes de la *Revista Ciência & Trópico*. Esa discusión integra la mayor parte de los países, sea como una materia secundaria o subyacente, o como una constante. Esas consideraciones van, también, más

allá de los paradigmas teóricos, en que todo ocurre en medio a las preocupaciones pragmáticas de decisiones gubernamentales y de relaciones humanas, permeadas pelas incertidumbres que son controladas por los debates académicos. Es justamente para solucionar esas particularidades que esta selección de artículos va mas allá de las discusiones teóricas, trayendo, así, una serie de casos empíricos del escenario internacional.

Los trabajos de análisis más amplios, tales como “La diplomacia de los pueblos, relaciones internacionales alternativas desde el Sur”, de Karla Dias Martinez, Venezuela; “African perspective on the crisis of global capitalism”, de Demba Moussa Dembele, Senegal; y “El rol de IBSA (Índia, Brasil y Sudáfrica) en el sistema internacional contemporáneo: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?”, de Clarisa Giaccaglia, Argentina, ayudan en la construcción de un nuevo cuadro analítico basado en la perspectiva del excluido Sur Global. Ellos traen importantes contribuciones, pasando por distintas obras establecidas del conocimiento a través de la incorporación de actores excluidos y de casos que introducen una nueva perspectiva sobre las verdades aceptadas.

La diversidad geográfica de los autores y de los estudios de caso también fue una importante variable en la conformación de todo el debate. Un esfuerzo fue hecho no solo para incluir una gran variedad de países y regiones, sino también para enfatizar los locales excluidos del debate global. En especial, la perspectiva africana sobre el desarrollo también fue enfatizada por medio de artículos como: “Toward in Afric-ecological education: an alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries”, de Fatoumata Keita, Mali; “How political regime and trade liberalization help to rethink development in Central Africa: Empirical evidence”, de Gerard Tchouassi, Camerún; y “Perspectives from the Contested Terrains

of Africa: Intellectualism, Development and Social Movements”, de Siphesihle Dumisa, Sudáfrica

Finalmente, un asunto que no podría faltar en nuestra discusión se relaciona con la integración regional. Una de las principales controversias en las teorías de desarrollo, en las organizaciones regionales y en las iniciativas comunes de mercado es un tema recurrente en muchos artículos que están en el Quinto Instituto de Verano Sur-Sur. Hay una gran variedad de perspectivas: desde revisitando la teoría de la dependencia clásica, que orientó gran parte de los procesos de integración regional en América Latina, hasta documentos que discuten la relación entre nuevos paradigmas económicos y del conocimiento establecido en la integración. La experiencia latinoamericana es particularmente enfatizada en artículos como “Los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en el Sur. El caso del MERCOSUR y las perspectivas del ALBA y la UNASUR”, de Victoria Mutti, Argentina; y “Los desafíos de una agenda regional para el desarrollo. Hacia un sistema social de innovación en el MERCOSUR: el caso del diseño industrial”, de Luciano Borgoglio, Argentina.

Otros temas como seguridad, religión, democratización, desigualdad, cultura y su diálogo mutuo, bien como su relación con el concepto de desarrollo, están incluidos, no solamente por medio de la variedad de casos expuestos, sino también a través de la variedad de expresiones asumidas en la diversidad de las regiones del Sur global. Algunos de esos datos aparecen en artículos como “Desarrollo participativo en La sociedad cubana actual: repensando los gobiernos municipales como principal actor para el desarrollo, desde un estudio de caso”, de Hans Carrillo Guach, Cuba; “Market Led Agrarian Reform in the Global South: Histories,

Issues and Prospects”, de Mark Stevenson Curry, Filipinas; “Linking Development with Security in the Global South? An introduction to the Security Sector Reform”, de Mathias Valdez Duffau, Japón; y “Política industrial, La experiênica boliviana”, de Roberto del Barco Gamarra, México, cuando permiten, a través de experiencias específicas, una nueva mirada sobre las construcciones teóricas del debate sobre el desarrollo.

La presente edición de la Revista *Ciência & Trópico*, bien como la conferencia que la originó, intenta establecer una base teórica para subsidiar la discusión de los acontecimientos actuales y de los casos empíricos sobre los asuntos propuestos por el programa de la conferencia. Con todo eso claro, tres grupos principales de artículos pueden ser identificados. Primeramente, un abordaje teórico es establecido para las bases de la teoría del desarrollo y de muchos de sus temas marginales, entretanto inseparables, siempre adoptando una perspectiva alternativa del Sur. Un segundo grupo de documentos puede ser clasificado como aquel que busca un análisis internacional y de las generalizaciones, intentando, también, transmitir el escenario internacional a través del punto de vista del Sur. Por fin, un conjunto de artículos trata sobre específicos estudios de caso que identifican las particularidades de muchas de las dinámicas que son bien conocidas y que muchas veces son estudiadas en el Norte Global, frecuentemente ignoradas en el Sur.

Aunque muchos, ni todos los artículos que están en esta revista fueron mencionados en esta introducción, una vez que todos los tres números de la Revista *Ciência & Trópico* contribuyeron en la construcción de un espectro más amplio de debate Sur-Sur. Esta nota nunca significó cualquier declaración sobre la calidad o importancia de las obras que fueron, o no, mencionadas. Todos los artículos presentes fueron cuidadosamente elegidos por su calidad

y relevancia académica para el debate global. Sin embargo, los objetivos de la presente nota explicativa fue más allá de detenerse en las particularidades de cada trabajo, intentando, así, dibujar la imagen de como ellos se encajan en el debate más amplio, bien como la forma como ellos discuten entre sí.

Así, esperamos lograr el objetivo de componer una pieza en la cual distintos puntos de vista fueron introducidos en el más amplio objetivo de Sur-Sur. Es relevante destacar que, para la Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, este evento fue extremadamente importante para una institución que viene contribuyendo en la disseminación del conocimiento plural, científico e interdisciplinar en el contexto internacional.

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# **EL ROL DE IBSA (INDIA, BRASIL Y SUDÁFRICA) EN EL SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL CONTEMPORÁNEO: ¿Qué tipo de desarrollo y para quién?**

Clarisa Giaccaglia \*

## **INTRODUCCION**

Desde inicios del nuevo siglo algunos países se convirtieron en dinámicos centros económicos de la periferia comenzando a ser visualizados como “economías emergentes”. En el 2003, Jim O’Neill, economista perteneciente al grupo inversor Goldman Sachs, dio a conocer la llamada “tesis BRIC”, según la cual el potencial económico de Brasil, Rusia, India y China era tal que se podía pensar que se transformarían en las cuatro economías dominantes hacia el año 2050. Ese mismo año, los gobiernos de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica conformaron IBSA, un foro de discusión trilateral presentado como la unión de tres poderes emergentes altamente influyentes, cada uno en su continente, que comparten intereses, necesidades y capacidades similares en el plano regional.

El concepto de “economía emergente” empleado por O’Neill se basó en la consideración de indicadores económicos, -principalmente financieros, que han demostrado ser muy inestables a lo largo del tiempo-, debilitando la posible validez de este concepto para explicar el fenómeno de los poderes medios<sup>2</sup>. Se estima, además,

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<sup>2</sup> A modo de ejemplo, Argentina fue considerada como parte del grupo de merca-

que el enfoque desarrollado por Goldman Sachs corre el riesgo de exagerar las potencialidades de estas naciones. En este sentido, se coincide plenamente con lo sostenido por Joseph Nye cuando advierte que “semejantes simples extrapolaciones de las tasas de crecimiento económico actual con frecuencia resultan equivocadas a consecuencia de acontecimientos imprevistos” (NYE, 2010).

En este contexto, resulta oportuno reflexionar sobre los alcances y limitaciones de la concepción de “poderes emergentes” tomando en consideración los casos de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica. Para ello, el presente estudio se concentra en el análisis de los atributos económicos y sociales de cada uno de estos tres países, siendo interesante preguntarse: ¿Qué modelos de desarrollo socioeconómico han llevado adelante estos estados? ¿Qué características específicas presentan? ¿Dichas condiciones han impactado en su actual identificación como poderes emergentes?

En el presente trabajo se subraya la necesidad de incorporar las variables domésticas a los análisis internacionales, con el objeto de alcanzar una mejor comprensión de las políticas desarrolladas por los actores estatales en la esfera internacional. Desde esta perspectiva, se considera que países con iguales capacidades materiales actúan de forma diferente en virtud de sus distintas estructuras domésticas (ROSE, 1998, p. 147). De allí, la importancia de su consideración. Asimismo, se destaca la necesidad de repensar el desarrollo y las posibles alternativas desde el Sur, teniendo en cuenta este tipo de iniciativas conjuntas, como la planteada por IBSA, así como también las dificultades demostradas por los modelos de desarrollo vigentes, en el marco de la actual crisis económica internacional.

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dos emergentes en la década de 1990 siendo completamente descartada y relegada a las últimas posiciones mundiales a comienzos de la década siguiente.

El artículo comienza con la descripción de las condiciones territoriales y demográficas de estos países continuando con el análisis de sus modelos de desarrollo económico. Posteriormente, se ponen en consideración sus respectivas realidades sociales a fin de identificar quiénes han sido verdaderamente los beneficiados por el ascenso internacional de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica.

### **PAÍSES BALLENAS: ventajas territoriales y demográficas**

Uno de los primeros aspectos que se remarcan al momento de analizar a India, Brasil y Sudáfrica, refiere a sus condiciones geográficas y demográficas. En efecto, los tres países poseen extensiones territoriales de relevancia. Brasil e India, particularmente, son considerados estados de tamaño continental. Sudáfrica, por su parte, es el país de mayor magnitud territorial en el África Austral<sup>3</sup>.

Desde el punto de vista poblacional, los datos también son sobresalientes en los tres casos destacándose India la cual, detrás de China, constituye el segundo país más poblado del mundo con 1.210 millones de personas (CENSUS OF INDIA, 2011).

Teniendo en cuenta estos aspectos, tanto India como Brasil han sido identificados como países “ballenas” (DUPAS, 2006) lo cual conlleva una serie de ventajas y oportunidades. En primer lugar, la posesión de una gran cantidad de recursos naturales se traduce en una significativa capacidad de abastecimiento de bienes alimenticios y energéticos para el resto del mundo. En segundo lugar, sus dimensiones poblacionales comportan un doble beneficio: la posibilidad de contar con una abundante mano de obra y, al mismo tiempo, con un importante mercado consumidor.

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<sup>3</sup> Según el ranking mundial de países por superficie, Brasil e India ocupan el quinto y séptimo puesto, respectivamente. Sudáfrica está ubicada en el puesto 25

La distribución demográfica *por edad* constituye un dato a destacar. En India, la mitad de la población posee actualmente menos de 25 años. Por lo tanto, en un futuro mediano, “habrá cien millones de consumidores y trabajadores productivos más frente a las poblaciones menguantes de Japón, China y Europa” (SRINIVASAN, 2008, p. 14). A su vez, es probable que se mantenga bajo el número de jubilados soportados en la práctica por cada miembro de la población económicamente activa, lo cual es evaluado positivamente como forma de asegurar un crecimiento sostenido.

Tanto India, Brasil como Sudáfrica poseen pirámides poblacionales progresivas, es decir, con bases anchas motivadas por altos porcentajes de población joven. Las personas menores de 15 años representan el 32% en India, el 27 % en Brasil y el 31% en Sudáfrica, de la población total. Dichos números resultan significativos si se los compara con el tan sólo 16% correspondiente a toda Europa. En cuanto a los sectores más ancianos (mayores de 65 años) constituyen el 7% del total en Brasil. Tanto en Sudáfrica como en India sólo alcanzan al 5% de la población (BUREAU, 2010, p. 6-8).

Por consiguiente, la estructura demográfica de los tres países demuestra que gran parte del crecimiento de la población mundial futura ocurrirá en estos estados. Dicho panorama, frente al marcado envejecimiento de los países desarrollados, tendrá consecuencias significativas en el devenir socioeconómico mundial.

En cuanto a la composición *por género*, se observa que la cantidad de mujeres en la población total es mayor al número de hombres tanto en Sudáfrica como en Brasil. No obstante, esta diferencia no es lo suficientemente notoria y, en consecuencia, la distribución por sexo puede ser considerada mayoritariamente uniforme.

En India, en cambio, el número de hombres es sensiblemente superior. Esta desproporción entre ambos sexos es considerada de forma negativa puesto que, sumado al denominado “abombamiento” en los grupos jóvenes, ambos factores han sido históricamente considerados como motivos para mayores niveles de inestabilidad política, violencia entre grupos sociales y movimientos antiestatales extremistas (SAHNI AJAI, 2010, p. 32; BUSTELO, 2010, p. 27). La enorme disparidad de género en India se explica por una preferencia cultural por los hijos varones al momento del nacimiento y, en consecuencia, por el aborto selectivo de los fetos femeninos. Si bien está prohibida la detección del sexo del feto, a fin de realizar un aborto por razones de género, lo cierto es que esta práctica se encuentra muy extendida especialmente entre las familias urbanas y las más acomodadas (BUSTELO, 2010, p. 27).

Con respecto, finalmente, a la *distribución entre áreas urbanas y rurales*, India y Brasil constituyen dos casos contrapuestos. Mientras que en Brasil sólo el 15 % de la población habita en zonas rurales, en India, el 71% de los habitantes reside en estas áreas dedicándose a actividades agrícolas. En cuanto a Sudáfrica, la distinción entre sectores urbanos y rurales resulta más pareja teniendo en cuenta que el 52% de la población es urbana y el 48% rural.

## **MODELOS DE DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO**

Las características territoriales y demográficas señaladas propiciaron, entre otros factores, que los gobiernos de los tres estados promovieran un crecimiento preeminente autárquico mediante el desarrollo de una estructura industrial doméstica que combinó una política económica proteccionista con una activa participación estatal.

En efecto, tanto en Brasil como en Sudáfrica se promovió, desde la década del treinta y del sesenta respectivamente, un modelo económico basado en la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones (ISI). En India a su vez se llevó adelante desde su independencia una estrategia que, siguiendo el discurso soviético, apuntó al establecimiento de una economía planificada.

No obstante, hacia fines de la década del setenta este esquema de desarrollo comenzó a manifestar importantes limitaciones. Con el fin de la Guerra Fría, el modelo económico neoliberal se impuso en el escenario global en el marco del denominado Consenso de Washington. Si bien la magnitud de este proceso, conocido habitualmente como globalización, involucró a prácticamente todas las naciones del mundo, las particularidades que presentó la adopción de este nuevo modelo en cada país y, especialmente, en los tres que aquí interesan; tornan necesario un análisis individual de cada uno de estos casos.

### **INDIA: una apertura económica con fuerte presencia estatal**

Luego de su independencia, el gobierno indio llevó adelante una estrategia de crecimiento hacia adentro, inspirado en el modelo soviético de desarrollo. Durante sus primeras cuatro décadas como Estado independiente, la India adoptó un sistema económico de planificación estatal cuyas principales características fueron la expansión del sector público, el control de las actividades privadas y la restricción de las inversiones extranjeras con el objeto de lograr la autosuficiencia nacional. Durante la mayor parte de ese período, la inflación se mantuvo bajo control pero el ritmo medio de crecimiento real del PBI fue tan sólo del 3,5 % anual.

A la hora de evaluar los resultados de esta política, D’Orazi considera que “su mérito indiscutible reside en haber dotado a un país pobre y atrasado como la India de un sector industrial moderno”. Sin embargo, desde el principio se evidenció que las decisiones estuvieron viciadas por incoherencias y compromisos, sobre todo “por la pretensión de construir una economía socialista en un sistema no-socialista” (D’ORAZI, 2003, p. 51). Desde la perspectiva de Kohli, es importante señalar que la industrialización india “no derivó en socialismo y en una redistribución sino en una especie de capitalismo financiado por el Estado, sobre el que podía apoyarse y prosperar una industria nacional mantenida al amparo de la competencia exterior” (KOHLI, 1987, p. 64).

La caída del régimen soviético en 1991 constituyó el puntapié inicial para una serie de importantes transformaciones económicas en India. Cabe mencionar que las medidas de reforma y apertura se habían iniciado, en la década del ochenta, durante el gobierno de Rajiv Gandhi. No obstante, estas políticas habían llevado consigo déficit presupuestario, inflación y endeudamiento con el exterior. Asimismo, “la combinación de la invasión iraquí de Kuwait, la respuesta a ella por parte de Estados Unidos y la posterior subida del precio del petróleo hicieron que India se enfrentara a una severa crisis de la balanza de pagos” (NAGESWARAN, 2008, p. 41).

En dicho contexto, el gobierno de Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) – con Manmohan Singh como ministro de Finanzas<sup>4</sup> – decidió emprender en 1991 un ambicioso programa de liberalización económica que combinó medidas de estabilización a corto plazo con reformas estructurales de largo plazo. Es importante destacar que, con

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<sup>4</sup> Manmohan Sing, quien posteriormente se convirtió en primer ministro de India por dos períodos, es considerado el principal arquitecto de este proceso de reformas económicas.

diversos estilos y diferentes velocidades, los distintos gobiernos han aplicado dicho modelo hasta la actualidad. Pese a estos cambios, el Estado sigue teniendo una amplia participación en la determinación del rumbo económico del país.

En términos de Shovon Ray, el proceso de reformas económicas realizado en India puede dividirse en dos fases (SHOVON Ray, 2006, p.72-86). La **primera fase** (1991-1996) se focalizó en amplias reformas de sectores claves de la economía e implicó una liberalización del comercio, el establecimiento de un régimen cambiario determinado por el mercado y la apertura a las inversiones extranjeras.

En cuanto al sector industrial, quedó abolida la política de licencias, la cual fue considerada responsable en gran parte de la ineficiencia de la industria india, con la excepción de ciertos sectores específicos considerados sensibles por cuestiones de seguridad nacional, medioambientales o de salud. Por otra parte, ciertas actividades que hasta ese momento habían sido reservadas de forma exclusiva al sector público, fueron habilitadas para las empresas privadas. Por último, se buscó modernizar las pequeñas empresas, a fin de que fueran tecnológicamente avanzadas y competitivas, mediante un mejoramiento de las líneas de crédito.

Con respecto al sector financiero, se realizó la desregulación del sector bancario así como también reformas impositivas con el objeto de eliminar una serie de impuestos al comercio exterior. Asimismo, se fomentó la informatización de las tarifas.

Las disposiciones adoptadas durante la primera etapa implicaron una radical transición y, en general, fueron consideradas exitosas (SHOVON RAY, 2006, p. 76). De 1991 a 1996, la economía se expandió a un ritmo medio del 5,5 % con una ulterior aceleración que alcanzó el 7% en 1996. Además, la inflación fue controlada



y la deuda externa se tornó manejable (D'ORAZI, 2003, p. 321-322). Pese a esto, los avances en relación a una reforma agrícola y a proyectos de infraestructura se estimaron muy limitados debido a que el gobierno prefirió un avance más cauto y gradual dada la complejidad de dichos sectores.

La **segunda fase de reformas** comenzó en 1997 y se extiende hasta la actualidad. En la misma se ha buscado tanto profundizar las medidas ya establecidas como iniciar nuevas.

Desde mediados de la década del noventa, el proceso de reformas mostró signos de desaceleración tanto por factores externos (crisis financiera asiática de 1997) como internos (cyclón Orissa, enfrentamiento armado en Kargil en 1999) Además, los frecuentes cambios de gobierno durante el período 1996-1999<sup>5</sup> socavaron la capacidad del poder ejecutivo para proseguir el proceso. No obstante, hacia fines de la década del noventa, el gobierno de A. B. Vajpayee (1996-2004) logró estabilizar la situación política del país y, en consecuencia, se retomaron las reformas económicas.

A partir de allí, se realizaron modificaciones fiscales tales como la eliminación de subsidios a ciertos productos derivados del petróleo y reformas financieras como la apertura del sector de seguros a la participación privada. En cuanto al sector externo, se profundizó la política de atracción de inversiones extranjeras directas y, en 1999, se creó The Foreign Investment Implementation Authority (FIIA) que actúa como intermediario entre los inversores y la administración pública.

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<sup>5</sup> En esta etapa se sucedieron dos experiencias cortas de gobierno pertenecientes al Frente Unido (una coalición de partidos). Posteriormente, la asunción de A. B. Vajpayee perteneciente al Bharatya Janata Party implicó, por primera vez en India, la llegada de un gobierno de derecha nacionalista. Es importante aclarar que todos los gobiernos mencionados, independientemente de su orientación política, apoyaron la continuación del proceso de reformas económicas.

En 2004, el gobierno de Manmohan Singh anunció la “Política Nacional de Comercio Exterior” para el período 2004-2009, cuyos dos principales objetivos eran: - duplicar los intercambios comerciales internacionales para los próximos cinco años, poniendo especial atención en sectores como joyas, software y fármacos, y - utilizar la expansión comercial como un instrumento efectivo para el logro del crecimiento económico y para la generación de empleo.

En el año 2008, Kamalnath, ministro de Comercio e Industria, expresó: “I am pleased to say that our achievements have exceeded our targets. Not only have we fulfilled our performance in full measure, but we have gone beyond – and done it in just four years, instead of five”. En efecto, mientras que en el 2004 las exportaciones habían representado US\$ 63.000 millones, para el 2008 dicho número ascendió a los US\$ 155.000 millones. En cuanto al empleo, la expansión de las actividades comerciales implicó la creación de 136.000 nuevos puestos de trabajo (Foreign Trade Policy for 2004-2009, 01/04/2008, p. 7).

En agosto de 2009, en el marco de la crisis financiera internacional del Norte, el actual gobierno de Manmohan Singh anunció la “Política Nacional de Comercio Exterior” para el período 2009-2014. Frente a la caída de las exportaciones desde agosto de 2008, como consecuencia de la mencionada crisis, una de las primeras metas establecidas por el nuevo programa radicó en concentrar los esfuerzos para revertir dicha tendencia. Este objetivo se consiguió a fines de 2009 cuando las exportaciones alcanzaron los US\$ 178.660 millones (Foreign Trade Policy for 2009-2014, 27/08/2009, p. 5).

Por otra parte, la política comercial vigente se propone a diversificar los mercados incorporando destinos no tradicionales de América Latina, África y Asia así como también emprender una tarea de simplificación de los procedimientos administrativos

a fin de reducir los costos de transacción. Además, el gobierno ha fomentado la internacionalización de las empresas nacionales. Las compañías privadas indias, mundialmente competitivas representan un número más elevado que, por ejemplo, las empresas chinas (de propiedad china y enteramente gestionadas desde China). Esta realidad beneficia a la India en desmedro de su vecino puesto que los beneficios generados por las empresas extranjeras se retiran del país, “en vez de ser reinvertidos localmente, mientras que la etiqueta “made in India” (fabricado en la India) puede traducirse cada vez más por “made by India” (fabricado por una empresa india)” (PETERS, 2010, p. 128).

Como se dijo anteriormente, reforma agraria e infraestructura constituyen los dos grandes temas pendientes de la agenda económica india. Con respecto a la agricultura, la situación se explica en gran medida por la resistencia de importantes grupos de intereses. Asimismo, la fuerte incidencia de las cuestiones climáticas en las actividades agrícolas, por la excesiva dependencia de las lluvias monzónicas, ha sido enfrentada a través de una serie de políticas que buscan mitigar estos riesgos: esquemas de seguros, diseño de agencias rurales de crédito, revisión de los bancos cooperativos para incrementar su eficiencia, entre otras medidas.

En cuanto a la infraestructura, resulta ineludible tanto su desarrollo como su modernización. Las áreas más necesitadas de atención son la energía eléctrica y el transporte. Los cortes eléctricos son un problema material y un impedimento muy importante para el crecimiento económico del país (SANJAY, 2010, p. 136).

El transporte (carreteras, ferrocarriles, puertos y aeropuertos) es otro sector que precisa de una fuerte inversión. Históricamente, el sistema de transporte indio ha sido ciertamente nefasto. Sólo el 58% del total de las carreteras están asfaltadas. El obsoleto sistema de

redes ferroviarias dificulta tanto el transporte de mercancías como el de pasajeros. Las condiciones en puertos y aeropuertos también son insatisfactorias (SANJAY, 2010, p. 144).

Frente a esta adversa realidad, el gobierno de India ha emprendido ambiciosos proyectos de infraestructura vial tales como el Golden Quadrilateral - que tiene por objeto conectar las cuatro ciudades más importantes del país: Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai y Kolkatta, abarcando 5.846 km -; y los North-South and East-West Corridors – que comprenden 7.142 km y aspiran a vincular los lugares más extremos de la nación, de Norte a Sur y de Este a Oeste (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways of India, Annual Report 2008-2009, 2009).

Si bien las autopistas nacionales constituyen sólo el 2% del sistema de rutas, por las mismas circula el 40% del tránsito total. Paralelamente, la explosión del mercado automotor acontecida en los últimos años (con un crecimiento en promedio del 10% anual) torna imperativo el accionar gubernamental en esta materia. Con este cometido, “national highways registered an increase of 14.744 km (from 52.010 km en 2000 to 66.754 km in March 2008). However, the largest increase of 629.353 km was in case of rural roads” (Ministry of Road Transport and Highways of India, Annual Report 2008-2009, 2009).

Paralelamente, el gobierno indio ha emprendido, apoyado por la iniciativa privada, la modernización de los principales puertos (Ennore, Marmagao, Turicorin) y aeropuertos (Mumbai, Delhi). Cabe mencionar finalmente que el transporte ferroviario constituye el sector menos modernizado.

## **BRASIL: la puesta en marcha del monetarismo desarrollista**

Desde la década de 1930 hasta fines de la década de 1980, Brasil adoptó un modelo económico de sustitución de importaciones

por medio del cual se buscó implementar un proyecto de desarrollo nacional basado en un proceso de industrialización. Comenzando con los textiles se fue entonces instalando gradualmente un vasto campo de industrias ligeras y pesadas. Desde 1950 se agregó a dicho proceso la conformación de un pensamiento desarrollista<sup>6</sup> que permeó los gobiernos de Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, Jânio Quadros, João Goulart y Ernesto Geisel (VISENTINI, 1994, p. 35).

Desde la perspectiva de Cervo, este paradigma desarrollista puede ser dividido en tres fases sucesivas. Una primera etapa de implantación de la gran industria asociada a los emprendimientos extranjeros (1950-1960); una segunda fase de conformación de una industria de base a partir de iniciativas estatales (1970) y, por último, un período de innovación tecnológica (1980 en adelante) en algunos sectores de punta a partir de esfuerzos tanto públicos como privados (CERVO, 2008, p. 75).

En relación a esta última fase, Villares sostiene que, a partir de los años ochenta, Brasil consolidó un nuevo patrón competitivo por el cual los emprendimientos se especializaron en ciertos segmentos específicos de la cadena productiva. Asimismo, gracias a un vasto mercado interno, el país ingresó a esta nueva década “with a more integrated and competitive productive structure than, for instance, Chile or Argentina, whose small markets rendered inviable some of the links in the productive chain or, at the most, allowed for the participation for only one or two competitors” (VILLARES, 2006, p. 25). Esta compleja estructura productiva dio lugar a un intenso proceso de urbanización que implicó una dilatación de las ciudades, particularmente de aquellas en las cuales se concentraron

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<sup>6</sup> El pensamiento desarrollista se desplegó fundamentalmente en el seno de la CEPAL abarcando los trabajos teóricos de Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Theotônio Dos Santos, Rui Mauro Marini, Fernando Henrique Cardoso y Enzo Faletto, entre otros (CERVO, p. 73).

las actividades industriales. En suma, para fines de los años setenta, Brasil había logrado un rápido crecimiento convirtiéndose en la novena economía mundial, sólo por detrás de los países del G-7 y de la Unión Soviética (VIOLA, 2005, p. 15).

No obstante, para mediados de la década de 1980, Brasil pasó a ser, junto con Argentina y México, uno de los tres países más endeudados de América Latina lo cual transformó al país en un exportador de capitales. Los serios problemas de la balanza de pagos intentaron subsanarse a través de un ajuste de los flujos comerciales externos, esto es, mediante un aumento de las exportaciones y una disminución de las importaciones con el objeto de alcanzar una balanza comercial superavitaria. Cabe señalar que el crecimiento de los ingresos vía exportaciones en Brasil se logró en parte mediante subvenciones abiertas o encubiertas para los exportadores, contribuyendo con ello al aumento del déficit público, generador de inflación (PÉREZ SÁNCHEZ, 1995). En este sentido, Belluzzo y Almeida afirman que “the economy does not explode in a hyperinflation disaster, but it starts to rotten in rentism and in the indexation habit” (BELLUZZO; ALMEIDA, 2002).

Desde la perspectiva de Villares, las medidas económicas adoptadas, tendientes a generar un balance comercial positivo, se concentraron en la producción de ciertos segmentos que no eran viables desde el punto de vista económico, tecnológico o financiero. Por consiguiente, Brasil sufrió una pérdida de competitividad y un deterioro en cuanto a la imagen de sus productos en términos de precio y calidad (VILLARES, 2006, p. 34). Por tanto, la combinación de estancamiento económico, inflación y vulnerabilidad externa convirtió a los años ochenta en una década perdida para Brasil, al igual que para el resto de los países latinoamericanos.

Para principios de la década del noventa, con el fin de la Guerra Fría y el triunfo de un nuevo ideario neoliberal, se diagnosticó el agotamiento del modelo de sustitución de importaciones. En este contexto, los países latinoamericanos comenzaron un proceso de importantes reformas macroeconómicas e institucionales sustituyendo la tradicional visión desarrollista por un enfoque monetarista<sup>7</sup>.

En Brasil, el Plan Collor de 1990 combinó la liberalización fiscal y comercial con medidas anti-inflacionarias. Posteriormente, el Plan Real de 1993-94 no fue sólo un plan de estabilización económica sino que constituyó un programa que implicó profundos cambios en la economía y en la sociedad brasileña. En este sentido, es posible identificar rasgos comunes con otras experiencias de estabilización de precios y reformas institucionales en la región, en las que se recurrió al control del tipo de cambio y a una mayor apertura externa para controlar la inflación. Estos rasgos se refieren a “la valorización real de la moneda nacional, a una variación de precios relativos adversa a los bienes y favorable a los servicios, a la fuerte entrada de capitales externos, así como al rápido crecimiento de las importaciones, del crédito interno y del consumo privado” (SÁINZ; CALCAGNO, 1999, p. 7). Además, se produjo, durante los primeros

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<sup>7</sup> Bouzas y French Davis señalan que “así como se atribuye a la CEPAL y a un conjunto de economistas el haber desempeñado un papel clave en la difusión del paradigma de la industrialización sustituta, lo propio puede afirmarse con relación a una vasta cohorte de economistas profesionales entrenados en universidades norteamericanas”. Entre ellos, los autores mencionan a la llamada “Escuela de Chicago”, donde se formaron aquellos economistas que proponían el enfoque monetario del balance de pagos como la herramienta analítica más importante para orientar la política monetaria y externa de un país. A partir de la década del noventa, la emergencia de una nueva tecnocracia, mayoritariamente entrenada en Cambridge (Massachussets), alcanzó también posiciones de influencia pública en un gran número de países latinoamericanos (BOUZAS; FRENCH DAVIS, 2005, p. 53).

años, una recuperación de la inversión orientada principalmente a la modernización de las empresas del país, por medio de un proceso de privatizaciones.

No obstante, el caso brasileño presenta particularidades significativas. Sáinz y Calcagno reconocen cinco características distintivas. En primer lugar, remarcan que se trata de una economía de magnitud continental, con una estructura de oferta sumamente diversificada y con una apertura comercial significativamente menor que la del resto de los países latinoamericanos. En segundo lugar, destacan que los ajustes de balanza de pago se hicieron, sobre todo, con incrementos y reducciones de las exportaciones antes que de las importaciones. Asimismo, la reestructuración del sistema bancario se realizó durante las primeras etapas del proceso de reforma y no, como en muchos otros casos, con motivo de una crisis de balanza de pagos. Una tercera característica que diferencia el caso brasileño es que, al menos hasta 1996, el efecto social del plan de estabilización fue positivo especialmente en términos de reducción de la pobreza. En cuarto lugar, la política fiscal de los años noventa aumentó las transferencias al sector pasivo (principalmente jubilaciones y pensiones) en porcentajes apreciables. Una quinta diferencia es la magnitud relativa de la deuda pública doméstica en relación a la externa, lo que se originó en un intenso financiamiento interno de la reestructuración bancaria y de los déficits operativos federales y estatales (SÁINZ; CALCAGNO, 1999, p. 10).

El período 1994-1995 resultó, en principio, exitoso: se aceleró el crecimiento económico y se resistió con éxito los efectos de la crisis mexicana de 1994. A partir de 1996, no obstante, comenzaron a aparecer los primeros síntomas de dificultades y se empezó a cuestionar la capacidad de crecer con un esquema que privilegiaba la mantención del tipo de cambio como instrumento para la estabilidad



de precios. La situación se complicó definitivamente con el desenlace de la crisis financiera rusa en 1997 y finalizó con la devaluación de la moneda brasileña en enero de 1999.

A la hora de analizar toda esta etapa, Sáinz y Calcagno estiman que “la mantención de la política económica y la acentuación del uso de la política monetaria terminaron por frenar los cambios de fondo de la economía real, acentuando los desequilibrios externos e impidiendo la reducción de la deuda pública pese a contar con los recursos de las privatizaciones”. Dicha situación desembocó “en el estancamiento económico y en un mayor desempleo abierto” (SÁINZ; CALCAGNO, 1999, p. 79).

Carneiro, por su parte considera que, desde el punto de vista de la estructura productiva, la economía brasileña sufrió una desindustrialización puesto que los emprendimientos se concentraron en los eslabones iniciales de la cadena productiva (*commodities*), en los cuales se poseen ventajas comparativas y, como es sabido, dichos sectores poseen un bajo valor agregado, tienen un crecimiento limitado de demanda y se encuentran expuestos en mayor medida a las fluctuaciones del mercado internacional (CARNEIRO, 2002).

En palabras de Cerro, la experiencia neoliberal en Brasil, irónicamente, en lugar de resolver el déficit en las cuentas nacionales como se proponía, terminó agravándolo; “Sem projeto de desenvolvimento e sem recursos, a era Cardoso provocou a estagnação da economia brasileira e interrompeu um ciclo de sessenta anos de desenvolvimento” (CERRO, 2008, p. 81). No obstante, el analista brasileño cree que la apertura comercial, y la consiguiente inundación del país con productos extranjeros, tuvo un resultado positivo sobre la industria nacional la cual se vio obligada a modernizar sus plantas y sus métodos elevando la productividad de la economía brasileña. Este efecto positivo, a diferencia de lo ocurrido

en los restantes países sudamericanos, se explica por el grado de presión que los empresarios, obreros industriales, agricultores y comerciantes ejercieron sobre el gobierno nacional, graduando tanto el ritmo como la dimensión de la apertura en función de la capacidad de adaptación de los distintos segmentos económicos (CERVO, 2008, p.82).

De este modo, el gobierno de Cardoso implantó un liberalismo poco ortodoxo, polarizado entre una vertiente neoliberal, predominante en la gestión macroeconómica, y otra liberal-desarrollista, responsable de que se aprobasen medidas destinadas a reducir el impacto de la política macroeconómica sobre el sistema productivo (SALLUM, 2008, p. 158).

La llegada de Lula da Silva a la presidencia de Brasil, en 2003 acentuó este eclecticismo económico, dando lugar a una etapa basada en un monetarismo desarrollista. En efecto, el equipo económico del gobierno nacional<sup>8</sup> combinó una política monetaria restrictiva (basada en un real sobrevaluado a fin de mantener la estabilidad) con un despliegue de inversiones estatales expansivas desarrolladas desde el ministerio de Planificación. Asimismo, se implementaron una serie de políticas que permitieron extender la cobertura social a los sectores más pobres posibilitando el ascenso de la clase media baja (ROMERO, 2010).

El mantenimiento de las premisas básicas de la política económica del gobierno de Cardoso tranquilizó a los empresarios e inversores (nacionales y extranjeros) ya que se demostró que no existiría una transformación profunda de las reglas económicas del país. De este modo, se otorgó prioridad al sistema de metas de

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<sup>8</sup> El equipo económico estuvo conformado por, en primer lugar, Antonio Palocci y desde el 2003 Guido Mantega como ministros de Economía y Henrique Meirelles como presidente del Banco Central.

inflación y al régimen de cambio fluctuante, junto con el ajuste fiscal para sostener el superávit primario y el respeto de los contratos.

Pero además, el gobierno de Lula interrumpió el proceso de privatizaciones y, con ello, evitó la reacción crítica de las corrientes de izquierda. En contrapartida, la nueva administración propuso la figura de “asociación” como mecanismo de articulación entre el sector público y las empresas privadas. En el año 2004, el Congreso brasileño aprobó una ley que regula las asociaciones público-privadas para obras de infraestructura. En este marco, “el Estado define qué hacer, conservando el papel dirigente, y realiza parte de las inversiones. Una vez finalizada la obra, las empresas privadas se convierten en explotadoras de los servicios (camino, ferrocarril, metro) con una rentabilidad mínima garantizada por un fondo público” (SALLUM, 2008, p. 162).

Siguiendo esta política focalizada en las inversiones, sobre todo en infraestructura, en enero de 2007 el gobierno de Lula lanzó el Plan de Aceleración del Crecimiento (PAC). El PAC fue un programa de inversiones muy difundido discursivamente pero muy limitado en la práctica. Además, muchas de las inversiones que lo conformaban ya habían sido previstas con anterioridad. No obstante y, en función de la aplicación de las políticas económicas mencionadas, Brasil recuperó el crecimiento en un nivel modesto pero aparentemente sustentable, en torno a un 4% anual (SALLUM, 2008, p. 163).

Por otra parte, se procuró mejorar la capacidad de competencia de las empresas brasileñas en relación con las multinacionales que operan en el país, además de alentar a las compañías nacionales para que se expandan al exterior. En este sentido, el ministro de Desarrollo, Industria y Comercio Exterior del gobierno de Lula, Miguel Jorge, aseguró en 2008 que el gobierno estaba fuertemente interesado en acompañar el proceso de internacionalización de las empresas

brasileñas. Desde su perspectiva, este nivel de internacionalización aún es bajo (entre el 2002 y el 2006, representó el 0,4 % del total mundial) si se lo compara con los países asiáticos (PESQUISA SOBEET, 2008, p. 66).

Por otra parte, resulta de gran importancia considerar la repercusión de la crisis financiera internacional iniciada el 2008. En un informe publicado por la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE) se indica que la disciplina fiscal y ortodoxia monetaria brasileña, así como las reservas de divisas sin precedentes de 190.000 millones de dólares amortiguaron el golpe de las fugas de capitales (ROBINSON, 2009). La expansión del mercado interno, la adopción de políticas anticíclicas y la política de diversificación de socios comerciales contribuyeron a atenuar los efectos de la crisis (AMORIM, 2010, p. 219). En suma, si bien la crisis del Norte detuvo el crecimiento económico nacional, “el país tuvo capacidad de resistir. No consiguió avanzar, pero tuvo la capacidad de no retroceder” (Equipo de la Fundación Getulio Vargas en Diario del Pueblo en español, 11/2/2010).

Hacia fines de su segundo mandato en 2010, el presidente Lula dio a conocer el segundo Programa Acelerado de Crecimiento (PAC) a partir del cual se proyectó un crecimiento de la economía brasileña en torno a un 5% anual. En el marco de este segundo plan deben incluirse las inversiones que se realizarán en ocasión de la Copa Mundial de fútbol 2014 (que involucrará a doce ciudades brasileñas) y de los Juegos Olímpicos 2016 en Rio de Janeiro. El gobierno de este último estado prevé que las inversiones de 2010-2016 alcanzarán los US\$ 50.000 millones en infraestructura, construcción, transporte, seguridad pública, educación y capacitación, entre otros.

## **SUDÁFRICA: la búsqueda de la reinserción económica internacional post *apartheid***

Luego de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Sudáfrica se insertó en el sistema de comercio internacional como un país productor de materias primas en el cual la minería tenía un papel preponderante. Al igual que en el caso brasileño, el gobierno sudafricano implementó a mediados de la década del sesenta un modelo por sustitución de importaciones. Sin embargo, el sistema de *apartheid* imperante en el país otorgó a este proceso económico ciertas características particulares.

Desde los años sesenta, el gobierno blanco lanzó importantes proyectos de industria pesada (aluminio, acero y químicos, entre otros) y realizó significativas inversiones en infraestructura para servicios públicos tales como rutas, trenes y telecomunicaciones. Este conjunto de políticas, propias de un modelo sustitutivo, se vieron reforzadas por consideraciones políticas en función de la necesidad de garantizar la autonomía del país en sectores estratégicos, en vistas al creciente aislamiento internacional que gradualmente sufría el país producto del régimen de segregación racial (LE PERE, 2006, p.259).

Es importante señalar que la crisis petrolera de 1973 tuvo un efecto poco significativo en el caso de Sudáfrica ya que el impacto negativo se vio compensado por el aumento de los precios de los productos primarios exportables. Dicho incremento benefició especialmente al oro sudafricano tras el abandono internacional del patrón cambiario dólar-oro.<sup>9</sup>

No obstante, el crecimiento alcanzado por el país comenzó a deteriorarse a mediados de la década del setenta y se profundizó en los años ochenta, por una combinación de factores internos y externos

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<sup>9</sup> En 1981, el oro representaba el 51% del total de las exportaciones sudafricanas (LE PERE, 2006, p. 261).

(económicos y políticos). Desde un punto de vista estrictamente económico, la balanza comercial se tornó crecientemente negativa mientras que la caída del precio internacional del oro erosionó la rentabilidad de la minería y redujo las divisas públicas sudafricanas. Además, la existencia de un mercado doméstico pequeño sumado al hecho de que los bienes de consumo sólo eran accesibles para la minoría blanca, constituyó un claro límite para el desarrollo de este modelo económico.

Entre los factores de índole política es posible mencionar los acontecimientos ocurridos en Soweto en 1976<sup>10</sup> los cuales provocaron una declinación en los niveles de inversión. Dicha situación se debió a la pérdida de confianza del sector privado sobre la evolución de la economía nacional en un contexto de profunda inestabilidad política y, por consiguiente, se produjo una inevitable fuga de capitales al extranjero (LE PERE, 2006, p. 263).

Asimismo, el gobierno nacional afrontó serias dificultades presupuestarias, a raíz de los incesantes incrementos de los gastos en seguridad nacional que el *apartheid* exigía, lo cual obligó a reducir las inversiones públicas. En otros términos, para poder funcionar el sistema requería de una extensa y costosa administración que implicaba una burocracia específica para cada grupo étnico. Al respecto, Lipton sostiene que “the political cost of apartheid was also linked to the lunacy of shifting millions of black people to ethnic homelands, to infrastructure and construction investments, and to fiscal measures to attract businesses to create employment

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<sup>10</sup> El 16 de junio de 1976, surge la oposición simbólica de los estudiantes negros a la opresión blanca, negándose a asistir a las clases dictadas en afrikáner (lengua de la minoría blanca boer). Esta situación dio origen a una revuelta que se prolongó por semanas y que se extendió a todo el país. Como consecuencia de los enfrentamientos con la policía, fallecieron más de 500 estudiantes.

and settle populations in the homelands” (LIPTON, 1986 apud LE PERE, 2006, p. 263).

En cuanto a los factores externos, se destacan las independencias de Angola, Mozambique y Zimbabwe<sup>11</sup> las cuales desencadenaron nuevos incrementos en el presupuesto militar sudafricano. A su vez, la imposición de sanciones financieras y comerciales internacionales a Sudáfrica – en señal de repudio a la política del *apartheid* – agravó aún más su situación económica. En efecto, el embargo comercial realizado por Estados Unidos en 1986 constituyó uno de los más significativos pues obligó a las compañías norteamericanas a retirar sus inversiones de Sudáfrica.

Consecuentemente, el gobierno de Pieter Willem Botha (1984-1989) declaró en 1985 una moratoria de pagos de su deuda externa. Al mismo tiempo, el país ingresó en una profunda recesión económica que se extendió hasta el fin del sistema de *apartheid*. Dichas circunstancias conllevaron un replanteamiento general del modelo de desarrollo así como de la situación de economía de enclave basada en la producción minera, que históricamente caracterizó al país.

A partir de 1994, en el marco de un sistema político democrático, se produjo el levantamiento de las sanciones económicas que recaían sobre el país posibilitando su completa reinserción internacional, tanto a nivel de su participación en los organismos internacionales como en el ámbito de su economía. En este sentido, se produjo un aumento de las importaciones y la llegada de las primeras inversiones extranjeras.

En este marco, el gobierno de Mandela (1994-1999) adoptó *el Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP), un plan

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<sup>11</sup> En 1975, Angola y Mozambique lograron la independencia de Portugal. Posteriormente, en 1980 se produce la independencia de Zimbabwe.

económico que buscaba el mejoramiento de la infraestructura y de los servicios sociales con el objeto de estimular el crecimiento nacional. El gobierno sudafricano partió de la premisa de que

this will lead to an increased output in all sectors of the economy, and by upgrading our infrastructure and human resource development we will also enhance export capacity. For this process to be effective, attention will be paid to those economic factors inhibiting growth and investment and placing obstacles in the way of private sector expansion (WHITE PAPER ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, 15/11/1994).

En este sentido, los objetivos planteados se manifestaron en consonancia con las medidas recomendadas por el ya mencionado Consenso de Washington, esto es, liberalización comercial, disciplina fiscal, privatizaciones y estabilidad cambiaria. Sin embargo, la relevancia otorgada al mercado y al rol del sector privado fue acompañada por un énfasis sobre la importancia del Estado y del reforzamiento del sector público: “the broad presumption was that when the market failed, as it so often did in South Africa, the estate would step in to both force capital to follow a long-term rational, non racial capitalist logic and to facilitate access to basic goods and services” (BOND, 1999, p. 118).

En el marco del mencionado programa fueron posibles algunos importantes avances. En materia habitacional los logros fueron sobresalientes proporcionando viviendas a seis millones de personas entre 1994 y 2003. Además, más del 70 % de la población accedió a suministro eléctrico y agua corriente (MILLS, 2004, p. 83). De forma más gradual, también se mejoró en cuestiones vinculadas a salud y educación. Pese a ello, los objetivos perseguidos por el RDP fueron demasiado ambiciosos.



Si bien el RDP no fue oficialmente abandonado, en la práctica, fue reemplazado por el *Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy* (GEAR), un plan de 1996 de corte más neoliberal. Este nuevo programa subrayó el papel de la economía de mercado y relegó a un segundo plano el tema de la redistribución. Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno agudizó los controles fiscales y la liberalización comercial, inició el proceso de privatizaciones de empresas estatales así como también la flexibilización de la legislación laboral. Le Pere asegura que “rhetorically, attempts were made to align it with the socially progressive objectives of the RDP; however, the central pillars of the strategy were fashioned in accordance with standard neo-liberal shibboleths” (LE PERE, 2006, p. 275).

El GEAR no logró los resultados que se esperaban y las desigualdades sociales se profundizaron. La única meta que se alcanzó fue la de disminuir el déficit fiscal que pasó de un 5 % del PBI a un 3,1 % entre 1996 y 2001, lo cual se logró recortando la inversión pública y el gasto social (ANTENTAS, 2006).

Por otra parte, con el objeto de continuar con la promoción de políticas tendientes a eliminar los efectos adversos del *apartheid*, el gobierno de Mandela estableció en 1998 la política de *Affirmative Action*. Dicha política implicó una discriminación positiva en favor de los sectores que habían sufrido la segregación racial, priorizándolos en la contratación de personal para cubrir puestos de trabajo en el ámbito de las administraciones del Estado y de las grandes compañías, tanto públicas como privadas. De este modo, el gobierno apuntó a afrontar los altos niveles de desempleo que imperaban en el país.

Con la llegada de Thabo Mbeki a la presidencia sudafricana (1999-2004) se mantuvieron las principales directrices de la política económica impulsadas durante la gestión de Mandela.

Esta continuidad se manifestó en la titularidad de los ministerios económicos los cuales no reflejaron ninguna modificación: Trevor Manuel permaneció como ministro de Finanzas y Alec Erwin hizo lo propio como ministro de Industria y Comercio.

El nuevo gobierno buscó superar las históricas desigualdades sociales. No obstante, durante los primeros años del nuevo siglo, los avances fueron muy poco significativos. Además, la aceleración del proceso de privatizaciones a inicios del 2000 afectó a la industria nacional beneficiando a un sector muy restringido de la población y aumentando nuevamente los índices de desempleo.

Pese al levantamiento de los embargos y de los boicots internacionales, la economía sudafricana prácticamente no creció durante este período (1994-2000). Para 1999, el PBI se situaba en torno al 1,2 % anual. Finalmente en 2001, el gobierno realizó una importante devaluación del 55% del rand con respecto al dólar.

A partir del segundo mandato de Mbeki (2004-2008), el gobierno se concentró en la promoción de las iniciativas económicas nacionales (fundamentalmente en el acceso a la propiedad privada para los sectores de población negra) así como también en una expansión de la infraestructura pública.

El primer objetivo fue abordado desde el 2003 a través del *Black Economic Empowerment* (BEE). Este plan busca un cambio sustancial en la composición racial tanto de la posesión como del ámbito decisorio de las empresas privadas, nuevas y ya existentes. En este sentido, se ha estipulado un porcentaje de propiedad en manos de población negra en los sectores minero, financiero y otros rubros económicos básicos. No obstante, los logros obtenidos han sido débiles. En efecto, según datos obtenidos por la consultora sudafricana Business Map, se observa que de un total de 450 organizaciones asentadas actualmente en Johannesburg, sólo 30

pertenecen a propietarios de raza negra (CARROLL, 2004). Por tanto, si bien se vislumbran ciertos avances, los cambios son aún moderados.

El segundo objetivo fue encarado por medio del *South African Expanded Public Works Programme* (EPWP), planteado para el período 2004-2014. En este marco, el gobierno se comprometió a asignar importantes sumas de dinero a fin de desarrollar un amplio programa de obras públicas que permita además mitigar los altos índices de desempleo existentes. De este modo, se planteó renovar la red viaria urbana y rural, desagües, pavimentación, tendidos ferroviarios, instalaciones portuarias y electrificación, entre otros (EPWP, 2011).

El énfasis en el mejoramiento de la infraestructura del país se vio además fuertemente impulsado por el actual gobierno de Jacob Zuma (2009- actual), dada la realización de la Copa Mundial de la FIFA en julio de 2010. La inversión realizada en materia de carreteras, extensión de los servicios de agua y electricidad, sistema de transporte, remodelación de aeropuertos y estadios alcanzó los 5.540 millones de euros. De acuerdo con el gobierno sudafricano, dicha inversión supuso la contratación de más de 695.000 trabajadores en la construcción. Es importante señalar, además, que estos emprendimientos permitieron moderar los efectos de la crisis financiera internacional de 2008 sobre la economía sudafricana (CAMBRA, 2010).

## **TRES ECONOMÍAS EMERGENTES**

Al producirse la finalización de la Guerra Fría, el debate económico en torno al modelo estatal-socialista y al libre mercado-capitalista pasó a ser una cuestión carente de importancia. La relación

entre liberalización económica, rol del Estado y crecimiento nacional, en cambio, se ha convertido en un asunto digno de reflexión.

En el análisis económico de los tres casos se advierte que, aún en los períodos de mayor auge neoliberal, el Estado mantuvo un rol preponderante lo cual otorgó a las políticas económicas desplegadas un alto grado de continuidad. En efecto, tanto en Brasil como en India y en Sudáfrica las transformaciones económicas iniciadas en la década del noventa se han mantenido independientemente de los cambios de gobierno nacional. En India, esta realidad representa “una garantía de que se ha formado un consenso sobre la nueva trayectoria económica colocándola al resguardo del peligro de ser asociada a un solo componente político y, por tanto, verse abandonada al primer cambio de gobierno” (D’ORAZI, 2003, p. 322). La situación se replica en el caso brasileño en donde, en oposición a todos los pronósticos, la llegada al poder de un gobierno fuertemente vinculado a la retórica de izquierda no se tradujo en una modificación de las directrices económicas básicas. En cuanto a Sudáfrica, la persistencia del mismo partido político en el gobierno nacional (African National Congress - ANC) desde la culminación del régimen del *apartheid*, podría explicar esta continuidad. En este sentido, el ascenso de Jacob Zuma<sup>12</sup> demostraría diferencias políticas que no se trasladaron a cambios en el modelo económico.

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<sup>12</sup> El 14 de junio 2005, Jacob Zuma había sido destituido de su cargo como vicepresidente por el jefe de Estado, Thabo Mbeki, tras verse comprometido en un escándalo de corrupción relacionado con el cobro de comisiones a una empresa de defensa francesa. Tres años después, en septiembre de 2008, el Comité Ejecutivo Nacional del ANC -liderado desde 2007 por Zuma- aprobó una resolución por la cual “revocó” al presidente Mbeki en su cargo acusándolo de haber instigado políticamente contra Zuma, con la incriminación de los cargos de corrupción debido a sus aspiraciones en la carrera a la presidencia de la República. Esta crisis política culminó con la asunción de un gobierno de transición encabezado por Kgalema Motlanthe, hasta mayo de 2009, fecha en la cual el pueblo de Sudáfrica eligió como presidente a Jacob Zuma (CIDOB, 2005; 2009).

Lo antedicho no implica negar las particularidades de cada caso. En este sentido, la influencia del Fondo Monetario Internacional fue notoriamente más aguda en Brasil y en Sudáfrica. En India, por el contrario, el liberalismo pregonado por el organismo mundial fue rechazado y calificado como “doctrinario” (D’ORAZI, 2003, p. 320).

Si bien los resultados fueron relativamente satisfactorios en algunos ámbitos como el del control de la inflación, las políticas macroeconómicas neoliberales implementadas en los años noventa se mostraron infructuosas con serias repercusiones negativas en la esfera social. Los tres casos bajo estudio corroboran esta afirmación.

Como se señaló anteriormente, la existencia de fuertes aparatos gubernamentales en India, Brasil y Sudáfrica aminoró muchos de los efectos adversos. No obstante, dichos intentos no fueron suficientes para afrontar los históricos problemas de desigualdad social que aquejan a estos tres países.

Frente al descrédito internacional que sufrieron las recetas neoliberales desde comienzos del nuevo siglo, los tres países concentraron sus esfuerzos en la generación de un crecimiento basado fundamentalmente en el desarrollo de una industria nacional fuerte y en la internacionalización de sus empresas, en tanto se otorgó menor atención a la atracción de inversiones extranjeras. Asimismo han realizado una fuerte apuesta a ambiciosos programas de infraestructura con participación tanto pública como privada. De esta manera, las economías de los miembros de IBSA tienen menores probabilidades de verse expuestas a los efectos adversos de los *shocks* externos.

Según datos del Banco Mundial, se observa que el Producto Bruto Interno (PBI) alcanzó los US\$ 1.377.264.718.251 en India, US\$ 1.594.489.675.024 en Brasil y US\$ 285.365.879.676 en

Sudáfrica (Datos del Banco Mundial, 2009). Tomando como punto de partida el año 2003 (fecha de creación de IBSA), el crecimiento de India ha sido entre un 8 y un 9% anual, observándose como única excepción el año 2008 en el cual se verificó el nivel más bajo: 4,93%. En Brasil, los índices muestran signos más erráticos con un crecimiento de tan sólo 1,14 % en el 2003 llegando en los siguientes años a un pico del 6% en 2007 y volviendo a disminuir hasta un -0,64% en 2009. Sudáfrica, finalmente, manifestó un crecimiento de entre un 3 y un 5% anual (datos del Banco Mundial, 2009).

En suma, los niveles de crecimiento alcanzados por los tres países en los últimos años, así como la creciente proyección regional e internacional de sus respectivas economías, han llevado al reconocimiento de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica como economías emergentes en cada una de sus regiones.

Es importante aclarar que los niveles de menor crecimiento coinciden con el desencadenamiento de la crisis financiera internacional de 2008, la cual provocó un estancamiento e incluso una regresión en el proceso. No obstante, los efectos fueron más moderados que en crisis anteriores pudiendo ser afrontados y superados en un menor período de tiempo. Así, India, Brasil y Sudáfrica constituyen actualmente la quinta, décima y vigésima sexta economía mundial, respectivamente.

Sin embargo, cabe preguntarse ¿en qué medida este crecimiento económico está posibilitando un mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de las poblaciones nacionales de los tres estados?

### **Las dificultades sociales de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica**

Pese a los avances obtenidos en materia macroeconómica, al momento de sopesar los indicadores sociales, la realidad de estos tres países se manifiesta altamente desfavorable. En este sentido, la

extrema desigualdad social presente tanto en India, en Brasil como en Sudáfrica constituye su principal fuente de debilidad.

La grave deuda social que dichos gobiernos mantienen con sus respectivas poblaciones es frecuentemente analizada a partir del índice de Gini. En los tres estados bajo estudio, hacia fines de la década del noventa y principios del nuevo siglo, este índice ascendía a 32,5 % en India, 56,5 % en Sudáfrica y 58,5 % en Brasil (datos del Banco Mundial, 2006).

Otros indicadores permiten visualizar también esta dramática situación social. En **India**, según datos oficiales publicados entre 2004 y 2008, “el 49% de las mujeres son crónicamente pobres y más de 230 millones de personas están desnutridas”. A ello se suma que, de un total de 1.100 millones que conforman su población, 300 millones de indios son analfabetos (HARTMAN, 2009, p. 20). Desde el punto de vista alimentario, el 87% de la población rural de India consume menos de 2.400 kl por día, que es el parámetro estipulado por el gobierno para medir la pobreza a nivel nacional (PATNAIK, 2007 apud BANERJEE, 2010, p. 12) Asimismo, India ocupa el puesto 119 de un total de 169 en el índice de desarrollo humano (Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano PNUD, 2010, p. 162).

En **Brasil**, el panorama social no resulta muy diferente. América Latina es una de las áreas geográficas con mayor desigualdad en el mundo siendo dicho país el ejemplo más acabado de sociedad polarizada en la región. Según datos divulgados por Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea), el 10% más rico de la población brasileña posee el 75,4% de la riqueza del país. Esta situación se ve agravada por la existencia de una inequitativa distribución de las cargas impositivas puesto que los sectores económicamente más favorecidos pagan pocos impuestos mientras que la mayor parte de los gravámenes recaen sobre la clase media (PAES BARRETO,

2008). En comparación con Argentina, Uruguay y Chile, sus índices de mortalidad infantil y de analfabetismo son mucho mayores. En cuanto a la esperanza de vida, sólo es superado en América del Sur por Bolivia. Posee, asimismo, altos niveles de empleo informal.

Con respecto a **Sudáfrica**, cerca de 25 millones de personas sobreviven sin acceso a bienes tan esenciales como la electricidad o el agua corriente. El desempleo constituye uno de los mayores problemas, principalmente entre la población negra, llegando a alcanzar un 25% (South African Statistics Council, 2010) Además, la tasa de mortalidad infantil (por mil) es de 43 y, desde el punto de vista sanitario, el país adolece -al igual que muchos de sus pares continentales- de altos niveles de enfermedades como el sida y la malaria.

Finalmente, los niveles de pobreza existentes en India, Brasil y Sudáfrica corroboran la delicada realidad social que padecen. Sin embargo, al momento de considerar los datos empíricos, hay importantes y significativas variaciones entre los informes nacionales y los datos relevados por el Banco Mundial. Los números del Banco Mundial permiten una comparación de los tres estados, en tanto las informaciones brindadas por las instituciones nacionales parecerían ser más precisas pero no poseen sistemas de medición comparables<sup>13</sup>. Lo relevante, en todo caso, es que significativos niveles de pobreza forman parte de la cotidianeidad de estos países.

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<sup>13</sup> Según los datos brindados por el Banco Mundial, las personas que se encuentran por debajo de la línea de pobreza representan el 41,6 % en India, el 3,8 % en Brasil y el 17,35 % en Sudáfrica (datos del BM, 2010). Por otro lado, las líneas de pobreza nacionales indican que los sectores más desfavorecidos representan el 27,5 % en India (*datos de la Planning Commission of India*), el 21,4 % en Brasil (datos de IPEA, 2009) y el 23 % en Sudáfrica (*datos del Ministry of Finance of South Africa*, 2005).



## **INDIA: las apremiantes necesidades del sector rural**

En los últimos años, India ha experimentado un aumento considerable de la renta por habitante, una reducción apreciable de la incidencia de la pobreza (que se redujo del 36% en 1993-1994 al 19,3% en 2007) y una mejora de otros indicadores sociales (BUSTELO, 2006). En el período 2001-2006, cien millones de indios ingresaron en el mercado laboral. Asimismo, la presencia de ventajas sustanciales tales como una mano de obra calificada y anglófona y un sistema político democrático permitirían presagiar un futuro favorable para el desarrollo de este país.

A diferencia de Brasil, India posee un coeficiente de Gini comparativamente inferior (32). Dada entonces esta desigualdad de ingresos relativamente baja, el mayor desafío que se le plantea al gobierno indio consiste en delinear medidas que permitan extender los incipientes beneficios experimentados a la inmensa mayoría de indios que aún viven en condiciones muy desfavorables.

El país presenta serias deficiencias en cuanto al desarrollo de una educación primaria. Pese a que India ha hecho progresos sustanciales en la alfabetización y en las tasas de matriculación escolar, todavía tiene el mayor número de analfabetos del mundo, y la participación de las niñas en la educación primaria es muy baja.

En materia de salud, la esperanza de vida ha ascendido desde la independencia del país de 33 a 65 años y la tasa de mortalidad infantil ha disminuido de 148 a 63 cada mil habitantes. No obstante, la infraestructura sanitaria sigue siendo muy insatisfactoria. El acceso a los cuidados médicos en India es todavía muy reducido, sobre todo en el medio rural. La escasez de hospitales y centros de salud hace que éstos se encuentren sobrecargados y que resulten inaccesibles

para gran parte de la población por cuestiones de lejanía geográfica (VIASSA MONTEIRO, 2010).

Desde un punto de vista socioeconómico, los sectores más afectados son los rurales. Como se señaló anteriormente, el proceso de urbanización de la India alcanza sólo al 28% de la población total. Por consiguiente, una abrumadora mayoría de indios viven en economías de subsistencia atadas a la tierra o autoempleados en el pequeño comercio en una multitud de pequeños pueblos (para la escala india).

El gobierno de Manmohan Singh ha concentrado especialmente sus esfuerzos en estas áreas. En 2005, se dio a conocer el *Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act* (MNREGA) el cual persigue un doble objetivo: lograr el desarrollo rural y generar puestos de trabajo. El MNREGA garantiza empleo público por 100 días al año a, por lo menos, un miembro adulto que se encuentre por debajo de la línea de la pobreza, de cada residencia rural. El trabajo debe realizarse a un máximo de 5 km de la vivienda familiar y por un mínimo de 15 días. El salario varía entre las 60 y las 125 rupias<sup>14</sup> (The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005, Tercera Edición, 2008).

Si bien anteriormente el gobierno de India había implementado otros programas de índole similar, el MNREGA constituye, por sus características y alcance, el más relevante de todos. De hecho, el programa es considerado como el más importante que se haya planteado, en su tipo, a nivel internacional. En este sentido, varios analistas especializados en cuestiones de desarrollo y en ruralidad se han referido a este plan “as a historic piece of legislation” siendo una

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<sup>14</sup> El National Floor Level Minimum Wage (NFLMW) - piso nacional del salario mínimo- se encuentra actualmente fijado en 100 rupias por día - alrededor de US\$ 2. (Ministry of Labour and Employment of India, Annual Report, 2010, p. 28).

de sus principales fortalezas la reivindicación del derecho universal al trabajo (SJOBLOM; FARRINGTON, 2008, p. 2).

Esta política fue diseñada por el economista de origen belga Jean Drèze y ha generado un intenso debate en torno a sus posibles beneficios y perjuicios. Los críticos de este proceso alertan, en primer lugar, sobre sus repercusiones financieras. Esto se debe a que el programa implica un gasto de 300 mil millones de rupias, por lo cual podría llegar a involucrar hasta un 5% del PBI. Mientras que sus oponentes hacen referencia a una probable crisis fiscal, sus defensores aseguran que estos fondos podrán sostenerse en el tiempo en la medida en que se realicen importantes reformas administrativas e impositivas (SJOBLOM; FARRINGTON, 2008, p. 1).

En segundo lugar, los detractores advierten que la implementación del programa ha estado rodeada de altos niveles de corrupción así como también de manifestaciones de discriminación en función de la casta, la edad o el género. Los tutores del proyecto, por su parte, aseguran que esta política ha permitido un incremento del empleo que, para mayo de 2009, incluía a 44 millones de personas. A su vez, han disminuido las migraciones e incluso se ha promovido el regreso de los sectores urbanos más empobrecidos a las zonas rurales. Por último, las previsiones estipuladas por el MNREGA han contribuido a la equidad social y de género al priorizar a las mujeres y a las castas más bajas. No obstante, también se reconocen la existencia de problemas burocráticos para la implementación del proyecto frente a lo cual se propone reforzar las políticas de monitoreo y evaluación.

## **BRASIL: la erradicación del hambre y la pobreza como principal política social**

Pese a las mejorías sociales alcanzadas durante los últimos años en Brasil, resulta importante señalar que las clases más desfavorecidas siguen siendo la inmensa mayoría representando casi el 40% de la población y dependiendo de los subsidios oficiales para garantizar su subsistencia (DIARIO LA TERCERA, 21/9/2010).

Durante el gobierno de Cardoso, las políticas sociales fueron, por lo general universales, sobre todo en salud y educación. En cambio, las políticas focalizadas en familias por debajo de la línea de pobreza sólo ganaron importancia durante el segundo mandato de Cardoso sustituyendo a la distribución de canastas básicas. Durante este período, la protección social fue definida como

la transferencia de recursos a aquellas familias con un ingreso inferior a la línea de pobreza que tuviesen hijos pequeños, niños en edad escolar o alguna otra característica que justificase el auxilio. Esta protección, además, obligaba a las familias beneficiadas a mantener a sus hijos en las escuelas o a llevarlos a los centros sanitarios para su vacunación, entre otras contraprestaciones (SALUUM, 2008, p. 164).

Con la llegada de Lula da Silva al poder, la protección social se amplió, incluyendo a todas las familias ubicadas debajo de la línea de pobreza, en lugar de considerar sólo a aquellas con características especiales. Cabe aclarar que abandonadas en un primer momento, el gobierno de Lula volvió a reclamar posteriormente a los beneficiarios ciertas contraprestaciones (SALUUM, 2008, p. 165). El nuevo gobierno partió de la idea de que a través de la creación de una extensa red de protección social, Brasil podía dar el puntapié inicial para deshacerse de su imagen de un país de ricos y pobres.

El programa Bolsa Familia fue lanzado en el año 2003, unificando varios programas sociales que se habían creado durante el gobierno de Cardoso. Bolsa Familia se asienta actualmente en tres ejes principales: transferencia de renta (que promueve el alivio inmediato de la pobreza), condicionalidades (que busca reforzar el acceso a derechos sociales básicos en las áreas de educación, salud y asistencia social) y programas complementarios (cuyo objetivo son las familias a fin de superar situaciones de vulnerabilidad). Dependiendo de la renta familiar por persona (limitada en R\$ 140), del número y de la edad de los hijos, el valor del beneficio recibido por familia puede variar entre los R\$32 y los R\$ 242, según ajustes realizados en abril de 2011<sup>15</sup>. Así, las familias beneficiadas por los planes de transferencia pasaron de 5,6 millones a 12 millones en la actualidad. Bolsa Familia comprende también el plan *Hambre Cero* que tiene por objetivo asegurar una alimentación adecuada, promoviendo la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional (MINISTERIO DE DESARROLLO SOCIAL DE BRASIL, 2011).

Por tanto, la cobertura social, los recursos destinados a la asistencia y el salario mínimo real han aumentado a un ritmo mayor que el PIB. Pero al mismo tiempo, los fondos destinados a las políticas universales de salud y educación apenas se han expandido al ritmo del crecimiento general de la economía implicando una inversión de prioridades en relación con el gobierno de Cardoso (SALUUM, 2008, p. 165).

La generalización de la protección social se vio también reflejada en la implementación de políticas destinadas a ampliar el acceso a la educación superior para los sectores de renta media baja con vistas a promover el ascenso social de aquellos jóvenes que

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<sup>15</sup> Es importante mencionar que el salario mínimo en Brasil está fijado, a partir de enero de 2011, en R\$ 540,00.

comparativamente afrontan mayores dificultades. Entre ellas, cabe mencionar los programas de cuotas en las escuelas de nivel superior los cuales privilegian a estudiantes provenientes de secundarias públicas y a minorías como negros, mulatos e indígenas. Asimismo, la investigación constata que a comienzo de los años noventa el 15 % de los niños entre 7 y 14 años no iban a la escuela. Hoy, en cambio, son menos del 2,5 %. Este incremento de la escolaridad facilita la inserción en el mercado de trabajo, a pesar de que Brasil tiene una enseñanza pública de mala calidad y una enseñanza privada cara.

Realizando un balance de las políticas sociales efectuadas, Robert Mangabeira Unger -ex ministro de Asuntos Estratégicos del gobierno de Lula y actual asesor de Dilma Rousseff- considera que el gran reto de Brasil es desplegar un nuevo modelo de desarrollo mucho más orientado al mercado interno y una nueva economía productiva de pequeñas y medianas empresas, imprescindible para consolidar a la nueva clase media. El asesor brasileño asegura que “tradicionalmente los sectores avanzados internacionales han generado un superávit económico que se usa para financiar programas sociales; esto ya no vale”. Hace falta “transformar las instituciones y mejorar la enseñanza para que la nueva clase media mestiza sea emprendedora” (ROBINSON, 2009).

### **SUDÁFRICA: en busca de mayores niveles de igualdad racial y económica**

Como se mencionó precedentemente, la profundización de medidas neoliberales a fines de la década del noventa (particularmente a partir de la implementación del GEAR), conllevó consecuencias sociales muy drásticas para los sectores populares sudafricanos: la tasa de desempleo aumentó (de 19,3 % en 1993 a 31,2% en 2003), el salario real permaneció estancado y los ingresos medios de

las familias trabajadoras disminuyeron, en particular de aquellos sectores vinculados a la economía informal, que alcanzan al 50% de la población activa (ROJAS MATEUS, 2006).

Con la llegada de Mbeki a la presidencia sudafricana en 1999, y la puesta en marcha del Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) y de la política de Affirmative Action, se buscó corregir los enormes desequilibrios en las rentas, los salarios y las categorías laborales comenzándose a vislumbrar algunos avances. En 2004, al final de la primera presidencia de Mbeki, ya se habían registrado ciertos progresos. En este sentido, Rory Carroll sostenía que “there is a new generation of ambitious, wealthy black people transforming the country. As fast as they are moving into senior positions in banks, multinationals and stateowned firms they are moving out of townships and into the once white-only suburbs of lawn sprinklers and pool filters”(CARROLL, 2004).

Sin embargo, algunas miradas más escépticas advierten que el mejoramiento de las condiciones socioeconómicas de ciertos sectores de raza negra ha añadido a la tradicional desigualdad entre blancos y negros, la desigualdad entre negros. En este sentido, Alicia Divinzenso realiza una aguda crítica al señalar que la nueva clase media negra, “maltrata a los obreros negros y es igual de autoritaria que los patrones blancos. Por lo tanto, si bien reivindica su condición de negra cuando la discriminación positiva la ayuda a subir posiciones en la escala social, se comporta con todos los prejuicios” (DIVINZENSO, 2003).

Por ultimo, en términos educativos, se verifica que a partir del régimen democrático, el gobierno sudafricano promovió una importante reforma curricular que destacó en sus contenidos la defensa de los derechos humanos. Si bien la reforma amplió los alcances de la educación, el proceso no implicó una mejora en la

calidad educativa ya que ahora la diferenciación es económica: “*the racially fragmented system is gone, but in its place a two-tier school system has emerged* (BLOCH, 2008 apud MARAIS, 2011).

## CONSIDERACIONES FINALES

El examen de las capacidades territoriales, demográficas, económicas y sociales de los países miembros de IBSA permite inferir que los tres estados lograron un destacado crecimiento económico, a partir de las políticas desplegadas durante la última década del siglo pasado y, especialmente, a lo largo del nuevo siglo. Esta realidad habilitó la consabida identificación internacional de los mismos como “emergentes”. Sin embargo, el análisis de su situación socioeconómica interna demuestra que dicho crecimiento aún no ha significado un desarrollo colectivo sino que sólo propició una mejora de ciertos segmentos económicos y sociales.

La presencia de algunos sectores que han podido ascender socialmente en los países bajo estudio no debe hacer perder de vista la existencia de importantes mayorías que aún permanecen, en los tres casos, bajo una situación de extrema carencia. La observación general del panorama nacional de cada uno de estos estados posibilita el reconocimiento de **sociedades duales** (con claras diferenciaciones entre ricos y pobres) pincelando un escenario en el cual islas de prosperidad conviven en mares de indigencia.

Es decir, escasez y abundancia coexisten sin problemas en un proceso simultáneo de globalización y marginalización. Esta dinámica se ve ampliamente reflejada en su distribución espacial poniendo de manifiesto una “nueva geografía de centros y márgenes<sup>16</sup> que cruzan transversalmente la antigua divisoria entre países ricos

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<sup>16</sup> La expresión pertenece a Sassen Saskia (1991).



y países pobres”. En términos de Sassen Saskia, “dentro de las ciudades más importantes tanto del mundo en desarrollo como del desarrollado vemos una nueva geografía que no sólo contribuye a reforzar las desigualdades existentes sino que, además, pone en marcha toda una serie de dinámicas nuevas de la desigualdad” (SASKIA, 1998, p. 41). La autora agrega que “junto a las nuevas jerarquías regionales y mundiales de las ciudades, hay un vasto territorio que ha ido volviéndose cada vez más periférico y ha ido quedando cada vez más excluido de los más importantes procesos económicos que alimentan el crecimiento económico en la nueva economía mundializada” (SASKIA, 1998, p. 39). En efecto, la segregación urbana, (representada por las favelas brasileñas, los slums indios y las townships sudafricanas) constituye un punto en común en los tres países bajo estudio dando muestras concretas de esta realidad.

En otros términos, tanto India, Brasil como Sudáfrica supieron implantar en el ámbito global un discurso basado en su cada vez más relevante y prometedora presencia internacional. De este modo, los países de IBSA lograron convertirse en verdaderos centros de atención mundial. Pero quizás lo más importante sea que no se quedaron en el plano discursivo sino que, como hemos visto, ejecutaron una gran variedad de políticas -aunque de modo más pausado- para sustentar este primigenio alegato de ser poderes crecientemente globales. Sin desmerecer los logros alcanzados, las propias características del modo de producción capitalista marcan limitaciones por las cuales ciertos sectores quedan históricamente excluidos. El desafío radica entonces en encontrar nuevos modos que habiliten una mitigación de estos rasgos de marginación.

En este sentido, cabe preguntarse, ¿es necesario reformular el concepto de desarrollo para explicar estas nuevas realidades?

El pretendido planteamiento universalista y atemporal del llamado Consenso de Washington, asentado en unos pocos indicadores macroeconómicos, conllevó la aplicación en gran parte de los países en desarrollo de un conjunto de recetas, basadas en principios excesivamente simplistas. En este sentido, se postuló una concepción lineal del desarrollo en virtud del cual se ponderó el crecimiento económico en desmedro de la distribución. En palabras de Cambra Bassols, el desarrollo “es conceptualizado reduccionistamente como crecimiento, en un proceso esencialmente técnico que privilegia el crecimiento económico como condición y causa del desarrollo general y, específicamente, del desarrollo social” (CAMBRA BASSOLS, 2008, p. 82). El caso de India resulta ejemplificador en virtud de una creencia generalizada de que el país se ha embarcado “en una trayectoria acumulativa y unidireccional de desarrollo que aportará grados cada vez mayores de prosperidad y bienestar a una población en constante aumento, hasta que toda la población acabe abarcada en su beneficioso abrazo” (SAHNI, 2008, p. 31).

Asimismo, el excesivo tecno-economicismo ha derivado en una “obsesión cuantofrénica” (CAMBRA BASSOLS, 2008, p. 82), que lleva a reducir todos los análisis a variables económicas cuantificables. De allí la importancia de repensar los contenidos de aquellas políticas que aspiran a una mejora de las condiciones de vida humana. Desde este punto de vista, resulta interesante mencionar el enfoque del “Desarrollo a Escala Humana”, formulado por el economista Manfred Max-Neef y por el sociólogo Antonio Elizalde. Estos autores chilenos explican que la economía convencional (clásica y neoclásica) incurre en un error fundamental al considerar las necesidades humanas como crecientes e ilimitadas, puesto que las mismas son limitadas e invariables en el tiempo. Para ellos, las necesidades son concretamente nueve: subsistencia,

protección, afecto, ocio, creación, libertad, entendimiento, identidad y participación. De esta manera, este enfoque “rompe con el ‘núcleo duro’ de la vieja teoría del desarrollo<sup>17</sup> ya que no se centra en el crecimiento económico ni lo prioriza” (CAPALBO, 2008, p. 40).

En suma, la concepción de desarrollo como mero crecimiento económico constituye, entonces, una perspectiva exigua, que cristaliza la necesidad de adoptar miradas alternativas que contemplen un desarrollo humano y social integral.

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<sup>17</sup> Capalbo identifica la “vieja teoría del desarrollo” con la Teoría de Rostow (1960) en la cual se concibe un modelo de crecimiento económico estructurado en etapas, desde el estado original de subdesarrollo que considera a la sociedad tradicional, a la etapa de consumo en masa.

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## RESUMEN

El presente artículo busca reflexionar sobre los alcances y limitaciones de la concepción de “poderes emergentes” tomando en consideración los casos de India, Brasil y Sudáfrica. Para ello, el estudio se concentra en el análisis de los atributos económicos y sociales de cada uno de estos tres países siendo interesante preguntarse: ¿Qué modelos de desarrollo socioeconómico han llevado adelante estos estados? ¿Dichas condiciones han impactado en su actual identificación como poderes emergentes? En este contexto, se destaca la necesidad de repensar el desarrollo y las posibles alternativas desde el Sur, teniendo en cuenta iniciativas conjuntas como la planteada por IBSA.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** IBSA. Poderes emergentes. Desarrollo.

## RESUMO

O presente artigo busca refletir sobre os alcances e limitações da concepção de “poderes emergentes”, levando em consideração os casos destes países: Índia, Brasil e África do Sul. Para tanto, o estudo foca na análise dos atributos econômicos e sociais de cada um desses três países, o que nos leva questionar: Que modelos de desenvolvimento econômico vem realizando esses Estados? Será que tais condições têm impactado a sua atual identificação com as potências emergentes? Nesse contexto, destaca-se a necessidade de repensar o desenvolvimento e as possíveis alternativas desde o Sul, levando em consideração as conjuntas tais como as propostas pelo IBSA.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** IBSA. Poderes emergentes. Desenvolvimento.



# **TOWARD AN AFRIC-ECOLOGICAL EDUCATION: An alternative strategy for the development of Sub-Saharan African countries.\***

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## **INTRODUCTION**

If there is a much debated issue today among scholars of the continent, it is the one dealing with the question of Africa's development. What Mazrui (1980) calls the "African condition" or what he terms the "paradox of African predicament as an underdeveloped continent"<sup>1</sup> reflects the paradox of a whole continent which encapsulates a bountiful amount of world natural resources and is characterized by a diversity of cultures, knowledge and resources which are still lagging behind. In fact, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is an extremely rich region and abounds in potentials for development. It is said to gather one fifth of all known plant, mammal and bird species, and one sixth of amphibians and reptiles.

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<sup>1</sup> According to Mazrui, the African condition is characterized by six paradoxes which are: the paradox of habitation, the paradox of humiliation, the paradox of acculturation, the paradox of fragmentation, the paradox of retardation and the basic paradox of location."(Mazrui, 1980, p. xv-xvi).

As for the climate, it is diverse and highly variable ranging from extreme aridity of the Saharan deserts to the extreme humidity of the Congo rainforest (GUNI, IAU, AAU SURVEY REPORT, 2011, p. 2).

In addition, it is a region endowed with a rich historical and cultural heritage and gathers more than the half of the world reserve in minerals, mines and other raw materials. Moreover, the hydro-electric potential of Africa is estimated to about 30 to 40% of the world (KI-ZERBO, 1990:23). If we add to this the immense oil, gas and solar deposit, the SSA appears as a “garden of eden” compared to many developed countries. Despite this entire natural predisposition to development, many SSA countries like Mali have made very little progress toward economic recovery and human development. Mali has even dropped into the bottom category of least developed countries. This overwhelming paradox of the African continent has led certain thinkers like Kabou (1991) to wonder if the continent is really willing to achieve development.

In fact, in the past decade, with the exception of South Africa and a few countries which are making steady inroad toward sustainable development and educational reform, the rest of the SSA, and particularly Mali, continues to hover around the margin of the world economy. Actually, South Africa accounts for over 30% of the African continent’s GDP and the weight of its economy is felt through its entry in the global South regional trade cooperation like IBSA, (India, Brazil and South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, India, China and South Africa) (LECHINI, 2011:216). In terms of educational and vocational trainings, South Africa is among the pioneers as illustrated by the diversity and richness of the curricula and the high role universities play as levers of development.

Beyond the question of the complexity of Africa's development, there is another one lurking beneath the surface of the different debates. It is the question of who is qualified enough or entitled to pronounce on the question of Africa's development; who has the *locus standi*; and who can best tackle and solve the huge challenges besetting the path of Africa's development? Who have the priority: Africans or non Africans? The question has divided the africanist researchers of the continent and abroad.

For a long time, it was widely accepted that only economists and politicians have this privilege. However, as Africans, it appears that no one is insensitive to this problem. The africanist community from the continent and the diaspora is widely affected by the downward turn of Africa's economic, political and social condition of the past twenty years as well as the marginalization of African knowledge and way of life in the educational system. In this dire context, everyone is entitled to bring his or her little contribution in order to make development, particularly what is called "human development" (WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1994) not a mere concept or an ideal, but a genuine reality and truth for the Africans. It is in this framework that this article strives to address some alternative solutions to the thorny issue of Africa's chronic underdevelopment.

This paper tills the idea that there can be no sustainable development in the SSA countries without a sound and adequate educational system that incorporates endogenous values and behaviours as well as environmental preoccupations into the curriculum. In this regards, Sawyerr (2008), the secretary general of the Association of African Universities (AAU), makes an interesting comment: "In order to eradicate chronic poverty and achieve sustainable development, Africa has to be able to integrate

its indigenous knowledge with modern global knowledge and apply it in all areas of social life” (SAWYERR, 2008:1).

It is also our contention that the primary objective of all education (formal or informal) is not only to instill certain ethical values and knowledge, but it is also a springboard through which cultural and societal values are transmitted from generation to generation and valorized. Therefore, education in SSA should be a channel through which African history; experiences, worldviews, knowledge and overall values are taught, renovated and promoted for the best interests of the Africans. Education must reflect African cultural identity and personality. For this reason, schools and universities should be real engines of development as well as mediums of cultural empowerment. Therefore, education should be a stepping-stone to a better and healthy future for the Africans.

Besides, education should be a catalyst for change as well as instigate a genuine sustainable development instead of promoting exogenous values and being a mere prosthesis (KI-ZERBO, 1990:16). It is our belief that education must be functional in order to put forward the interests of the community. Unfortunately, countries like Mali have inherited an educational system steeped in the colonial ideology and biases. Therefore, schools and universities do not serve the communal interest as they bypass the urgent needs of the masses. In addition, there is often a mismatch between the trainings offered by the universities and the demands of the job market.

In this study, our main objective is to demonstrate that we can get out from the prison house of Afro-pessimism and mimetic educational policies that overlook our aspirations, needs, values and creativity by implementing new curricula that combine sustainable development with sustainable education. We call this curriculum Afric-ecologic. It is derived from our collective will, our historical

experiences, cultural diversities and foster creativity, dialogue, communality and a new ethical impulse toward our environment. Such curricula combine new technological tools with indigenous know-how and wisdom as well as ensuring a sustainable future for Africa and the whole humanity. It constitutes a springboard to lift us out of the quagmire of under development.

## **DEFINITION OF MAJOR TERMS USED**

### **WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT?**

Development has become one of those fickle and complex theoretical puns of this millennium, (THOMAS, 2004: p.1) and ambiguous (GORE, 2000:795). Often associated with the idea of growth and progress, development has longtime been regarded as a measurable data with macroeconomic indicators like GNP (Gross National Product) and GDP (Gross Domestic Product). This neo-classical conception has been perceived by many to be biased and inhuman as it marginalizes other factors like the quality of living of the population, namely their access to health care systems, education, information, employment and a healthy environment. In the past twenty years, the term has been contested both theoretically and politically by many thinkers.

Consequently, recent debates in the economic circle such as the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have focused since the 1990s on what is termed human development and sustainable development. The latter is according to Brundtland, “that which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (UNESCO, 2008:2).

Besides, in the Human Development Report, it is stated that economic growth is only the means, whereas human development is the end. Consequently, they add that the “purpose of growth is to enrich people’s life” (UNDP, 1996:1). The interest of these new approaches to development theories, namely the shift toward notions of sustainability and humanity, is that they focus on the impact of growth on environment and humans instead of centering on figures and macroeconomic indicators of growth only.

Furthermore, the pro-growth and materialistic approach to development advocated by mainstream theorists has been challenged also by many leaders and thinkers in the South who have coined new concepts that take into account the well-being of the people. The Latin American concept of *Buen vivir* (the right to a good life) and the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH) issued by the kingdom of Bhutan are presented as alternatives to the GNP and GDP which emphasize on growth and thereby downplay the anthropocentric dimension of development. These new concepts not only call for a humanization of growth and development, but they also require a holistic approach to the multifaceted issues and challenges that the question of development involves, particularly in SSA.

Interestingly, according to Myrdal (1974), development concerns the overall system of the society, not the economic sector only. Therefore, he defines it as: “the movement upward of the entire social system”. In the same vein, he adds this:

This social system encloses, besides the so-called economic factors, all noneconomic factors including all sorts of consumption by various groups of people; consumption provides collectively; educational and health facilities and levels; the distribution of power in society; and more generally economic, social, and political stratification (MYRDAL, 1974, p. 729).



In this context, development looks like a giant machine with many parts. It raises multidimensional questions which need to be analyzed from different perspectives and standpoints in order to find a global solution. It is a multifaceted process which concerns all the aspects of the social life. In his groundbreaking work, Walter Rodney has highlighted this multidimensionality of development in these terms:

Development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and material well-being. Some of these are virtually moral categories and are difficult to evaluate – depending as they do on the age in which one lives, one's class origins, and one's personal code of what is right and what is wrong. However, what is indisputable is that the achievement of any of those aspects of personal development is very much tied in with the state of the society as a whole.<sup>2</sup>

### **What is education?**

According to *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (1989, p. 74), education is “a process of teaching, training and learning, especially in schools or colleges, to improve knowledge and develop skills”. There is a close link between education and development as both aim to bring a positive change in the lives of peoples and societies at large. In this respect, both are geared toward the improvement of the human condition. So there is an intimate link between education and development. A change in one requires sometimes a revision of the other and vice versa. According to Rodney (1973), “Education is crucial in any type of society for

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<sup>2</sup> RODNEY,1973. Disponible in: <<http://www.marxists.org/subject/Africa/Rodney-wlater/how-europe/cho1.htm>>. Access on 22 aug 2005.

the preservation of the lives of its members and the maintenance of the social structure. Under certain circumstances, education also promotes social change”<sup>3</sup>.

As far as Ki-Zero (1990) is concerned, he has called for an education that is rooted in endogenous values and that is capable of producing goods and services for the entire social uplift. He assigns education a dual role; it must be functional as well as being praxis.

### **What is a Curriculum?**

A curriculum is often known as a regular course of study or training and their content offered at a school or university. The term derives from the Latin word “currere” meaning to “to run” (THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 1989, p. 152). Curricula include syllabuses and highlight the methods of learning, teaching and assessment. Curriculum can be official or formal when it is elaborated at a state level and identifies the program that must be taught and to what level in order to attain a certain standard. This includes leaflets, books, prospectus and hand-out.

It can also be unofficial and include extra-curriculum activities for instance. According to Eisner (1979), there is also an “excluded curriculum” which concerns what has been omitted intentionally or unintentionally. He calls this “the null curriculum”. In Malian educational system, particularly in the higher education, this corresponds to the indigenous values, age-old customs and spiritual matters that are often left out from the official curricula. Smith (1996), for his part, surmises that there are four ways of approaching curriculum theory and practice:

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<sup>3</sup> *ibid*: 57 of 129

1. Curriculum as a body of knowledge to be transmitted.
2. Curriculum as an attempt to achieve certain ends in students – product.
3. Curriculum as a process.
4. Curriculum as a praxis.

Hence, a curriculum appears as an aggregate of many elements. It combines theory and praxis. It is also an ongoing process which aims to achieve a certain end. An afric-ecological curriculum is the combination of all these elements.

### **What is Afrocentricity?**

Asante (1998) coined the concept of Afrocentricity at the end of 1970s. It is broadly defined as “placing African ideals at the center of any analysis that involves African culture and behavior” (ASANTE, 1998:2). As an academic, political and cultural discourse, Afrocentricity stands as both a critique and a corrective of Eurocentrism (ASANTE, 1999:7). In this respect, Asante considers it as “a moral as well as an intellectual location that posits Africans as subjects rather than as objects of human history and that establishes a perfectly valid and scientific basis for the explanation of African historical experiences” (ASANTE, 1998: xii-xiii.).

Yet, since its inception, Afrocentricity has been attacked by both black and white thinkers because of its supposed radicalism and essentialism. According to Lefkowitz (1996), the leader of the anti-afrocentrist camp, Afrocentricity is no more than a “myth”, a “historical fiction”. Howe (1999) regards it to be a “psychological and cultural phenomenon rather than a pedagogical and intellectual one”. As far as Walker (2001) is concerned, an African American

historian, Afrocentrism is an expression of “decline” in the sense that it “deemphasizes politics”. Adeleke (2009), for his part, holds that the movement is essentialist and monolithic in its construction of African and African American identity and historical experiences.

If Afrocentricity as theory and concept has been subjected to sundry forms of criticisms, we believe that Afrocentricity used as praxis can be a way-out from the situation of marginalization, inferiority complex, poverty and underdevelopment of the Africans. Like Negritude, African Socialism, Panafricanism, we need Afrocentricity in order to change the gloomy picture of the continent. The aforementioned movements are according to Achebe, “props we have fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again. Once we are up we shan’t need them anymore. But for the moment it is in the nature of things that we may need to counter racism” as well as underdevelopment (ACHEBE, 1990:44-45). Consequently, Afrocentricity and the endogenous development theory are still reliable “props” we can use in order to stand up in our feet. For the time being, the continent is still crouching, bending under the weight of debts, diseases, poverty, illiteracy, mismanagement, corruption, embezzlement and slavish mimicry. Ki-Zerbo (1997) has underlined this downfall of the continent in his Right Livelihood Award acceptance speech where he stated that although Africa holds only 15 per cent of the world population, it bears 50 percent of the most serious afflictions of the world. Beside the omnipresence of armed conflicts of many parts of Africa, the continent holds the notorious record of 50 percent of the world’s refugees and 50 per cent of its AIDS victims (KI-ZERBO, 1997).

Furthermore, the heuristic value of the afrocentric theory is that it dovetails perfectly with the project of Africa’s development. As the centrepiece of human regeneration, Afrocentricity is regarded to

be transformational, revolutionary and committed to the development of Africa as it destroys the person's images, symbols, lifestyles, and manners that are contradictory and destructive to personal and collective growth and development (ASANTE, 1988, p. 1). Its methods are believed to provoke change in the African's cultural, economic, social, political, educational and psychological situation. Therefore, its ultimate goal is human development. This viewpoint is shared by Modupe (2000) who argues that Afrocentricity "theorizes about the development of people of African descent, as African people". Consequently, Afrocentricity is presented by its creator as the most complete philosophical totalization of the African being-at-the-center of his or her existence. It is not merely an artistic or literary movement, or an individual or collective quest for authenticity; it is above all the total use of method to effect psychological, political, cultural, and economic change. The Afrocentric idea reaches beyond decolonizing the mind (ASANTE, 1998, p. 137).

It must be emphasized that Afrocentricity is not only a diasporic movement limited to the United States. In Africa, there is an afrocentric school led by the troika, Chinweizu, Onwuchekwa Jemien, Ihechukwu Maduibuike and their followers. Like Asante, they have pleaded for an afrocentric study of African literature and education. Their analysis of the African situation is overwhelming.

In examining the criticism of African writing, we find that a significant number of African critics are eurocentric in their orientation, whereas they ought to be afrocentric. Such critics habitually view African literature through European eyes. Most of them would be ashamed to admit it, but the fact of the matter is that these African critics view African literature as an overseas department of European literatures, as a literature with no traditions of its own to build upon, no models of its own to imitate, no audience

or constituency separate and apart from the European, and, above all, no norms of its own (none at any rate, that would be applicable to contemporary writings) for the proper, the beautiful, or the well done (CHINWEIZU, et al.,1983, p. 3).

Like Chinweizu (1983) and his followers, many African writers and intellectual are pleading for a re-africanisation of African educational system. In this regards, they have noted that a shift from eurocentric approach o education to an afrocentric one entails the designation and implementation of new curricula adapted to African realities, the one that put their needs and vision at the center. In Africa, the majority of the syllabuses and curricula are modeled on that of Europe or the United States. It is high time curriculum planners implement new ones in tune with the realities of their countries. Ayi Kwei Armah, the Ghanaian novelist defends an afrocentric curriculum that focuses on the teaching of African past, particularly the Egyptian civilization as Africa's heritage in his two groundbreaking novels, *Osiris Rising: A novel of Africa past, present and future* and *KMT: In the house of life* (ARMAH, 1998, 2002). What Armah advocates in these novels is an africological curriculum.

### **What is Africology?**

Africology is defined as the afrocentric study of phenomena, events, ideas, and personalities related to Africa (ASANTE, in MAZAMA, 2000:105). It is also presented as the “transgenerational and transcontinental afrocentric study of African pheneomena” (ASANTE, 1998:19). The africological methodological principles are the following:

1. The African experience must determine all inquiry;
2. The spiritual is important and must be given its due place;
3. Immersion in the subject is necessary;
4. Wholism is a must;
5. Intuition must be relied on;
6. Not everything is measurable because not everything that is significant is material;
7. The knowledge generated by the Afrocentric methodology must be liberating. (MAZAMA, 2003, p. 26).

In addition, an Africological pedagogy “expands the curriculum to include the valid achievements and knowledge of all societies and to use the voice of the community/culture itself to present a people’s histories and struggles for affirmation” (DEI, 1998: 201). Therefore, an educational system that combines an Africological methodology of research and teaching with an ecological awareness is likely to solve some of the most urgent problems of Africa, namely poverty, illiteracy, lack of clean drinking water, shortage of research on renewable bio-energy technology, famine, malnutrition, infant and maternal mortality. These encapsulate some of the important points of the MDG goals which many African countries have pledged to achieve by 2015.

## **THEORETICAL AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

This work is fuelled and given impetus by our reading of the theoretical works of Ki-Zerbo’s endogenous development paradigm and the afrocentric/africological pedagogical approach issued by Asante. In 1980, at the heat of the debate on the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs), Joseph Ki-Zerbo created the *Centre d’Etudes*

*pour le Développement Africain* (CEDA) in Ouagadougou about which he said:

CEDA conducts research which is actually rooted in our land for the purpose of determining one or more global hypotheses of understanding, liable to inspire action by Africans and capable of integrating ecological preservation, the social praxis and cultural identity, key sectors which are almost invariably treated as secondary in development projects.”(THE RIGHT LIVELIHOOD FOUNDATION AWARD, 1997).

CEDA was later replaced by CRDE, *Centre d'Etudes pour le Développement Endogène* (Center of research for the endogenous development). Ki-Zerbo promotes a social praxis that combines ecological preservation and cultural identity. Our conception of an afric-ecological pedagogy is modeled on these premises.

As a convinced Africanist, Ki-Zerbo had pleaded for the awakening and renaissance of the African continent during his acceptance speech of the Right Livelihood Foundation Award in 1997 where he said: that the Africa which the world needs is a continent able to stand up, to walk on its own feet rather than on crutches or on its head, in vacuous mimicry or escapism. It is an Africa conscious of its own past and able to keep on reinvesting this past into its present and future. It is an Africa which “lies on its own mat”, because “to sleep on someone else’s mat is akin to sleeping on the ground” (KI-ZERBO, 1997).

It is important to mention that Ki-Zerbo is one the most brilliant and committed scholar of Africa. As a historian, politician, educator and theoretician of African development, his lifelong battle has been how to move Africa from the margin to the center of the world economy through research and autonomous thinking. He has advocated an African way of development and education. As a fervent



historian, he rewrites African history from an African perspective and removes the veil from the fallacies and misconceptions that surround Eurocentric discourse on the history of his people.

But Ki-Zerbo is known mainly for challenging Western development theories imposed on Africa by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The publication of his masterpiece, *Le Développement Endogène* (The Endogenous Development) challenges the Structural Adjustment programs (SAPs) which are responsible for the crumble of the African economy in many countries and the destruction of their social structure. These programs have failed for different reasons. On the one hand, they were not adapted to the socio-political and economic realities of Africa, on the other; they were tailored on Eurocentric models that were ignorant of African history and expectations.

Consequently, Ki-Zerbo advocates a development model centered on African cultural realities and experiences. He promotes what Amadé Badini names “self made development” (BADINI, 2000:2). Ki-Zerbo fosters the idea of an autonomous development program in Africa where the real agents and actors are Africans themselves rather than some so-called foreign experts. He defines the endogenous as follow:

L’endogène n’est ni un africanisme de plus, ni une néo-négritude. C’est un concept universel. L’endogène n’est pas l’indigène de naguère. (...) L’endogène n’est ni un trésor enfoui que nous devrions déterrer, ni une diapositive figée pour la contemplation. (...) L’endogène est un concept identitaire et progressiste central: un concept stratégique (KI-ZERBO, 1992:2).

The endogenous is neither another Africanism nor a new Negritude. It is a universal concept. The endogenous is different

from the former native. The endogenous is neither a buried treasure that we have to unearth nor a contemplative slide. The endogenous is a key progressive and identity concept: it is a strategic concept (KI-ZERBO, 1992, p. 2).

For Ki-Zerbo, there can be no endogenous development without an endogenous research. That form of research is predicated on a conceptual autonomy, an interdisciplinary and panafricanist approach to the African phenomenon (KI-ZERBO, 1992, p. 38)

Furthermore, Ki-Zerbo has also undertaken a radioscopy of African educational system in order to lay bare its blemishes and challenges in his *Eduquer ou Périr* (Educate or Perish). It is important to note that since the independence of many SSA countries, the issue of education for national development has been dealt with in epistemological terms, and most of the time, the legacy of colonialism and its educational system have marked the debate. Many thinkers have decried the inadequacy of this colonial education to the young independent countries. Because of its eurocentric orientation, the pedagogy was regarded to be faulty and alienating (CÉSAIRE, 1955; FANON, 1976; KI-ZERBO, 1990, 1992). This situation was lambasted by Ali A Mazui who argues that the educated Africans suffer from a kind of cultural bondage because they are still captives of the West (MAZRUI, 1978:13). As a matter of fact, some intellectuals have advocated an educational reform that lays a strong emphasis on teaching African cultures, languages and historical experiences (WA THIONG'O, 1981, 1993; ASANTE, 1998; ARMAH, 1995, 2002).

Today, the crisis that shakes African schools and universities dates back to the colonial era. In fact, according to Joseph Ki-Zerbo, the crumble of the African educational system was triggered by the colonial domination which was premised on exogenous values and

interests (KI-ZERBO, 1990, p. 16). In the same vein, Peteh P Ekeh asserts that the purpose of colonial history taught in African schools was to legitimate the European colonial rule of Africa (EKEH, 1975:98). As for Walter Rodney, colonialism is the root cause of the underdevelopment of Africa. Contrary to those who tend to put forward that Africa had benefitted from this system, Rodney remained convinced that “colonialism has only one hand”, it was a kind of “one-armed bandit” (RODNEY, 1973, p. 90).

All these thinkers have underlined the fact that the colonial educational system was devoid of functionalism in so far as it pays a lip service to the colonial master and reinforces his authority. In this respect, Walter Rodney comments: “The main purpose of the colonial school system was to train Africans to help man the local administration at the lowest ranks and to staff the private capitalist firms owned by Europeans” (RODNEY,1973:60 of 129). This form of education that continues after the independence has been called by Walter Rodney “education for underdevelopment” (RODNEY, 1973). This view was shared by sundry Africanist thinkers like Hubert de Leusse who has spotlighted the alienating nature of this colonial education. His following analysis is very meaningful:

Sauf exception trop rare, l'école n'est donc pas à la hauteur de sa mission éducatrice. Par la rudesse excessive de sa discipline, au lieu de former les enfants, elle les déforme. Elle en fait des esclaves ou des révoltés. Elle ne leur donne pas le sens de la responsabilité personnelle, le goût d l'initiative. Elle n'en fait pas des hommes (LEUSSE, 1971, p.185).

Rarely has education fulfilled its mission of teaching. Because the discipline is rude, it fails to train the children. Instead, it has contributed to distort them. It has transformed them into slaves

and rebels. Hence, it has fallen short in its duty to instill into them the sense of personal responsibility and the passion for initiative. Education simply turns out to be a dehumanizing machine (LEUSSE, 1971:185).

In the same vein, Irele (2008) makes an interesting comment, he surmises that the western school was an instrument of a forced acculturation of the Africans in the sense that it cuts the students from their roots through its teaching of Westerns ideals (IRELE, 2008:53).

However, it is an irony that twenty years after the publication of Ki-Zerbo's seminal books, *Educate or Perish* (1990) and *Other people's mats* (For an endogenous development in Africa, 1992); and about twenty five years after Asante's *Afrocentricity* (1987), the continent is still bending beneath the yoke of exogenous and inappropriate development and educational policies. This situation is worsened in the past ten years by recurrent strikes of teachers and students alike; the emergence of overcrowded classes (as an outcome of the universal education promoted by Unesco); the political instability of many SSA countries; the incapacity of the governments to meet the demands of teachers and students as well as the schedules of repayments of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Consequently, many African schools and universities are shaken by a profound educational crisis that requires an in-depth assessment and reform of the entire curriculum and pedagogical approaches. The crisis is twofold: on the hand, there is no congruence between the taught curricula and the needs and demands of the labour market. On the other, these taught curricula are not in line with the basic aspirations, needs and expectations of the people. If the first situation is at the root of youth employment and

the brain drain, a new phenomenon that is gaining ground in the whole continent. The second situation has created a chasm between the elites and the masses, particularly in the rural areas. In fact, the elitist/solipsistic vocation of the present-day school system excludes millions of women and children of the rural areas as it fails to take into account the specific forms of training and schooling adapted to their situations.

More, it tends somehow to downgrade Agriculture, the linchpin of Food security. In this regards, Africans should emulate the example of the Barefoot College in India as well as The African Leadership Academy in South Africa.<sup>4</sup> Institutes of this kind must be multiplied in the continent in order to attain the objectives of the DESD (Decade of Education for Sustainable Development) in Africa. As far as Mali is concerned, education suffers from a chronic disease that started in 1990s and became even worse in this decade (DIAKITÉ, 2000, p. 6).

Mali has implemented some curriculum reform. In 1962, there was a reform of education whose objective was somehow to link schools to life by being a channel through which the Malian personality and identity are promoted and rehabilitated. In addition, the role devoted to education was to participate in solving the socio political and cultural problems of the nation. So education was holistic and oriented toward praxis. The socio cultural realities were also highlighted (DIARRA APud PILLAI, 2001, p. 48).

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<sup>4</sup> The African Leadership Institute (ALI) was founded in 2004 by Fred Swaniker, Chris Bradford, Peter Monbaur and Acha Leke, but it the ALI opened only in 2008. It is a panafrican institute which receives students from all the African countries. It has an afrocentric curricula that focuses on leadership, African studies and Entrepreneurship as well as traditional disciplines. In: <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African\\_Leadership\\_Academy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Leadership_Academy)>. Access on: 12 jul 2012.

Since the advent of the university in Mali in 1996, the educational crisis has moved from bad to worse. Poor salaries of teachers, lack of training of staff, shortage of a space of working and research for teachers and the absence of didactic materials added to the endless strikes of both teachers and students have completely degraded the educational system which is moribund today. We can say that the higher education is agony in Mali because of the numerous problems it faces today. Except some faculties, the majority of the curriculum in higher education is outdated, inappropriate and incompatible with the needs of the masses and the expectation of the global economy.

Consequently, every year, hundreds of students desperately flow into the job market with degrees that do not permit them to be competitive enough to find a good job. This situation has been decried by Ki-Zerbo who states that African universities and schools constitute a “factory of unemployment” in the sense that they train students destined to be jobless all along their lives (KI-ZERBO, 1990:54).

The other theoretical base of this paper is Molefi Asante’s afrocentric theory. In fact, Asante calls for a shift in the pedagogy as far as the African American students are concerned. He regards the American educational system as Eurocentric and ethnocentric in so far as it only puts into the limelight the achievements and values of the white community while bypassing that of the ethnic minorities like Blacks. Hence, Asante (1997), through his centric theory, harnesses a multicultural curriculum that emphasizes the achievements of all the components of the American society instead of the Whites only. He defines “centricity” in education as: “a perspective that involves locating students within the context of their own cultural references so that they can relate socially and psychologically to other cultural

perspectives” (ASANTE, 1997:289). He adds that “the Afrocentric idea must be the stepping-stone from which the multicultural idea is launched” (ASANTE, 1997:291). This curriculum is germane to his perception of Afrocentricity which is delineated as follow.

A frame of reference wherein phenomena are viewed from the perspective of the African person. The Afrocentric approach seeks in every situation the appropriate centrality of the African person. In education this means that teachers provide students the opportunity to study the world and its people, concepts, and history from an African world view (ASANTE, 1997, p. 290).

Beyond the endogenous development and afrocentric theory, this study comes within the framework of the sustainable development program implemented by UN, particularly the DESD. It is important to note that the concept of sustainability along with that of good governance have become key theoretical concepts of this twenty one century. In December 2002, at its 57<sup>th</sup> session, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/254, declaring the period 2005-2014 the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (DESD) in order to highlight the chief role of education in achieving a sustainable development (UNESCO, 2007, p. 5).

In its Resolution 59/237, the United Nations General Assembly encourages Government to consider: “the inclusion... of measures to implement the Decade in their respective education systems and strategies and, where appropriate, national development plans” (Unesco, 2007:5). In this regards, the DESD ambitions to

[...] integrate values, activities and principles that are inherently linked to sustainable development into all forms of education and learning and help usher in a change in attitudes, behaviours and values to ensure a more sustainable future in social, environmental and economic terms (UNESCO, 2007:5).

As far as the African continent is concerned, The DESD was launched through the regional Strategy of Education for Sustainable Development for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSAESD) at the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) Biennial meeting at Libreville, Gabon, 27-31 March 2006). The Objective of the meeting was to help SSA countries meet the goals of DESD (UNESCO, 2007).

In order to bring into public awareness the importance of adopting a new development trend, mainly the one that stresses sustainability in the domain of education and training, the United Nations University Institute's symposium on Education for Sustainable Development in Africa (ESDA) held in Nairobi on 1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> March, 2010 was launched in order

[...] to promote education for sustainable development in African countries by training professionals who may serve as planners, instructors, organizers, field development agents and practitioners for sustainable development in these countries"<sup>5</sup>.

This symposium which was followed by a workshop emphasized the urgency of educational reform in Africa. Because of poverty, lack of visionary policies about education and the absence of curriculum development in many parts of SSA, the application of ESDA agenda entails a certain number of challenges because of the overlapping scope of the crisis that touches the domain of education and training in these countries.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that certain universities are making steady progress toward the implementation and achievement of DESD. The University Gaston Berger in Senegal

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<sup>5</sup> United Nation University project on ESDA Report, 2010, p. 2.



(UGB), like many francophone African universities has implemented in 2006 The African and Malagasy Council of Higher Education's (CAMES) Resolution n°4 of the Council of Ministers which engaged the Universities within the CAMES space in the LMD (Licence (Bachelor), Master (Master) and Doctorat (Doctorate) degrees<sup>6</sup>.

This reform focuses on the harmonization and equivalence of degrees in the CAMES space. Its aim is to make university degrees in Africa more competitive. The UGB adoption of this reform has favoured the introduction of vocational training and the reform of the curriculum. Through its Contrat de Performance 2012 (AGREEMENT ON PERFORMANCE, 2012), UGB envisions to enhance the management and performance of the university through the increasing of the access to the ICT, and by connecting the university to the job market (CONTRAT DE PERFORMANCE UNIVERSITÉ GASTON BERGER, 2012.). Thanks to these strategies, UGB is ushering in positive changes in the development of its educational policies and system. After South Africa, Senegal appears as a pioneer in curriculum development and educational reform in Africa.

Yet, as far as the ESDA agenda is concerned, the lack of financial means and the shortage of teachers trained into the education for sustainable development constitute a serious impediment to the achievement of the MDG goals and sustainability in all areas of the academic life.

At any case, there is an urgency regarding curriculum reform in SSA, particularly in Mali in order to achieve the ESDA agenda. As a matter of fact, our paper calls for the implementation of an African-ecological education in order to transform schools and universities (public and private) into real engines of DESD application.

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<sup>6</sup> KOUDOU, in : [http://www.events.aau.org/./jean\\_koudou\\_creating\\_AHES](http://www.events.aau.org/./jean_koudou_creating_AHES).

## **Presentation of the Afric-ecological education**

An Afric-ecological curriculum is a model of teaching, learning and training that stands as a counterpoise to, and a visceral subversion of received colonial methods that bypass peoples' values and principles of knowing and positioning themselves in the universe. We think that if education cuts itself from the humus of the people, its cosmology, worldview, its ethics and laws, it becomes lifeless and less productive as the present school system. If everyone agrees that development is an ideal Africa shall strive to reach, the question one may ask is: Which development? And whose development?

In order to move out from the pitfalls of Eurocentric discourse, we advocate an *afric-ecological* pedagogical approach to education. Such pedagogy will put Africa and the specific needs and problems of the Africans at the center of the curricula. In addition to this, the Africans will be the actors and inventors of these curricula instead of receiving them from outside. We believe that an educational and development policy created for a snowy European country is likely to melt if brought and applied in an Harmattan African sun. For such a policy to function, it should be contextualized and adapted to the realities of Africa. It should meet all the demands and challenges of the educators, educates and overall community in order to be functional and productive.

### **Objectives**

The objective of this new pedagogical method is to stir awareness about the importance of the reform of our educational system, particularly in Sub-Saharan African regions. As a prerequisite for the development of the continent, such a pedagogical method will put the interests of Africans (continental and diasporan) at the

center of the curricula. The African way of teaching, learning and other traditional cognitive methods will be analyzed and used as a valid framework for pedagogy.

Besides, the indigenous knowledge will be valorized and studied in the curricula and their preservation and implementation will be spearheaded by students and teachers for sustainability. In addition, the new approach will draw from the rich index of computer sciences and Information and Communication Technology. Besides, it will promote research in marginalized areas like Agriculture, Food security, Water and Soil Management, Food Science and Technology, Food Crop, Food Processing Industry, Architecture, research on renewable energy and technologies as well as traditional academic disciplines in order to provide the learners with a more range of choice in terms of career and job opportunities and make them more competitive and efficient at a regional and global level.

## **Vision**

An Afric-ecological education has a Pan-Africanist, feminist and environmental vision. Its methods combine the afrocentric worldview and epistemology with a feminine/feminist sensibility. It combines regional exchange with diasporan experience. This Pan-Africanist dimension promotes team-actions, exchange, tutoring and monitoring students' learning. It promotes integration and peace among peoples, particularly in war-stricken area.

In addition, an Afric-ecological educational paradigm will place a strong emphasis on the importance of culture, particularly in dealing with sensitive issues like FMG (Female Genital Mutilation), AIDS/HIV and STD (Sexually Transmitted Disease). It will be gender sensitive, informative, inventive and rooted in the urgent needs of the people, the whole seasoned with a Pan-Africanist vision

and consciousness. More interesting, the new curricula will foster a strong ecological awareness as to rivet attention on the environmental issues affecting the continent as a whole. Among these knotty issues, desertification, deforestation, pollution, the silting up of rivers, the Global warming, drought, the mismanagement of waste disposal (electronic, plastic and the like) a new form of pollution that is invading the continent as a whole and causing devastating damage to the environment.

Besides, in the curriculum planning and teaching, the contribution and achievements of both men and women will be valorized as to achieve harmony, the backbone of the philosophy of *maat*. The latter is a pursuit of truth justice, love and ethical values. In terms of training, teaching and learning, it will foster exchange, creativity, entrepreneurship and the sense of responsibility and initiative. An africological pedagogical curriculum will emphasize the aforementioned elements and actively contribute to their teaching, learning and spreading through new syllabuses.

## Goals

The goal of this new curriculum is to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by making Africans agents and actors of their own development policies, but it also ambitions to focus more on the interests of the Africans by using endogenous values and techniques in the training. In order to meet the overall objectives of the MDG and effectively deal with all the challenges, the Afric-ecological pedagogy will emphasize the need for the relocation of certain universities and academic centers to local areas or to build new ones in those places.

Such decentralization is likely to provide a breathing-space to overpopulated capital universities as well as to contribute to the development of the local areas. In this case, the gap between capital

cities and regional ones will be reduced in terms of education facilities and job opportunities as well as transport and other infrastructures that permit and strengthen development. The rural areas will become the driving force of economy and the lever of change.

### **Mission**

Its mission is to enhance sustainable development by increasing student's awareness about some ecological problems endemic to certain areas of the continent. Problems linked to the management of waste disposal (plastic bags mainly), and the deadly effects of pollution, unclean water, smoking, deforestation and other environmental issues affecting their regions by implementing new and practical syllabuses dealing with those issues. Students will be actors in those courses and will use extracurricular activities to find solution to their local problems. Besides, they can exchange with other students from Africa or abroad as to acquire a variegated experience and know-how in order to face those world-wide ecological problems. In addition, such a curriculum will put a special emphasis on career related learning experiences as to enable students to combine theoretical learning with practical activities. The aim is to stimulate students' generative knowledge by implementing new cognitive methods and learning.

Such a curriculum will take into account certain values like community and its importance. The notion of community is often equated with pinnacles of hospitality, generosity and solidarity, good manners that strengthen bonding among peoples. Courses should stir up those values and put them on the limelight. It should revisit and encourage ideas like the palaver tree for the settlement of dispute among neighbours.

In its framework for peace building and conflicts settlement, an africological pedagogical curriculum will take its inspiration from ancient African philosophies and wisdom like *La Charter du Mandé* (or the Charter of Kurukan Fugan) proclaimed by Sundjata Keita, the king of Mandé during his coronation in 1222. The charter encapsulates lessons that can help Africans to build a sustainable peace and human security. In its preamble, Keita stipulates:

“Every human life is a life ... there is no life more ‘ancient’”,  
Or more respectable than another life, as no life is worthier  
than  
another life.”

For this reason:

“Every life being a life,  
Every damage inflicted on a life needs repair.  
Therefore,  
Nobody may without reason oppose his neighbour,  
Nobody may do his neighbour a wrong,  
Nobody may torment another human being”.<sup>7</sup>

The charter of Kurutan Fugan constitutes an indigenous mechanism of conflict settlement and peace building among neighbours, nations and communities. In fostering and spreading such lessons in the curricula, they can serve as a brake to the gruesome “power mongery”, dictatorship, ethnic strife and the like that are taking place in many African countries. If we consider that today’s students are tomorrow’s leaders, instilling into them certain

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<sup>7</sup> KEITA, Sundjata. *La Charte du Mandé*, 2003. Disponible in: <<http://www.afrik.com/article5949.html>>.

ethical behaviors can prevent them from indulging themselves into bloodshed electoral conflicts, embezzlement and power greed.

Indeed, Africa needs to look into the past like the Sankofa bird of the Akan cosmology. Africa must return to the sources in order to find peace and improve the present as well as prepare a better future. This is one of the guiding principles of the Afric-ecological education. This idea is germane to what Mazrui (1986) said about the future of African countries. Mazrui holds that two imperatives will mark any social reform in Africa in the coming decades:

One is the imperative of looking inwards towards ancestry; the other is the imperative of looking outward towards the wider humanity. The inward imperative requires a more systematic investigation into the cultural preconditions of the success of each project, of each piece of legislation, of each system of government. Feasibility studies should be much more sensitive to the issue of “cultural feasibility” than has been the case in the past. Africa’s ancestors need to be consulted through the intermediary of consulting African usage, custom, and tradition. Since the world is becoming a village, Africa cannot just look inward to its own past. The contact with the twentieth century has to include sensitivity to the wider world of the human race as a whole” (MAZRUI,1986:21).

In addition, the new curriculum will be structured around the rewriting and re-imagining of the concept of nation and state. Such a vision will not be based on the colonial model, but rather, will consider the state as the compound, the community, the village. Because of the colonial legacy, many Africans (even in the intellectual circles) still consider the nation as a symbol of the colonial authority. As a matter of fact, many leaders do not hesitate to plunder it shamelessly.

Strangely enough, even the masses passively condone this plundering because the looters are believed to have taken their slice

in the big cake that is the state. Consequently, a new notion of state, nation and governance should be implemented. Such curricula shall foster the love of the nation as something belonging to everyone not the ruling party only. A new notion that combines Julius Njerere's African's socialism known as Ujaama and Wangari Munthai's ecological and womanist concerns.

Last, the new curriculum should have a nomethetic impulse, it must change the old laws and inert knowledge and replace them with new generative one. For this reason, the curriculum must inspire and enhance visionary attitudes from the students unlike the traditional method that often overlooks ingenuity and creativity. In traditional system, those who memorize their lessons are considered to be effective and intelligent and given higher grades. As far as ability, skills and other innate talents of invention, improvisation, and management are concerned, they are not given pre-eminence. An Afric-ecological curriculum should be combative and visionary. It should be daring, ambitious and open-minded. It should combine the power of men and the trickiness and seductiveness of women. It should mesmerize, cajole, impress, motivate and convince.

## **Challenges**

Implementing an Afric-ecological educational system in SSA, particularly in Mali entails a certain number of challenges. The Oxfam report on education in Mali reveals a profound and overriding dysfunction of the overall educational system. It is stated that the MDG agenda, particularly education for all by 2015 is still a dream than a reality for Malian children because almost a million (900.000 exactly) children aged 7 to 12 years are out of school among which 60 per cent are girls (OXFORD INTERNATIONAL REPORT, 2009:7). The report has also stressed the poor quality of education



delivered in the schools due to the lack of good infrastructures and curriculum as well as the poor qualification of teachers themselves. Because of all these factors, the study shows that only 23 per cent of Malian adults and 29 per cent of them aged 15 to 24 can write and read correctly. These figures place Mali among the countries with the lowest literacy rate of the world (OXFORD INTERNATIONAL REPORT, 2009, p. 7).

In fact, according to Diakité (2000), education in Mali suffers from an endemic crisis that goes back to the 1990s. The increase in the number of students in the past decade has not been followed by equipments and the availability of didactic materials (DIAKITÉ, 2000:1). This situation is worsened by the existence of inadequate curriculum and the dearth of training of the staff, a situation that seriously affects the quality of the education, particularly in higher education. Consequently, many students want to stay at the university as long as possible in order to take advantage of the scholarship offered by the government not for the passion for education *per se*. (DIAKITÉ, 2000: 9). The absence of university libraries and the lack of access to the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) by both teachers and students have diminished the quality and performance of the students.

In addition, the curriculum is outdated and disconnected to the current needs of the people. It carries some remnants of the colonial educational system even though there is the introduction since a few years of the national languages in the curriculum. In fact, according to Woolman, Mali has adopted a curriculum development whose objectives was to africanize the content and structure of the curriculum so as to suit local and national needs. This reform has consisted basically of restricting the primary school to nine years divided into three cycles instead of ten years like in the French

system. In the 1980s, the ruralization of school was meant to teach children some practical skills in economics, health, agriculture and husbandry. Today, the school is geared toward the vocational training. In this framework, it offers two trends in the high schools: academic education and technical skills (WOOLMAN, 2001:3).

Another huge challenge to the implementation of an Afric-ecological education is the fact that this study is embedded in a theoretical framework only. Given that a curriculum involves both theory and praxis, the realization of this new curriculum requires on the one hand an active participation of both teachers and curriculum planners; on the other, it entails the engagement of the governments of SSA countries as well as the NGOs and other partners. The shift from a theoretical base to a practical one implies a huge financial means and training of teachers and staff and the designation of new syllabuses. So, both students and teachers should be empowered in order to be able to design, monitor, assess and implement this new curriculum.

Besides, human development which is the aim of both DESD program and the endogenous development theory concerns the whole population, not elite only or a single sector of the social life. However, in Mali, only a few people really grasp the meaning and implication of this concept. Therefore, an Afric-ecological education will address the issue of poverty and illiteracy from the grassroots. It will develop joint projects whose aim is to sensitize and train the illiterate masses into issues of sustainability dealing with the preservation of the environment, the implementation of income generating activities, how to increase the productivity of agricultural output by using fertilizers that do not pollute the environment, etc.

In order to raise fund for this educational and developmental project from below, an Afric-ecological educational system will

create partnership with regional and international universities involved in these questions as well as NGOs and the DESD program led by Unesco. The Barefoot College in India is a good initiative of the grassroots' education and human development in the sense that its main target is the illiterate rural women. The Barefoot College is a non-governmental Organization (NGOs) founded by Bunker Roy in Tilonia (India) in 1972. Since 1989, it has been promoting solar energy through the electrification of many villages. The College trains illiterate or semi-illiterate middle-aged women from Third World countries into the technology of installation, repairing and maintenance of solar powered lightening systems. Once in their respective villages, these grandmothers become "Barefoot solar engineers" (Unesco, 2012). Creating in SSA a similar initiative that includes also young men and women who drop out from schools or who are illiterate will help achieve sustainable development in SSA, mainly in Mali. Indeed, one of the main problems of the continent is the access to electricity despite the huge deposit of oil energy of the continent.

There is also the challenge of globalization and competition. In this respect, Sawyerr (2004) writes: "Every society must have the capacity to generate, acquire, adapt, and apply modern knowledge if it is to take advantage of the opportunities and reduce the risks posed by the rise of the knowledge society". In the same vein, Mazrui (2005) argues that a university must develop three kinds of relationships if it wants to be functional. His analysis is the following:

In relation to the wider world, a university has three crucial relationships. A university has to be politically distant from the state; second, a university has also to be culturally close to society; and third, a university has to be intellectually linked to wider scholarly and

scientific values in the world of learning (MAZRUI,  
MKANDAWIRE, 2005, p. 62).

Finally, as far as Mali is concerned, the implementation of an Africological curriculum with its emphasis on sustainable and human development is thwarted by the challenge of peace and human security, particularly in the North of the country. Since January, the northern Mali has been facing armed conflicts, rebellion, attacks from Toureg separatist groups and Islamic fundamentalists, a situation that has seriously affected the quality of education as many people have fled their places in order to find harbor in neighbouring countries. If education is the bedrock of all development programs, security is the pillar upon which everything is constructed. Without a sustainable peace, Mali can neither achieve the MDG goals by 2015 nor the ESDA agenda.

In addition, the poor economic and social situation of the past years worsened by repeated drought, famine, malnutrition, unemployment have severely curtailed the human development index as illustrated by the UNDP 2011 report on Mali. This report positions Mali among the countries with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) of about 0.359. Therefore, Mali is 175 out of 187 (UNDP REPORT, 2011:1). HDI is a summary measure of long-term progress based on three dimensions of human development: long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent living standard (UNDP Report, 2011:1). All these problems constitute serious impediments to development as they affect the quality of education. However, without an education of high quality, nothing can be realized according to the following statement of Mazrui:

No university or research organization can be a first-class institution of learned inquiry if the training

schools that fed into it are all mediocre. In order to fully develop a university, a society has to develop the educational ladder as a whole. Qualities of education at the primary and second levels need to be sustained if the financial candidates for possible admission to the universities are to be of a high standard. The capacity to be curious and fascinated by ideas has to start early in the educational process. The spirit of intellectualism has to be nourished from primary school onward, but it can die at university level if mediocrity prevails (MAZRUI, in MKANDAWIRE, 2005:61).

Consequently, for Mazrui, intellectualism should be the foundation of education. The earlier it is instilled into the children, the better the quality of their education and performance. As we have seen, the implementation of curriculum reform involves sundry forms of challenges and roadblocks. Yet, despite the far-flung task of this reform, we are still convinced that it is the only viable solution to the development of SSA countries in general and Mali in particular.

### **RETHINKING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: a prerequisite of development in the SSA**

An afric-ecological education embodies the humanist and cultural ethic that is missing in the current curricula. Therefore, this article is a call for a re-africanisation of African educational system in order to take into account Africa's indigenous knowledge and developmental challenges. It is our belief that a curriculum that places a strong emphasis on the knotty issues of cultural empowerment of the Africans through a teaching and rehabilitation of their values, achievements and knowledge as well as highlighting the core environmental problems of our modern era is likely to

offer a glimpse of hope from the maelstrom of the overlapping developmental problems of SSA, mainly Mali.

## CONCLUSION

This bird-eye view of the educational situation in SSA, particularly in Mali and the review of development theories reveal that the situation is really alarming but not desperate. We believe that there is no fatality regarding the current situation of the SSA countries. By implementing a sound educational and developmental policy like Afric-ecology, these countries can knock down all the problems and all the “unders” they face today in terms of human development. It is a well-known fact that the access to knowledge, information and all forms of education constitutes the very backbone of all development programs.

In diversifying the forms of training and education; in focusing on ecological preservation; in stirring awareness on the paramount necessity to think for ourselves and for our own benefit instead of adopting exogenous policies that cloak our interests; and in stressing the importance of agency, location and cultural rootedness for the Africans, the Afric-ecological educational policy is likely to lift us out from the quagmire of slavish mimicry and unproductive development programs.

Given that Africa is the oldest of the continent (it is the cradle of humanity) as well as being the youngest in terms of its population constitutes a tremendous potential for development and places Africa as the hope of humanity. In combining the experience and maturity of age-old traditions and wont; and the bloodstream of youth, the African renaissance preached by leaders like Mandela, Mbeki and Ki-Zerbo is heading on its way. The only hurdle is the

integration and unity of Africa in order to counter the “paradox of fragmentation” (MAZRUI, 1980). The Afric-ecology expands this panafricanist vision in its curriculum and training. Therefore, it appears as a glimpse of hope in actualizing African development despite the various forms of challenges and roadblocks that beset our path to sustainable development and economic recovery.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to discuss the paramount necessity to implement an adequate educational system in order to achieve sustainable development in the SSA countries with a focus in Mali, one of the poorest countries in the world with an endemic educational crisis. It is a truism that education is the cornerstone of development. In this respect, any strategy of development in SSA shall start with a change in the pedagogy. This reform implies not only a rethinking of knowledge production and teaching in Africa as to take into account the current needs of the masses, their cultural and historical experiences as well as their environmental problems; but it also involves a curriculum development which makes universities and schools spearheads of larger social transformations and communal uplift in order to attain the Millenium Development Goals as well as mainstream a genuine sustainable development. In this connection, this paper makes a case for the implementation of an Afric-ecological curriculum in order to deal effectively with the multidimensional challenges of development and education in the SSA, particularly in Mali. Such a curriculum has the advantage to combine an afrocentric perspective to teaching and learning with a strong ecological awareness. In addition, it is geared toward reducing inequalities between men and women, and between rural and urban women in terms of educational and job opportunities.

**KEYWORDS:** Development. Education. Curriculum. Afrocentricity/Africology.

## RESUMO

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir a necessidade primordial de implementar um sistema educacional adequado, a fim de alcançar o desenvolvimento sustentável nos países da África Subsaariana (ASS), com foco em Mali, um dos países mais pobres do mundo, com uma crise endêmica educacional. É um truismo dizer que a educação é a base do desenvolvimento. A este respeito, qualquer estratégia de desenvolvimento da ASS terá início com uma alteração na pedagogia. Essa reforma implica não apenas uma reflexão sobre a produção do conhecimento e do ensino na África como também tem em conta as necessidades atuais das massas, de suas experiências culturais e históricas, bem como seus problemas ambientais, além do envolvimento de um desenvolvimento curricular que faz com que as universidades e escolas lancem grandes transformações sociais

para atingir os objetivos de desenvolvimento do milênio, bem como integrar um verdadeiro desenvolvimento sustentável. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho faz um caso para a implementação de um currículo Africo-ecológico, a fim de lidar eficazmente com os desafios multidimensionais de desenvolvimento e de educação particularmente em Mali. Um currículo tem a vantagem de combinar uma perspectiva afrocêntrica de ensino e aprendizagem com uma forte consciência ecológica. Além disso, ele é voltado para a redução das desigualdades entre homens e mulheres e entre mulheres rurais e urbanas em termos de oportunidades de educação e trabalho.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Desenvolvimento. Educação. Currículo. Afrocentricidade/Africologia.

# **HOW POLITICAL REGIME AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION HELP TO RETHINK DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA: Empirical Evidence**

Gérard Tchouassi \*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Macroeconomic policy's role in the different varieties of capitalism has been largely ignored. The varieties of capitalism literature, from Hall and Soskice (2001), differentiate and deal with developed economies according to a certain number of institutional characteristics: industrial relations, education and vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and intra-firm coordination. It distinguishes two types of capitalism: the liberal market economies (found in United States, in United Kingdom) and the coordinated market economies (presented in France, Germany, and Japan), which differ not only in their institutional features but also in certain macroeconomic characteristics, most notably comparative advantage and industrial specialization (AMABLE; AZIZI, 2011). How about developing countries in the global south today or particularly in Sub-Saharan African countries? These countries faced many problems: varieties of democracies, diversities of customs duties, varieties of development, diversities of culture and civilization, among others.

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Democratization is more of an abstract enterprise, centering on multi-party systems and national elections at regular intervals. Actually, the democratic processes on the ground are generally of less importance. Sometimes you get the feeling that even democratically elected leaders are not too keen on democracy on the ground. It cannot be granted that democratization actually leads to a democratic society, on the contrary, common fusing with patrimonial politics in the postcolonial state often leads to anti-democratic patterns. The gradual increased access to information is indeed of great importance, but even this access and communication possibilities do not in themselves lead to democratization (ARNFRED; UTAS, 2007). Democratization is the transition to a more democratic political regime. It may be the transition from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy or from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system. Different patterns of democratization are often used to explain other political phenomena, such as whether a country goes to a war or whether its economy grows. Democratization itself is influenced by various factors, including economic development, history, and civil society. There is considerable debate about the factors which affect or ultimately limit democratization. Factors, including economics, culture and history have been cited as impacting on the democratic process. Some of the more frequently mentioned factors are: wealth, education, natural resources, market economy, social equality, civil society, middle class, culture and civil culture, human empowerment and emancipative values, homogeneous population, previous experience with democracy, foreign intervention and age distribution.

Extending the measure of democratization, the Freedom House stands as one of the most comprehensive “freedom measures”,



nationally and internationally. Freedom House categorizes all countries of the world, according to a seven point value system with over 200 questions on the survey and multiple survey representatives in various parts of every nation. The total raw points of every country place the country in one of three categories: free, partly free, or not free. One study simultaneously examining the relationship between market economy (measured with one Index of Economic Freedom), economic development (measured with Gross Domestic Product – GDP –/ per capita), and political freedom (measured with the Freedom House index) found that high economic freedom increases GDP/capita and a high GDP/capita increases economic freedom. A high GDP/capita also increases political freedom, but political freedom did not increase GDP/capita. There was no direct relationship either way between economic freedom and political freedom if keeping GDP/capita constant.

Measuring varieties of democracy, Coppedge and Wolfgang (1990) had addressed all of these demands with four innovations. First, rather than attempting to produce a single simple rating of “democracy”, it seeks to capture six different conceptions of democracy: the pared-down, “minimalist” concept of electoral democracy, that is the foundation on which most of the other conceptions build; liberal democracy, which adds guarantees of basic civil and political rights and institutes checks and balances to guard against the tyranny of the majority; majoritarian democracy-partially at odds with liberal democracy which concentrates power in the hands of the majority; participatory democracy, which encourages the involvement of citizens in many stages of the political process; deliberative democracy, which requires governments to give reasoned and respectful justifications for their decisions; egalitarian

democracy, which is inspired by the belief that political equality is unattainable without some degree of economic and social equality.

Second, varieties of democracy radically disaggregate all these concepts. Each conception is broken down into several “components” – more than thirty altogether, including such components as regular elections, competitiveness, legislative power, sub national autonomy, gender equality, and free media. These components are, in turn, broken down into 316 specific indicators, each of which is measured separately. One of the key benefits of this degree of specificity is improved measurement reliability: one can judge more confidently whether any journalists were killed in a given year than what “level of media freedom” prevailed; one can more reliably judge whether the legislature can override an executive veto than how tight “executive constraints” were.

Third, varieties of democracy are designed to have very broad historical and geographic coverage. To the extent possible, it is to rate all sovereign states and most non-sovereign territories, such as colonies, from 1900 to the present. This lengthy historical coverage is especially useful to scholars studying causal relationships, because many of these relationships seem to unfold over decades rather than year to year or month to month. If scholars can develop a better understanding of the forces that create and sustain democracy, they will be better able to advise practitioners who seek to promote it. Finally, this is designed to provide systematic estimates of the precision and reliability of its ratings. Other projects simply provide a score, such as a “3”, with no indication of how accurate it is. Varieties of democracy would say that there is an 85% probability that such a score is a 3, for example, or that it is a “3, give or take 0,2”. This does not mean that the existing indicators are more certain or precise; on the contrary, it means that we have no idea how imprecise they

really are. No other major democracy index provides such estimates of precision and reliability. Calculating this information and making it public is essential for the responsible use of such data.

Trade liberalization is the term for the process whereby a country opens up its markets to international trade. For instance reduces the taxes (known as tariffs) and other limits (such as quotas) on goods coming in. It also often comes alongside increased rights for investors and pressures to privatize its economy. Trade liberalization can be a good thing in the right circumstances, if it's phased in correctly at the right time in a country's development. However, for many years European Union countries have used institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, conditions attached to aid and trade deals like those negotiated at the World Trade Organization to force developing poor countries to liberalize their economies. Economic Partnership Agreements are part of the same trend. There is now ample evidence which shows that this liberalization agenda actually increases poverty, especially when imposed from outside and not driven by country needs and timetables. Instead, poor countries need the freedom and right to protect and support their industries and farmers until they are strong enough to compete internationally.

Are political regimes and trade liberalization played an important role in thinking development in Central African region? Are free political regimes and free trade worked for rethinking transformation process in Central African region? Development is considered here as well-being and as a process of transforming the society. As the increase of well-being (material, social and security), it is synonymous to a good quality of life. This notion includes material well-being, often expressed as having enough bodily well-being (being strong, being in the right frame of mind and looking

good). Social well-being includes caring for and settling children, having self-respect, peace, and good relations in the family and the community. Having security includes civil peace, a safe and secure environment, personal and physical security, and confidence in the future. Having freedom of choice and action includes being able to give, share and help other people in the community. Some of the key indicators of well-being are: rate of poverty, peace, freedom, life expectancy at birth, adult illiteracy, access to health care services, access to safe water, access to sanitation, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, prevalence of malnutrition, population estimates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (WORLD BANK, 2008).

Capturing the other dimensions of development, the multidimensional poverty index (MPI), as an index of acute multidimensional poverty (ALKIRE; SANTOS, 2010), reflects deprivations in very rudimentary services and core human functioning. Although deeply constrained by data limitations, the MPI reveals a different pattern of poverty than income poverty, as it illuminates a different set of deprivations. It MPI has three dimensions: health, education, and standard of living. These are measured using ten indicators. Poor households are identified and an aggregate measure constructed using the methodology proposed by Alkire and Foster (2007, 2009). Each dimension is equally weighted and each indicator within a dimension is also equally weighted. Concerning the transformation of society, policies that ensure that openness leads to that broad transformation must be adopted. It is crucial that trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) not be confined to small enclaves, even if those enclaves give a temporary boost to statistical measures of national output. For instance, a wealth of natural resources (gold or diamond) in an area far from a country's

population base might well be successful at attracting foreign direct investment and increasing mineral exports, but may well do little to spur development over the long term.

If there is systematic differences in trade integration between political regime type (democracies or autocracies), this paper contributes to the broader debate about political regime, trade liberalization and development and the role of “good governance” in fostering economic progress. This subject is based on theoretical and empirical evidences such as the state theories (multiparty system, state failures, etc.), the theories of trade, the customs duties theories (VINER, 1950; MEADE, 1956; LIPSEY, 1957), the new theory of international trade (KRUGMAN, 1991), the theory of regional integration (BALASSA, 1960; HUGON, 1993; HETTNE, 2000), the development theories and the games theory analysis.

Can political regime and trade liberalization help to re-think development? This paper answers in the affirmative. Furthermore, it uses a much larger data set. And its empirical design demonstrates that political regime differences in trade policy, while playing a role, cannot fully account for the observed differences in trade flows. Both the observation that autocracies trade less and the observation that they trade less conditional on trade policy are consistent with the theoretical model uses to re-think development in Central Africa. But evidence is also presented that countries with a free or partly free political system, free press and effective political accountability trade more, suggesting that these particular transmission channels permitted to think the new model of development are important.

The main objective of this research is to estimate econometrically the impact of political regime type on trade flows in order to re-think economic development in central Africa. The article is organized as follows: the section 2 reviews the relevant

literature, the section 3 presents the model of political regime and trade liberalization to re-think development and data collections, the section 4 develops the empirical results and discussions in detail and, for last, the section 5 summarizes the findings and offers some concluding remarks.

## **REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

Why should a country in an early stage of development adopt democracy instead of authoritarianism? One reason is the inherent and universal importance of democracy itself such as freedom, human rights and participation. Another reason would be to expect democracy to provide the procedure to secure legitimacy and maintain unity of a multi-ethnic nation and the means to gain popular support to developmentalism and development projects. Moreover, in the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it must be noted that no country, regardless of its development stage, could be admitted as a valid member of the international community and receive aid and cooperation unless it embraces a democratic form of government. From 1981 to 1996, Central African countries experienced significant episodes of violent conflict between government and opposition groups. These conflicts lasted as little as one month to more than twenty years. By 1998, some people may have lost their lives as a direct result of this political violence. Another people have become refugees. In illegitimate or quasi legitimate states, the state's own security forces often challenge the internationally recognized leadership. During the 1980s, many successful or unsuccessful military takeovers were recorded, affecting Central African countries. Some Central African heads of state lost their lives. Still, it is important to observe that

the region is not monolithic; significant differences exist in political institutions and practice.

Different samples and periods may explain the divergent results of these researches, but they tend to support the Washington Consensus that democracy is economically advantageous for poor countries. If we turn to Central Africa, there is little empirical evidence to show that recently open politics have helped to improve economic conditions. The region's emerging democracies are not more prone than their predecessors are to adopt economic reform programs (SERIEUX, 1999). Nor did they perform better than the remaining authoritarian political regimes in presiding over economic growth, stable prices, or balanced budgets in the 1990s (VAN DE WALLE, 1999). Perhaps insufficient time has passed to observe positive economic results from Africa's "second independence". Another research does find that democracy is associated with faster growth in Africa over the longer period, 1960 to 1992 (FENG, 1996). Moreover, none of the data suggest that the fledgling democracies do worse in the economic arena compared to rival systems. Given democracy's inherent value, that itself is a strong argument for continuing to favor political liberalization in Africa.

Towards a new paradigm for development, Stiglitz (1998a) re-think development as a transformation of society, a movement from traditional relations, traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and education, traditional methods of production, to more "modern" ways. For instance, a characteristic of traditional societies is the acceptance of the world as it is. The modern perspective recognizes change, it recognizes that we, as individuals and societies, can take actions that, for instance, reduce infant mortality, extend lifespan, and increase productivity. Key to these changes is the movement to "scientific" ways of thinking,

identifying critical variables that affect outcomes, attempting to make inferences based on available data, recognizing what we know and what we do not know. All societies are a blend. Even in more “advanced” societies there are sectors and regions that remain wedded to traditional modes of operation, and people wedded to traditional ways of thinking. But while in more advanced societies, these constitute a relatively small proportion, in less advanced societies, they may predominate. Indeed, one characteristic of many less developed countries is the failure of the more advanced sectors to penetrate deeply into society, resulting in what many have called “dual” economies in which more advanced production methods may co-exist with very primitive technologies. Change is not an end in itself, but a means to other objectives. The changes that are associated with development provide individuals and societies more control over their own destiny. Development enriches the lives of individuals by widening their horizons and reducing their sense of isolation. It reduces the afflictions brought on by disease and poverty, not only increasing lifespan, but improving the vitality of life. Given this definition of development, it is clear that a development strategy must be aimed at facilitating the transformation of society, in identifying the barriers to, as well as potential catalysts for, change.

These notes outline some of the ingredients of such a new development strategy (STIGLITZ, 1998a). Approaching development from the perspective of transforming society has profound implications not only for what governments and aid agencies do, but how they proceed – how they engage, for instance, in participation and partnership. Thus, this paper can be seen as providing an analytic framework for much of the re-thinking that has been occurring in the last few years about how best to promote development. The experience of the past fifty years has demonstrated



that development is possible, but not inevitable. The rapid growth of the countries of East Asia showed that development was possible, and that successful development could be accompanied by a reduction of poverty, widespread improvements in living standards, and even a process of democratization. It recognizes that an integral part of successful development is the increase in GDP per capita. But this is only part of the story, and even this will not be achieved unless the country adopts a broader development focus. If successful, the new development strategy will not only raise GDP per capita, but also living standards, as evidenced by standards of health and literacy. It will reduce poverty, but the main goal should be its elimination, a goal that the more successful economies have actually attained (at least by the *absolute* poverty standard). It will be sustainable, strengthening the environment.

In this new development strategy, trade can play a crucial role. In the model of international trade, openness to foreign goods is supposed to bring benefits primarily through its effects on the market price of imported goods. The magic of comparative advantage is that a poor country benefits from trade even if, in absolute terms, its productivity is lower than its trade partners' across the whole range of goods. Both rigorous empirical research and country experience suggest that the growth effects of engagement in the global marketplace are far larger than would be predicted by the standard model (ROMER, 1994). Many specifications of empirical growth regressions find that some indicators of external openness are strongly associated with per capita income growth (SACHS; WARNER, 1995). Countries, especially small and poor ones, have tried autarky have typically found themselves lagging far behind in development, for reasons that apparently stem in part from their closed borders. The most important gains from trade may come

from the increased variety of goods to which an open trading system offers access (RODRIGUEZ-CLARE, 1996; STIGLITZ, 1997). That is, rather than just reducing the price of goods that are already available domestically, trade also offers access to many goods that simply were not available at any price under autarky. The new inputs bring down costs and spur innovation in the importing economy.

The issue of development and better distribution of world resources have long been components of the world trading system and it is widely recognized that there is a strong nexus between trade and development. Meanwhile, it is hard to refute the fact that international trade can be a powerful engine for a country economic development, the exact nature of the link between trade and development is constantly a subject of controversy within the ranks of academics and policy makers. Over time, the trade and development paradigm has shifted and this is reflected in the changes in the debate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO). The time-honored and simple models of international trade, which show that unrestricted trade can lead to poverty alleviation in developing economies like those of Central African countries, have been criticized for its simplicity. It is true that in the time since these basic models of international trade were first formulated; major changes have taken place in the world economy. Yet, no model of large scale-economic activity may encompass all the complexity of the true reality. Wade (2008) argues that the WTO has become the world's most important multilateral organization. It represents a quantum leap in the regulation or "governance" of world trade and investment according to principles of free or almost free markets. It is a spearhead for the "internationalization" of the Washington Consensus on desirable economic policy for developing countries.

For this very reason, the WTO has become a dangerous organization for development and a more equal world (WADE, 2003). In order to re-think the trading system, Kwa (2007) has showed that neo-liberal trade liberalization experiments have failed in developing countries.

Neo-liberalism has been unsuccessful in bringing about broad-based development, because it has ignored the power imbalances along the value chain. The over enthusiasm regarding exports is also logically flawed. Not all countries can attain export surpluses. Others will end up with an import surplus and the contraction of their internal markets. The pressure to be competitive also pushes wages down, often shrinking rather than expanding people's purchasing power and standard of living. The multilateral institutions have been the primary agents advocating liberalization to the developing world, and their agenda has penalized rather than supported the poor. The current Doha Round is an example of an anti-development package that experts have already shown will cause further harm to low-income developing countries.

Brunetti and Weder (1995) review twenty earlier empirical studies. Three studies discover a positive relationship, and five discover a conditional relationship, between democracy and growth. Ten cross-national studies fail to turn up any significant relationship. Only two of the studies find that democracy affects economic growth negatively. Goldsmith (2001) looked at an additional dozen studies on the same topic. Using increasingly sophisticated methods, they are even more favorable for representative government. Only one finds a negative correlation between democracy and growth or development (GASIOROWSKI, 2000). The other eleven find a positive, mixed, or neutral correlation. All of the following studies uncovered a positive association between democracy and growth or social well-being: Feng 1996; Wickrama and Mulford, 1996; Leblang, 1997;

Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Fedderke and Klitgaard, 1998; Nelson and Singh, 1998; and MINIER, 1998. None were detected by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994). Inconclusive or mixed results were found by Helliwell, 1994; Mbaku, 1994 and Durham, 1999.

Is there a systematic relationship between economic and political liberalization? Does a country's political regime systematically affect its involvement in international trade? According to AIDT and Gassebner (2010), the first question has received much attention recently, with studies of the determinants of democracy (BARRO, 1999; ACEMOGLU et al. 2008) and economic freedom (BOOCKMANN; DREHER, 2003; DREHER; RUPPRECHT, 2007) as well as studies of the relationship between democracy and economic freedom (STURM; DE HAAN, 2003; GIAVAZZI; TABELLINI, 2005). The second, more specific question is much less well researched, and AIDT and Gassebner (2010) provide new answers. Knowledge of how political regimes influence international trade comes primarily from the political science literature. Seminal works find that democracy encourages trade. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000) stress the congruence between the political regimes of pairs of trading countries. They show that pairs of democratic countries trade more than pairs consisting of a democracy and an autocracy. Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998) also find that democracies trade more with each other. Daumal (2008) finds that federalist systems increase international trade. Milner and Kubota (2005) study the relationship between political regime type and trade policy in a sample of developing countries and show that democratic political institutions are associated with liberal trade policy. So that countries that are not involved in international trade could be autocracies. Some researchers have argued that international trade

encourages democratization (LI; REUVENY, 2003; RIGOBON; RODRIK, 2005; LOPEZ-CORDOVA; MEISNER, 2008).

Re-thinking the development agenda, Ocampo (2002) calls for a development based on five major premises: first a more balanced form of globalization based on a genuine respect for diversity; second a broad view of macroeconomic stability, which provides an adequate role for countercyclical policies; after the need to complement macroeconomic stability with active productive development policies; then strong social policies and the mainstreaming of social objectives into economic policies to guarantee adequate linkages between economic and social development; and finally the recognition that development involves broader human development goals. This author has recognized that one of the most positive events of the past decade has been the full realization that development comprises broader goals (STIGLITZ, 1998b). The concept of “human development” or the more recent concept of “development as freedom” (SEN, 1999) gives expression to this perspective, but it is clearly a long-standing and deeply-rooted element of development thinking. The most important manifestation is the gradual spread of global ideas and values, such as those of human rights, social development, gender equity, respect for ethnic and cultural diversity, and environmental protection.

From the Washington to the post-Washington Consensus towards an inclusive-neoliberal regime of development, Ruckert (2006) analyses the recent articulation. This articulation has been met with two fundamentally opposed responses. On the one hand, critics of the development establishment maintain that the post-Washington Consensus and the policy changes that it involves do not represent a shift away from neoliberal policy practices, while supporters of the international financial institutions (IFIs) argue that

the post-Washington Consensus amounts to a fundamental rupture in development thinking and a progressive move away from policy conditionality towards country ownership and poverty reduction. Different interpretation of this recent shift in the development discourse argues that the bifurcation in the literature has led to a significant impasse in understanding the relevance of this policy shift. The post-Washington Consensus neither represents a fundamental rupture with the Washington Consensus (WILLIAMSON, 1990) nor an attempt to reproduce the same neoliberal policy regime. Moreover, a neo-Gramscian (GRAMSCI, 1971) reading of this inclusive-neoliberal development regime suggests that its introduction represents an attempt by the IFIs to resolve some of the legitimacy problems and contradictions that neoliberal policies faced in the global south. What should developing countries do to increase their growth rates and speed up the rates at which their citizens converge to the level of material well-being obtained in today's advanced nations? To re-think growth policies in the developing world, Rodrik (2003, 2004) recommended to "augmented" Washington Consensus (fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, openness to FDI, privatization, deregulation, and secure Property Rights) the previous 10 items, plus: Corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible labor markets, adherence to WTO disciplines, adherence to international financial codes and standards, "prudent" capital-account opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, social safety nets, and targeted poverty reduction.

If trade liberalization did not produce the expected boost to economic activity, it must be because labor markets were not sufficiently flexible, the fiscal system was not robust enough, and the

educational system not good enough. If privatization did not work and proved unpopular, it must be because the appropriate regulatory system had not been put in place. If financial liberalization led to financial crises, it must be because the prudential regulation and corporate governance systems were too weak. If tight fiscal policies did not produce macroeconomic stability, it must be because they were not perceived as credible and hence credibility-enhancing institutions were required. If the poor did not receive much of the benefits and ended up feeling more insecure, it must be because targeted anti-poverty programs and social safety nets had not been put in place. And let's not forget corruption, which has the potential to blunt the effectiveness of any and all of these reforms if not tackled aggressively (RODRIK, 2004). The augmented Washington Consensus seems to be a non-starter. It is empirically at odds with the advanced countries' own historical development experience. It is too ambitious a reform agenda.

In order to develop the "development thinking" (KANBUR, 2004) and to analyze the co-evolution of the Washington Consensus and the economic development discourse, Kanbur (2008) gives an account of development debates of the past two decades, focusing on the Washington Consensus and on the broader economic development discourse in historical context. According to Draper (2010), it is important to contextualize the debate over the role of African states in the development of their countries and the associated "good governance" agenda. The danger of embarking on discussions of this kind is that we run the twin risks of engaging in "Afro-optimism" which at worst is akin to racism connected with alleged continued imperial domination (ADEBAJO, 2009). Or indulging in what Mkandawire (2001) terms the "impossibility thesis" by which he identifies an implicit view in the "good governance" agenda that

African states are serially incapable of managing their own affairs owing to the nature of African politics, and therefore should not attempt to construct “developmental states” in the mode of East Asian models. Therefore, it is important to take into account the argument that the trouble with the “good governance” paradigm is that, it comes embedded in “neoliberal” policy prescriptions in terms of which African state capacities have been denuded in line with purportedly liberal conceptions of the “minimalist” or “night-watchman” state.

Ohno (2009) considers democratic developmentalism as “a political regime in which a developmental party remains in power for a long time by consecutively winning free elections which permit multiple parties, under which policies that punish rent seeking and encourage productive investment are implemented with a strong state guidance”. This should be construed as a new model which Africa is trying to attain rather than an already established and well-functioning political regime. The transformation of development strategy must begin with politics because, in the recognition of the African leaders, the developmental failure of Africa comes not only from the theoretical and technical shortcomings of economic policy but also, more fundamentally, from political factors such as the existence or absence of the will, the regime and the leaders that are determined to resist private profiteering and promote national development. For this reason, a political regime consistent with national development must be installed in parallel with or even before the formulation of concrete policy measures. Here, the developmental state is a regime that mobilizes available resources to build institutions, policies, and incentive systems to stimulate domestic value creation or productive investment. Moreover, this endeavor must be undertaken under the rules of democracy rather than authoritarianism. Under democratic



developmentalism, the fruits of successful development are expected to win popular support, which is confirmed through a series of elections. Thus, the developmental state earns legitimacy and keeps its power for a long time through both economic performance and democratic procedure.

The problems of regional integration have long been recognized in Africa's political circles (ARNFRED; UTAS, 2007). Many decades ago, Nkrumah forcefully stated the case for regionalism in Africa. While different integration mechanisms have been successfully launched by other regions to improve their economic welfare, Africa lags behind with regards to economic growth and general living standards. In spite of the existence of a whole range of regional arrangements and a plethora of policy plans regional integration is yet to be a feature of Africa political economies and development. The Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos were adopted almost three decades ago setting out the vision for an integrated Africa by the beginning of the third millennium. The question, if trade promotes peace in reducing the probability of interstate conflict, has been in the focus of empirical research for the last 30 years. Up to today the answer is not conclusive, although a tendency exists that trade indeed reduces conflict (BARBIERIE, 1996, 2003; ONEAL; RUSSET, 1999, 2003; POLACHEK, 1980, 2007). A few researchers asked if conflict reduces trade and some evidence exists it does (LONG, 2008; MARTIN et al., 2008). Clearly the causality goes both ways and focusing on one direction only results in biased estimates by ignoring endogeneity. Furthermore the approaches are diverse, which makes it difficult to compare results. Diversity is not just introduced by covering different countries or years, or in using different regression techniques but also by the use of regressors. For instance, if a trade relationship involves

two countries how to include a variable like polity, a measure of democracy? Is it the sum of the polity scores of two countries, the product, the lower score or the simple average?

## METHODOLOGY AND DATA

First, the empirical model to be used is specified and, second, the data collections are presented.

## EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION

To attain this objective the gravity equation form is used and it is based on the potential concept from physics. The idea is that two objects attract each other because of their size and their distance. This idea goes back to Isard (1954) and was empirically applied in Tinbergen (1962) for the first time. The gravity equation has a basic form:

$$T_{ie} = \beta_0 Y_i^{\beta_1} Y_e^{\beta_2} D_{ie}^{-\beta_3} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  and  $Y_e$  is the mass of an object or GDP and  $D_{ie}$  is the actual distance between two objects or two countries. The gravity model assumes that there is attraction between the GDP of two countries  $i$  and  $j$ , the same for attributes  $i$  and  $e$ . Attraction can be interpreted as dependence between two variables. The practical implication is that there is no need to construct summary variables containing the information for country  $i$  and  $e$ .

From Aidt and Gassebner (2010), we estimate the relationship between a country's political regime and its involvement in international trade, by testing the two main implications of the

model by the propositions below: (1) the effective trade distortion is higher in autocracies than in democracies and, as a consequence, autocracies trade less with the rest of the world than do democracies; and (2) for given official trade policy, autocracies trade less with the rest of the world than do democracies because of differences in red tape and other unofficial trade distortions, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) answered the question posed by using a dyadic model of trade. In this model, the dependent variable is imports of country  $i$  from country  $e$  in year  $t$  rather than total trade flows between pairs of countries. This choice avoids what Baldwin (2006) calls the “silver-medal of gravity mistakes”-that is, the sizable upward bias that regressions with average bilateral trade flows as the dependent variable are subject to when trade is unbalanced. This follows from the fact that the log of the average is not equal to the average of the logs if the import and export flows are not identical in magnitude. For a formal proof, refer to Baldwin (2006).

More specifically, the baseline specification is the following dyadic panel model adapted from Aidt and Gassebner (2010) who estimate the importation as:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{import}_{iet}) = & \beta_1 \text{regime}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{regime}_{et-1} + \beta_3 \ln(\text{GDP}_{it}) + \beta_4 \ln(\text{GDP}_{et}) + \beta_5 \ln(\text{GDP}_{p.c.it}) \\ & + \beta_6 \ln(\text{GDP}_{p.c.et}) + \beta_7 \ln(\text{WTO}_{it}) + \beta_8 \ln(\text{WTO}_{et}) + \beta_5 \ln(\text{regional}_{iet}) \\ & + \gamma_{ie} + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{iet} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $\text{import}_{iet}$  is imports of country  $i$  from country  $e$  in year  $t$ ;  $\text{regime}_{it-1}$  and  $\text{regime}_{et-1}$  are lagged values of measures of regime type (democracy or autocracy) of the importing and exporting country (to be discussed below);  $\text{GDP}_{it}$  and  $\text{GDP}_{et}$  are real GDP of the importing and exporting country;  $\text{GDP}_{p.c.it}$  and  $\text{GDP}_{p.c.et}$  are GDP per capita of the importing and exporting country;  $\text{WTO}_{it}$  and  $\text{WTO}_{et}$  are dummy variables indicating whether the importer or exporter country is a

member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (WTO); and  $regional_{iet}$  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if both the importer and the exporter are members of the same regional trade agreement. All regressions include fixed effects for the trading pair,  $\gamma_{ie}$ , as well as year fixed effects,  $\delta_t$ .  $\varepsilon_{iet}$  represent the error term.

According to Alkire and Foster (2007, 2009), who have showed the intuitive and robust of the measure of development using MPI, it was possible to use this new index in this research but according to lack of data for many years we use Human Development Indicators (HDI) to capture the well-being. So the dependent variable here HDI can be written as follow:

$$HDI_{it} = \beta_1 Regime_{it} + \beta_2 Import_{it} + \beta_3 Export_{it} + \beta_4 Pop_{it} + \beta_5 Inflat_{it} + \beta_6 WTO_{it} + \beta_7 Regional_{it} + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (3)$$

where  $HDI_{it}$  is real HDI of the country  $i$  at the time  $t$ ;  $Pop_{it}$  is population of the country  $i$  at the time  $t$ ;  $Inflat_{it}$  is the inflation rate of country  $i$  at the time  $t$ . Democracy is represented here by  $Regime_{it}$ , which is a dummy variable taking 1 if the political regime in the country  $i$  is free and 0 else at the time  $t$ .  $Import_{it}$  and  $Export_{it}$  are respectively importation and exportation of the country  $i$  at the time  $t$ .  $Regional_{it}$  is a dummy variable that takes 1 for CEMAC and 0 for CPGL.  $\delta_t$  and  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  are respectively the specific time effect and the error term. And  $t = 1, 2, \dots, 16$  years is time from 1995 to 2010,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, 11$  countries.

In the current application, estimations using regression analysis, are done to evaluate first the impact of importation on HDI, second the impact of exportation on HDI and then the impact of

democracy (political regime) on HDI. The panel considered here is balanced of 11 Central Africa countries with 176 observations.

### **Data collections**

Since independence, eleven developing countries in Central African region (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tom  and Principe) experienced regionalism (the Central African Economic Community CEEAC, Central African Monetary Community CEMAC, and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes CEPGL) and significant episodes of violent conflict between government and opposition groups. These conflicts lasted as little as one month to more than twenty years (several started before 1981 and others were still ongoing as of 1998). By 1998, some people may have lost their lives as a direct result of this political violence. Another people have become refugees. In illegitimate or quasi legitimate states, the state's own security forces often challenge the internationally recognized leadership. During the 1980s, many successful or unsuccessful military takeovers were recorded, affecting Central African countries. Some Central African heads of state lost their lives. Still, it is important to observe that the region is not monolithic. Significant differences exist in political institutions and practice.

Collier (2007) formulates four development traps observed in Central African region: the conflict trap (Angola, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo), the natural resources trap (Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea), the trap of being landlocked (Burundi, Central

African Republic, Chad, Rwanda) with bad neighbors, and the bad governance trap (the eleven Central African countries). Essentially, wars and coups keep countries from growing and hence dependent on primary commodities. But because Central Africa countries are poor, stagnant, and dependent on primary commodities (oil; minerals: iron ore, diamonds, cobalt; and agricultural: cocoa, coffee, cotton and tea) they remain prone to wars, conflicts and coups. Incidentally, this trap has not being confined to the “bottom billion”, but also affecting middle-income countries which stagnate at that level. Poor landlocked countries depend on their neighbors not just for their trade relationship, their economic infrastructure and access to the sea, but also as export markets. The problem is worse for resource-scarce countries as they face additional hurdles to development of infrastructure even if for resource extraction. These problems are compounded by agglomeration of economic activity in coastal locations with their easier access to global markets (WORLD BANK, 2000). Countries in the bottom billion that also have bad governance and bad policies are most likely to end up as “failed states” in which reform initiatives are quickly overwhelmed by those who benefit from disorder. However, if even good governance and good policies cannot propel a country into rapid growth, it does not have opportunities to grow. In this view it is possible for countries to break free of these traps.

The Freedom House, today an institution and a think tank, stands as one of the most comprehensive “freedom measures” nationally and internationally and by extension a measure of democratization. Freedom House categorizes all countries of the world according to a seven point value system with over 200 questions on the survey and multiple survey representatives in various parts of every nation. The total raw points of every country

place the country in one of three categories: free, partly free, or not free. One study simultaneously examining the relationship between market economy (measured with one Index of Economic Freedom), economic development (measured with GDP per capita), and political freedom (measured with the Freedom House index) found that high economic freedom increases GDP per capita (i.e. development) and a high GDP per capita increases economic freedom. A high GDP per capita also increases political freedom but political freedom did not increase GDP per capita. There was no direct relationship either way between economic freedom and political freedom if keeping GDP per capita constant.

Free, partly free and not free political system, press freedom and political accountability go together and are features of democracies that tend to be absent in autocracies. The freedom of the press indicator published by Freedom House and the democratic accountability indicator from the International Country Risk Guide (KNACK; KEEFER, 1995) are used to measure these attributes empirically. Data from Bratton and Van De Walle (1997), Freedom House (1995 to 2010), Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999), Derksen (1999), Goldsmith (2001), Undp (2010) and World Development indicators (WDI) for many years will be also used. Trade, HDI, Population, Inflation, WTO, Regional and Regime data are respectively collected from IMF (2012) data and statistic.

## **EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS**

Results obtained from the estimations of the above models (fixed effect and random effect) are summarized in the Tables 1 and 2 as follow:

Table 1: Results from fixed effects model

|   |                 |                    |   |               |
|---|-----------------|--------------------|---|---------------|
| Fixed-effects (within) regression                       |                 | Number of obs      | = | <b>176</b>    |
| Group variable: <b>state</b>                            |                 | Number of groups   | = | <b>11</b>     |
| R-sq: within  | = <b>0.2492</b> | Obs per group: min | = | <b>16</b>     |
| between   | = <b>0.2455</b> | avg                | = | <b>16.0</b>   |
| overall   | = <b>0.2073</b> | max                | = | <b>16</b>     |
| corr(u <sub>i</sub> , x <sub>b</sub> ) = <b>-0.7908</b> |                 | F(4,161)           | = | <b>13.36</b>  |
|   |                 | Prob > F           | = | <b>0.0000</b> |

| hdi        | Coef.            | Std. Err.                                     | t            | P> t         | [95% Conf. Interval] |                  |
|------------|------------------|---|--------------|--------------|----------------------|------------------|
| wto        | <b>(dropped)</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| regional   | <b>(dropped)</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| regime     | <b>(dropped)</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| inflation  | <b>-0.000114</b> | <b>5.55e-06</b>                               | <b>-2.05</b> | <b>0.042</b> | <b>-0.000223</b>     | <b>-4.13e-07</b> |
| population | <b>0.0049607</b> | <b>.0008462</b>                               | <b>5.86</b>  | <b>0.000</b> | <b>.0032897</b>      | <b>.0066317</b>  |
| export     | <b>-0.000575</b> | <b>.000039</b>                                | <b>-1.47</b> | <b>0.142</b> | <b>-0.001345</b>     | <b>.0000195</b>  |
| import     | <b>.0000778</b>  | <b>.0000785</b>                               | <b>0.99</b>  | <b>0.323</b> | <b>-0.000772</b>     | <b>.0002329</b>  |
| _cons      | <b>.3516499</b>  | <b>.0096732</b>                               | <b>36.35</b> | <b>0.000</b> | <b>.3325471</b>      | <b>.3707527</b>  |
| sigma_u    | <b>.17544559</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| sigma_e    | <b>.02455805</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| rho        | <b>.98078342</b> | (fraction of variance due to u <sub>i</sub> ) |              |              |                      |                  |

F test that all u<sub>i</sub>=0: **F(10, 161) = 259.75** Prob > F = **0.0000**

Table 2: Results from random effects model

note: wto dropped because of collinearity

|   |                 |                    |   |               |
|---|-----------------|--------------------|---|---------------|
| Random-effects GLS regression                   |                 | Number of obs      | = | <b>176</b>    |
| Group variable: <b>state</b>                    |                 | Number of groups   | = | <b>11</b>     |
| R-sq: within                                    | = <b>0.2486</b> | Obs per group: min | = | <b>16</b>     |
| between   | = <b>0.0288</b> | avg                | = | <b>16.0</b>   |
| overall   | = <b>0.0325</b> | max                | = | <b>16</b>     |
| Random effects u <sub>i</sub> ~ <b>Gaussian</b> |                 | wald chi2(6)       | = | <b>50.67</b>  |
| corr(u <sub>i</sub> , x) = <b>0</b> (assumed)   |                 | Prob > chi2        | = | <b>0.0000</b> |

| hdi        | Coef.            | Std. Err.                                     | z            | P> z         | [95% Conf. Interval] |                  |
|------------|------------------|---|--------------|--------------|----------------------|------------------|
| regional   | <b>.1279116</b>  | <b>.0898253</b>                               | <b>1.42</b>  | <b>0.154</b> | <b>-.0481427</b>     | <b>.303966</b>   |
| regime     | <b>.135838</b>   | <b>.1003511</b>                               | <b>1.35</b>  | <b>0.176</b> | <b>-.0608466</b>     | <b>.3325223</b>  |
| inflation  | <b>-0.000122</b> | <b>5.56e-06</b>                               | <b>-2.19</b> | <b>0.028</b> | <b>-0.000231</b>     | <b>-1.30e-06</b> |
| population | <b>.0044924</b>  | <b>.000821</b>                                | <b>5.47</b>  | <b>0.000</b> | <b>.0028832</b>      | <b>.0061015</b>  |
| export     | <b>-0.000568</b> | <b>.0000391</b>                               | <b>-1.45</b> | <b>0.146</b> | <b>-0.001335</b>     | <b>.0000199</b>  |
| import     | <b>.0000856</b>  | <b>.0000787</b>                               | <b>1.09</b>  | <b>0.277</b> | <b>-0.000686</b>     | <b>.0002399</b>  |
| _cons      | <b>.2500575</b>  | <b>.0702459</b>                               | <b>3.56</b>  | <b>0.000</b> | <b>.1123781</b>      | <b>.3877369</b>  |
| sigma_u    | <b>.14528969</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| sigma_e    | <b>.02455805</b> |   |              |              |                      |                  |
| rho        | <b>.97222308</b> | (fraction of variance due to u <sub>i</sub> ) |              |              |                      |                  |

The Table 3 below presents the test of difference in coefficients:



Table: 3: Results from the test of difference in coefficients

|            | Coefficients |            | (b-B)<br>Difference | sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))<br>S.E. |
|------------|--------------|------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|
|            | (b)<br>fix   | (B)<br>ran |                     |                             |
| inflation  | -.0000114    | -.0000125  | 1.15e-06            | .                           |
| population | .0049607     | .0043387   | .0006221            | .0002123                    |
| export     | -.0000575    | -.0000565  | -9.81e-07           | .                           |
| import     | .0000778     | .0000883   | -.0000105           | .                           |

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg  
 B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

chi2(4) = (b-B)' [(V\_b-V\_B)^(-1)](b-B)  
 = 8.58  
 Prob>chi2 = 0.0725  
 (V\_b-V\_B is not positive definite)

Table 1 presents the results of the regression analysis using fixed effects. The fixed effects model is a statistical model that represents the observed quantities in terms of explanatory variables that are treated as if the quantities were non-random. Because of collinearity (the property of lying on a single line, aligned), the variables Regime, Regional and WTO were dropped. The R-square within is 0,2492 and the overall R-square is 0,2073 meaning that there is a correlation between HDI, inflation, importations and exportations.

Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis using random effects. The random effects model is used in the analysis of hierarchical or panel data when one assumes no fixed effects (i.e. no individual effects). Because of collinearity, the variable WTO was dropped. The general least square (GLS) is used for the estimation. The overall R-square is 0.0325 showing that there is a correlation between HDI, inflation, importations and exportations.

The random effects is efficient, and should be used (over fixed effects) if the assumptions underlying it are believed to be satisfied. This can be tested by running random effects, then fixed effects, and doing a Hausman specification test. Using Hausman test (Table

3), the random effects is inconsistent under alternative hypothesis ( $H_a$ ) and efficient under null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ). The fixed effects is consistent under null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis.

Inflation and exports negatively affect populations' or consumers' well-being. Indeed the increase in inflation rate causes a reduction in purchasing power. An increased in exports commodities tends to decrease the quantity of goods available for the country of origin. Imports have a positive effect on the Human development indicators (HDI) probably because this variable tends to increase the quantity of goods available.

The variable political regime (capture here by regime) has a positive effect on the HDI. Indeed, this means the democratic political system positively affects the level of development. Instead of the existence of varieties of democracy and varieties of development the notion of democratic countries is inextricably linked to the concept of freedom. However, the constant term is positive. This means that for countries with other types of political system the HDI still positive. This result can be explained by the existence of varieties of democracy in Central Africa and by the fact that a democratic political system is not a necessary and sufficient condition for development.

## CONCLUSION

The question that motivates this paper is simple: Can political regime and trade liberalization help to re-think development? The empirical model provides reasons why the answer is yes. Imports and democracy have a positive effect on the Human development indicators.

What policy implications can be drawn from this research? Trade liberalization and democracy are often seen as an engine of development. As Sachs and Warner (1995) put it, “Trade liberalization not only establishes powerful direct linkages between the economy and the world system, but also effectively forces the government to take actions on the other parts of the reform program...”. This paper shows that instead the existence of varieties of democracy and varieties of development, autocracies are less integrated in world trade than democracies. This result corroborates with Aidt and Gassebner analysis in their 2010’s research paper title “Do autocratic States trade less?”.

In Central Africa region many countries have missed to channelize trade liberalization and democracy to build human well-being because of the lack of accountability and good governance. This is why the capacity building on “good governance agenda” fostered by many international institutions is a very important programme used to counterbalance the negative impact that varieties democracy regimes have on the regional economic integration in Central Africa and on economic growth.

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## ABSTRACT

Can political regime and trade liberalization help to re-think development? This paper has documented the strong presumption that political regime and trade liberalization contribute positively to economic development. The main objective of this research is to estimate econometrically the impact of political regime on trade flows in order to channelize economic development in Central Africa countries. A panel of Central Africa countries has been used to test empirically the predictions. The empirical evidences show that there is a correlation between human development indicators, inflation, importations and exportations. Imports and democracy have a positive effect on the level of development in Central Africa countries. Findings show that the capacity building programme on “good governance agenda”, fostered by many international institutions, is an important initiative to be used to counterbalance the negative impact that varieties of democracy systems have on economic development.

**KEYWORDS:** Political regime. Democracy. Trade liberalization. Development. Central Africa.

## RESUMO

O regime político e a liberalização do comércio podem ajudar a repensar o desenvolvimento? Este trabalho tem documentado a forte presunção de que o regime político e a liberalização do comércio contribuem positivamente para o desenvolvimento econômico. O objetivo principal da pesquisa é estimar econometricamente o impacto do regime político sobre os fluxos comerciais, a fim de canalizar o desenvolvimento econômico em países da África Central. Um painel de países da África Central tem sido utilizado para testar empiricamente as previsões. As evidências empíricas mostram que há uma correlação entre os indicadores de desenvolvimento humano, inflações, importações e exportações, em que as importações e a democracia têm um efeito positivo sobre o nível de desenvolvimento dos países da África Central. Os resultados mostram que o programa de capacitação na «agenda da boa administração», promovida por muitas instituições internacionais, é uma iniciativa importante para ser utilizada para contrabalançar o impacto negativo que as variedades de sistemas de democracia têm no desenvolvimento econômico.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Regime político. Democracia. Liberalização do comércio. Desenvolvimento. Bem-estar. Integração regional. África Central.



# **LOS DESAFÍOS DE UNA AGENDA REGIONAL PARA EL DESARROLLO. HACIA UN SISTEMA SOCIAL DE INNOVACIÓN EN EL MERCOSUR: el caso del diseño industrial**

Luciano Borgoglio \*

## **INTRODUCCIÓN**

En la última década, en el marco del giro a la (centro) izquierda experimentado por numerosos países latinoamericanos, han reaparecido con fuerza en la agenda estatal las cuestiones relativas a la integración regional, la innovación y la diversidad cultural, entre otras. Esta reaparición se da en el marco más general de una reafirmación y redefinición del rol del estado en los procesos de desarrollo económico, social, cultural y político de nuestros países luego de los efectos devastadores de las reformas estructurales de inspiración neoliberal ensayadas durante las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX.

Precisamente, este artículo surge de vincular las cuestiones citadas. La innovación resulta un factor de desarrollo alta y crecientemente reconocido tanto por la literatura académica como por

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las políticas públicas diseñadas e implementadas en nuestra región. Sin embargo, dos dimensiones no han sido lo suficientemente exploradas y desarrolladas: la regional (la construcción y fortalecimiento de un sistema regional de innovación) y la cultural (el reconocimiento de la innovación “blanda” – en oposición a la estrictamente tecnológica –, relacionada con las dimensiones estéticas e intelectuales de los bienes y servicios).

En los últimos años, se han verificado ciertas condiciones que han dado mayor visibilidad al diseño en nuestra región. Para el caso argentino (en particular en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires), puede observarse el gran crecimiento experimentado por los corredores comerciales, particularmente Recoleta, Palermo y San Telmo, el surgimiento de nuevos medios y suplementos especializados en la temática y el surgimiento de nuevos concursos, ferias y congresos de diseño (y el crecimiento de los ya existentes), y finalmente la distinción de la UNESCO a Buenos Aires como la primera Ciudad Creativa del Diseño en 2005. Los aspectos citados ciertamente han contribuido a la visibilidad del diseño y le ha dado una mayor institucionalidad y legitimidad, pero sin alcanzar revertir cierta autonomización y desconexión de las dinámicas productivas e innovativas locales (BORGOGGIO, 2011).

Esta desconexión tiende a mantener al diseño, a los diseñadores, a las universidades de las que egresan, a los productos diseñados y a los *clusters* de diseño en una esfera relativamente autónoma, con una lógica “de autor” donde los productos y sus autores son los protagonistas. Esto contribuye a sostener cierto sentido común que considera al diseñador como un mero “hacedor” de productos específicos (decoración, indumentaria etc.), enfocado en sus aspectos estético-formales, para una elite capaz de pagar por esos bienes (muchas veces considerados “de lujo”). Sin embargo,

como veremos, los alcances de las disciplinas proyectuales son mucho más amplios, así como la naturaleza de su aporte al desarrollo económico y cultural de nuestros territorios.

Explorar sistemáticamente la cuestión de la configuración de un sistema social de innovación en diseño industrial en el MERCOSUR resulta novedoso y necesario, ya que podría contribuir a una integración regional que hoy por hoy – aunque mayor que en el pasado reciente – dista mucho de ser satisfactoria. Asimismo, podría contribuir a la redefinición de una “agenda estatal para el desarrollo” (que incluya los aspectos culturales del desarrollo económico y la dimensión regional) que resulta de crucial importancia frente a los desafíos y oportunidades de los países de nuestra región en los comienzos del siglo XXI. Más allá de su impacto cultural en las sociedades, cuestiones extensamente tratadas en la literatura, existe un área de vacancia importante respecto a las modalidades que asumen los procesos de innovación en diseño industrial y su contribución al desarrollo productivo, en el marco de las políticas públicas de reindustrialización que resurgieron con el nuevo siglo.

Por fuera de los aspectos más inmediatamente observables y superficiales del “fenómeno del diseño”, en este trabajo nos proponemos conceptualizar al diseño industrial y sus distintos enfoques (parte 1), tratar los aspectos del actual paradigma socioproductivo que propician un rol de peso para esta disciplina (parte 2), pasar revista a los aportes teóricos y empíricos en torno a la innovación como fenómeno sistémico y regional (parte 3), repasar el concepto de *industrias creativas* y el lugar que le da al diseño (parte 4) para luego analizar al diseño industrial en tanto actividad de innovación por derecho propio y su aporte al desarrollo de nuestros territorios.

## EL DISEÑO INDUSTRIAL, ENTRE EL PAR FORMA-FUNCIÓN Y LA ESTRATEGIA

Tomás Maldonado define, en 1961, al diseño industrial como “una actividad proyectual que consiste en determinar las propiedades formales de los objetos producidos industrialmente”, definición que es la reconocida hasta la actualidad por el International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID).

El diseño industrial interviene en tres dimensiones cruciales de los productos industriales: la técnica, la usabilidad y la significación. Por ello, se ubica en un espacio epistémico lindante con la ingeniería (ubicada entre la técnica y la usabilidad), las artes (técnica y significación) y las ciencias sociales (usabilidad y significación). Esta actividad hace las veces de interfase entre la tecnología y la vida cotidiana: si bien comparte con las ingenierías la preocupación por las metas técnicas, lo hace reformulándolas de modo de alcanzar resultados sociotécnicos: articula simbologías, rituales y creencias, así como determinados sistemas de preferencia referidos al lenguaje, a la comprensión y a la percepción de los objetos (LEIRO, 2006).

**Figura 1 – Fronteras epistémicas del diseño**



Fuente: LEIRO (2006)

El diseño, desde el surgimiento de la Bauhaus (1919-1933), estuvo centrado en la noción de proyecto y, específicamente, en el desarrollo de productos. Esto se debe a su fuerte tradición funcionalista enfocada en el par forma-función. Como señala Devalle:

El término Diseño – entendiéndose que se trata del campo pertinente para la producción material de objetos para la vida cotidiana – surge de esta particular conjunción entre una sensibilidad técnico-cientificista, una necesidad del sistema de producción –redefinido a partir de la Segunda Guerra – y la herencia del legado sobre la experimentación y las cualidades de la forma, presentes en los sucesivos planteos de Werkbund, la tradición de las vanguardias constructivas, el debate de la Arquitectura Moderna, y las escuelas símbolo como Bauhaus (DEVALLE, 2009).

Esta corriente funcionó como modelo durante muchos años para el desarrollo de la práctica profesional y para gran parte de los programas de las escuelas de diseño, cristalizando nociones como “la forma sigue a la función”, “la buena forma” y el lema “menos es más”. Esta concepción ha fomentado cierta homogeneización de las producciones dentro del campo y, por otra parte, resulta insuficiente para formular los verdaderos alcances de la disciplina. En la actualidad se observa cierta disgregación de los límites de lo que se considera objeto de diseño y se han agregado nuevas modalidades a la práctica profesional que desbordan las nociones heredadas.

Como afirma Bernatene (2006), surge “la necesidad de ampliar el campo epistemológico o área de fundamentación de la disciplina para que se puedan incorporar como parte de ella otros objetos de estudio hasta ahora no incluidos”. De este modo, hacia fines del siglo pasado, el diseño ha reconocido nuevas formas de práctica profesional, y en este marco se ubica como protagonista la

Gestión Estratégica de Diseño. Esta concepción de la disciplina quita el foco sobre el producto y sus atributos, referidos estrictamente a su forma y su función. Adopta una visión sistémica donde todos los eslabones que conforman su cadena de valor son tenidos en cuenta, así como la imbricación de ésta con su contexto social más amplio, cuestiones que se pueden rastrear en las distintas definiciones.

Galán (2006) define la Gestión Estratégica de Diseño como “el reordenamiento de recursos, ya sean éstos materiales o simbólicos para mejorar el posicionamiento de un grupo, comunidad, o empresa, para mejorar su desempeño en un contexto productivo y social”. En esta misma óptica, Lebediker y Cervini (2010) lo definen como un “modelo de pensamiento y acción para la resolución de problemas, de una manera innovadora, creativa y ajustada a las posibilidades de la empresa y su vínculo con la comunidad de usuarios y consumidores”.

El Instituto Metropolitano de Diseño e Innovación (del Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico del Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires) propone un modelo para analizar y operar sobre el sistema del producto “desde su materia prima hasta la distribución y se propone proyectar en función de una estrategia” (BECERRA; CERVINI, 2005). Conviene detenerse en los aspectos comprendidos por el modelo, ya que ilustran bien el enfoque más abarcativo del diseño al que hacemos referencia.

El sistema comprende cuatro escenarios: el material (uso, forma-función, materias primas y semielaborados), el de la transformación (tecnología, procesos de fabricación, armado y control de calidad), el de la comunicación (*packaging*, soportes gráficos, marca y publicidad) y el del consumo (distribución, punto de venta, posicionamiento y público) (BECERRA, CERVINI, 2005). Todas estas variables son analizadas y valoradas según un propósito

común y, como puede verse, exceden ampliamente lo estrictamente relacionado con la forma y función de los objetos.

En definitiva, se observa un movimiento hacia una mayor generalidad y abstracción en el enfoque de la disciplina, que la aparta del enfoque anterior focalizado en la forma y la función y del sentido común aún hoy extendido que lo reduce a la intervención sobre los atributos estético-formales de los objetos. Todavía goza de gran arraigo en el sentido común la noción del diseñador como hacedor de productos, tal vez porque, como afirma Bachelard (1974), “hay explicaciones que resultan aceptables a la conciencia natural: en este caso el diseñador como creador-autor de objetos”.

## **FORDISMO Y POSFORDISMO**

El paradigma socioproductivo denominado *fordismo*, que transitó su etapa de agotamiento desde mediados de los años '70 en los países centrales, configurado por los procesos de trabajo tayloristas y fordistas, estaba estructurado sobre la racionalización y organización científica del trabajo y la mecanización de las tareas. Algunos de los sectores característicos de este paradigma son el metalúrgico, el automotriz y el petroquímico.

Las principales características de este paradigma son: el estudio sistemático de tiempos y movimientos de los trabajadores (para eliminar tiempos muertos, establecer tiempos de reposo para permitir la recuperación de la fatiga etc.); la estandarización de objetos de trabajo (materias primas e insumos intermedios) y de las herramientas; estandarización de las tareas (implementación de la *one best way*); separación entre las tareas de concepción y ejecución; asignación por anticipado de un número limitado de tareas específicas a cargo de cada trabajador individual (oponiéndose al trabajo

grupales); fuerte sistema de control y supervisión de los trabajadores; medición objetiva y cotidiana de los resultados cuantitativos de cada trabajador y la tendencia a la producción de series largas de productos homogéneos y a la integración vertical de la producción (CORIAT, 1996; HOLLINGSWORTH, 2003; NEFFA, 2000).

Los aspectos de organización del trabajo estaban complementados por aspectos macroeconómico-institucionales: una relación salarial orientada a fijar la mano de obra en la empresa otorgando contratos de trabajo estables, sindicatos fuertes y difusión del convenio colectivo de trabajo y un Estado que asumía de forma activa las funciones de productor de bienes y servicios, constructor de la infraestructura económica y social que necesitaban las empresas, promotor de la demanda y codificador de la relación salarial y la protección social (NEFFA, 2000).

Desde el punto de vista de los empresarios, estos cambios significaron un importante progreso, ya que les permitió reducir el tiempo requerido por cada tarea. Además, por la simplificación operada sobre cada tarea, se logró reducir sustancialmente los tiempos de capacitación y aprendizaje al tiempo que era posible evaluar rápida y objetivamente el desempeño productivo de los trabajadores. Todo esto coadyuvó en incrementos de la productividad y reducciones en los costos de producción.

Sin embargo, la organización científica del trabajo dejó de lado la creatividad, la capacidad de autonomía responsable, en definitiva, la subjetividad, dificultando el involucramiento de los trabajadores en los objetivos generales de la empresa. Por estos motivos, con el paso del tiempo se dejaron ver los límites de esta forma de organización, agotándose las potencialidades generadas originalmente. Surgieron importantes conflictos entre el trabajo y



el capital y la organización científica del trabajo dejó de garantizar incrementos sostenidos de productividad y reducción de costos.

Finalmente, la organización científica del trabajo dificultaba la introducción y absorción de innovaciones, la socialización de las competencias entre los trabajadores de ejecución y los procesos de aprendizaje colectivo, impidiendo adaptarse rápidamente a los actuales cambios cuanti y cualitativos de la demanda, así como el incrementar la calidad y la variedad ofrecida (NEFFA, 2000). Estos aspectos serían cruciales en el nuevo paradigma que se perfilaría a fines de los años '70.

La desaceleración del crecimiento en las economías centrales a fines de los años '70 llevó a la disciplina económica a interrogarse acerca de las fuentes del desarrollo y la prosperidad. La macroeconomía formalizada de los '80 había otorgado un papel central al cambio tecnológico, la tecnología y el capital humano en las fuentes del crecimiento, de los retornos de la inversión y en última instancia de la competitividad de los territorios, lo cual se tradujo en las teorías de crecimiento endógeno.

Esta visión contrasta con la ciencia económica de las décadas previas que dejaban al cambio técnico en segundo plano, como un elemento exógeno y sin explicar. Si bien esta fue la generalidad en el devenir de la disciplina, una lectura atenta mostraría excepciones, tales como las de Karl Marx y Joseph Schumpeter. Este último pensó la innovación radical como el mecanismo central del desarrollo económico (SCHUMPETER, 1997).

A partir del aporte de Schumpeter, numerosos trabajos han demostrado empíricamente el vínculo entre innovación y crecimiento, aún si transcurre un cierto tiempo entre los avances obtenidos en la investigación básica, el desarrollo tecnológico y la puesta en el mercado de los productos y procesos resultantes de

la innovación. De cualquier manera, el porcentaje de inversión en investigación y desarrollo respecto del PBI es un indicador central cuando se clasifican los países según su grado de desarrollo.

A nivel microeconómico, se ha comprobado con estudios econométricos que existe un impacto positivo de la inversión en investigación y desarrollo sobre la productividad y la performance exportadora de la empresa, entre otras variables (CRÉPON; DUGUET; MAIRESSE, 1998; CHUDNOVSKY; LÓPEZ; PUPATO, 2004; GUELLEC, 1998).

La innovación debe ser entendida como un proceso reactivo e interactivo de resultado incierto, y no como un acto puntual. Consiste en “actividades de búsqueda, descubrimiento, experimentación, desarrollo, imitación, diseño y concepción, difusión y absorción de conocimientos aplicados para generar nuevos productos, procesos y formas de organización” (DOSI, 1984).

En el nuevo paradigma socioproductivo surgido como consecuencia del agotamiento del fordismo, que algunos denominan *posfordismo*, se busca implementar formas de especialización flexible, de modo de afrontar la mayor competencia surgida de la globalización y adaptarse rápidamente a los cambios en la demanda, ampliando la gama de productos ofrecidos orientándose a producir series cortas de productos heterogéneos, reduciendo el tiempo transcurrido desde la concepción del producto hasta su puesta en el mercado e incluso tercerizando actividades que no constituyan el *core business* de la empresa (PIORE; SABEL, 1984).

Para lograrlo, se precisa una mano de obra más calificada, polivalente y móvil, utilizando todas las competencias humanas, con disposición y capacidad de aprender y trabajar en equipo, así como procedimientos menos burocráticos y descentralizados para tomar decisiones (ASKENAZY, 2001; HOLLINGSWORTH, 2003).

Estos cambios no habrían reducido la fatiga psíquica y el *stress* propias del paradigma anterior, ya que son comunes exhortaciones paradójicas tales como “ofrecer al cliente el mejor servicio posible en el menor tiempo posible” para las que los trabajadores no siempre pueden defenderse psicológicamente incrementando su ansiedad (ASKENAZY, 2001).

Si bien existen discusiones acerca de las características precisas del cambio, la denominación a dar al nuevo paradigma y el alcance geográfico de su difusión, existe consenso en que el cambio ocurrido sería radical y no meramente incremental. El sector característico de este paradigma es el de las Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación (TICs).

Otro de los aspectos señalados del nuevo paradigma socioproductivo es una creciente individuación y una concomitante reflexividad cognitiva y estética de los sujetos, que se mueven en el marco de una economía rica en símbolos y conocimientos aplicados a los procesos de producción. Lash y Urry (1987) tratan de captar el contenido cultural de los procesos económicos con el concepto de “acumulación reflexiva”: el fenómeno de una creciente acumulación de conocimientos por parte de individuos y empresas y su aplicación en el trabajo y la producción, en una economía donde tanto los sujetos como los objetos son altamente móviles y éstos se encuentran cada vez más vaciados de su componente material.

Esta nueva economía sería *posfordista* porque sucede a la era de la producción y consumo de masas, mientras que es, al mismo tiempo, *posmoderna*. Según Devalle, en la crisis de la modernidad

las imágenes de producción, circulación y consumo masivos llegaron a sostener un nuevo registro del mundo (...) abarcando multiplicidad de fenómenos: el reemplazo del consumo de objetos por el consumo

de marcas, el desarrollo del valor de la imagen como un sinónimo de la identidad –personal e incluso empresarial-, la exacerbación del voyeurismo, y la apropiación de nuevos modelos de belleza con una fuerte impronta visual estetizante, entre otros. (DEVALLE, 2009).

Lash y Urry (1998) dan cuenta de una “sociedad de los dos tercios”, donde el tercio inferior y excluido presenta la proliferación de guetos urbanos, fuertes corrientes de inmigración para trabajar por magros salarios y jornadas extenuantes y la consiguiente formación de una infraclase que representa la movilidad social descendente de algunos de los obreros del fordismo o capitalismo organizado.

En esta nueva economía se producen cada vez más signos y cada vez menos objetos materiales. Los nuevos objetos pueden tener un contenido predominantemente cognitivo-utilitario o bien estético-expresivo. La proliferación de esta última clase de objetos puede observarse no sólo en objetos de sustancial componente estético como la música *pop*, el cine, las revistas, los videos etc., sino también en el valor de signo o de imagen que pasa a constituir los objetos materiales o a encarnarse en ellos.

Esta estetización se observa en productos donde el diseño representa un componente más grande del valor de los bienes en relación con el trabajo, incluso en el sector industrial, por el peso de la “investigación y desarrollo” o la “intensidad de diseño”. Esta investigación y desarrollo suele presentar un notable sesgo estético, como en la indumentaria, el calzado, el mobiliario, automóviles y artefactos electrónicos (LASH; URRY, 1998).

En la misma óptica, Baudrillard (2007) conceptualiza el consumo como “una actividad de manipulación sistemática de signos”, por lo cual “para volverse objeto de consumo es preciso que el objeto se

vuelva signo”. Entonces, lejos de la dimensión de la satisfacción de necesidades, del valor de uso, el consumo no tiene límites:

el proyecto mismo de vivir, fragmentado, decepcionado, significado, se reanuda y se aniquila en los objetos sucesivos. ‘Moderar’ el consumo o pretender establecer una red de necesidades capaz de normalizarlo es propio de un moralismo ingenuo o absurdo (BAUDRILLARD, 2007).

La demanda continua de esos “objetos sucesivos” obliga a las empresas a ofrecer una mayor gama de productos y a renovarla permanentemente, para lo cual deben emprender la búsqueda de formas más flexibles de producción.

## **LA INNOVACIÓN DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA SISTÉMICA Y REGIONAL**

En el marco de las nuevas regularidades económicas del posfordismo, la innovación como fenómeno sistémico y la correspondiente importancia de las diversas instituciones y actores que la sostienen comienza a ser bien reconocida. Desde perspectivas evolucionistas, neoschumpeterianas o regulacionistas, autores como Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), Patel y Pavitt (1994), Metcalfe (1995) y Amable, Barré y Boyer ([1997] 2008) buscan captar la innovación como el resultado de una compleja interacción entre diversos actores e instituciones.

En el centro de este sistema están las firmas y el modo en que organizan la producción y la innovación y los canales por los que tienen acceso a conocimientos externos, los cuales pueden provenir de otras firmas, institutos de investigación públicos o privados, universidades, instituciones de transferencia, proveedores,

consumidores etc. (OCDE, 1997). Estos estudios demostraron los fuertes vínculos entre las performances innovativas de diferentes países y la densidad y calidad de las relaciones entre dichos instituciones y actores diversos, dando lugar a la literatura sobre “Sistemas Nacionales de Innovación” (SNI) o “Sistemas Sociales de Innovación” (SSI).

Según la teoría de los Sistemas Sociales de Innovación, propuesta por Amable, Barré y Boyer ([1997] 2008), la acumulación de conocimientos y el cambio técnico se apartan del modelo de competencia perfecta por presentar características tales como rendimientos crecientes por adopción, fenómenos de aprendizaje por la práctica, externalidades de red, economías de escala, apropiabilidad imperfecta, entre otras. Estas características hacen que los mecanismos “puros” de mercado no puedan, por sí mismos, regular el ritmo y la naturaleza de las innovaciones en pos del desarrollo socioproductivo. Por ello, en la práctica, una serie de reglas, instituciones, rutinas y hábitos son necesarias para sostener y dirigir la acumulación de conocimientos y el cambio técnico, que, lejos de interferir en el dinamismo tecnológico y organizacional, lo propician, a la manera de verdaderas “restricciones creadoras” (AMABLE; BARRÉ; BOYER, 2008).

El cambio técnico es, entonces, un fenómeno sistémico que presenta determinantes que exceden con amplitud la esfera de la ciencia y la tecnología en sentido estricto, ya que es la creación y difusión de conocimientos y competencias en el conjunto de la economía lo que se debe considerar. De esta manera, intervienen otros subsistemas tales como el de educación y formación, las intervenciones públicas, el sistema financiero, entre otros. La literatura regulacionista entiende por Sistema Social de Innovación (SSI) a este conjunto de subsistemas y sus interacciones, que sostiene

y dirige los procesos de acumulación de conocimientos y de cambio técnico (AMABLE; BARRÉ; BOYER, 2008). Esta representación de la innovación cuestiona tanto la de Schumpeter ([1912] 1997), enfocada en el empresario innovador, como la del “modelo lineal” (BUSH, [1945] 1999), donde se concibe el proceso de innovación como una secuencia estrictamente lineal de la ciencia al mercado (o viceversa).

El concepto de Sistema Social de Innovación se emparenta con el de Sistema Nacional de Innovación de la teoría neoschumpeteriana pero no circunscribe el análisis necesariamente al nivel nacional ni al conjunto de las actividades de innovación posibles, evita el determinismo tecnológico en el que suele caer dicha corriente e involucra un análisis más holista que incluye a la estructura económica e industrial y las regularidades macroeconómicas que dan lugar a los modos de regulación. Por otra parte, considera a las instituciones también como *locus* de conflicto, en lugar de conceptualizarlas como meros mecanismos de coordinación, introduciendo la dimensión del poder que está prácticamente obturada en los análisis neoschumpeterianos.

Para el caso argentino, existe convergencia en torno a que

la baja interactividad que se observa entre los componentes del SNI argentino, constituye un obstáculo al avance hacia procesos de innovación más dinámicos y profundos, que apuntalen aumentos sostenidos de productividad y competitividad en la producción local (LUGONES; PEIRANO; GUTTI, 2006).

Los rasgos principales del perfil de innovación en las empresas serían: 1) baja magnitud de los esfuerzos innovativos; 2) concentración de esfuerzos en tecnología incorporada; 3) baja densidad de la trama de vínculos y relaciones; 4) alto número de

empresas que declaran realizar I+D (investigación y desarrollo); 5) alto número de empresas que declaran haber realizado innovaciones; y 6) un modo individual de supervivencia (ANLLÓ; LUGONES; PEIRANO, 2007). Los rasgos positivos 4) y 5) son fuertemente discutidos por diversos trabajos empíricos (PEIRANO, 2006; SÁNCHEZ; RUFFO; NAHIRÑAK, 2007; ANLLÓ; LUGONES; PEIRANO, 2007).

Lejos de tratarse de particularidades de la Argentina, los rasgos observados para los SNI de los diferentes países del MERCOSUR presentan más similitudes que diferencias. Como afirman Thomas y Gianella (2009) para el caso de Argentina, Uruguay y Brasil,

(...) más allá de las marcadas diferencias cuantitativas -medidas en términos absolutos- de superficie, población, producto, exportaciones, recursos destinados a I+D, etc., es posible identificar isomorfismos significativos, tanto al realizar mediciones en términos relativos (por ejemplo, per cápita o por unidad de recurso disponibilizado) como al observar aspectos marcadamente cualitativos de la dinámica innovativa o del desarrollo de estilos socio-técnicos locales (THOMAS; GIANELLA, 2009).

Algunos de los rasgos hallados por los autores son: 1) estilo socio-técnico con énfasis en innovaciones menores; 2) seguimiento de patrones tecnológicos exogenerados; 3) difusión de trayectorias de bajo riesgo, escasa definición estratégica, sin interacciones con instituciones locales; 4) bajo nivel de sinergia; 5) bajo nivel de interacciones inter-institucionales; 6) escasa participación de las unidades públicas de I+D en la dinámica innovativa de las empresas; entre otros.

Por su parte, el concepto de Sistema Regional de Innovación (SRI) amplía la noción de SIN al nivel regional (supranacional).



En su conformación intervienen como estímulos, por ejemplo, los derrames entre las distintas economías y las economías de escala en I+D. Del mismo modo que acontece con el SIN, un SRI no surgirá espontáneamente de las fuerzas del mercado (ROSENWURCEL, 2009).

Si a nivel de cada país el panorama no es alentador, al nivel supranacional del MERCOSUR, es decir, al nivel de un Sistema Regional de Innovación (SRI) con esas fronteras, lo es aún menos, debido a la desarticulación que caracteriza a los SNI de los países miembros y a los todavía débiles efectos de la integración sobre los encadenamientos productivos regionales. A esto se suma la dificultad de alcanzar una masa crítica en ciertas dimensiones del sistema de ciencia, tecnología e innovación, el excesivo predominio del sector público en los esfuerzos de innovación vinculados a la investigación y desarrollo (I+D) y la aun prácticamente inexistente institucionalidad regional (ROSENWURCEL, 2009). Aun así, debe reconocerse el predominio del MERCOSUR en el contexto de América Latina y el Caribe, ya que el bloque regional concentra el 66% de la I+D. Dentro del bloque, las asimetrías en esta dirección resultan muy marcadas, ya que Brasil concentra el 90,6%, Argentina el 8,8%, Uruguay el 0,6% y Paraguay el 0,1% de la inversión en I+D del MERCOSUR (BID; REDES, 2007).

## **EL DISEÑO COMO INDUSTRIA CREATIVA**

Entonces, luego de un largo período caracterizado por la producción en masa de productos estandarizados, en los años '70 sobrevivieron en los países centrales – y luego desigual y heterogéneamente en los países en desarrollo – importantes cambios en el paradigma socioproductivo que desde entonces debe responder

a una demanda cada vez más orientada a la diversidad, a la novedad, a la calidad y a los aspectos simbólicos de los productos. En este marco, el concepto de *economía creativa* advierte el potencial de la creatividad como factor de desarrollo social, económico y cultural en un mundo globalizado donde dominan y proliferan las imágenes, los sonidos, los textos y los símbolos (UNCTAD, 2008).

Del mismo modo que conceptos previos como el de industrias culturales, el de economía creativa e industrias creativas debe pensarse como una “nueva narrativa de ruptura de fronteras entre la economía y la cultura” (O’CONNOR, 2007). Esta serie de narrativas da cuenta de las tensiones, conflictos e incomprendiones entre estos dos campos, desde Adam Smith que consideraba las actividades culturales como “improductivas” hasta el día de hoy con la idea de que la cultura sería más un gasto que una inversión (REY, 2004). La noción de industrias creativas, que se ha desarrollado en las últimas dos décadas, “ha ampliado el ámbito de las industrias culturales más allá de las artes y ha marcado un cambio en el enfoque del potencial comercial de actividades que hasta hace poco se consideraban no económicas” (UNCTAD, 2008; OIC, 2009).

Las industrias creativas son pensadas “en la encrucijada entre las artes, la cultura, los negocios y la tecnología, usando el capital intelectual como principal insumo” (UNCTAD, 2008). Según el ámbito en que se definan, es decir, según el país, ministerio, organismo etc., estas industrias pueden incluir un rango amplio de actividades tales como la música, los libros, los diarios, las artes visuales y escénicas, la cinematografía, la animación digital, los videojuegos, la arquitectura, la publicidad y el diseño en todas sus formas.

Algunas de las características de estas actividades son la coexistencia de un gran número de PyMES con grandes corporaciones

globales, una elevada concentración (en particular en el eslabón de la distribución), la fuerte inserción de organizaciones públicas o cuasi-públicas, una demanda fuertemente aleatoria y cambiante por los bienes y servicios creativos, una organización del trabajo flexible que da alta autonomía al trabajador y una relación salarial relativamente precaria en comparación con otros sectores de la economía.

En el marco del enfoque de las industrias creativas surgió la noción de ciudad creativa, “un complejo urbano donde actividades culturales de varios tipos son un componente integral del funcionamiento económico y social de la ciudad” (UNCTAD, 2008). Estas ciudades se sostienen en una fuerte infraestructura cultural y suelen atraer al trabajo calificado las inversiones y el turismo por el ambiente estimulante que brindan. Según Landry (2000)<sup>1</sup>, “las ciudades tienen un recurso crucial – su gente. La inteligencia, los deseos, las motivaciones, la imaginación y la creatividad humanos están reemplazando a la localización, los recursos naturales y el acceso a los mercados como recursos urbanos”.

En el contexto urbano resultan particularmente relevantes las economías de aglomeración, es decir, los derrames de los que se benefician las empresas por su proximidad unas con otras. Como afirma Scott (2005)<sup>2</sup>.

Agrupándose en torno a clusters, las empresas logran optimizar sus interacciones espaciales, alcanzan las múltiples ventajas de los mercados laborales espacialmente concentrados y acceden a abundantes flujos de información y oportunidades de innovación que están presentes donde se congregan muchos productores especializados pero complementarios (SCOTT, 2005).

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<sup>1</sup> Traducción es nuestra.

<sup>2</sup> Traducción es nuestra.

Esto es particularmente cierto para las industrias creativas: el diseño, el audiovisual, el teatro etc., tienden a agruparse en *clusters* que evidencian las interacciones sociales, económicas y culturales que existen entre las empresas de cada sector.


A modo de ejemplo, para el caso argentino, las industrias creativas argentinas se concentran fuertemente en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: se estima que aproximadamente el 82% de los ejemplares y el 69% de los títulos editados del sector editorial se imprimieron en la Ciudad y que el 56% de las compras legales de música tuvieron lugar en dicho distrito. Por otra parte, la Ciudad concentra el 77% de la producción de software y servicios informáticos, el 59% de la producción de largometrajes y el 79% de la producción de comerciales (OIC, 2009). En líneas generales, este patrón de concentración se repite en todas las variables de producción y consumo de bienes y servicios creativos, mientras que en mayor o menor medida resulta el caso para los restantes países del MERCOSUR.

Esta concepción de “industrias creativas”, que englobaría y excedería en alcance sectorial aquella de “industrias culturales”, ha sido objeto de críticas, sea por su origen (como estrategia de distinción del Reino Unido), por sus mecanismos de difusión (tecnocráticos, tales como *think tanks* y organismos internacionales tales como la UNCTAD), por su contenido político (de matriz neoliberal), entre otras (TREMBLAY, 2011; BUSTAMANTE, 2011). La desarrollamos aquí por ser la matriz conceptual que subyace a las estadísticas que emplearemos y porque da al diseño un lugar de mayor peso (frente a otras perspectivas, como la de industrias culturales, que suele centrarse en los sectores fonográfico, editorial y audiovisual).

La constatación de que las actividades basadas en la creatividad, el talento y la innovación han tenido en las últimas décadas un desempeño económico que supera al resto ha contribuido

a visibilizarlas como sectores productivos por derecho propio, adicionalmente a los atributos culturales o simbólicos que les son adjudicables. Según UNCTAD, las industrias creativas han mostrado un dinamismo excepcional en el comercio internacional, creciendo un 14% anual entre 2002 y 2008 (creciendo incluso en 2008, cuando el comercio mundial se contrajo un 12%). Los países en desarrollo han incrementado su cuota de mercado durante ese mismo período, ya que aumentaron su participación en el total de comercio mundial de bienes creativos de un 37% a un 43,3%.

**Gráfico 1– Comercio exterior global de bienes creativos<sup>3</sup>.**




FUENTE: Creative Economy Database (UNCTAD)

Dentro de este dinamismo, es notable el volumen del comercio internacional de bienes de diseño. Los bienes de diseño

<sup>3</sup> Año 2010. En millones de dólares estadounidenses (precios y tasas de cambio corrientes).

son considerados por la UNCTAD como “creaciones funcionales”, producidas por un grupo de industrias relativamente más orientadas a la demanda. Según dicha institución, el comercio mundial de bienes, tales como juguetes, joyas, moda y artículos de interior en 2010, fue de US\$ 241.088 millones. En ese mismo año, dichos “bienes de diseño” representaron el 63% del conjunto de bienes creativos, y si se toma el conjunto de países en desarrollo, la proporción asciende al 69,5%. Los cinco mayores exportadores de esta clase de bienes son China (24,3% del mercado global), Hong Kong-China (9,9%), Italia (9,8%), Alemania (6,7%) y EE.UU. (5%).

**Gráfico 2 – Comercio exterior global de bienes de diseño.<sup>4</sup>**



FUENTE: Creative Economy Database (UNCTAD)

<sup>4</sup> Año 2010. En millones de dólares estadounidenses (precios y tasas de cambio corrientes)

Según UNCTAD (2010), “sin diseño, la mayoría de los bienes y servicios no existirían o no lograrían diferenciarse en el mercado”. Pero, por otro lado, afirma que “las clasificaciones estadísticas actuales no permiten una clara identificación de aquellos productos funcionales con mayor contenido creativo en la cadena de valor del diseño”, por lo que se seleccionaron “aquellos productos con un contenido de diseño presumiblemente mayor”. Lejos de ser un detalle menor, los criterios para determinar que un bien o servicio tiene un “alto contenido de diseño” pueden ser más o menos sofisticados, pero siempre deberían ser explícitos. Lamentablemente no suele ser el caso en las estimaciones disponibles y en este caso particular cabe sospechar de una sobreestimación del volumen de comercio de estos bienes en la medida en que resulta probable que se incluyan bienes en los que el diseño no ha tenido alta incidencia.

En parte, debido a las exigencias de la medición estadística, la concepción de la UNCTAD pone el foco en los *productos* del diseño en lugar de hacerlo sobre sus *procesos*. Este enfoque, que restringe al diseño a un ámbito reducido de productos (tales como juguetes, objetos de decoración etc.) no alcanza a poner en evidencia los aspectos más potencialmente transformadores de las disciplinas proyectuales; en particular, no considera que el diseño es, en realidad, un *proceso* aplicable a un rango mucho más amplio de bienes y servicios que exceden aquellos que el sentido común (o la exigencia de la medición) considera “de diseño”. A continuación, exploraremos esta vertiente en torno al diseño como actividad de innovación.

## **EL DISEÑO COMO ACTIVIDAD DE INNOVACIÓN**

Entre las denominadas “actividades de innovación”, la Encuesta Nacional de Innovación y Conducta Tecnológica (ENIT) del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC, 2008) argentino (en línea con las recomendaciones de la OCDE) releva, además de la I+D y entre otras, el “diseño industrial y actividades de ingeniería”, que “incluyen todas las preparaciones técnicas para la producción y distribución no incluidas en I+D, así como los planos y gráficos para la definición de procedimientos, especificaciones técnicas y características operativas; instalación de maquinaria; ingeniería industrial; y puesta en marcha de la producción”. Las restantes actividades de innovación son la I+D interna y externa, adquisición de bienes de capital, hardware y software, contratación de tecnología, capacitación y consultorías.

Para el caso de Brasil y Uruguay, las Pesquisas Industriales de Innovación Tecnológica (realizada por el IBGE con apoyo del Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología) y las Encuestas de Actividades de Innovación (llevadas adelante por la Dirección Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación y el Instituto Nacional de Estadística) también relevan las actividades de innovación de las empresas, y, entre ellas, el diseño industrial, con un enfoque similar al de la OCDE (GUTTI; LUGONES; PEIRANO; SUÁREZ, 2006).

Sin embargo, el tratamiento del diseño en las encuestas de innovación y en los manuales internacionales (fundamentalmente de la OCDE) que le dan sustento teórico (Oslo, Frascati, Bogotá etc.) es deficiente en tanto y en cuanto tienen una concepción de la innovación con un fuerte sesgo científico y tecnológico con exclusión de los aspectos estéticos e intelectuales. Estos últimos aspectos son la base de un volumen importante de innovación que



Stoneman (2010) denomina “blanda”, en la cual incluye al diseño. Si bien esta perspectiva permite ampliar provechosamente el campo de la innovación por fuera de la dimensión tecnológica, cabe tener en cuenta que encierra al diseño en la dimensión estética cuando en realidad también interviene fructíferamente en los aspectos funcionales de los productos. La innovación blanda tendría lugar no sólo en las industrias creativas sino en mayor o menor medida a lo largo de toda la economía.

Por sus características, el diseño permite un tipo de innovación particular, centrada en el usuario, que asegure la mejor interfase con sus necesidades, aspiraciones y habilidades (COMISIÓN EUROPEA, 2009). Por otra parte, a diferencia de las ingenierías por un lado y de disciplinas como el *marketing* por el otro, enfocadas en los aspectos productivos o comerciales de la empresa respectivamente, el diseño articula ambas dimensiones. Además, puede hacer las veces de “traductor”, actuando como nexo entre recursos humanos de distintas áreas de la firma, manejando distintos lenguajes (WALSH; ROY, 1985). Lebediker y Cervini (2010) van en la misma dirección cuando afirman que “el diseño es capaz de integrar conocimiento específico de diversos campos, conjugando de modo armónico y estratégico, dentro de un mismo proyecto o producto, aspectos tecnológicos, culturales, económicos y sociales”.

Del mismo modo en que se ha demostrado los vínculos entre la innovación en general y la performance empresarial, existen estudios que muestran que el diseño es una importante herramienta competitiva para las empresas. Por ejemplo, en el Reino Unido se ha observado que una mayor densidad de diseño en la empresa lleva a una mayor probabilidad de realizar innovaciones de producto y que la inversión en diseño tiene una asociación positiva con el

crecimiento de la productividad (DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 2005). Otro estudio para el mismo país muestra que cuando las empresas aprovechan las habilidades de los diseñadores, mejoran su performance a través de una mayor calidad en los bienes y servicios producidos o incrementos en sus cuotas de mercado (HM TREASURY, 2005).

Respecto de la inserción del diseño en empresas de nuestra región, a diferencia del caso de países centrales (y al igual que el caso de los otros países de la región), se registran muy pocos antecedentes. De la vertiente cuantitativa, puede citarse el trabajo del Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Industrial (INTI, 2009), que encuentra una relación significativa entre el grado de diseño y el volumen de ventas en empresas manufactureras del Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires y centros urbanos del interior argentino. Por otra parte, otro trabajo de corte cuantitativo (OBSPYME; CMD; OIC, 2011), que toma pequeñas y medianas empresas industriales del Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires, concluye que la utilización de servicios profesionales de diseño está poco difundida y que tiene efectos importantes en la satisfacción de los clientes, la percepción de marca en el mercado, la calidad y la organización interna de la firma.

Por otro lado, desde una perspectiva cualitativa de estudio de casos, un trabajo del Instituto Metropolitano de Diseño e Innovación argentino (IMDI, 2011) concluye que la incorporación de diseño en empresas incide en aspectos tanto comerciales como productivos, tales como el volumen de ventas, la apertura de nuevos mercados externos, la percepción de marca, así como en la reducción de costos, el impacto ambiental, la calidad, entre otros.

Desde una concepción del diseño más amplia que la de las encuestas de innovación (que la restringe a actividades de

corte técnico, enfocadas en la producción y no en la concepción misma de los productos), los citados estudios entienden al diseño como una actividad de innovación que permite incorporar valor y diferenciación a los bienes producidos y por lo tanto potenciar la competitividad, involucrando dimensiones que exceden el ámbito de lo estético, tales como la interfaz entre la tecnología y el usuario, la ergonomía, la funcionalidad y el uso eficiente de los materiales. El diseño resultaría una opción relativamente más accesible en países en desarrollo, permitiéndoles diferenciar y complejizar su oferta (aún en sectores tradicionales de tecnología madura) redundando en una mejor inserción internacional (INTI, 2009).

Pasando de la demanda a la oferta de servicios de diseño, particularmente en Argentina y Brasil, se encuentran valiosos recursos tanto humanos como institucionales. Lebediker y Cervini (2010) afirman que existe hoy en Argentina una amplia oferta de servicios de diseño que es comparable en cantidad y calidad a la de cualquier otra región del mercado global, gracias a una multiplicación de los profesionales del diseño debido a la proliferación de la enseñanza terciaria y universitaria en las últimas décadas.

Respecto de las políticas de diseño en Argentina, los estudios empíricos en cuanto a sus alcances y efectos son prácticamente inexistentes, tal vez porque en su mayor parte estas políticas son relativamente recientes. Aun así, puede afirmarse que a pesar de los citados hallazgos empíricos locales e internacionales respecto a su impacto económico, y a diferencia de otros países, el diseño no ha sido aún lo suficientemente tenido en cuenta en el marco de las políticas públicas argentinas. La principal política a nivel de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires la encarna el Centro Metropolitano de Diseño (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico – GCBA) mientras que a nivel nacional se destaca el Programa de Diseño (INTI) y el

Plan Nacional de Diseño (Ministerio de Industria). Por otra parte, en el Ministerio de la Producción de la Provincia de Buenos Aires funciona el programa BA Diseño.

En los restantes países del Mercosur, los antecedentes son prácticamente inexistentes, aun cuando Brasil resulta el país de la región más avanzado en la materia lanzando en 1995 el “Plan Nacional de Diseño”, en el marco de un sector industrial de gran tamaño y diversificación (FRÍAS, 2008). El caso uruguayo resulta, a menor escala, similar al argentino: se registra una baja visibilidad del diseño como factor de innovación, una presencia de servicios de diseño competitivos a nivel mundial y una concentración fuerte en la ciudad capital del país. Por la cercanía geográfica, Buenos Aires es el principal competidor de Montevideo (BID, 2009). Continuando con el paralelismo entre desarrollo económico relativo y situación del diseño, según evidencia anecdótica, el caso paraguayo se encuentra en el otro extremo del continuo, existiendo una gran debilidad institucional, una baja visibilidad del diseño y una débil inserción en las empresas.

## **CONSIDERACIONES FINALES**

Tanto el diseño en particular como la innovación en general han experimentado abordajes progresivamente más holísticos y contextuales por lo que la noción de Gestión Estratégica de Diseño y la de Sistema Social de Innovación resultan particularmente compatibles, en el marco de una concepción de la innovación centrada en el usuario y que incluya aquella no estrictamente tecnológica y propia de las industrias creativas, pero enfatizando los procesos de diseño y no solamente sus productos.

Para los países de nuestra región, la verificación de los efectos positivos del diseño en la empresa contrasta con una inserción en el sistema productivo y una presencia en las políticas públicas todavía débil. Esto resulta preocupante en tanto y en cuanto se han demostrado los efectos positivos del diseño en la performance empresarial, resulta una opción particularmente adecuada para países en desarrollo y la región presenta una base de valiosos recursos humanos e institucionales relativos al diseño cuya utilización en pos del desarrollo productivo es aún insuficiente.

Si bien las cifras del “sector de diseño” tal como es definido en el marco de las industrias creativas son alentadoras y dicho paradigma ha contribuido en cierta medida a una mayor valorización de las disciplinas proyectuales, una concepción del diseño que contribuya a aprovechar todo su potencial debe pensarse menos como una disciplina en el borde de lo artístico y artesanal, aplicada a un puñado de bienes característicos considerados “de diseño” y más como un proceso aplicable, en mayor o menor medida, al conjunto de los bienes y servicios que ofrece una economía, mejorando su competitividad a través de la diferenciación e incluso la reducción de costos.

En el nuevo paradigma productivo surge una proliferación de valores de signo-imagen en bienes y servicios que exceden el sector “de diseño” acotado por algunas instituciones y por un sentido común que lo restringe a la indumentaria, a los artículos de decoración y a algunas otras de las manifestaciones más inmediatamente evidentes del diseño. Una mayor divulgación de los enfoques más actuales de la disciplina, como el estratégico, podría contribuir a ajustar un sentido común que atrasa varias décadas.

Paradójica y lamentablemente, el conjunto de discursos acerca de la importancia de la inserción del diseño en las esferas

productivas se da, en mayor medida, en el marco de ese campo relativamente autónomo que esos discursos buscan poner en cuestión. La responsabilidad, por supuesto, es compartida entre los diseñadores, los empresarios y los gestores públicos, que deberán encontrar espacios en común y llegar a cierto lenguaje compartido que posibilite un intercambio que ha demostrado ser altamente fructífero en otras latitudes.

En Argentina, y en mayor o menor medida en otros países de la región, la política pública de innovación orientada al diseño tiene aún mucho camino por recorrer, pero cuenta con un importante acervo de experiencias internacionales exitosas. Algunas de las causas de la posición relativamente marginal de la política de diseño en Argentina (aún en un contexto de fortalecimiento general de la política científica y tecnológica) podrían ser la débil representación corporativa de los diseñadores (la representación de los intereses de los diseñadores se encuentra atomizada en distintos organismos con limitado alcance geográfico o disciplinar), la dificultad de determinar el impacto económico del diseño, la relativamente débil capacidad institucional del Estado argentino para diseñar, implementar y evaluar políticas de sintonía fina y sostenerlas a lo largo del tiempo, así como el foco actual de la política científica y tecnológica en tecnologías “duras”, como la biotecnología, la nanotecnología y las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación.

El análisis de la política de diseño puede arrojar luz sobre los desafíos generales que enfrentan los estados actuales para llevar adelante políticas que ponen a prueba sus capacidades institucionales y que involucran la promoción de la incorporación de saberes en los procesos productivos que la actual fase de la acumulación capitalista ha demostrado de elevada eficacia en otras latitudes, pero que aún no

se encuentran lo suficientemente institucionalizados y visibilizados en las nuestras.

Debe tenerse en cuenta que el alcance geográfico de las transformaciones bosquejadas en este artículo es profundamente desigual, mientras que estas mismas transformaciones generan nuevas desigualdades. Lejos del escenario imaginado por el economista David Ricardo, donde cada región se especializa para lograr el mayor bienestar general, la realidad muestra “una asimetría entre regiones pobres, ultra-especializadas y vulnerables a la competencia de las otras periferias, y de los centros polivalentes, mejor protegidos de los avatares del comercio” (COHEN, 2007). Esta dinámica vale entre los países tanto como entre las regiones dentro de un mismo país e incluso dentro de una misma ciudad y se observa en forma muy aguda en países como los nuestros, con enormes asimetrías regionales económicas, sociales y culturales.

Más allá de las implicancias económicas de esta actividad cultural, el diseño, y como argumenta el informe sobre Nuestra Diversidad Creativa de la Unesco, “la cultura no es, pues, un instrumento del progreso material, es el fin y el objetivo del desarrollo, entendido en el sentido de realización de la existencia humana en todas sus formas y en toda su plenitud”. En esa misma óptica, Rey (2004) sugiere que

la cultura no sólo aporta al PIB, genera exportaciones y empleo, reparte utilidades por derechos de autor, innova tecnológicamente, sino que, lo más importante, contribuye al fortalecimiento de las identidades, profundiza en la conversación intercultural, apoya la diversidad cultural, estimula la participación social y ciudadana (REY, 2004).

El diseño, además de hacer un importante aporte a las economías actuales, representa un factor de desarrollo social, en su vertiente orientada a resolver algunos problemas de los grupos más vulnerables. En la intersección entre el diseño social y la rama de la profesión orientada estrictamente al desarrollo de productos, se destaca el caso de la muestra *Design for the Other 90%* realizada en el Museo Nacional de Diseño Cooper-Hewitt de Nueva York. El hecho de que uno de los museos de diseño más importantes del mundo dedique una muestra a productos orientados a resolver problemas de los sectores vulnerables de la población habla del definitivo asentamiento del tema en la agenda del diseño a nivel mundial (OFFENHENDEN; BORGOGGIO, 2008).

En Argentina, fruto del encuentro entre el diseño social y la Gestión Estratégica de Diseño, tenemos la operación desarrollada sobre la Cooperativa Manos del Delta, que produce objetos con materiales de su entorno, principalmente en mimbre y junco. El proyecto, liderado por Beatriz Galán y Pedro Senar, integra a 18 artesanos con los que se han generado proyectos de innovación productiva. La iniciativa tiene como objetivo el fortalecimiento de las capacidades productivas de la cooperativa y la construcción de prácticas dialógicas entre diseñadores y artesanos para la creación de materialidades plurales que contribuyan a la diversidad cultural. En diversos talleres con modalidad de autogestión asistida, trabajan para reconstruir el tejido productivo a través de mejoras en el desempeño ambiental y simbólico de las producciones materiales.

El diseño puede contribuir a pensar la diversidad cultural también en la cultura material de nuestras sociedades. Una cultura que atraviesa capilarmente nuestra vida cotidiana, nuestros espacios domésticos y que se acerca a nosotros a través de los productos que utilizamos cotidianamente. Una cultura donde, de algún modo, los



objetos van hacia el usuario en lugar del usuario hacia los objetos. Para dar adecuada cuenta de nuestras sociedades, es necesario pensar no sólo los objetos de la cultura, sino también la cultura en los objetos.

Si este trabajo cumplió su objetivo, ha quedado claro que el aporte que esta industria creativa, el diseño, hace al desarrollo económico excede los reductos o circuitos llamados “de diseño” e involucra al conjunto de la economía en tanto actividad de innovación centrada en el usuario, capaz de articular en la empresa las dimensiones materiales y simbólicas de los bienes y servicios, y que las actuales políticas públicas no alcanzan a hacer justicia al potencial del diseño, en particular en su perspectiva estratégica y articulado en una política de innovación, para contribuir a la transformación de nuestros sistemas productivos. Esta situación se agudiza en el plano regional, en el que las iniciativas de colaboración entre países en materia de diseño son todavía muy escasas pero necesarias para sostener y fortalecer la integración (que ha resurgido como objetivo declarado de los gobiernos de nuestros países), aprovechando los valiosos recursos humanos e institucionales existentes en la materia.

En un mundo donde la globalización exagera las presiones competitivas y la demanda es cada vez más diversificada, atomizada y cambiante, cobra relevancia la adopción de métodos para la concepción e interpretación de la dimensión simbólica de los productos y la aplicación de dicho conocimiento a sus procesos materiales de producción. El diseño brinda valiosas herramientas para hacerlo, más aún en el marco de regímenes macroeconómicos más propicios a los sectores productivos y regímenes políticos que propician una dinámica burocrática más atenta a las cuestiones del desarrollo que los vigentes a fines del siglo pasado.

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## RESUMO

Na última década, na virada para a (centro)esquerda experimentada por vários países da América Latina, reapareceram, com força, na agenda estatal as questões relativas à integração regional, a inovação e a diversidade cultural, entre outras. Esta reaparição se dá, de maneira mais geral, a partir de uma reafirmação e redefinição do rol do Estado nos processos de desenvolvimento econômico, social, cultural e político de nossos países após os efeitos devastadores das reformas estruturais de inspiração neoliberal ensaiadas durante as últimas décadas do século XX. Este artigo surge, precisamente, da vinculação das questões citadas. A inovação é um fator de desenvolvimento alta e crescentemente reconhecido tanto pela literatura acadêmica como pelas políticas públicas desenhadas e implementadas na nossa região. No entanto, duas dimensões não foram suficientemente exploradas e desenvolvidas: a regional (a construção e fortalecimento de um sistema regional de inovação) e cultural (o reconhecimento da inovação “branda” – oposta à estritamente tecnológica –, relacionada com as dimensões estéticas e intelectuais dos bens de serviço). Dessa forma, nos propomos a conceitualizar a contribuição econômica do desenho industrial no atual paradigma socioprodutivo, assim como as perspectivas de um sistema regional de inovação no desenho industrial no Mercosul.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Sistemas regionais de inovação. Desenho industrial. Indústrias criativas.

## RESUMEN

En la última década, en el marco del giro a la (centro)izquierda experimentado por numerosos países latinoamericanos, han reaparecido con fuerza en la agenda estatal las cuestiones relativas a la integración regional, la innovación y la diversidad cultural, entre otras. Esta reaparición se da en el marco más general de una reafirmación y redefinición del rol del estado en los procesos de desarrollo económico, social, cultural y político de nuestros países luego de los efectos devastadores de las reformas estructurales de inspiración neoliberal ensayadas durante las últimas dos décadas del siglo XX. Precisamente, este artículo surge de vincular las cuestiones citadas. La innovación resulta un factor de desarrollo alta y crecientemente reconocido tanto por la literatura académica como por las políticas públicas diseñadas e implementadas en nuestra región. Sin embargo, dos dimensiones no han sido lo suficientemente exploradas y desarrolladas: la regional (la construcción y fortalecimiento de un sistema regional de innovación) y la cultural (el reconocimiento de la innovación “blanda” – en oposición a la estrictamente tecnológica-, relacionada con las dimensiones estéticas e intelectuales de los bienes



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y servicios). De esta manera, nos proponemos conceptualizar el aporte económico del diseño industrial en el marco del actual paradigma socioprodutivo, así como las perspectivas de un sistema regional de innovación en diseño industrial en el Mercosur.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** Sistemas regionales de innovación. Diseño industrial. Industrias creativas.



# **MARKET-LED AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: Histories, Issues and Prospects**

Mark S. Curry<sup>1\*</sup>

## **INTRODUCTION**

Deininger, Byerlee, Norton, Selod and Stickler (2011, p.27) provide that global farmland expansion from 1990 to 2007, reached 1.5 billion hectares. This growth occurred in the countries of the Global South even as agricultural land use in the Global North diminished by some 3.3 million hectares. They describe this phenomenon as large-scale land acquisition under commodity-driven demand, such as in palm oil, for which the organization and directives of private capital are indispensable. A term for this process is elsewhere given as Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) (BORRAS, 2003; LAMBAIS, 2008; LAHIFF, BORRAS and KAY, 2007; BAER and FILIZZOLA, 2005; BALETTI et al., 2008). The significance of such market-directed investment initiatives is that they are frequently implemented in formerly colonized countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, in which the ownership and control over land are critical and deeply contested issues. A key term for the legitimacy of newly independent states in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century rested on

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decolonization and the restitution of land to formerly dispossessed communities. Historical injustice and the rights of indigenous peoples thus constitute a moral argument in favor of state led agrarian reform. Whereas post-apartheid South Africa was lauded for its early efforts in this regard, by the new millennium Fantu Cheru (2001) and John Saul (2001) respectively had thoroughly critiqued the new South African state for having embraced neoliberal market norms and reneged on prior promises.

A less obvious but equally important consideration for such newly independent states has been and remains policies regarding rural poverty and national food security. The lack of access to land and agricultural resources, as Borrás, Kay and Lodhi (2007, p.1) elaborate, is closely related to underdevelopment and inequality. Effective and attentive state institutions and directives are fundamental for addressing such problems. Yet the trend since the 1990s towards MLAR suggests that states have been unable autonomously to accomplish such goals. This can be accounted for in terms of at least four factors: debt burdens, political conflict, policy prioritization in respect of institutional capacity, and elite resistance to redistributive programs (BORRAS, KAY and AKRAM-LODHI, 2007, p. 7; AKRAM-LODHI, 2007, p. 1440-1441; BORRAS, 2003; ROZELLE and SWINNEN, 2004, p. 447; LAMBAIS, 2008, p. 9). To a certain extent, problems and practices are inherited from prior structures: South Africa's debt obligations from the apartheid era and those of the Philippines in the post-Marcos democracy era constitute two examples. Such debt obligations pressed independent states to accept terms offered by international lenders under Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) agendas. This has included a greater role for the market in all sectors of the economy, including agriculture and land relations.

In other cases, however, change has occurred under democratic conditions in relation to state capacities. Brazil's Landless People's Movement (MST) forced the type and speed of land distribution on the state since the mid-1980s in the post-dictatorship era precisely in response to the parlous record of constitutional transfers of land to destitute farmers (LAMBALIS, 2008, p. 6). In other words, where Brazil was relatively ripe for MLAR domestically, mass democracy movements introduced an alternative approach. In contrast, in the Philippines, political conflict among local people's movement groups has made this possibility less attainable (REID, 2000, p. 40-43). Meanwhile, in South Africa, the state's overall dominance of political life has meant that a change in policy towards MLAR under neoliberal restructuring of the agricultural sector has been relatively unchallenged (BALETTI et al., 2008, p. 303).

From this brief overview, the following paper proposes to examine the debate surrounding MLAR from the perspectives of its proponents and critics. These ideas and findings are then reflected against the history of land and agrarian relations in three cases from three continents of the Global South: Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa. This elaboration seeks to identify common elements as well as particular characteristics that have a role to play in enabling or thwarting South-South dialogue and cooperation. Added to which, the question of resistance to dominant discourses and how resistance is mobilized is addressed. This is followed by a discussion of comparative and contrasting issues derived from the study, and a conclusion that brings the findings here to new areas relevant to South-South development: sovereignty, democracy and participation; South-South communication and epistemology building; and, the need to disseminate such experience and understanding.

## **THE MLAR DEBATE: Investment or neocolonial exploitation?**

The debate over MLAR involves highly emotive language. A charge of neocolonialism, on one hand, is countered on the other by terms of necessity in a world of pressing factors like population growth and climate change. Proponents of MLAR forward a broad range of arguments in support of the position. Taking outsourcing as an engine of global growth, *The Economist* (2009), posits the farmland investment surge as the third wave of the offshore investment paradigm. Kanayo Nwanze, president of the International Fund for Agricultural Development or IFAD, holds that the MLAR investments offer “win-win” opportunities for stakeholders (KOVALYOVA, 2009; NAZARETH, 2010). Gary Blumenthal (2009, p. 57) sees the investment trend and its mode of implementation as “inevitable”.

Given such conjectures, profit maximization still requires that harvests from the Global South inevitably must be sold in rich country markets. Since population pressures and food security threats are more critically experienced in the Global South, not the Global North, it remains unclear how arguments in favour of MLAR like Blumenthal’s (2009) can alleviate existing concerns and raise large, rural populations from poverty in countries like the Philippines and South Africa. From another perspective, promises in the form of access to agricultural markets and labour mobility have been serially made and postponed by rich world countries even as subsidies provided to European and US agriculture, according to Stiglitz (2005, p. 7), have crowded out investment in Global South agriculture and diminished the chances for fair as opposed to free trade. Alternatively, Chartres and Varma (2011), focusing on the issue of water *vis-à-vis* land, hold that water is the key to productivity

improvements, but that reforms and management require the engine of state and local government combined with the active participation of small-scale farmers. Solutions need to be “locally-relevant” such as by means of small pumping systems rather than imposed from outside under large scale blueprints.

Nevertheless, an academic presentation of ideas in support of MLAR has been forwarded by Klaus Deininger and Hans Binswanger, according to Saturnino Borrás (2003, p. 368-369). Here, MLAR’s usurpation of the state-led agrarian reform (SLAR) model was explained as inevitable because limits on compensation to landowners, a ceiling on landholdings, and bureaucratic encumbrances served corruption and evasion rather than land redistribution. The market would eliminate these strictures through a settling price for willing buyers and willing sellers.

Borrás, Carranza and Franco (2007) take a nuanced stance against MLAR in describing its results in the Philippines under World Bank supported initiatives, beginning with a pilot project, in 1996 (BORRAS et al., 2007, p. 1558). They identify four ways by which MLAR has been implemented in the country: elite-elite; state-elite; foreign donor-elite; and poor-elite. In other words, through MLAR, elite interests benefitted substantially at the expense of all other stakeholders. Furthermore, land transfers under MLAR since 2003 were more limited in extent than what occurred under the constitutionally mandated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), there were fewer beneficiaries, and the costs were up to six times higher (BORRAS et al., 2007, p. 1565-1566). This sum of results under MLAR crowds out and impairs redistribution of land on the basis of the constitution, historical injustice and peasant – or state-led initiatives, despite the relative effectiveness of the latter.

Other critics of MLAR in the past decade, but particularly since 2007, have been zeroing in on the drivers of this as a policy option. An elaboration from McMichael (2011, p. 6-7) and Deininger (2011, p. 217) is that one driver, incidental or otherwise, of MLAR investments was the United States' subprime housing market failure between 2007 and 2008. This precipitated a financial market and global credit crisis, in turn contributing to a commodities supply shock. Oil rose to over USD 150 per barrel while the FAO grain price index had tripled by April 2008 from a 2005 baseline, causing agricultural land-sparse countries like South Korea to declare domestic food security a priority in 2008 (GRAIN, 2008, p. 5; SPIELDOCH; MURPHY 2009, p. 42). Korean – and Chinese – state-backed enterprises engaged briskly in large-scale land deals in formerly colonized countries, like Tanzania and the Philippines (VON BRAUN and MEINZEN-DICK, 2009). In response, much of publicised material, particularly from NGO researchers, has labelled this wave of MLAR investments as “land grabs” (COTULA et al., 2009; BORRAS and FRANCO, 2010, 2011; MONTEMAYOR, 2009; GRAIN, 2008; DANIEL and MITTAL, 2009; DE LA CRUZ, 2011). Another assessment provides it as a “land rush” (McMICHAEL, 2011, p.1). Collated evidence for the idea derives from Deininger (2010) as well as Landportal's (2012) Land Matrix. The latter source has tabled 924 land deals since 2000 covering nearly 49 million hectares.

The basic point behind such critiques of MLAR in countries with weak institutions and unstable or corruptible governance is that land and water have been cleared of existing communities, which in general are poor or relatively powerless and rely on customary or traditional title rather than legally binding documentation. In countries like Vietnam and Tanzania, where land has in post colonial times been held in trust by the state, the scope for conflict and/or



dispossession has been acute. In general, lands transferred have been enclosed by means of force, and put to purposes that have direct bearing on foreign investor interests rather than in service to the indigenous communities and cultures (COTULA et al., 2009; ZOOMERS, 2011).

McMichael (2009) has argued that while the current conditions are not novel, they are precipitated by the structure of the world food regime whereby fossil fuel dependence and agribusiness monopoly pricing under an enabling financial and trade relations architecture drive the need for particular kinds of agricultural expansion into states that lack the capacity to resist. These assessments have created awareness and insight without necessarily clarifying what the fundamentals, prospects and implications of the deals are. Opponents and proponents of MLAR in its existing forms cannot both be correct. Instead they serve as advocacies of a partisan nature and contribute to the difficulty of deriving meaningful and reliable information on the processes.

The significance of this inquiry is therefore in trying to provide a clearer picture of the current status of MLAR implementation in three countries, one from each major continent that comprise the Global South, highlighting the similarities and differences in light of colonial histories, contemporary national land reform programs and dominant discourses used to promote MLAR to peasants and other stakeholders. This, in turn, advances a way for further examination of the potential implications related to questions of sovereignty, democracy, participation in development. More importantly, the paper contributes to further and enhanced South-South dialogue in aid of South-South cooperation, communication and shared visions for regional development outside of the dominant North-North neoliberal paradigm.

## MLAR AS THEORY AND POLICY

MLAR is forwarded as a viable alternative to State-Led Agrarian Reform (SLAR) in which a top down, bureaucracy managed, supply driven system identifies land and/or beneficiaries and appropriates the former for provision to the latter (BORRAS, 2003, p. 368). According to MLAR proponents, this has several deleterious effects, including corruption, evasion, entanglements in the courts, delays, and pricing that diminishes fair value to the landowner as well as awarding title to beneficiaries who are less likely to make a success of the beneficial venture. It provides relevant state agencies with axiomatic rent-seeking platforms and crowds out the provision of credit while taxing the state's capacity to ensure such additional factors as post-harvest facilities and market conduits (BANERJEE, 1999; BINSWANGER; DEININGER, 1997).

By contrast, MLAR is proposed as a transformative process under willing buyer-willing seller guidelines in which market processes shape agricultural relations most efficiently, fairly, effectively and quickly. This would govern land tenure, utilization, production, processing, marketing, and delivery of goods (DEININGER, 1999, 2003; DEININGER and BINSWANGER, 1999). The logic of the process relies on three assumptions: (1) the rational self interest of all stakeholders; (2) demand driven prospects that implicitly are more immediate, local and transparent; and (3) a decentralized bidding system in which the state supplies only an institutional framework and leaves the market to find its own level through negotiation and consultation (BUAINAIN et al, 1999; VAN ZYL, KIRSTEN and BINSWANGER, 1996). Transformation includes a gradual emergence of newer, younger, more energetic farmers, and optimal land sizing for the crop type best suited to

the existing agricultural and market conditions (DE JANVRY et al., 2001). These descriptions of the MLAR model are entirely consistent with the neoliberal fundamentals as laid out under the Washington Consensus (WILLIAMSON, 2003). They take into account none of the warning signals of the 1998 Asian economic crisis to say nothing of the later and more severe global credit crisis of 2008. Nevertheless, as Borrás (2003, p. 388-389) shows of three cases of MLAR implementation in Latin America and South Africa, in practice, the assumptions upon which MLAR rested do not hold adequately or at all. First, political factors cannot be relegated; secondly, because of such politics, willing buyers and sellers do not obtain freely, easily, or problem-free; and, thirdly, stakeholders as rational actors is more imaginary than real. Results of a study by Borrás, Carranza and Franco (2007) reveal, in the Philippines, that fewer distributions accrued to fewer beneficiaries at far higher costs than had been the case under SLAR.

Regardless, data from Land Portal (2012), an online public database on land deals and land governance initiated by the International Land Coalition (ILC) and Landtenure.info<sup>1</sup>, show that MLAR investments surged globally from 2001 until 2005 dipped briefly in 2007 and peaked conclusively 2009. Gary Blumenthal (2009), an advocate of this new land deal investment process, declared that changes in the structure of agricultural production are being driven by Malthusian population-food supply pressure; demand for high protein nutrition; China's influence as a commodity consumer; biofuels; and, diminishing returns from existing production capacity. He argues that technology and large scale production can add 400-500 percent to existing small lot yields. Farmland, furthermore, is a sound hedge against inflation, a portfolio diversifier, and an

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<sup>1</sup> URL: <http://landportal.info/>

opportunity to improve investor lifestyle features. He dismisses any focus on peasant agriculture as a suitable factor in increasing production as sentimental:

[M]eeting the food requirements of a larger and wealthier world population requires scale and capital investment. Using smallholdings agriculture as a development policy is like promising an automobile to everyone in the world, but limiting construction to hand labour (BLUMENTHAL, 2009, p. 67).

Factors relevant to this argument are freedom from regulation, profit repatriation, the elaboration of outsourcing production into primary production sectors, and a competitive urgency as mediated by the struggle maintain investor advantage in commodity industries.

### **MLAR as Neocolonial Expansion**

Opponents of MLAR approach the issue from diverse perspectives. Patnaik and Moyo (2011) see it as an intensified type of primitive accumulation and trace its antecedents from the 19<sup>th</sup> Century enclosures of private farmland in Britain through to the 1970s “Green Revolution” in Mexico and India. In their assessment, the link between structural adjustment programs and the land rush of the 2000s is definitive. In an earlier paper, Akram-Lodhi (2007) posits MLAR as akin to neoliberal restructuring of agriculture globally by way of the enclosure process. This promotes two results: the system of property relations under capitalism is embedded in the Global South and the system of peasant subsistence farming of the Global South is seconded to the model of large scale agribusiness. McMichael (2009), similarly, sees MLAR in terms of monopoly pricing under global agribusiness in the neoliberal dispensation

added to which particular shocks such as the 2007-2008 credit crisis act as spurs for investment action. Lahiff, Borras and Kay (2007) concur with the idea of the neoliberal umbrella under which MLAR operates and argue that MLAR fails to deliver on its promises in three key respects: (1) the political and economic force of large landowners denudes the assumption of a free and fair market such that the willing buyer-willing seller condition does not freely obtain; (2) land transfers are limited in both number and scope and come at a higher cost than could be obtained under SLAR or peasant led agrarian action; and (3) the issues of the landless and the rural poor are not adequately addressed. Other work addressing these issues, particularly in the Asian context includes that of Zoomers (2011), Borras (2003, 2008), Borras and Franco (2010, 2011), Borras, Hall, Schoones, White & Wolford (2011) and Manahan (2011).

In Brazil, criticism of the real beneficiaries of MLAR, the political interests subtending World Bank loan awards, and the effectiveness of large scale agricultural investments in practice has been undertaken by Sergio Sauer (2006, 2009), particularly with respect to increasing debt burdens. In examining the contest between agribusiness and the Landless People's Movement, or MST, in Brazil, Baer and Filizzola (2005) note the relative impact of technology and investment in large-scale farming in Brazil in contrast to the strategies and actions of the MST to achieve redistribution for the unlanded and the rural poor, concluding that co-existence of the two forces is possible.

Wendy Wolford's (2007) contribution to this argument holds that both populist and market-led programmes of land distribution are founded on a Lockean labour theory of property relations. Yet Lambais (2008) argues that both SLAR and MLAR in Brazil fail in achieving macro objectives of actual land transfer owing to

the ineradicable political element in the agrarian reform process. However, at the micro level wherein ongoing improvements to the land reform practice of both kinds can be realized, the utility of both models obtains. Juliano Assunção (2006), in a separate study, explains the particularity of these political elements in Brazil in terms of landlord sensitivity to expropriation measures. This accounts for both the poorly developed rental market for land as well as the non-agricultural use of farmland for such interests as inflation hedging, loan collateral and money laundering.

In South Africa, Lionel Cliffe (2000) considers the three-pronged approach by the newly democratic South African state post-1994 to address land redistribution, restitution-restoration-compensation for losses sustained under apartheid, and reform of apartheid and Bantustan era land tenure. The introduction of MLAR as a means of achieving these ends resulted in non-governmental agents controlling decision and action processes ineffectively. Implicitly, reform measures tended to benefit black African agricultural entrepreneurs at the expense of unlanded, dispossessed and poor or marginalized African communities. These findings concur with Lahiff's (2007) and Hall's (2010) respective studies demonstrating that poor, rural communities were marginalized by South Africa's MLAR programme. Existing white farmers, urban black insiders to state power, and donor sources such as the World Bank found MLAR practices appropriate and viable, and hence benefitted most from them. Decentralization of policy implementation furthermore runs the risk of transferring lands to tribal leadership that lacks democratic capacity or intentions. In noting that resistance and militancy against these measures is muted, Lahiff (2007) draws from Bernstein's (2003) historical overview of the South African agrarian phenomenon and the idea that both South Africa's systemic

revolution remains incomplete and the current wave of globalisation has decisively fragmented labour's capacity to articulate a negotiable position.

Manji (2006) contributes the idea that an unintended consequence for investor-friendly South Africa of MLAR may be the extent to which its markets in land and water resources become ever more affordable to foreign investors and ever less affordable to South Africans. Notwithstanding the expense to willing buyers, the process has been slow. As Cheryl Walker (2005), Hall and Ntsebeza (2007) point out, South Africa transferred only 3.5 percent of formerly white-owned farmland to African beneficiaries in the first decade of democratic independence. This contradicts a primary motivation of the national liberation movement in South Africa to fulfil the three promises of restitution, redistribution and protection from the violence and injustice that characterized the apartheid past. Admos Chimhowu's (2006) findings are more encompassing. He critiques the pervasiveness of political rhetoric at the expense of real institutional support, resource provision, or support systems even for existing beneficiaries. Also, the selection of projects and programs and marginal lands has widened the poverty trap rather than increased opportunities for communities. Most importantly, there is evidence across southern Africa of policy capture by elites at the expense of legitimate beneficiaries. Similarly to Cliffe (2000) and Hall (2010) he notes the tendency for tenure policy under tribal leadership to disadvantage the poor. MacDonald (2003), meanwhile, looks at two aspects of the land reform agenda. One is the discourse of development for small-scale women farmers in the context of redistributive justice for historical victims of land expropriation. The other is its undermining after 1998 by an alternative and contradictory

discourse of economic development privileging market oriented production where in agricultural terms this equated with MLAR.

## Synthesis

Despite the wealth of research, commentary and advocacy against MLAR or its implementation alongside other modes of agrarian reform, MLAR is still maintained by its proponents under the watchword of “viability”, by which economic productivity, profitability, and export-orientation are implied or stipulated. However, Cousins and Schoones (2009) argue that viability must be seen in human rather than economic terms: the viability of peasant communities on whose land MLAR is imposed need to be prioritized above other considerations. This point has also been made relevant by others, like Arce and Marsden (1993, p. 306-307), in reporting the effects of free trade economics on peasant farmers in Chile. Commercial agri-business encroachment under state-directed initiatives in the dictatorship era of the 1980s-1990s displaced between 200.000 to 250.000 families to marginal spaces between their former holdings and urban areas with no public services. Colchester and Chao (2011) and Derek Hall (2011) document how palm oil, among other commodity crops like cocoa and coffee, have been engines of dispossession for indigenous and peasant peoples in South East Asia in recent years. In this scenario, transformation of agrarian relations under MLAR and the neoliberal approach has effectively ruined the livelihoods and in some cases the lives of those it is meant to raise from poverty.

Overall, however, issues related to the lack of reliable information and intense emotional and theoretical polarity of arguments between those promoting and advocating against MLAR



pose as obstructions towards a truly nuanced understanding or even appreciation of MLAR as a social development option in the Global South. In particular, the relative dearth of data available *from* (as opposed to *about*) countries such as the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa regarding the status, scope and effects of MLAR implementation in these respective territories is noteworthy. As earlier detailed, Chimhowu (2006) is not alone in detailing that reliable information is difficult to obtain, particularly with respect to evaluating and monitoring MLAR implementation comparative to SLAR and peasant-led initiatives such as La Via Campesina's. Moreover, as Jayatri Ghosh (2011) makes clear, many of the MLAR land deals have been agreed to in terms that might best be described as secretive and unequal in the extreme. Contracts are a few pages long, terms are ill-defined, and funding opaque. Yet many deals are for beneficial tenure of between 25 and 99 years at upfront rates of USD 35 per hectare, and annual rents of as little as USD 1.20 per hectare per year for the duration of the lease. Does this gap support one major argument of groups opposing MLAR implementation – that the lack of transparency especially on the part of the state as MLAR implementors is intentional – or is it a ground to err on the side of caution and put good faith in the institutions backing MLAR?

This paper addresses the need to describe the impetus and current status, as far as practicable, of MLAR in the three countries as sample cases from each continent in the Global South. These will be discussed in the context of each country's colonial histories and in light of the current struggles with national land reform implementation. Similarities and differences that obtain will be particularly given focus. For the reason stated above, academic research in the field must be complemented with journalistic, interview and book reports. An example of this approach is provided by the work of The Land

Matrix (LANDPORTAL.INFO, 2012). Here, five research centres collate the findings of over 40 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), academic research, journalism and fieldwork to present an aggregated tableau of global MLAR practices, priorities and trends. While imperfect, this type of approach has the added benefit of opening inquiry to insights and participation along the lines of South-South dialogue envisaged and promoted by the Fifth South-South Summer Institute.

## Method

Taking Global South dialogue and cooperation as basic to this issue of *Ciência & Trópico*, the approach in this paper is to discuss, compare and contrast three MLAR cases on three continents of the South: Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia. The basis for selection of the cases in Brazil, South Africa and the Philippines is that, primarily, in their respective post-colonial eras all three have a significant and roughly simultaneous history of authoritarian or dictatorial control of at least two decades. Between the 1960s and 1980s, Brazil was ruled by government under military control; Ferdinand Marcos's civilian dictatorship dominated Philippine politics; and South Africa remained under apartheid control until 1994. All have direct experience of financial and economic instability concomitant to dependency on foreign donors. The Philippines and Brazil have had Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) imposed on them since the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. South Africa's economy was effectively derailed when foreign loans were rescinded in the late 1980s. All three countries have had or are intent on regional influence in their respective continents. Importantly, all have implemented significant programs of MLAR. In Brazil,

the *Cédula da Terra* compares with South Africa's *Reconstruction and Development Program* (RDP) and to a different extent with the *Philippine Agricultural and Development and Commercial Corporation* (PADCC). While the differences between the three countries are great, of particular interest to the concerns of this paper are the structure and practice of land reform, as will be discussed in the following section.

## **LAND REFORM AND COLONIAL PASTS**

The following sections tackle the history of land reform in Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa, to shed more light on the origins and impetus of the current drive for MLAR. The discussion on Brazil focuses on the origins and current efforts of the Movement of Rural Landless Workers or MST, which is credited as the largest grassroots organization of peasants and rural workers in Brazil aiming to “depend their right to work the land” (MST, 2003). In South Africa, the discussion inevitably zeroes in on the dismantling of apartheid and its unexpected consequences for national land reform initiatives. The discussion on the Philippines appears more extensive not only due to the immediate availability of data on land deals covered by MLAR, but also owing to the larger body of literature that has devoted itself to this area of the globe. This is an important finding of Borrás and Franco (2010) who discovered that “land grabbing” in the context of MLAR has been most extensively and systematically implemented in the Southeast Asian region. The implications of this and the relatively uneven access to information, particularly those published in the English language, are discussed in the succeeding portion of the paper.

## Land Reform and People's Participation in Brazil

Brazil's land area was divided into fifteen tracts or captaincies by the Portuguese monarchy soon after colonization in the 1530s and awarded to select beneficiaries under hereditary terms of tenure. Subsequently, to encourage settlement during the 17<sup>th</sup> Century sugar boom awards of land known as *sesmaria* were implemented, giving total control over the land to the tenant provided cultivation was maintained (LAMBAIS, 2008, p. 2; ASSUNÇÃO, 2006, p. 1-2). Although the provision that land remain productive is a term in the post-dictatorship constitution of 1988, Sauer (2006, p. 177) cites a 1996 census report detailing 25 million fallow hectares (60 percent of all arable land). In short, the immense concentration of land ownership among a small minority has been socially and economically unproductive. Simmons (2004, p. 183) records a brief history of conflict over land across the country beginning with the Canudos War of 1821 to the Contestado Rebellion of 1912 and various long running struggles in Western Paraná (1940s), Mato Grosso (1950s) and Pará (1990s) including the killing of 19 peasant farmers in 1996. Alston, Libecap and Mueller (1999) link ongoing conflict in Amazonia between landless communities and landowners to accelerated deforestation: since the beneficial use is one Constitutional criterion for legal tenancy and the forests are excluded from productive use considerations, both clearances and violence are structurally guaranteed. In conjunction, Cullen (2005, p. 749-751) notes the conflict between the landless people's movement (MST) and conservationists over forest clearances. Real land reform advances in Brazil are thus social, economic and environmental in focus.

While land reform efforts began under the military dictatorship with the Land Act of 1964, an effect of the corresponding economic modernization program was to promote such agricultural activity as soybean production by means of loans, credit and input incentives (BAER ; FILIZZOLA, 2005, p. 6). This further subsumed small and medium-sized farms into Brazil's fledgling agribusiness industry, effectively sterilizing any purpose towards alleviating Brazil's grossly unequal socio-economic relations (ASSUNÇÃO, 2006, p. 6). As late as 1996, farms of over 1.000 hectares still constituted less than one percent of the total number and over 45 percent of the total farm area in the country (SAUER, 2006, p. 178)

According to Lambais (2008, p. 8) and Assunção (2006, p. 6) incipient attempts to instigate land reform to address social and economic inequality began from 1971 with the establishment of INCRA (National Institution for Rural Settlement and Agrarian Reform): a merging of two separate state entities intended less to redistribute land than to forestall peasant mobilization and relocate people to relatively uninhabited areas. The establishment of the MST, after 1984, from small beginnings in the south of Brazil answered the state on the limits of its policy and capacity and created the necessary challenge by planning, organizing and administering occupations and redistribution of non-productive farm properties. Wolford (2003, p. 201) estimates that, in over 25 years, the MST has seen to 2.500 occupations and the supply of workable lands for 370.000 families.

Among those who have described and critiqued the work of the MST in English are Hammond (1999), McMichael (2006), Desmarais (2007), Wolford (2003, 2007, 2010) and Borrás (2008). Wolford's (2003) summation of three factors in the genesis and success of the MST are salutary: agricultural production initiatives

during the military dictatorship that produced a massive landless class; the restoration of democracy in 1985; and, the support of determined religious movements in the rural areas (WOLFORD, 2003, p. 201-202; NAVARRO, 2000). Wolford (2010), moreover, describes the details of how lands are identified, how accommodations with state actors are negotiated, and how the process and rules of occupation are undertaken. Where this kind of direct action has been construed as an affront to property rights and democratic norms (KEEN ; HAYNES, 2009), it must be seen in contrast to two major thrusts of a contrary kind. One is the emerging dominance within Brazil of its domestic agribusiness industries since the 1990s (MUELLER ; MUELLER, 2006, p. 9). Another is the proliferation of corporate and state-involved land deals implemented in recent years in many former colonies of the Global South, as addressed by Borrás, Hall, Schoones, White and Wolford (2011), among others.

### **The State, Elites and Land Reform in the Philippines**

Since 1988, the Philippines has had one of the world's longest SLAR programs: the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) (MANAHAN, 2011, p.13). It was instituted with a 20 year mandate to redistribute private and public lands to peasant beneficiaries. The program ended in 2008, with mixed results, because well over 1 million hectares of private lands had escaped redistribution and private deals were deliberately set up to immediately take advantage of CARP's imminent expiry, a new initiative was forced into law, in 2009. Known as CARPER (CARP Extension with Reforms), it is due to expire in 2014. Despite a massive budget, it has thus far succeeded in redistributing about 20 percent of its mandated domains (Source). In this frame alone, Philippine land

reform conditions differ markedly from those undertaken in Brazil by the MST over the past 25 years (MST, 2009a).

The context for agrarian reform in the Philippines begins decisively with U.S. colonial control from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. The U.S., as immediate successor to Spanish domination, exacerbated extractive and exploitative conditions rather than alleviated them as had originally been promised (FRANCO, 2000, p. 37-38, 72; BORRAS, 2008, p. 3-6). Furthermore, U.S. control instituted a landed oligopoly as the legislative controllers of the archipelago; and, in the promotion of a cash crop export economy, drew large numbers of the rural population into entrenched conditions of economic and social servitude. The resistance that this fomented contributed to the contemporary Philippine political economy (FRANCO ; BORRAS, 2005, p. 4,8).

Philippine resistance over unjust relations on the land has been continuous in differing degrees of intensity since at least 1745, the date of a major uprising against the religious orders that dominated agricultural land holdings in the Spanish colonial era (McANDREW, 1994, p. 19; FRANCO, 2000, p. 64). Responses to the struggle over land control, use and ownership have involved a range of political ploys. Prior to the Japanese occupation in 1942, this included the eviction and transplantation of tenant farmers from politically sensitive areas of Luzon to other parts of the archipelago, notably to Mindanao under Manuel Quezon's presidential policies (ESCALANTE, 2002, p.1; TRICOM, 1998, p. 8; FRANCO, 2000, p. 88). To the extent that this reduced contested land rights in Luzon Province, the principal island in the archipelago, it multiplied problems in the southern-most islands.

Under President Magsaysay in the 1950s, according to David Wurfel (1988, p. 15), the first significant land reform ideas

were promulgated but achieved little, in part because both tillers and owners of the land were not capable of being mutually placated and, as under Manuel Quezon, landowners dominated the legislature so securely that change to the ownership status quo was effectively sterilized (McANDREW, 1994, p. 45; ABINALES and AMOROSO, 2005, p. 182). Actual land distribution did make significant headway under the Ferdinand Marcos era (WURFEL, 1988, P. 169) but was limited to rice and corn, and was staged experimentally in Luzon, specifically in places like Neuva Ecija (CALDERON, 1978, p. 1). This area was notable for conditions of tenant servitude owing to indebtedness, excessive usury, and generations of inherited poverty that escalated drastically under the U.S. administration (FRANCO, 2000, p. 76).

Calderon's (1978) explanation of this land reform scheme following Marcos's Presidential Decree No. 27 of 1972 reveals several key points. Firstly, agrarian reform in the Philippines was deliberately technocratic or centrally planned, accommodating the institutional concerns of multiple state agencies. This excluded the preferences or perspectives of farmers themselves, whose perceived backwardness was a factor in their exclusion (CALDERON, 1978, p. 2, 7). Secondly, the complexity and cost of contingencies like credit, infrastructure, post-harvest facilities, marketing and chemical inputs needed in the long term to make a success of reform initiatives, effectively crowded out any peasant participation (CALDERON, 1978, p. 5). Yet, as Brazil's MST has taken pains to demonstrate in over 25 years of peasant-led land reform initiatives, land reform from above and without input and post-harvest support is fatally flawed. In the Philippines, research by IBON (1998), Tecson (2009) and Flores-Obanil (2008) show that basic problems like poor health and expensive medicines, low quality and access to education, and



unfair valuation of farmers' produce, are common obstacles to the developmental prospects of peasant farmers. Moreover, farming inputs required for production are both prohibitively priced, if at all available, and not endogenously designed or developed by the farmers themselves, which in turn often results in debt. Land reform beneficiaries are thus trapped in a paternalistic web of agencies, departments, and institutions that govern but do not build their capacity.

The era after Marcos is fundamental to an understanding of the agrarian reform program's impetus and contestation in 2008-2009. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), emphasizing the return of the land to those who worked it, was the centrepiece to the new constitution enshrined in 1987 under President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, whose presidency followed the 1986 'People Power Revolution' (ABINALES ; AMOROSO, 2005, p. 234). Redistributive land reform was thus originally drafted during what was deemed an opportune time for left-of-centre politics (RIEDINGER, 1995, p. 13). However, obstacles to its realization surfaced almost immediately via presidential hesitancy amid struggles for legitimacy from both the far left and the far right; congressional delays, dilution of the terms via loophole clauses, exemptions, and demands for landlord compensation; and outbreaks of violence between landless peasants and the state, most notably the Mendiola Bridge massacre of 19 farmers on January 22, 1987 (RIEDINGER, 1995; PUTZEL, 1992, p. 221; BORRAS, 2001, p. 546). President Cory Aquino herself was severely compromised since her elite landed family owned a 6.435 hectare sugar estate in Hacienda Luisita, located north of Manila, that had been founded on a contractual obligation of redistribution to the peasants that inhabited it – a promise that was conveniently forgotten over time

(ABINALES; AMOROSO, 2005, p. 235). Distribution of this estate to its tenants has remained a perennial flash point in owner-tenant politics across the country and only in 2011 was given unanimous adjudication by the Supreme Court in favour of the peasant farmers (BUSINESS WORLD, 2011.).

The inconsistent or limited implementation of CARP, since 1988, has been attributed to a number of factors. These include weak or co-opted leadership at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), shortfalls in budgetary allotments, the capacity of owners to evade requirements, and the conversion of estates into residential or industrial lots (BELLO, 2009, p. 52-58). While a statistical analysis conducted by Reyes (2002, p. 20-46) shows that “agrarian reform had a positive impact on farmer beneficiaries” in terms of higher real per capita income and reduced poverty incidence between 1990 and 2000, Borrás and others (2009, p. 14) point out that the DAR has achieved far less than it set out to do, and less even than it claimed of its targets. Gross figures suggest that 6,000,000 hectares was distributed to 3,000,000 beneficiary families over the 20 years of CARP’s implementation (BORRAS et al., 2009, p. 14); but, since much of this distribution did not represent real land reform but made use of public, marginal or idle lands, or even distributions purely on paper for bureaucratic purposes, an area of 30 per cent less may constitute fair representation (BORRAS, 2008b, p. 9; BELLO, 2009, p. 80; RIEDINGER, 1995, p. 194). The least budgeted and most limited land distributions are reported by Bello (2009, p. 57) as having taken place under the explicitly neoliberal presidency of Gloria Arroyo (2001-2010). Of particular note is the Philippine Agricultural Development and Commercial Corporation’s (PADCC) earmarking of over 3 million hectares of almost 25 percent of the Philippines’ arable land for foreign investment ventures (DEININGER, 2010).

By the end of CARP's allotted period of implementation in 2008, it had become what Bello (2009, p. 65) terms an "orphan program". Its achievements in having come to life at all were offset by various stalemates: ideological exhaustion, interminable political and financial costs, and population growth outstripping productive possibilities. As the Philippines became more industrialized, populated and tourism oriented, land prices and the pressure by developers for conversion of "rice bowl" agricultural zones, such as in Cavite and Batangas, became clamorous (SEROTE, 2004, p. 302; BELLO, 2009, p. 51-52; McANDREW 1994, p. 12-13). To this, annual weather calamities, particularly during harvest season, as Boudreau (2001, p. 44) and Ofreneo and Serrano (1991, p. 3) note, further adversely affect sustained rural development in the agricultural sector.

For many observers, particularly landlord legislators, the opportunity to let CARP end in 2008 was therefore well regarded and the idea then that CARP could be prolonged was deemed almost impossible (LIM, 2009, p. 5-6). Furthermore, a concurrent model of land reform under market leadership championed by the World Bank held that land distribution on voluntary terms, rather than by expropriations, was optimal. But MLAR, as Borras and others (2009, p. 14) point out, achieved extremely limited distribution at a cost approximately six times higher than even the state-mediated model, it was not a fit solution to any pro-tiller movement. Contextually, Herring (1999, p. 2) points out a paradox in the politics and philosophy of agrarian reform: where the political change needed for real reform must be made to work through the existing political process itself, little or nothing can be expected to happen. Only under revolutionary or interventionist conditions, as in China, Taiwan, South Korea and

Japan in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century, might general effective change happen (PUTZEL, 1992, p.116; HAYAMI et al., 1990, p.3).

Along this line of reasoning, the far left National Democratic platform in the Philippines mirrored that of the conservative right in seeking an end to CARP, yet for entirely different reasons. The Left's insistence had consistently been for a Genuine Agrarian Reform Program (GARP) that eliminated loopholes and pointedly ignored elite special pleading and the right of landowners to market-based compensation (RIEDINGER, 1995, p. 149-151). As in the decision of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to boycott the elections of 1986 that ultimately collapsed the Marcos regime and which split the party, a point made by Fuwa (2000, p. 38) and Riedinger (1995, p. 127), the decision to reject the continuation of CARP poses necessary and acute questions for participatory democracy in the Philippines: to what extent could new schisms or a hardening of approaches result? Equally importantly, the steps taken to promote CARPER create other questions about participatory development: to what extent is a unifying force or, conversely, a new competitive wedge driven into the arena of resistance against the status quo?

While CARPER has been in existence for almost three years, implementation has been stalled and debates are not yet settled. The DAR is on target to redistribute less than 50 per cent of the designated lands by the time CARPER expires. Nevertheless, critics of the CARPER program, particularly the far left National Democrats, maintain that the program was always structurally designed to fail because it ignored or eliminated the voice and engagement of those groups that have consistently argued for full participation on terms determined by peasant communities themselves (MARIANO, 2012). In other words, as in the reform program instituted under Ferdinand

Marcos in the 1970s, a top down, elite-administered system is in place without the requisite investment in and support for the peasant beneficiaries. Valuable and decisive lessons remain to be learned from the experience of Brazil's MST (2009b).

### **Land Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

To elaborate, from Moyo and Yeros (2005, p. 4-6), the South African case is a prime example of 20<sup>th</sup> Century white-settler colonization under a globalizing imperial construct that set a high premium on Global South resources for ventures and competition in other theatres. The social and economic legacy across Southern Africa but particularly in South Africa exhibits deep, intransigent cleavage along race and class lines amid gross inequality in resources and opportunities.

White settler colonial agriculture was secured in South Africa in 1913 by the Native Lands Act under which 90 percent of the productive farmland was reserved exclusively for white farmers even though the white settler population was never more than 6 percent of the total (HALL; NTSEBEZA, 2007, p. 2). Black farmers, large numbers of which were women heads of home, were sequestered on marginal lands of indifferent fertility and irregular rainfall in nominally independent homelands known as Bantustans. In both South Africa and Zimbabwe, as Moyo and Yeros (2005, p. 4) point out, racial and social cleavage developed out of competition between mining and agricultural interests for steady supplies of on-site labour at low rates of pay. This gave rise to a large foreign born wage labour contingent from neighbouring countries like Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho. Their legacy is one of "double-victimization": exploited for their labour and yet disdained by indigenous local people who by

the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in both Zimbabwe and South Africa preferred them to be evicted or deported (MOYO, RUTHERFORD and AMADOR-WILKS, 2000, p. 189).

South Africa abolished the racist system of apartheid after democratic elections in 1994 concomitant to formal processes of reconciliation and nation-building. Part of this objective was the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) of 1995 (BORRAS, 2003, p. 373). Like the *Cédula da Terra*, a project in Brazil, it was an incipient promotion of MLAR. Cheryl Walker (2005, p. 805) explains the three facets of land reform in South Africa as land restitution to those dispossessed of it under apartheid; land redistribution to the landless and poor majority; and to provide security from violence to the citizens in general. Under the RDP, an envisaged 30 percent of some 99 million hectares under private white farmer ownership would be redistributed to approximately 8 million families under a cost ceiling per beneficiary between 1994 and 1999. Since landowners could evade land restitution measures, results in this category of righting historical injustice were negligible by 2001 (BORRAS, 2003, p. 384). Although land shortages are a constant issue, particularly during elections, by 2004 a mere 3.5 percent of formerly white farmland had been transferred to African farmer beneficiaries (WALKER, 2005, p. 806; HALL; NTSEBEZA, 2007, p. 9). The democratic state thus experienced and continues to experience real and serious demands from a fast growing population for developmental change to offset historical deficits and to bolster the legitimacy of the state as liberator from such impositions (CHERU, 2001, p. 506). However, the meagre actualization record since 1994 indicates a problem of coherence and compatibility in the discourses of the major actors. Walker's (2005, p. 823) assessment is that South Africa has developed an economy entirely disconnected from its

agrarian past in which the peasantry does not count for much. Three consequential conditions instead obtain: black elite empowerment at the expense of redistributive justice, decentralization by default in favour of traditional or tribal leadership and a rhetorical approach to rural poverty.

The first condition, as Hall (2010, p. 180, 184) observes, with the failure to act early and speedily on real land redistribution, the South African state has shifted the discourse to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). This program maintains general structures and socio-economic relations but enlarges the space in the name of land reform specifically for African elites and connected interests to seamlessly claim a share of valuable enterprises. This has involved share transfers and corporate board appointments that do little to alleviate pressure and problems for the many millions of urban and rural poor.

One acute example of this as a problem is how, despite the Constitution's gender equality provisions, it affects women farmers. MacDonald (2003) and Simon-Kumar (2007) consider that the state's discourse of upliftment for female and new farmers, as well as redistributive justice for historical victims, was consciously undermined after 1998 by an alternative and contradictory discourse of economic development privileging market oriented production. Added to this and in respect of MLAR initiatives designed by foreign donors, Hall's (2010) and Cliffe's (2000, p. 273) respective insight is acute: land policy for impoverished black women farmers in South Africa is all too often made by foreign, white, male agricultural economists who do not themselves farm for a living. In South Africa, for example, as Potts (2000, p. 807-808) and Hall (2010, p. 179-180) show, where stewardship of agricultural land in rural areas has for generations been occupied by housewives, state policy discourse

does not recognize women as valid or “committed” farmers. Instead, official policy presses absent or urban-based males to return to the rural areas or else lose their right to own farmland.

A second consequential issue is the historical question of indirect rule as Williams (1996, p. 211), Moyo and Yeros (2005, p. 6), Alexander (1994, p. 333) and Moore (2001, p. 913) give account. While Roman Dutch Law maintained South Africa as an asset in the semi-periphery of the world system of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the colonial state itself was responsible for the project of national development through commodity production, as Bernstein (2003, p. 205-206) puts it. This gave rise to necessary liaisons and relations with tribal elders and chieftains that has persisted through to the present. Following democratic independence in 1994, ties between the state and traditional leaders were enhanced and supported. By 2001, the chieftains had control over access to land for 17 million people (MOORE, 2001, p. 921). Regional cultural conditions, tribal litigation procedures, and decision-making on land tenure and distribution can cause serious tensions and conflict even in areas where land is relatively abundant. In particular cases, the state’s institutions are impotent to exercise control or effect change. A rider to this understanding is that, as Lahiff and Cousins (2001) anticipate, the chief beneficiaries in South Africa of future redistribution initiatives will likely be commercial-industrial black farmers and tribal chieftains. This could be described as decentralization by default than by outright policy concession.

A third consequence of the state’s post-apartheid policy of delaying or postponing redistributive justice and land restitution is the issue of rural poverty. Sarah Bracking (2003) and Charles Meth (2004) respectively identify a fundamental issue in the ongoing proletarianization of the rural poor: the use of cash transfers serves



as policy in lieu of genuine land reform programs. Meth (2004, p. 22-23), for example, argues that post-apartheid South African state discourse, by the use of terms like “victimhood” and “dependency”, discriminates against the poor while obviating the requirement of the state to relieve conditions that are structurally unchanged from the oppressive legacy of South Africa’s racist past.

### **MLAR IN THREE CONTEXTS**

The case closest to South Africa with which it can be compared is Zimbabwe which opted, in 2000, for a fast-track SLAR program of expropriation and redistribution of prime farmland. Officially proclaimed as the “Third Chimurenga” (Uprising), most of Zimbabwe’s 4500 white farmers lost their holdings in the process and as many as 500,000 commercial farm workers and their families, particularly the foreign born, lost their livelihoods and homes. Hundreds of farms were handed over to government insiders and elites with limited farming experience (WILLEMS, 2004, p. 1772, 1774-1776). Donald Williams (1996) would argue that the Zimbabwe example typifies land reform in Africa. It enlarges the state’s mandate and coercive legitimacy at the expense of other areas of development in an arbitrary and uncoordinated way. In a neo-paternalistic sense it is aimed at satisfying “disparate interests of well-placed individuals, their families, and other favoured groups (WILLIAMS, 1996, p. 207).

By contrast, within a decade of democratic independence South Africa had turned to the MLAR program of willing-buyer/willing seller or a strategic neglect of the problem of land redistribution. This, as Lahiff (2007) claims, is an accommodation of state and market-led processes with normative rhetoric about justice

and democracy (LAHIFF, 2007). Yet it has both failed in itself and has multiplied the problems that must eventually be addressed. If South Africa feels it can afford the luxury of benign neglect of land issues, it is because the state has accommodated itself to its role as an emerging regional and strategic power in a globalising world, as argued or indicated by Moore (2005), Cheru (2001), and Manji (2006). O’Sullivan’s (2009) point is incisive: the viability of land redistribution of the official market-driven kind adversely affects democracy as a whole.

## **MLAR AND PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE**

To advance South-South dialogue and terms of understanding in the area of land and agrarian relations, it is necessary to identify what experiences obtain, how they have come into being and what commonalities and differences exist. Market-led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) offers particular terms of comparison and contrast across the three cases of Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa. In the argument advanced here such conditions must be seen within the context of path dependencies of centuries of gross inequality in land relations and land ownership. Even in 20<sup>th</sup> Century, under the Brazilian military dictatorship, the Ferdinand Marcos decades in the Philippines and South Africa’s apartheid regime, economic modernization programs respectively privileged a narrow elite set at the expense of the large majority of the urban and rural poor. This in turn proved to be a catalyst for resistance and opposition, after and despite which a secondary wave of investment under neoliberal conditions occurred at roughly the same time in all three places. These market-led initiatives from the 1990s under the auspices of foreign lenders summarize as the *Cédula da Terra*, in Brazil, the

Reconstruction and Development Programme in South Africa and the public-private development projects under Gloria Arroyo, in the Philippines. In all three cases investment in agricultural pilot projects fed into a later wave of investments that were categorized as Market-led Agrarian Reform a decade ago and in more recent years have been described as land rushes or land grabs. The more pejorative term, land grabs, owes much to the types of contract that have been drawn up, the speed and secrecy of agreements and the effects on local communities who in many cases in all three countries have been waiting for land restitution, land redistribution or just compensation under state mandated directives or constitutional guarantees.

Significant differences among the three cases can be considered on the following terms: (1) resistance and opposition and (2) the discourses in operation.

South Africa is the most recent of the three cases to obtain political emancipation from colonial era control. More importantly, the national liberation movement, the African National Congress, has been in power since 1994 with an unassailable majority, virtually guaranteeing it long term control of the state and the nation under the condition that no revolution occurs in the interim. However, reform, restitution and/or compensation, particularly regarding land, has been slow and limited since democratic independence. Civil society organizations like the Landless People's Movement (LPM) are too close to the ruling ANC both in leadership and aspirations to make the same impression on landowners and the state that the MST in Brazil has done (BALETTI et al., 2008, p. 292).

In the Philippines, the liberation movement most closely seeking root and branch change in the country, the National Democrat alliance of groups and movements, has never been in power. Instead, since the era of US control a narrow oligarchy of landed interests

has maintained political control and coercive relations on the land with respect to peasant farmers and the landless (PUTZEL, 1992, p. 183-186, 221). A problem for opposition movements is a deep and abiding split stemming from ideological disagreements since the late 1980s (REID, 2000, p. 41).

Brazil's experience of a neoliberal turn under the first term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was in part aimed at redirecting land reform processes to market-managed solutions (SAUER, 2008, p. 178-179). This was reined in to some extent in the second Cardoso term as well as by Lula's government albeit at the expense of the far left wing of the party.

Regardless of such turns, the achievements of the MST, the world's largest social movement (LAMBALIS, 2008, p. 6; ASSUNÇÃO, 2006) are considerable but difficult to emulate in other socio-political environments. A compelling possible example of South-South cooperation between the MST and South Africa's Landless People's Movement (LPM) since 2001 has not brought much to fruition (BALETTI et al, 2008, p. 290). Despite the commonalities apparent between the two movements, the bases of exchange exhibit dissimilarities of internal dynamics, history, timing, purpose, strategies and methods. The MST owns three attributes that differ from the LPM: its leadership is drawn from offspring of peasant farmers; it employs direct occupation strategies; and it is independent of state, business and civil society. Furthermore, it has been supported by a broad-based religious base (WOLFORD, 2003, p. 201-203; McKEON, WATTS and WOLFORD, 2004, p. 39-40). In the Philippines, by contrast, the National Democrat coalition of peasant groups is smaller than the MST; it is unable to mount direct occupations of farmland without facing an onslaught by the state military, the police, and private armies of the landed classes; and

the movement remains outside of religious support, especially of the predominant Catholic Church.

A second primary issue, the discourses over land reform across the three cases, also exhibit particular terms of comparison and contrast. Dominant discourses, or discourses from above – those of the state under neoliberal tendencies and of the market, for example – promote democracy, freedom and the logic of the market. Terms such as efficiency, viability, development, profit and growth are reliable fixtures in the vocabulary in use (DEININGER, 1998; COUSINS and SCOONES, 2009; BORRAS, 2003). Resistant discourses, or discourses from below, see land in terms of historical, social, cultural and communal meanings. Landscapes are “embedded within sets of social relations” that the principles of the market seek to alienate and transform rapidly and entirely (AKRAM-LODHI, 2007, p. 1439). Whereas a term such as “democracy” may be incorporated by all actors in the struggle over rights and access to land, it has differentiated meanings and purpose depending on which actor uses it and in particular contexts. This holds true even in places as intransigently unequal as Brazil, the Philippines and South Africa (BORRAS, KAY & AKRAM-LODHI, 2007; CHERU, 2001). Differences that occur in all three contexts are eminently valuable for beginning and maintaining any form of South-South dialogue on land relations. More importantly, such differences relate to an intractably problematic issue: how is reliable information to be obtained and disseminated about such land deals in a continuous and educationally useful way so that real learning about what is happening can be constructed and developed? How can the gaps in the knowledge base be filled and what interests would thereby be best served, the proponents or critics of MLAR?

In South Africa, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), an official discourse from above, has worked to the benefit of state insiders and their allies (HALL, 2010, p. 184) in a version of neopatrimonial practice evident elsewhere in Africa. More importantly, South Africa, like Brazil, has accommodated itself to a role in the neoliberal configuration of states seeking recognition at the top table of global politics. It is less surprising, thus, that both South Africa and Brazil are included as investor states in the global farmland spree of the past decade (LANDPORTAL, 2012; DEININGER, 2010). Yet, the rights and equality of women as governed by South Africa's model Constitution of 1996 are explicitly undermined by the lack of state support for women farmers and the stipulation that men return to their home regions to claim land at the risk of forfeiture (POTTS, 2000; MacDONALD, 2003; SIMON-KUMAR, 2007; HALL, 2010). Moreover, viability in the agriculture sector has come in the neoliberal turn South Africa has taken to mean economic profitability rather than the life and livelihoods of the people who have traditionally farmed the land. In the Philippines, women also nominally enjoy equal rights with men but many women farmers cannot get or are ineligible to deed title to the land they farm, or even to inheritance when married to a titled farmer. The labour of women and children in rural Philippines remains effectively unpaid (FLORES-OBANIL, 2008, p. 20, 30). The conditions in Brazil are somewhat different in principle: from the 1990s the MST has increasingly turned from issues of class to gender and is big enough to create an impact. This attracts funding but real achievements in fact are more elusive (McKEON ET AL, 2004, p. 54). The differences across the three cases in this single issue demonstrate the complexity and subtlety required of South-South dialogue towards finding common ground and eliminating inherent problems.

## CONCLUSION

For South-South dialogue to develop and prosper, it is necessary to identify common concerns, to outline their histories and trajectories, and to set out terms by which they can be compared and contrasted. This enables a language of cooperation, resistance against shared expropriations under whatever façade they may be presented, and ways of discerning future conditions that may be no more salutary than past practices as engineered and implanted from abroad or imposed by wealthy elites upon the poorest and weakest. The way this idea has been developed here is by utilizing existing research from discrete fields such as history, political economy, comparative politics and agrarian politics in conjunction with journalism, interviews and field research from civil society movements. Thus, the theory, practice and purpose of MLAR have been elaborated on its own terms and against the findings of its critics. This in turn has shed light on the recent wave, between 2000 and 2010, of farmland investments across the Global South that have accounted for some 49 million hectares. That these investments have been undertaken by large countries of the Global South, like Brazil and South Africa is less important than two different ideas. One relates to the quality of information available about such deals, who and how it is reported, and how it can be collated continuously. Secondly, what common language obtains for South-South dialogue when primitive accumulation is exercised by the South upon its ostensible neighbours and allies? What, in other words, is to be made of the shared histories of exploitation and dependency when the leading states of the Global South appear effectively willing to do no better than ape their antecedents?

By tracing the contours of these relations and by considering resistance movements such as the MST, discourses from above and below, and the relegation of mandated land restitution, redistribution and the protection of marginalized communities, this paper establishes a base from which to elaborate on at least three further projects. One is the question across the Global South of participatory democracy within a broader South-South dialogue. A second area of attention is the meaning and focus of sovereignty across the Global South. The relative subjugation or subordination of states with shared histories and dependencies needs to become better understood, communicated, and entered into educational curricula and academic disseminations. Thirdly, a base is set for the current wave of MLAR, or land investments by outside interests, to reflect the condition of the democracies countries like the Philippines, Brazil and South Africa practice and promote. The role played by the form of MLAR that spread through the Global South at the turn of the millennium is beginning to be understood. It has yet to be properly documented and built into learning modules for the benefit of South-South dialogue and, as importantly, the dissemination of experience and knowledge from the South to the Global North.

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## RESUMO

O Mercado Conduzido pela Reforma Agrária (MLAR) evoluiu desde a década de 1990 como meio de redistribuição de terras entre compradores e vendedores dispostos dentro dos termos de apoio de financiadores externos e doadores. O debate sobre a eficiência e eficácia do projeto é altamente relevante para o diálogo Sul-Sul e a construção do conhecimento. Isso ocorre, em parte, porque o MLAR é um antecedente direto para a grande onda de investimentos em terras agrícolas, especialmente no Sul Global, desde 2000. Os críticos têm descrito os investimentos como a grilagem de terras neocolonialistas. Este artigo explora e descreve a história das questões fundiárias e agrárias em três importantes países de três continentes do hemisfério sul: Brasil, Filipinas e África do Sul. Os elementos relevantes do estudo são os tipos e métodos de mobilização de resistência e massa contra discursos de cima, que procuram impor as normas do mercado sobre a população rural pobre para quem tem terra de relevância não comercial. As semelhanças e diferenças derivadas desse exame são usadas para promover a divulgação de informações úteis e confiáveis no diálogo Sul-Sul, e para outras áreas ainda de investigação, tais como as questões de democracia, soberania e participação. Uma ideia relacionada é como a informação pode ser desenvolvida educacionalmente para transmitir a experiência e o conhecimento das relações agrárias no Sul Global para o Norte.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Mercado Conduzido pela Reforma Agrária. Comunicações globais sul. Resistência.

## ABSTRACT

Market-led Agrarian Reform (MLAR) has evolved since the 1990s as a means of redistributing land between willing buyers and willing sellers within the supporting terms of external lenders and donors. The debate over the efficiency and effectiveness of this project is highly relevant to South-South dialogue and knowledge building. This is partly because MLAR is a direct antecedent to the

large wave of investments in farmland, particularly in the Global South, since 2000. Critics have described the investments as neocolonialist land grabs. This paper explores and describes the history of land and agrarian issues in three important countries of three continents in the Global South: Brazil, the Philippines, and South Africa. Relevant elements of the study are the types and methods of resistance and mass mobilization against discourses from above that seek to impose the norms of the market on the rural poor for whom land has non-commodifiable significance. The commonalities and differences derived from this examination are used to consider the dissemination of useful and reliable information under South-South dialogue, and to further other areas of enquiry, such as the issues of sovereignty, democracy and participation. A related idea is how information can be developed educationally to transmit the experience and knowledge of agrarian relations in the Global South to the North.

**KEYWORDS:** Market-led Agrarian Reform. Global South communications. Resistance.



**LINKING DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY IN  
THE GLOBAL SOUTH?  
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY SECTOR  
REFORM (SSR)**

Mathias Valdez Duffau<sup>1\*</sup>

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper is part of the presentation made in June 2012, in the city of Recife (Brasil), at the “Fifth South-South Summer Institute Rethinking Development: Global and Regional Alternatives for the Development in the Global South.” That wonderful academic event allowed more than thirty researchers and scholars from Latin America, Africa and South East Asia to gather, exchange ideas and perspectives about how to continue developing the Global South by the Global South. That presentation was also part of the author’s research about Human Security and SSR in the Global South at Osaka University, Japan. This paper introduces a policy approach that is being implemented in many countries in the Global South under the auspices of Northern Countries and International Organizations. It also intends to contribute to a better understanding of a global security issue. Personally, the author hopes to encourage more students and scholars to research about the links between

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Development and Security and the outcomes of SSR policies in the Global South.

## **SECURITY COOPERATION DURING THE COLD WAR**

The Security Sector Reform arises from Civil-Military Relations and Development Studies. The latter started as a political science area of studies, especially, in the US after WW II and became a major theme as the military involvement in Latin American politics was increasing. The major powers during the Cold War (USSR and USA) were not interested in “using security and development assistance to promote democratic governance in the countries receiving aid” (BALL, 2010, p. 29). On the contrary, during the Cold War there were trends to support military regimes not only in Latin America but also in Africa and in some parts of Asia. In many aspects, that tendency was the result of the operations, planned by the US political system in a Cold War security scenario (CHUTTER, 2006, p. 3).

Apparently, governmental development donors did not have much to do with the Security Sector during the Cold War. In other words, SSR was not a necessity during those times while military governments were encouraged and tolerated as long as they pursued their anti-communist tasks. In fact, the situation was quite de opposite. Instead to seeking to advice recipient countries about how to develop accountable and human respectful security forces, French Militaries were the ones providing the “expertise” acquired in Algeria’s repression and then it was the US who financed and supported Latin American’s military governments under the National Security Doctrine.

In reality, according to Bellamy (2003, p. 103), bilateral assistance in security areas is not a new concept and it was a common practice during the Cold War. In those days, both super-powers offered military aid for purposes of nation or state-building and political legitimization. Throughout Latin America in particular, the United States transferred large amounts of aid to reinforce armed forces capable of defeating communist insurgency. In this sense, the focus was primarily in helping to defend and then to create, non-communist states which they were also usually non-democratic and not human rights respectful.

On the contrary, at that time, International NGOs and also UN branches<sup>1</sup> were not committed with security issues. Development agencies used to operate close to war zones providing humanitarian assistance or even trying to implement some development programs in countries under military regimes while disregarding political matters. The reasons were that International Organizations were ruled by the principles of restraint, consent, and neutrality. Emergency assistance for natural or human-caused disasters was provided separately from the long-term aid projects “diminishing the likelihood of agencies or militaries establishing the relationship between development and security” (BELLAMY, 2003, p.103).

During the Cold War period, the security assistance can be characterized as bilateral. That means between two governments and not from international organizations to a particular nation. The security forces were entitled to work autonomously under the rule of force of authoritarian and military regimes. Civil society oversight and accountability under the rule of law was simply non-existent. The availability of resources for domestic development was reduced

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<sup>1</sup> Bellamy (2003: 103) refers to Save the Children, Oxfam, CARE, Medecins sans Frontieres, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

in favor of inefficient security expenditure. The security was entitled to protect the ruling elite and to guarantee the stability of the regime and the state (BALL, 2010, p.30).

## **SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR POLITICS**

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many military and authoritarian regimes in African, Latin American and Asian countries started to collapse. Moreover, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the political liberalization of Eastern Europe there was a change in the international political agenda and priorities. Gradually, development agencies began to highlight the fact that development depended on two factors which had been absent during the Cold War: democracy and security.

Even though democratization had not been an essential feature during the Cold War, once the ideological opponent to liberal capitalism was defeated Western powers started promoting democracy and to link it with economic development. By that time, it became necessary to renew the focus of their security apparatus in order to preserve the new regimes from authoritarian counter effects<sup>2</sup>. Violent conflict and illegitimate security actors were beginning to be seen as causing and perpetuating under-development and in this way development was starting to be linked with security (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 104).

In the 1990s, Donors increasingly focused their efforts in trying to reduce military expenditures for development purposes. In 1992, the Mali Government and the Tuareg rebels signed a peace

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<sup>2</sup> Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to think about to what extent was possible for transitional countries to fully re-gain control over their former repressive security sector and also able to deal with their legacy

accord and two years after that, a UN mission proposed a security first approach. Under this scope development aid was bound to the demobilization of combatants and to the improvement of policing and border control. In that decade, the World Bank (WB), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began addressing the security sector in their programs (as in Sierra Leone, in 1996, or in Zimbabwe and DRC in 1999) focusing on military budgets (COOPE; PUGH 2002, p. 6).

By the end of the 1990s, governance was a well-established part of the rhetoric among donors allowing discussions about the security sector and the security actors (Ball 2010: 32). At the same time and in the context of new defense diplomacy some multilateral organizations as NATO and OECD started to promote democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern European countries. Those countries were considered to be transitional. Later, when the European Union started taking part in these policies, non-military components, such as the police, the border guards and the judiciary were also targeted to be reformed.

Likewise, during the 1990s security studies became both deeper and broader. In this sense, it was Buzan (1991) who introduced five dimensions of security: military, political, societal, economic and environmental. His analysis helped to deepen the understanding that “more people in the world are threatened by their own security forces than by other’s people’s, that military threats to security are only one of the causes of human insecurity” (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 105). Besides that, two factors helped to broaden security studies: one was theoretical and the other one practical.

The first and practical one was the trend to involve development programs with post-conflict and reconstructions missions.<sup>3</sup> In these

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<sup>3</sup> Peacekeeping operations were launched in the 1990s in different parts of

cases, the security agenda was primarily associated with force reduction. Where reconstruction missions were taking place in after-war scenarios, security forces were seen as a threat. As we will see later in this paper, this insight also helped to change donor's approach. In this sense, the innovation was that no matter how much international organizations might be working in an area, the delivery of assistance in insecure or unstable environments may not only be ineffective but could also potentially lengthen violent conflict and even reward warlords' power. Furthermore, agencies that were already involved in peace-building actions realized that conflict prevention was less expensive than conflict recovery (BALL, 2010, p.32).

The second and theoretical element that influenced and broadened security studies was Human Security. As a title of the UN Development Program Report in 1994 this emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities challenged the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the main referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Human security highlights the fact that a people-centered view of security was necessary for national, regional, and global stability. Its argument distinguished "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" as the best paths to tackle the problem of global insecurity and development. From this historical perspective it could be asserted that since the end of the Cold War, donors' policies initiated a significant shift. There was a move from a narrow and bipolar Cold War conception to a broader security understanding. Within this political move but without definitive answers the SSR, as a policing approach, was going to be designed (COOPER; PUGH 2002, p.5). Before dealing

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the world and post-conflict reconstruction took place in different places like in Cambodia, Kosovo, Aceh, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, the Solomon Islands, etc.

with what is SSR, it is time to introduce the theoretical approach under which security and development appeared to be merged: the new aid paradigm.

## **THE NEW AID PARADIGM AND SECURING DEVELOPMENT**

The World Bank (WB) explains the new aid paradigm by referring to the vicious circle. The WB assumes that poverty, fragility and conflict are intimately interrelated. It provides very clear statements to illustrate how, in its vision, this relation works in reality. For example, the WB understands that “poverty, fragility and conflict are, in many countries, elements of a vicious circle” and that “violence and fragility reinforce each other in several ways” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 3). The explanation appears to be simple. The cost of conflict is high and it not only undermines and slows down the pace of development but it deepens poverty and poses a threat to spill to neighbor countries across borders. Conflict creates IDPs, refugees, criminality, the spread of diseases, drugs abuses and extremist violence. Therefore, it is better for institutions to become engaged “to prevent fragility from degenerating into conflict in the first place” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 3).

Moreover, the WB states that violence undermines governance by limiting civic participation and if high levels of violence help to produce lawless areas, then state institutions are unable to deliver public service delegitimizing state’s authority. In the case of what the WB call extreme situations, fragile contexts may favor criminal networking to spread. If that occurred, there it would be a competition with the state itself, especially in the provision of security. “The close connection between violence and fragility shows

that by reducing violence the fragility might also be reduced. At least a minimum level of security must be established in order to allow citizens to rebuild the country” (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 27).

In other words, because fragility, violence and development are said to be intertwined then security becomes a key aspect in the donors’ development agenda. World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick synthesizes the idea by affirming that:

This is not security as usual or development as usual. Nor is this about what we have come to think of as peace building or peace keeping. This is about Securing Development –bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

In a sense, the academic support for this new aid paradigm comes from Paul Collier, an English economist who connects underdevelopment and conflict under his ‘bottom billion’ countries explanation. Collier (2008) deals with the explanation of how certain groups of low-income countries with a combined population of around a billion people had missed out on global economic development and so had diverged from the rest of mankind. Under his vision less developed countries are locked in what he refers as conflict traps. Helping those countries to catch up the rest is a central issue of development. Basically, conflict traps can be caused by civil wars, *coup d’états* and by competing powers for controlling natural resources. According to Collier, governments of the bottom billion do not rely upon their own security forces because they can be a threat to development. In his words, “the situations where governments



face the greatest risks their own military establishments are not the solution but rather part of the problem” (COLLIER, 2008, p. 131).

Even though the provision of security seems to be a basic example of a public good sometimes it is not effectively provided by states of the ‘bottom billion’. Because those governments have small size economies they cannot afford to provide effective security to their populations like large scale and rich economies can. Bottom billion governments face the dilemma of whether or not to finance and equip a military because it would secure power against rebellions on one hand but, on the other, it also might increase the threat of a *coup d’état* to take place. On the contrary, the idea is that weak military are less capable of conducting successfully a coup but they cannot defeat strong insurgency of rebellions either (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 11).

In other to contribute to solve this dilemma, Collier openly states that

external military intervention has an important place in helping the societies of the bottom billion, and that these countries’ own military forces are more often part of the problem than a substitute for external forces (COLLIER, 2008).

In his opinion until 1990 international military intervention into failing states was just an extension of the Cold War. After that period he highlights that military interventions are still needed. From his point of view, there are “three important roles for external military interventions: restoration of order, maintaining post conflict peace, and preventing coups” (COLLIER, 2008, p. 124).

Following this logic, the cost-benefit analysis of development aid from the security perspective is presented as simple to understand in post-conflict scenarios. The main concern for development donors

in a post-conflict case is that the risk is high. In Collier terms (2008, p. 106) “around half of all civil wars are post-conflict situations gone wrong”. This seems to prove that the higher the risk is the deeper the country might be trapped in the conflict cycle, local governments are aware of it and if they can manage their economies well, they would increase the wealth and decrease the risk. In order to keep the risk down while developing the economy, Local Governments do need some military force to maintain peace during this initial post-conflict period. This is what in practice “securing development” is about and this also part of the basic argument of SSR.

However, Collier (2008, p. 133) points out that if the force is domestic, it might also exacerbate the problem. Therefore, in a post-conflict situation some extent of an external military force would be preferable to take action in order to provide security for development. In this context, peace-keeping becomes again an effective option to provide security and to decrease the risk level. In economic terms, peacekeeping is expensive but the cost of conflict is much higher (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 12). Because of it, the security benefits alone appear to be more than enough in order to justify a large amount of development aid in post-conflict scenarios. The conflict trap theoretical framework provides extensive support to what the WB understands as ‘securing development’ which might also end up favoring donors’ interest in security matters.

In other sense, the World Bank (2009) also assumes that “securing development” depends on building an effective state. But, what does effective state mean? The OECD defines it in the following terms:

An effective state has both the capacity and willingness to mobilize resources, exercise political power, control its territory, manage the economy, implement policy, and promote human welfare in an inclusive manner, including delivery of vital services such as justice and security, health care, education, water and sanitation (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

Furthermore, the process of building effective states from donors' perspective it is called state-building. Then, what is state-building about? It is "about creating institutions that are effective in the eyes of their beneficiaries, and which can be self-sustaining within a reasonable timeframe"(WORLD BANK, 2009).In this regard, the WB promotes itself as highly capable for helping countries to conduct state-building policies. In fact, the World Bank defines itself as an organization that "can assist countries by laying out solid technocratic advice on best practices in state-building" (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 4).

In the case where a certain country has already been through the state-building process and the outcome was not satisfactory, then capacity building is required. What is it? Capacity Building "depends on a reform of public administration, at least in the departments responsible for core services; such reform must strengthen incentives, organization, staffing and accountability" (WORLD BANK, 2009, p. 5). In a few words, in order to make aid work effectively, an effective state is needed. To develop an effective state, state-building is the name of the required process. Once the state is built, if not effective, it is possible to be reformed by focusing on capacity building.

In the end, what is the connection between state-building and SSR? The answer is that effective states need to have effective security sectors to secure stability, development and to decrease the risk of conflict. Moreover, effective security actors are needed to

satisfy both the state and local populations security needs. This is why the development of SSR has been closely related with state-building endeavors in the post-Cold War era. Since the Security First initiative in Mal in 1992, from where the “new aid paradigm” was developed it has been assumed that self-sustaining security depends upon the “creation of a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector” (BELLAMY, 2003, p. 101).

To summarize the core ideas, the new aid paradigm assumes that no peace is achievable without development, and no development is sustainable without security. That also means that no development is sustainable if there an ongoing conflict. Therefore, connecting development and security by implementing SSR (including DDR in post-conflict scenarios) appears to be the binding link of a virtuous circle. Furthermore, the process of creating a legitimate, democratically accountable and effective indigenous security sector as part of a state-building process was going to be labeled Security Sector Reform (SSR).

## **DOES THE “NEW AID PARADIGM MEAN SECURITIZING THE GLOBAL SOUTH?”**

Prof. Mark Duffield (2007) identifies this new aid paradigm as the result of the merger of two concepts: Security and Development. This is possible, according to the author, under the broad and common umbrella of Human Security (HS) which links sustainable development and international security and prioritizes the security of people over states. In this framework of analysis, International Security appears to be threatened, no longer by an external military hypothesis, but by underdevelopment. Under this logic, States are then distinguished between effective and ineffective, ‘weak’ or failed

ones. (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 111). The State remains at the core of the development analysis but it is now entitled to secure humans from underdevelopment and becoming responsible to protect (R2P) individuals. In the pacification, post-intervention or contingent sovereignty era, that concept derives into the responsibility to reconstruct. In this sense, HS can be utilized as a policy approach concerning geopolitical interest of Northern countries. Terrorism and insurgency in the Southern populations moved from the homeland security policies to the International agenda while transnational networks and flows from failed countries are seen as a threat to the global order (DUFFIELD, 2007, p.113).

Moreover, according to Duffield (2007), the Human Security, although it is a rising concept promoted by a certain number of donor countries and institutions as the result of an increasing humanitarianism in international relations, it lacks a precise scope. In this sense, this author represents HS as the latest version of the interdependence between development and security. In fact, it enacts a multiple and complex capacity of different levels of global governance and international division of labor to work together across national borders. Human Security consolidates a liberal and individual-centered vision of the security problem where “human” corresponds to people’s capacity for self-management and self-reliance while “security focuses on the threats, risks and dangers deriving from underdevelopment. In his own words,

Human Security embraces a liberal people-centered problematic of security. It reflects the optimism of sustainable development with its promise of freedom and rights while also drawing attention to the ‘downside risks’” (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 115).

From donors perspective, sustainable development finds its number one threat in internal conflict while sustainable development and internal conflict both focus on local communities (as beneficiaries in the former and as a victim in the latter). This understanding led to the assumption that security cannot be achieved without development and development is not possible without security. The post-Cold War increased in the number of wars taking place within states and not between them, was connected with an increase in religious and ethnic tensions. This situation also inflicted extensive suffering to civilian populations. In this way, internal conflicts fueled by religious and ethnic helped scholars to broaden the security scope. In addition to that, western moral values took internal conflicts into the international scene in the 1990s in order to justify a new type of post-Cold War interventionism: the humanitarian interventionism. Under the 'new aid paradigm' framework, Human Security can provide a theoretical justification to humanitarian interventions, Duffield (2007, p. 127) concludes.

If dealing with external interventions, Prof. Chandler (2008) reminds us that sovereignty in the field of international relations means both political and legal autonomy against any external interventions. By definition, states are equal and shall not be subordinated to each other and the concept is neither divisible nor limitable. During colonial times, the colonial power denied the right to self-determination to its colony or protectorate. But once independence was granted, they were said to be entitled with the indivisible and universal right to be sovereign. Particularly during the Cold War, the International Court of Justice defended the right of self-government and also the denial of any legitimate grounds for external intervention.

However after the Cold War, humanitarian interventions shifted that position into a broader pro-interventionist approach. The reason is that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the focus was re-oriented towards the individual and his rights. Within this new scope states were not considered the core referent on security while state sovereignty was now no longer considered to be an absolute barrier to external intervention. Chandler (2008, p. 337) affirms that “much of the debate in the 1990s posed the human rights of individuals as counter to, and as undermining of, the rights of state sovereignty and as necessitating new rights of intervention for international institutions.”

Furthermore, during the 1990s, concepts like state and capacity building helped to shape a new change. As a consequence of this shift, international intervention serves as a way of “undermining non-Western state sovereignty” while the discourse is being constructed to portray international intervention as necessary in order to support and enhance the feeble sovereignty of the non-Western states (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 338). Intervention continues being international but not only military and it can be not only humanitarian but also institutionally oriented. Non-Western states appear to be seen as a threat or as a potential partner or ally who needs support and assistance. Their sovereignty is no longer defined as their capacity to exercise self-government. Sovereignty becomes then a principle due to suffer a transformation “through the liberal political economy of international intervention” (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 338).

In order to succeed in the transformation process, donors support and assistance are provided through the lenses of state and capacity building. What is then state building about? Chandler defines state-building in a particular perspective by stating that:

State building, the development of international regulatory mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of intra-state conflict and the state ‘collapse’, or at shoring up ‘failing states’, is commonly held to be the most pressing problem of global security, on ethical, humanitarian, and, in the wake of 9/11, realist security grounds (...) Since 1990s, the United States, the UK and other major Western governments have established new state building departments and policy units, while international institutions, from the UN down to more specialized international bodies engaged in economic development, democracy or human rights promotion (CHANDLER 2008, p.337).

The way these departments work is by linking the aid their governments or institutions provide with state-building and capacity-building programs. Consequently, the remaining question is whether international aid through state-building programs is an approach seeking to enhance effective, autonomous and sovereign states? If the answer is yes, then sovereignty might not be understood within the same scope as during the Cold War. In the end, Chandler (2008) explains that the redefinition of sovereignty is central for the state building approach which also helps to blur the borders from where international institutions succeed to intervene. This author concludes that the reason why international donors prefer to act “under the programs of liberal peace” is “to distance themselves from the consequences of the political and economic policies they promote” (CHANDLER, 2008, p. 339).

Following this logic, Human Security can be understood as a policy tool to promote liberal governance in the Global South. It requires the weak and failed distinction to assert its interventionism according to the R2P insecure populations. This classification of states is certainly unequal and does not include the insecure populations



living within rich and developed nations. In simple terms, “effective countries” find themselves capable of ensuring the well-being of populations living within ineffective territories or conflict areas (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 122). Wherever the national-international boundaries become blurred, other public and private, international and regional institutions appear to be legitimized to operate at the community level of any weak or failed state. Duffield (2007, p. 130) reminds us that places like Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, East Timor or Iraq “relief and development assistance had been given the job of strengthening the legitimacy of weak and fragile states and remaking such countries into showcase examples of the benefits of Western involvement.”

The new aid paradigm appears to be a consequence of many historical and political events and also a particular insight from different approaches from a diversity of international actors to those events. Moreover, because donors found that dealing with long-term development projects in places with a lack of security was a barrier to their success, the engagement with the Security Sector also became crucial. Furthermore, hoping that armed forces could play a positive role in the development process, donors gradually began to be concerned about the unattended consequences that could emerge in cases where security cooperation was provided.

The Global War on Terror after the September 9 episode reinforced this concern and contributed to expand the global security side of the Human Security concept in a sense from which the times of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, concerning ineffective states, started to come to an end. This security-development nexus logic was also used to pave the road for a new and incipient interventionism in the name of war against terrorism. Following this perspective, a counter insurgency campaign on a global scale might be an implicit

major reason for aid agencies to engage in poverty reduction and democratic governance under the Human Security theoretical umbrella. If that would be the case, then it confirmed the hypothesis that the merge of Development and Security Assistance would be a strategic tool of what Duffield characterizes as the “unending war” (DUFFIELD, 2007, p. 126).

## **LINKING DEVELOPMENT WITH SECURITY AND THE PROMOTION OF SSR**

Historically speaking, the SSR was initially introduced by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) by early 1999<sup>4</sup>. In a policy report on poverty and security sector the DFID (1997, p. 1) remarked that: “The link between security and development has been increasingly recognized in recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War, and has been actively examined in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.” By that time, the DAC was producing guidelines about conflict, peace and development cooperation. In this way development programs began to focus on addressing the root causes of conflict. Not only that but they also started to link its work with the promotion of good governance. This aspect was entitled to be achieved by strengthening the rule of law, improving policing and promoting accessible justice and personal security.

In practical terms during those days, SSR mostly focused on the defense sector, but after a few years, it was evident for the UK Government that SSR needed to have a broader scope that could include other areas. In this sense, by 2003, the security sector was being defined also taking into consideration other bodies that

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<sup>4</sup> After the Labour Party, had won the elections in 1997.

legitimately deal with the use of force. This broad understanding now includes not only armed forces, police, and paramilitary units but also the judiciary, prisons, human rights commissions, defense and prosecutions services.

Being the creator it also was the main proponent of SSR. The UK strategically promoted SSR in the 1990s through the OECD DAC, and in the 2000s, within the UN system. Ball (2010, p. 34) affirms that “The UK frequently works through multilateral forums to promote its policy objective. DFID decided to promote its SSR agenda internationally by helping the DAC to develop donor thinking on SSR”. In this way, gradually SSR became part of donors’ agenda. Consequently, in 2004, the DAC members issued a policy brief called “Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice” in which SSR is explained as: “Security system reform<sup>5</sup> (SSR) seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law.” It continues stating that: “SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing” (OECD, 2004, p.1).

Regarding SSR actors, OECD DAC (2004) states the following:

The security system includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services, and judicial and penal institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. parliament, the executive, and the defense ministry) (OECD DAC, 2004, p.1).

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<sup>5</sup> DAC refers to SSR as Security System Reform and not Sector Reform.

In the same policy brief three main challenges “facing all states” are identified: i) developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable, such as women, children, and minority groups; ii) strengthening the governance and oversight of security institutions; and iii) building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society organizations (OECD, 2004, p. 2).

In 2007 the OECD issued the “OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) – Supporting Security and Justice” in which a broader scope of the security-development nexus is explained in this way:

Security is fundamental to people’s livelihoods, to reducing poverty and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights. Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures and escape from poverty (OECD 2007: 13).

Think tanks have also contributed to the conceptual development of SSR. For example, The Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform – GFN SSR clarifies that “Whilst SSR is a relatively new term, it has been adopted by major international bodies and countries as a holistic concept that includes various disciplines

and covers many different sectors and in order to be successful; must be treated as such. However there is not yet one universally accepted definition” (GFN, 2007, p. 5). This organization published, in 2007, “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” in which its own definition of SSR is states in these terms:

Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction, good governance and, in particular, the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law. This relies on the ability of the state to mitigate its people’s vulnerabilities through development, and to use a range of policy instruments to prevent or address security threats that affect society’s well-being. This includes establishing appropriate civilian oversight of security actors. Hence, a broader range of state institutions is now being considered in the provision of security, with the military seen as one instrument among many. The ‘security sector’ includes traditional security actors such as the armed forces and police; oversight bodies such as the executive and legislature; civil society organizations; justice and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and prisons; as well as non-state security providers” (GFN 2007, p. 4).

Partially critical of SSR, Chutter (2006) expresses interesting aspects concerning the lack of practitioners’ perspective in this matter. This author poses that the written material about SSR is normally composed by theoretical models drawn by political science scholars which are limited in the terms of understanding how the Security Sector actually works in practice and how it differs enormously from country to country. The reason of that is the lack of personal expertise of the authors. He concludes on the other hand, that the merge of the SSR with Development Policies has broadened the concept and created a certain degree of confusion about what SSR is really about.

Cooper and Pugh (2002, p. 1) propose a wider and more innovative understanding is needed. They argue that a Security Sector Transformation should be addressed in order to delineate the “role that transformative strategies can play in preventing conflict and promoting post-conflict peace building.” They imply that donors must also reform their own security apparatus and recompose the ‘democratic deficit’ they have in the relationship with recipients particularly concerning donor’s security interests.

Bellamy (2003, p. 107) asserts that the: “Security sector reform therefore promises to assist the process of building democratic peace by fostering armed forces that reflect and promote liberal values.” How does it do it? According to the author “by enhancing human security, democratization, and broader development programs in places where there has either been ‘protracted social conflict’ as in East Timor or Cambodia or a track record of illegitimate and ineffective governance as in many other parts of the Southeast Asian region.”

As a practitioner working in SSR in Timor-Leste, McCullough (2007, p. 2)<sup>6</sup> claims that SSR is a fairly simple concept. It is the “organizing policy and process for a set of activities through which the security system of a given country can evolve”. He emphasized that “it is an intrinsically political process creating winners and losers with all the associated fallout. In post-conflict countries, external actors have played a significant role in supporting, or even carrying out such activities, often as separate endeavors”. In his opinion “reform should be directed to ensure security institutions act in a people-centered manner.” He added that “further emphasis is thus placed on the principle that the actions of these security actors (as with all other actors) accord with principles of good governance,

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<sup>6</sup> SSR expert in charge of the Security Sector Support Unit at the UNMIT

transparency and accountability”. In a few words<sup>7</sup>, he synthesized that SSR is a political, and not only technical, process. In his words, SSR is “dealing with the testicles of the state”, he summarized.

From a local adviser’s perspective, Simoes<sup>8</sup> expressed that the UN and the UNDP have been promoting SSR in Timor-Leste, since 1999 until nowadays. In his own perspective, SSR means “no development without security.” In other words, it means that no country can develop with violence and instability. The link between security and development was re-affirmed after the 2006 crisis. Nowadays, Timorese government’s institutions are working on conflict prevention under the motto “Goodbye conflict, welcome development.” Nowadays, the Timorese society and leaders share a common perspective in order to avoid further foreign intervention by stating that “whatever happens we should not solve our problems through violence.” In this sense, SSR might be seen as a way to solve internal power disputes in a pacific manner in order to avoid further external interventions.

Technically speaking, it is easy to find nowadays SSR as something associated with academic programs and private consultancy companies dealing with a diverse spectrum that goes from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, including child and female soldiers, combating small arms and light weapons (SALW) and demining, to transitional justice, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, fighting trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs until good practices, civilian oversight and accountability for the security sector.

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<sup>7</sup> He was interviewed in his office at UNMIT on 1° April 2011

<sup>8</sup> Security Advisor for the Secretary of Internal Security (Timor-Leste Government) who was interviewed in his office in Dili on 28 March 2011

## **THE UN ROLE ON SSR: Securing Peace and Development**

In terms of the UN background, Ebo and Powell (2010, p. 45) affirm that “Security Sector Reform (SSR) is not a new activity for the UN” and, by 1989, the UN was already assisting the Government of Namibia in creating a new national army. Since then the UN has been involved in a variety of efforts concerning SSR in different regions of the world. This includes also the PKO in Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda in the 1990s where the UN was involved in DDR and armed forces training (UNSG, 2008, para 23).

It is only by October 2004 that the term “security sector reform” is explicitly mentioned by the Security Council<sup>9</sup> “as an umbrella concept for defense and police reform as well as DDR” (HANGGI and SCHERRER, 2007, p. 6). It was not until very recently that the UN lacked a framework about this subject. In January 2008, the Secretary General addressed a report called “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” in which it is established that UN’s main task is “to support national actors in achieving their security, peace and development goals. To that end, the development of effective and accountable security institutions on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect for human rights and the rule of law is essential” (UNSG 2008, p. 1).

Ensuring international peace and security remains a UN’s main challenge and regardless its efforts during the last 60 years “conflict and violence continue to pose a threat to member states and peoples; freedom from fear and want remain elusive for many.” In this sense, “United Nations continues to search for effective

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<sup>9</sup> In Security Council Resolution 1565/2004 the term ‘Security Sector Reform’ is mentioned twice (p. 7 and 12)



responses to address insecurity based on its charter.” In this respect, two related central themes have emerged, the UN states. The first one “is that security, human rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace”. The second one “is the recognition that these fundamental elements can be achieved only within a broad framework of the rule of law” (UNSG, 2008, para 1).

Under this understanding where development, human rights and security are intertwined within a rule of law framework the UN emphasized that “member States and their organizations remain central providers of security; this is their sovereign right and responsibility” (UNSG, 2008, para 2). In paragraph 11, the Secretary General warns that: “Security forces that are untrained, ill-equipped, mismanaged and irregularly paid are often part of the problem and perpetrate serious violations of human rights” and that “longer-term development demands a sufficient degree of security to facilitate poverty reduction and economic growth.” In the report, the Secretary-General defined the Security Sector by explaining that:

Security sector is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security

sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services (UNSG, 2008, para 14).

The UN recognized that each country defines security in accordance with its own “particular contexts, histories, cultures and needs. No single model of security sector exists. Effective and accountable security sectors, however, have a number of common features” (UNSG, 2008, p. 15). Among those common features it is pointed out the need for: a legal framework; an institutionalized system; the development of personnel’s capacities; transparent mechanism of interaction among security actors and the promotion of a culture of service.

Connected to the goal of effectiveness and accountability, the report highlighted the importance of the national commitment and ownership as key aspects for success by recognizing that SSR is a:

Highly political process that must be placed in its specific national and regional context. Effective support by outside actors also requires knowledge and sensitivity. Equally, successful reform of the security sector needs political commitment, basic consensus and coordination among national actors. Broad national consultation lies at the heart of national ownership. Ultimately, security sector reform can succeed only if it is a nationally led and inclusive process in which national and local authorities, parliaments and civil society, including traditional leaders, women’s groups and others are actively engaged (UNSG, 2008, para 36).

A set of ten basic principles are elucidated as guidelines or parameters for UN’s SSR initiatives. These include the following statements (UNSG, 2008: para 45):

1. The goal of the UN in SSR is to support states in

- developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions;
2. SSR should be national decision based;
  3. Success depends on national ownership and commitment;
  4. UN's approach must be "flexible and tailored to the country";
  5. The whole process must be gender sensitive;
  6. An SSR framework is essential from the very early post-conflict recovery stages;
  7. A defined strategy with priorities, partnerships and timelines is required;
  8. International support's effectiveness depends on the level of accountability and resources that are provided;
  9. Coordination among national and international actors is vital;
  10. Regular evaluation and monitoring is needed to asses SSR progress.

In the end, what is SSR for the UN? In the paragraph 17 SSR is explained in the following way:

Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. As the Security Council noted, security sector reform "should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question" (UNSG, 2008: para 17). "Security Sector Reform underscores that effectiveness; accountability

and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing elements of security. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing a shared vision of security (UNSG 2008: para 18).

Who has this shared vision of security according the UN Secretary General? First of all, a variety of UN agencies that have been involved in SSR such as: Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Peace building Support Office, UNDP, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), etc. Other national partners are included in the answer, for example, the UK with its involvement in post-conflict Sierra Leone; Angola, South Africa and other African nation's efforts in DRC and Burundi; and Latin American states' security cooperation in Haiti. Other examples of bilateral partners are the US in Liberia, France in Lebanon and Australia in the South Pacific region. The Report continues stressing that some Regional and multilateral organizations are also engaged in SSR. For example: The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, DAC OECD, the World Bank and NATO (UNSG, 2008, section IV).

The UN also reflected about its lessons learned from previous engagements with SSR by stressing that “the most fundamental lesson for the United Nations is that security is a precondition for sustainable peace, development and human rights” and that the success of a PKO after its withdrawal from a post-conflict scenario depends on the effectiveness of the local security sector to maintain the path of sustainable peace and development. Cases like Haiti, Liberia and

Timor-Leste demonstrated the UN's failure on institutional capacity building. Therefore, UN PKO "have increasingly emphasized the need to establish effective and accountable security sectors" (UNSG, 2008, para 35).

## **SSR AS A WORK IN PROGRESS?**

Even though SSR appears to be as a non-contested policy in mainstream academia and donors' community it could be affirmed that the variety of definitions and understandings might show something else. It appears to be that mostly donors (and not states nor practitioners nor scholars) are the ones who define what the security sector is and what its needs are. At least they make clear that there is no agreement in terms of a common terminology or approach within donors' community. The terms used to describe the intended subject refer to security sector reform or security system reform, security sector transformation or development and they express not only a different definition but a different perspective in itself. Is it that specific policy tools are linked with the promotion of SSR policies depending on each country's needs and also on Donors' interests?

Lacking a common approach, these days, not only the UK Government, the OECD and the UN are supporting SSR programs around the world but also many other countries have included SSR in their development agendas. This includes a variety of donor nations as: Canada, France, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and the United States, plus International or Regional Organizations as African Union, Council of Europe, ECOWAS, European Union, Nato, OECD, Organisation Intl Francophonie, OSCE, SADC, UN system agencies, and the World Bank. Furthermore, SSR is not only being implemented by national or international actors but

also outsourced to Private Military e Security Companies (PMSC). Pingeot characterizes this situation as a dangerous partnership in the case of the UN and the PMSC.

When thinking about where is SSR being implemented, is it easy to find spots all around the Global South. Not only in ongoing or post-conflict countries as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Timor-Leste in the case of Asia, and Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan if talking about some examples from Africa or Haiti and Colombia in the Americas. But also in transitional (post-soviet) nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, such as: Bulgaria, Rumania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Bosnia and Kosovo (WULF, 2004).

Ball (2010: 36) refers that among the present confusion there is a certain agreement about two problems: the ineffective provision of security (and justice) because providers can also be part of the problem and the lack of accountability and oversight over the security sector by the civil society. The author adds that “the objective is to promote the effective and efficient provision of security and justice to people and the communities and states in which they live within a framework of democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights.” According to the author the SSR should be taken with caution, “as a work in progress.”

## CONCLUSION

This paper is part of an ongoing research. Because of that, it has no conclusions to offer. However, it is willing to contribute with research questions for readers and scholars. As it is clear from the above, there is no precise understanding about SSR, its process and outcomes. Within the present broad scope, it might be relevant

to research how, in reality, does SSR work in linking security and development? Also whether, in reality, SSR *per se* secure peace and development and how does it enforce human security (i.e. people's security) and not only state's security?

Under these circumstances, it is uncertain how liberal values and human rights are supposed to be fulfilled as a result of an exogenous process by simply applying foreign aid policies intending to reform fragile and post-conflict (in some cases former repressive) security institutions. Remains unknown how Human Security is willing to ensure not only economical but also people's social and political rights and whether SSR is really a human rights-based approach or just a part of a securitized development plan. Moreover and in reality, SSR might not be fully capable of achieving stability for sustainable development in post-conflict scenarios but it could be an agent contributing to violence and to further instability in recipient countries.

Increasing donors' interest in security plus conditionality terms for providing aid could be seen as an imposed agenda by Western and former colonial powers. If that would be the case, how much of a change is there between Cold War security cooperation and nowadays SSR? Another interesting aspect for further research is why regional and former colonial powers are so interested in getting involved in SSR both bilaterally or under the umbrella of an international organization.

To what extent is legitimate that 'effective' countries entitle themselves to the commitment of ensuring the well-being of people living within ineffective territories? They appear to entitle themselves to protect and secure native populations' human rights by implementing their developed notion of what security means but without proving whether and how SSR practically benefits

local people. If that is the case, then it would be relevant to conduct extensive research whether by merging development and security policies, Northern developed nations camouflage the protection of their national interests in the name of the well-being of the people in the Global South.

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## RESUMO

A Reforma do Setor da Segurança (RSS) surgiu como uma abordagem política na agenda de desenvolvimento, na década de 1990. Depois da Guerra Fria, os doadores internacionais e as organizações multilaterais envolvidos com questões de desenvolvimento começaram a vincular o desenvolvimento com a segurança como uma maneira de resolver a necessidade de uma compreensão alternativa de questões de segurança relacionadas à assistência internacional. Originalmente promovido pelo Governo do Reino Unido, por meio da primeira OCDE, e, posteriormente, na ONU, a RSS foi retratado como parte do “paradigma de novos auxílios”. Buscando reduzir o risco de conflito e melhorar a estabilidade, e a fim de obter o “desenvolvimento seguro”, seu objetivo teórico é aumentar a segurança das populações locais através da criação de eficazes e responsáveis agentes de segurança respeitosos nos países destinatários. No entanto, a SSR também pode ser vista como uma ferramenta para proteger os interesses dos doadores no chamado pós-conflito, que é fraco e falido nos estados do Sul Global. Este artigo apresenta de que modo a segurança e o desenvolvimento uniram-se e, depois de lidar com o âmbito teórico da RSS, as definições e objetivos que sugerem novas áreas de investigação sobre as políticas implementadas da RSS e os seus resultados.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Reforma do Setor de Segurança. Segurança. Desenvolvimento. Sul global.

## ABSTRACT

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) emerged as a policy approach in the development agenda in the late 1990s. After the Cold-War, International Donors and Multilateral Organizations engaged with development issues began to link development with security as a way to solve the need for an alternative understanding of security matters regarding international assistance. Originally promoted by the UK Government through the OECD first, and in the UN later, SSR was portrayed as part of the “new aid paradigm”. Aiming to reduce the risk of conflict and to enhance stability in order to “secure development”, its theoretical objective is to enhance local populations’ security by creating effective, accountable and human rights respectful security actors in recipient countries. However, SSR can also be seen as a tool for securing donors’ interests in so-called post-conflict, weak

and failed states in the Global South. This paper introduces the reader to how security and development became linked and after dealing with SSR theoretical scope, definitions and objectives, it suggests areas for further research about SSR implemented policies and its outcome.

**KEYWORDS:** Security Sector Reform. Security. Development. Global South.



**THE DEKASEGI AND PINOY DESCENDANTS:  
Labor Conditions and Migrant Dynamics of Brazilian and  
Filipino Nikkeijin Workers in Japan**

Ron Bridget Vilog<sup>1\*</sup>

**INTRODUCTION**

In a nation where myths of homogeneity are still widely told, foreigners glaringly find themselves socially and politically excluded. What comes from outside remains impure, unpleasant, and occasionally troublesome. This is how *gaijins* are depicted a century ago in Japan. Nonetheless, traces of xenophobia still persist despite the government's effort to embrace multiculturalism.

Japan, a state that strictly adheres to the principle of *jus sanguinis* or the "rule of the blood", has always venerated their nationhood and ethnicity as part of their national psyche. Citizenship indeed, is more than a political fiction, thereby non-negotiable. Conversely, the rule of the blood is still complex and tricky. The narratives of the Nikkeijins elucidate this point as they struggle for social acceptance in their own ethnic homeland. Lamentably, in the eyes of the society, they are still "gaijins" or outsiders.

Since the 1980s, thousands of Japanese descendants traveled across the Pacific to explore better employment opportunities in Japan. These Nikkeijins who had lived in Brazil and other Latin

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American countries believe that they possess the ethnic right to be incorporated to the Japanese society. They had endured the cheap and disposable labor system which astonishingly improved their socio-economic conditions. However, as they contest their ethnic identity and legal status, the Nikkeijin migrants have been vulnerable to various forms of abuses and exploitation.

The flow of Nikkeijin migration remains dynamic amidst global economic crises and stricter immigration policies. Descendants of Japanese nationals, not only from Latin America but also from the Philippines and Indonesia continuously arrive at the Japanese borders to reunite with their families and join the labor force, unaware of the appalling conditions that await them at the “kaisha”<sup>1</sup> (company). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the plights of these workers as they engage in a society that refuses to accept their “Japaneseness” and instead, ascribes them the lower occupations known as 3K (kiken, kitsui, kitanai) – dangerous, difficult, and dirty. As conventional research initiatives highlight the dynamics of push and pull factors as well as neoclassical theories that shape migration decision and its impact on global development, this study hopes to derive fresh insights on the linkage of ethnic belongingness to the prospect of assimilation and holistic development. With the assumption that migrant wellbeing contributes to the stability and continuity of global migration process, it is significant to inquire how individual migrants view their host society in general, and the way they are accepted within the confines of their workplaces.

Despite the widespread view that Japan does not accept foreign workers, present reality tells us that this nation’s economy would not survive without the so-called outsiders. A glimpse at

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<sup>1</sup> Kaisha, in Japanese language, literally means “company.” However, workers use this term referring to their respective factories or workplace.

Japanese factories in Aichi Prefecture reveals that the manpower is dominated by foreigners with different colors and languages. Most of these Latin American and Asian workers are not merely foreign laborers but in fact Japanese descendants, with grandparents or great grandparents born in Japan before the Second World War. Tormented by the prevailing immigrant politics in Japan, these descendants from Brazil, Peru, America, the Philippines and Indonesia have been contesting their identities reflected through their ancestry, legal status, and citizenship.

This paper explores the migrant experiences of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins and the factors that ostensibly prolong the process of migration. Brazilian Nikkeijins, casually labeled as “*dekasegi*” (*people who go abroad temporarily to earn money*) and Filipino Nikkeijins, commonly known as Pinoy descendants among Filipino migrant and church groups, have continuously filled the shortages for low-skilled labor. While both groups of Nikkeijins consider themselves as temporary sojourners, social structures as well as individual agency create a rigorous trap in the host society, making them unable to terminate the migration cycle. The first part of the paper examines the dynamics of migration and the social agents that stimulate and sustain the migration process. The latter part focuses on their labor conditions and its correlation on identity struggle. Discussing the conditions and the challenges that they confront within and beyond their *kaisha*, this paper argues that there are parallelisms in the migration process of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijin groups, albeit different perceptions of identity and strategies in coping with the perceived discrimination in their respective working environment. Comparing the ethnographic results, this study reveals that the stark contrast of identity perception between Brazilian and

Filipino Nikkeijins significantly affect their views of assimilation, discrimination and the overall labor conditions.

The study employs life history interviews with 50 Filipino Nikkeijin workers residing in Aichi Prefecture. To compare the case of the Filipino descendants with the Brazilians, existing ethnographic studies of Brazilian Nikkeijins were reviewed, supplemented by a focus group discussion with Brazilian Nikkeijin informants who have been working in Nagoya.

## LEGAL BASIS OF NIKKEI MIGRATION

Japan has been viewed as a nation that is hostile to foreigners including migrant laborers. This is very evident with the post war policies that pushed for the repatriation of Chinese and Koreans and restricted the entry of all foreign migrants<sup>2</sup>. By and large, Japan's citizenship and migration laws reflect the country's historical closure and isolation that has been experienced for more than 200 years. The "sakoku" mentality<sup>3</sup> has aggravated the xenophobia; conspiring with the principles of insularity and myths of ethnic homogeneity and the general perception that foreigners are outsiders that threaten and disrupt Japanese purity (MORRIS-SUZUKI, 2010, p.10).

Indeed, the entry of foreign workers remained very minimal throughout the postwar period. However, the changing economy from the 1970s to the early 1990s posed as a challenge to the restraining policies. While the nation remained closed to the idea of foreign

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<sup>2</sup> During the American occupation, the SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) in collaboration with the Japanese leaders imposed restrictive policies in order to obscure the presence of potential migrants and obscure the presence of migrants who had already entered the country.

<sup>3</sup> Sakoku is the principle of "locked country." It has been the foreign policy of Japan under during the Tokugawa regime which isolated the country from 1633 to 1853. The country reopened during the restoration of Meiji.



immigration, the evident increase of illegal and side-door entrant foreign workers had initially been tolerated by the government to support the booming industries of the rising economic giant.

Throughout the post-war economic growth and recession, three stages of migration development in Japan has been noted by Mori (1997). During the first wave of migration, women from the Philippines and Taiwan arrived to serve as hostesses in night clubs. These foreign entertainers occupied the vacancies in the red light districts which were unpopular for the local women. The second wave emerged in the late 1980s. This group is composed of single men from China, Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand who found employment in the manufacturing and construction industries. Such period also marks the arrival of foreign laborers who engaged in services, retail trade and restaurants. Finally, the third wave of migration began when the new immigration law was enforced in 1990. This amendment legalized the employment of foreign workers of Japanese descent known as the “Nikkei.” Mostly from Latin American countries like Brazil and Peru, these groups of Nikkeijin satisfied the labor needs of large enterprises, specifically automobile assembly plants, auto parts companies, and electrical appliance industries.

It is important to highlight the legal shifts during the third wave. Because of the large influx of undocumented workers in the 1980s, the government responded by implementing the Immigration Control Act of 1990. Some of the important stipulations are the following (PAPADEMETRIOU and HAMILTON, 2000; REBICK, 2005):

1. The children of Japanese who had migrated to other countries, known as Nikkeijin, were allowed to take up residence in Japan and to work without restriction.
2. A limited number of trainee workers could be brought in for the purpose of training them skills that they would then use in their home country.
3. Except for the above categories, it is illegal to employ unskilled workers from overseas.
4. There was an expansion of the number of categories under which skilled workers were allowed to work.

As mentioned above, the revised law basically allows Nikkeijins to enter Japan even as unskilled workers while prohibiting foreigners from taking up unskilled jobs. With the implementation of this policy, the number of Latin American migrants has increased from practically zero to more than 250.000 (GOTO, 2006). Brazil has the largest number of Nikkeijins, mostly concentrated in Toyota (Aichi), Hamamatsu (Shizuoka), and Oizumi and Ohta (Gunma) (SUZUKI, 2008). Meanwhile, the Philippines has also lobbied for the recognition of Philippine Nikkeijin, initiating another wave of migrants from the Southeast Asian region. While the Japanese government remained extremely strict for Filipino workers due to its campaign on combating human trafficking and illegal immigration, Japanese descendants from the Philippines were eventually welcomed with the hope that they could contribute their skills in Japanese industries facing labor shortages.

In general, the main problem that has tremendously challenged the conservative immigration policy was Japan's demographic shift. The aging of Japan's population is accompanied by other detrimental phenomenon – birth rate decline, life expectancy increase, and total

population drop. In a study conducted by the NIPSSR, Japan's population has been projected in three variants; the worst case scenario was shown by the low variant which says that from a population of 126.93 million in 2000, the figure peaked at 127.48 million in 2004 and shrink to 92.03 in 2050<sup>4</sup>. As a consequence, the labor sector is concerned with the possible decline of labor force and its negative implications on productivity. According to the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the labor force will decline by approximately 4.1 million people in 2015 from the 2004 figure of 66 million. It is also predicted that by 2030, the entire working population will likely fall by some 10 million (MULGAN, 2006, p.125). As a result, economists forecast a decline on economic growth rate to 0.7 in real terms between 2004 and 2015, and 0,6 percent a year between 2015 to 2030. Then again, the government faces the challenge of overturning the policy of not accepting permanent foreign laborers. For the time being, a priority is given to the "Japanese blooded foreigners," the so-called "Nikkeijins."

## TEMPORARY SOJOURN

The implementation of the New Immigration Law of 1990 paved the way for the entry of thousands of Brazilian Nikkeijin who took advantage of Japan's booming industries. According to Tsuda, these migrants are solidly middle class and relatively well-to-do in Brazil, with incomes higher than average earners (TSUDA, 1999, p.689). Hence, the term *dekasegi* became widely used denoting the temporary sojourn of these migrants who simply wanted to improve

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<sup>4</sup> This demographic data from Japan's National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSSR) foresees high variant, medium variant, and low variant. The high variant predicts higher number of population growth, while the low variant indicates unstable low population growth.

their socioeconomic status by working for a certain period in Japan. Most of them had initially intended to return to Brazil as soon as they save sufficient fund for more investments. However, as many migration researchers have observed, these Brazilians have been prolonging the so-called “tentative stay.” Thus, the distinguished scholar of Nikkei migration, Prof. Takeyuki Tsuda has theorized the “permanence” of temporary migration of these workers.

Tsuda explains that structural embeddedness is a perspective that “examines how stable immigrant populations become firmly embedded in the host society, persisting over a long period of time, even if the economic incentives which encourage migrants to remain abroad considerably weaken (TSUDA, 2003, p.692).” To illustrate, although Brazil’s economy started to improve after the implementation of *Plano Real*, many Brazilian Nikkeijins still refused to go home, contradicting their initial intention to stay in Japan “temporarily.” The reason lies on the progression of economic and social factors which eventually formed the layers of “structural embeddedness.”

It is not surprising that most Filipino Nikkeijins share the views of Brazilian Nikkeijins on issues pertaining to the length of stay in Japan. Out of fifty interviewees, only seven (7) are aspiring for Japanese citizenship. Twenty one (21) participants are already holders of permanent residency visa, but they still express their intention to return to their home communities in the Philippines as soon as they fulfill their economic goals.

Filipino interview participants consistently maintained that economic factors had swayed them to migrate to Japan. Most of the responses denote financial difficulties in the Philippines, while a few had declared that they merely wanted to sustain or improve their current socio-economic status. Interestingly, upon analyzing

the biographical narratives, it can be surmised that most, if not all the participants are not from the poorest stratum of the society. Since majority of the interviewees are sansei (third generation) descendants, their issei (first generation) or nisei (second generation) family members who had migrated a decade ago evidently supported their financial needs prior to migration. In fact, twenty three (23) of them had obtained college degrees while fifteen (15) had acquired high school diplomas.

While it is possible that early Nikkeijin migrants who left the Philippines in the 1990s had experienced severe economic difficulties, my interview participants, mostly new generations of descendants had clearly enjoyed economic stability prior to migration. This fact is demonstrated not only by their educational attainment, but also manifested by their statements explaining their pre-migration status. Some Filipino interviewees like Malou, Vienna, Dennis and Noel were all company employees earning an above average employee income in the metropolis. Others like Alfred, Cams, and Ching were managing a small family-owned business (like sari-sari store or a small restaurant). Only very few participants like Greg and Marcy had experienced extreme poverty beyond doubt, citing their daily struggles of conquering starvation and looking for friends or relatives to whom they could borrow money for their necessities.

It can be argued that the Brazilian Nikkeijins' primary motivation to migrate is similar to the Filipinos. Coming from the middle-class socio-economic background with very good educational credentials, they decided to take unskilled job in order to earn monies that can be remitted to their families in Brazil. They were also concerned about the economic crisis in the country and its ominous effects on their socio-economic conditions. Most interestingly, they

believe that migration is the fastest way of improving their economic status. Quoting a UN Report, Knight reveals that Brazilian Nikkeijins

wished to use their sojourn in Japan to improve or maintain their standard of living in Brazil by purchasing homes, cars, and luxury items such as video and audio equipment, home appliances, TVs, and other electronic goods- things that they had come to expect in their lives, but which had become increasingly affordable (KNIGHT, 2002, p.16).

Interestingly, other factors that propel Nikkeijin migration are only true for the Brazilian case. Knight clarifies that economic factors seemed to be the initial impetus for Brazilian Nikkeijin migration, but there can be other reasons. This may include the historical, ethnic, and socio-cultural variables that act as transnational connections between Brazil and Japan. There was indeed a “strong transnational ethnic affiliation” between the two countries which has been strengthened by the existence of vibrant Japanese communities in Brazil. Even before the process of migration, Brazilian Nikkeijins were already molded to act like genuine Japanese even in a Latin American setting. Thus, many of them view migration as an “opportunity to experience the true Japanese culture, discover their ancestral roots, and acquire useful technical skills whilst they were in Japan” (KNIGHT, 2002, p.16).

## **LABOR CONDITIONS**

Salary is the most compelling reason for prolonging the ‘temporary’ sojourn in Japan. Economic benefits have consistently conflicted with emotional and psychological stress in shaping migrant behavior. This section discusses the working conditions of

the Nikkeijins based on my interviewees' perception. Both groups expressively articulated their stories of economic success countered by hardships, poor health, and a sense of being marginalized.

Unlike the usual process of job selection, Nikkeijin labor system does not offer a variety of choices and information regarding the *kaisha*. In the case of Brazilian Nikkeijins, prospective workers refuse to migrate until they acknowledge concrete job opportunities at destinations. Labor brokers operating in Brazil serve as a recruitment agency which initially process the immigration papers and match them to a specific workplace. They also serve as travel agents, issuing air tickets, arranging a pick-up service from the airport, and designating an accommodation close to the workplace. Brokers are responsible for placing a migrant to a particular *kaisha*, and transferring him if some problems arise. Higuchi calls it commodified migration system in which recruitment agencies or brokers serve as facilitator of migration process (HIGUCHI, 2005, p.9). Although it requires higher costs, migration becomes more viable and convenient.

Filipino Nikkeijins sometimes utilize the services of brokers upon entry to Japan. There are also some Nikkeijin organizations like Manila Nikkeijin-kai and Philippine Nikkeijin Mutual Foundation that provide legal advice for the processing of papers, and even actual job recruitment. For most of my sansei (third generation) interviewees, immediate family members or relatives did the processing of immigration papers and arrangement of accommodation. Sansei (third generation) and yonsei (fourth generation) mostly rely on their higher generation relatives to acquire an upgraded koseki tohon (family registry), process the certificate of eligibility, and look for a specific workplace or a trusted labor broker for them. Other participants disclosed that they were literally jobless when they first came to Japan because their relatives believed

that the most important thing is to enter Japan through a valid visa, whereas job seeking would be easier upon arrival.

In both Brazilian and Filipino cases, information regarding the workplace and job description is strictly limited. The consequence, as expected, is a tremendous physical and social distress due to the sudden shift of lifestyle and work environment. The difficulty of working in a Japanese factory depends on the nature of the company, the kind of job, and the attitude of the assembly leader. While both Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins experience have a certain degree of hardship in the workplace, some Nikkeijins feel that their job is tolerable and sometimes “fun”. For instance, Vienna and Emily, both Filipino sansei, had worked in the assembly line of Sony. The routinely task is to insert a small component of camera to the machine in a running conveyor. Both Vienna and Emily think the job is easy and simple. Vienna said she enjoyed the job because the entire line is composed of friendly Filipinos who are also descendants. On the contrary, Emily did not enjoy because of the boring and repetitive procedures that they need to do everyday for ten hours.

Those who are working in an automotive, textile, and other machinery firms expressed a different response: it was extremely hard. To summarize their reasons, the difficulty is attributed to the heavy components that they have to lift. “We were treated like machines with batteries,” according to Alfred. “I almost cried, I had never experienced such kind of work in the Philippines. We were carrying heavy tiles, and we can’t even rest,” said to Randy. One of my female interviewees, Cams, 23 years old, also recalled her experience:

I was carrying heavy steel parts, and we had to move really quick. Obviously, it’s a job for male workers. But I was already there and I can’t complain. There was



a time when my dad, who was working at the same company but different department suddenly saw me. He tried lifting the steel and he realized how heavy those were. He pitied me, and somehow he wanted to help me, but he simply can't.

Although they told stories of severe hardships in *kaisha*, Cams, Randy and Alfred have been staying in Japan for more than five years. They have all considered the financial rewards of such physical agony. They have also mentioned that the hardest part is only during the first year, but the succeeding period became more tolerable. Now, they are already used to the physical distress.

For most of the *kaishas*, the only break time is during lunch (1 hour) and the 15 minute interval between regular worktime and overtime. Most Filipino and Brazilian Nikkeijins are also required by their leaders to do overtime work everyday despite the legal stipulation that overtime must be made optional for workers. However, in most factories, it has been a corporate culture to extend the amount of service time to the company. Workers who refuse to do overtime are usually reprimanded by their line leaders or superiors. One of my interviewees who has been working as an administrator in an automotive *kaisha* also mentioned that those who decline to work after regular time usually earn the Filipino moniker “tamad” (lazy).

Not surprisingly, almost all my Filipino interviewees admitted that overtime is essential to significantly increase their salary, hence they are willing to regularly do it except during those days when they feel sick. One key informant who used to work as a translator in a Japanese factory in Gifu noticed that nowadays, Brazilians tend to turn down overtime work while the Filipinos take this as their advantage to increase their income. This observation is consistent

with Tsuda's view that there has been a weakened work ethic among Brazilian Nikkeijins. Having stayed in Japan for a long period of time, these workers have now shifted to a more socially satisfying and enjoyable lifestyle (TSUDA, 1999, p.705). Thus, a number of my Filipino Nikkeijin interviewees noted that Brazilians are *tamad* (lazy), unwilling to do overtime, and very argumentative. Mr. Albert, a Filipino Nikkei who was assigned as a leader of Filipino, Peruvian and Brazilian Nikkeijins, also noticed that the *yarikata* (the way of doing things/the way of working) of the "Bs" (referring to Brazilian Nikkeijins) is often unsatisfactory, resulting to numerous "NGs" ("no good") or defective/rejected items. Albert proudly asserted that Filipinos, referring to both Nikkei and non-Nikkei, have better work ethic as they accustom themselves to the Japanese working environment. Despite that attitude, the "Bs", according to Albert, still receive better treatment and higher wage compared to Filipino Nikkeijin and other *gaijins*.

Factory work is indeed difficult for those migrants who had never experienced hard labor in the Philippines or Brazil. But worse than physical exhaustion is the psychological trauma of doing a demeaning job. Some of them had been employed in corporate or government offices or public schools and they had never imagined doing such kind of work which entails carrying heavy components, utilizing weighty and dangerous machineries, being exposed to extremely warm or cold working environment, and doing a routine job continuously.

In Tsuda's ethnographic work, one of the Brazilian *Nisei* who had worked as a bank manager in Brazil told him:

I really feel the loss of my former status here because I had a high status in Brazil and associated with only educated people of my level. I was the boss, giving

other people orders. My first day in the factory, I remember my supervisor chastised me for not working fast enough. It got me mad and I felt like telling him, “How dare you boss me around? My social level is much higher than yours!” Now, I’m used to the factory work, but I still sometimes ask myself: “Why in the world do I have to do such work in Japan?” Only the salary is good in Japan, but the work is so demeaning (TSUDA, 2003, p.173).

The loss of occupational status is a common dilemma for both Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins especially for those who had professional jobs in their home countries. My Filipino informants also expressed their disappointments, although it is apparent that they eventually overcame the social shock. It is interesting to understand the strategies of these former professionals in rationalizing and accepting their humiliating work in Japan:

I told myself, “who cares?” Some of my fellow Pinoy descendants working in the same company are graduates of UP and Ateneo<sup>5</sup>. I also know somebody who used to be a professional engineer. They had good jobs in the Philippines, and they are all factory workers now. Well, they are happy... they are contented, because they all know that through hardwork, their families will have a better future.

The statement above came from Greys, 24 years old, a licensed pharmacist who used to work in a pharmaceutical company in the Philippines. Greys was supposed to take up medicine through the support of her sisters who are all working in Japan. However, feud among her siblings erupted until she realized that her sisters

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<sup>5</sup> The University of the Philippines and the Ateneo de Manila University are both considered as premier, top-performing universities of the Philippines.

were no longer willing to provide financial support for her medical education. Thinking that it would be better to earn money for herself, Greys decided to migrate through the support of her older brother. Greys has been working at Kawamura Electronics for four years, and she has already dropped her plan to study medicine.

Another strategy to “accept” this type of job is to consider transferring to a better one after settling in. Abie and Camz, for instance, think that factory work is just temporary while they plan to apply as English language teachers. Abie is aware that the salary is relatively low and the job market is very competitive because most English schools in Japan are prioritizing native speakers and “Caucasian looking” foreigners. However, she is still determined to get out of the factory and try a “more respectable job”. Filipino informants who intend to work as English teachers revealed to me that they are already accustomed to the factory work, but still desire for a job that would not put their college education in a trash bin.

The Brazilians, according to Tsuda’s accounts, have another strategy to get accustomed to the loss of occupational status. Those coming from the higher socio-economic class reject the collectively shared experience and solidarity, although the opposite occurs to the formerly impoverished Brazilian Nikkeijins. The richer ones emphasize their higher socio-economic background to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Nikkeijins. Hence, while Filipinos tend to say, “others also do that”, Brazilians tend to say “we are better than Nikkeijin immigrants.” Through such differentiation, they are able to assert social superiority among other migrants. (TSUDA, 2003, p.299)

The salary of Nikkeijin factory workers ranges from Y160,000 (US\$1,900) to Y300,000 (US\$3,700). Such wage depends on the size of the company, the nature of work, and the frequency

of overtime. Most of my Filipino informants believe that the salary of Brazilian Nikkeijins is higher than those from the Philippines. Nevertheless, the amount of salary is good enough to purchase their daily necessities in Japan and send some amount for their relatives in their home countries. In the case of Greg, a Filipino sansei who is currently earning Y250,000, his monthly wage is good enough to support the education and daily needs of his two siblings in the Philippines. The lowest earner among my research participants was Greys, with a monthly income of Y160,000 (without overtime). Aware that this wage is comparatively low, she still considers herself lucky because of her company's eased policies on holidays and overtime duties. Moreover, she has been receiving many benefits including health insurance, pension, and twice-a-year-bonus.

To sum it up, both Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins told stories of physical and emotional shock during their first few months in Japan. Being previously employed as professional workers and having college diplomas from reputable universities in Brazil and the Philippines, it took some time and considerable emotional effort for them to get used to their new work status as factory workers. Some had already adjusted, while others, particularly some Filipino Nikkeijins are currently thinking of getting a better job, knowing that they are qualified to teach at English language schools. Both Brazilian and Filipino informants intend to stay in their present job, despite these experiences of hard labor and sometimes, discrimination. Overall, there is a sense of "satisfaction" because of the high wage that they are receiving from the present workplace.

## PERCEPTIONS OF DISCRIMINATION

Being ethnically Japanese, Nikkeijins used to believe that they would be welcomed in their ancestral homeland. This perception is true especially for Brazilian Nikkeijins who were taught to behave in a Japanese way during their formative years in Brazil. Before migrating, they were exposed to the practices of “symbolic ethnicity” through various events and activities ranging from festivals, dinners, Japanese performances, traditional music and dance, and even Miss Nikkei beauty pageant (TSUDA, 2003, p.79). Together with their parents and other relatives, they had actively participated in Japanese communities within Brazil. Cognizant that they belong to the *primeiro mundo* (first world), Brazilian Nikkeijins tend to emphasize their “Japaneseness” during their pre-migration lives. Their positive perception of Japan had augmented their yearning for a Japanese homecoming.

Unfortunately, when homecoming took place, they hardly ever felt the warmth of their Japanese relatives. Although their physical appearance obviously displays traces of Japanese ancestry, they were usually labeled as *gaijins* (foreigners). Such experience has caused difficulties in adapting to work, school and the local community (SASAKI, 2008, p.59). This confusion distorts self-identity: Nikkei families had molded their children to become Japanese, and the Japanese society reshaped them to become another outsider (DECARALVALJO, 2003).

For Tsuda, this experience led to the disjuncture between community and consciousness (TSUDA, 2003, p. 245). They previously had “transnational hybrid identities” while in Brazil, a mixture of cultural affiliation to both Brazil and Japan. However, their dilemma in Japan has apparently caused their identities to move

in the opposite direction: to be more national and restrictive. They tend to distance themselves from the Japanese while affirming their allegiance to Brazil. A *sansei* Brazilian informant even told me:

I don't know how we have changed our mindset. When we were in Brazil, my family and I used to be proud of our Japanese heritage. I remember our weekly visit to the Japanese shops in Sao Paolo; we enjoyed the sights, the Japanese items, the people speaking Nihongo. But now, when somebody is speaking in Japanese I sometimes want to pretend I'm deaf.

The Filipino Nikkeijins, on the other hand, do not experience this kind of crisis upon entry to Japan. Unlike the Brazilians, these Filipino Nikkeijins knew from the very start that they were Filipino citizens, embracing Philippine culture and lifestyle. Moreover, they had never wished for a “Japanese homecoming”. Early Filipino Nikkei migrants, especially the first few batches in the late 1990s had even experienced economic hardships in the Philippines. With such difficult experiences in their provincial farms, they were used to hard and demeaning labor in the Philippines. If not for economic reasons, they were generally not interested to work and live in their ancestral home country. As one interviewee named Evelyn pointed out, “if not for my three children, I would rather stay in Davao, Philippines. I'm just here for my children.”

Recent Nikkei migrants from the Philippines, usually *sansei* and upgraded *sansei* have improved socioeconomic conditions, however they still came as economic migrants without expectations of being welcomed as an ethnic Japanese. Their Japanese facial feature is only manifested, to a limited degree, by their eyes. Most of them have an obvious Southeast Asian physical appearance. Being a Nikkeijin, for them, is simply a legal status to enter Japan and

explore better employment opportunities. None of my interviewees felt a significant degree of “Japaneseness.” They repeatedly told me that they are “Filipino” in heart and spirit.

Historically, Filipino Nikkeijin escaped from the public eye during the time when anti-Japanese sentiment swept across the region after the Pacific war. They had lost their documents and all physical evidence linking them to Japanese ancestry. During the administration of Corazon C. Aquino, these descendants had sought the help of the Philippine government to reach out to the Japanese authorities in order to be recognized as Nikkeijin. Tudor, in *Philippines Today* article published in 2006 reported that some 15 Nikkei associations were organized to help in the fieldwork and documentation researches of the descendants. It was only in 1999 when the first large group of Filipino Nikkeijin entered Japan with long term residence status through the concerted effort of the local government of Choshi, Japanese manufacturers, and Nikkei associations in the Philippines and Japan.

This “coming-out” of Filipino Nikkeijin entailed intricate courses and processes considering the social, cultural, political and legal battles that they went through. They have engaged in the “politics of recognition” through koseki-searching and koseki-registration movement. Through repeated negotiations with Japanese government, they have changed their self-identity from “Japanese descended Filipino” to “Japanese left behind (OHNO, 2007, p.243).” From “war stigmatized pariahs to visa-advantaged Nikkei”, these return migrants have been reshaping the contours of Philippines-Japan labor migration as their number continuously increase after a series of policy adjustments.

Taking into account the historical and societal dimensions that dominated their pre-migration experiences, Brazilian and Filipino



perceptions of discrimination are fairly different. While Brazilian Nikkeijins emphasize the societal rejection to their ethnicity, Filipino Nikkeijins tend to highlight their experiences within the workplace, without giving reference to their “Japaneseness.” This is probably the reason why the feeling of being discriminated is more intense in the case of the Brazilians than Filipinos. In Roth’s ethnographic research, he quoted Vanessa, a Brazilian Nikkeijin worker who was asked to use her injured hand while working:

I don’t think that I’m an animal, Joshua. I’m human; I’m very human... I have Japanese blood in me – my grandmother is Japanese. Understand? I think he should have treated me as a human, for I’m not an animal. I don’t know whether it’s because Japanese are real cold, in relation to sentiments, but when it comes to money... they’re going to die for money (ROTH, 2002, p.77).

The feeling of discrimination among Brazilian Nikkeijins is usually referenced to their identity as a Japanese-Brazilian. An emotional nuisance persists due to the failure to feel “belongingness” from the people whom she considered as fellow countrymen. It is worthy of noting that the Filipino group, including some nissei doesn’t even associate the concept of “being Japanese.” Thus, when I inquired about their experiences of discrimination, it was hard for them to think of any. Most often, they would say yes, there were cases of unfair treatment, but it can’t be helped. According to them, they simply need to accept the hierarchical system and the norms of the society.

In my interviews with Filipino Nikkeijins, discrimination is usually felt in situations when unequal treatment among Japanese, Brazilians and Filipinos is apparent. There is a common sentiment

that local Japanese occupy the highest post in the kaisha's hierarchy; the Brazilians have a low place but the Filipinos have lower position (not necessarily the lowest, to give place to the non-Nikkei South Asians). For instance, Alfred noted that when a Brazilian Nikkeijin commits a mistake, the supervisor tends to ignore it. However, when a Filipino Nikkeijin is at fault, a major meeting will be conducted to humiliate the worker. Moreover, assembly leaders put more pressure to the Filipino workers to work harder and do overtime, while evidently being lenient to the Brazilian Nikkeijins. When I asked how they respond in such situations, the usual response is "*ganun talaga eh,*" (that's they way it is). 29 years old Dan explains:

Brazilian Nikkeijins are treated better despite the fact that they are very *urusai* (noisy) and they refuse to do overtime. They are even paid well. Yes, their salary is different from ours. But, what can we do? They are more Japanese than us.

As previously mentioned, there are also a number of informants who believe that there was no discrimination in the workplace. Despite the tedious physical demands of factory work and the hierarchical set-up in their workplace, a significant number of Filipino interviewees think that these are not forms of discrimination. These remarks are often heard from those who had experienced doing hard labor in the Philippines. They tend to compare their previous manual work in rural areas of a third world country, thus they feel that the present work in Japan is even more comfortable. None of my interviewees had also disclosed any incidence of verbal abuse or racial slur during their stay in Japan.

An ethnographic observation supports such observation that Brazilian Nikkeijins receive indulgent treatment. While doing participant observation in Toyama, it was noted that although some

Brazilian Nikkeijins commit serious mistakes or were clearly slow and clumsy on their job, they were not chastised nor reprimanded (TSUDA, 2003, p.137). The observer was convinced that there was an “infinite patience” toward an incompetent Brazilian Nikkeijin worker who could not perform the simplest tasks. Filipino informants, both administrators/translators and manual workers disclosed that such kindness and patience were clearly not shown to Filipino Nikkeijins. Brazilians, according to them, were still perceived as semi-Japanese while Filipino Nikkeijins were absolutely “foreign” for them.

This unequal treatment between Filipinos and Brazilians can be attributed to the fact that Brazilians possess closer physical and cultural resemblance to pure Japanese. It is also interesting to point out the common sentiment among my Filipino interviewees about their views of the dichotomy of white and black: Japanese fascination of white-skinned people is manifested to their preferential treatment to the Brazilians, while Japanese abhorrence to dark-skinned people is evident on their coldness to the Filipinos. Despite the sense of injustice, Filipino Nikkeijin workers have still maintained professional relationship with their non-Filipino co-workers. None of them complained about any form of abuse, be it verbal or physical from their superiors. My respondents also clarified that there has been no animosity or conflict whatsoever between Filipino and Brazilian Nikkeijins. In fact, they easily get along with them.

Lastly, the result of my interviews concurs with Tsuda’s observation in his book titled “Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland” that treatment in smaller firms was better, because there was more interaction between the Japanese and the Nikkeijin (TSUDA, 2003, p.147). In smaller kaishas with very few laborers, Nikkeijins feel more warmth as their bosses frequently interact with them. Sometimes, the owners and managers even establish personal relationships with their

workers. Jeff, a newly arrived Nikkeijin from Davao, Philippines, delightedly told me that he easily got along with the owner of the food shop where he is presently working. He also described the Brazilians and Japanese workers as very friendly and “cool.”

### **CHAIN MIGRATION: A Coping Strategy**

Migration is not a simple, linear process of departure and return. It entails complicated dynamics, responding to various forces coming from the global market, the sending and host societies, and even the smallest unit of households. The case of Nikkeijin migration, whether Brazilian, Filipino, or Peruvian groups exhibits intricate mechanisms that lead to social embeddedness and one of its most vital features is chain migration. Castles explains the usual course of migrant decisions that lead to the arrival of family members:

In economic migration, the primary migrant is usually a young man or woman in search of temporary work and often intending to return home once certain savings targets have been reached. The difficulty in achieving such targets leads to prolonged stay. This, in turn, encourages family reunion. People start to see their life perspectives in the new country (CASTLES, 2007, p.36).

Certainly, migrant dynamics and patterns dramatically change when a family member joins the migrant worker in the host country. As a general pattern, one family member is usually followed by another member, and this chain swiftly continues as long as the state permits entry to the other family members. Nikkeijin migration is a case in point because through *koseki tohon* (family registration) applicant Nikkeijin easily receives long term visa, hence the

expansion of Nikkei families in Japan. In the case of Brazilian Nikkeijins, reunification of family members sharply increased after the 1990s, and the impact is generally positive due to the increased family income, considering that the number of working members in a household increased (ASAKURA; MURATA, 2006, p.336). A recent study also reveals that family reunification of these Brazilian Nikkeijins “ameliorates mental status to a certain degree.”<sup>6</sup> With the arrival of family members, everyday stress is generally reduced while the degree of homesickness is diminished.

Chain migration, indeed, is a coping strategy to ease the stressful routines of migrant life in Japan. Both Brazilian and Filipino informants detailed how the arrival of their immediate family and relatives contribute to the improvement of their well-being. They have talked about the joy of being reunited, and the comfort of having a companion to ease their loneliness and stress during tough times in *kaisha*.

The process of chain migration is even more dynamic for the Filipino Nikkeijins. While some non-Nikkei Filipino migrants experience emotional isolation due to the absence of a support group, Filipino Nikkeijins enjoy the accessibility of their cousins, aunts, siblings, and sometimes parents. During times of financial, emotional, or even legal problems, they usually rely on their family members or close relatives. The presence of these relatives significantly lessens the possibility of depression and despondency due to homesickness. This is also one reason for their unwillingness to return to their home community. As my interviewee named Noel said, “almost all the members of my clan are coming here. Another cousin and uncle will

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<sup>6</sup> Asakura and Murata employed multiple regression analysis to study the nonpsychotic disturbances of 265 Brazilian Nikkeijins residing outside Metropolitan Tokyo.

be coming next month. My sister has also lodged her application. Now, we're a very big, extended family in Japan. How can I leave now? Even if I want to leave, I simply couldn't, because these close relatives of mine need me."

It is important to emphasize the unique process that has facilitated the chain migration of the Nikkeijin parent, the son/daughter, the grandchildren, the great grandchildren, and so on and so forth. The process, which has been popular among Filipino Nikkei migrants is called generation upgrading. Since the Japanese Immigration law only allows the entry of descendants up to the third generation, the members of the fourth generation usually stays in the Philippines. Thus, the second generation parent (for example, a father) applies for his own *koseki tohon* which, in principle, converts his status to first generation. His children, who were formerly third generation, become second, and the grandchildren left in the Philippines will be able to enter Japan due to their upgraded status as third generation. This process has paved the way for the unbroken chain of descendants and relatives entering the Japanese borders since the late 1990s.

Through generation upgrading, it is possible for a Nikkei migrant to have a larger kin network across the country. In the case of Greg, for instance, he has more than thirty relatives who are continuously spreading and growing in Japan. This is indeed advantageous for migrants because relatives in other prefectures provide referrals for prospective job with better salary and working conditions. If one Nikkeijin encounters any problem with his *kaisha*, his relatives within or outside Aichi would suggest a vacancy in other *kaisha*, or refer him to their trusted employment broker. Because of this, the dynamic mobility of Philippine Nikkeijins is very evident: they are not only considered as international migrants but also as

internal migrants because they frequently move from one prefecture to another in search of better working conditions.

Both Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins have developed the practice of chain migration with varying strategies and mechanisms. With both cultures bestowing high regard for family bonding, it is not surprising to witness how they utilize their social and financial capital in order to facilitate the entry of a family member or even a distant relative. It definitely entails considerable costs. As one Brazilian informant told me, it is no joke to accommodate a family member:

I have to work harder for the airfare of my wife and daughter. Each ticket from Brazil costs \$2,000 or more! I have to transfer to a bigger apartment, because the owner of my current apartment reminded me that I couldn't bring my family here. It's too much headache, but I know it is really necessary to do it<sup>7</sup>.

Filipino informants also expressed the same concern, although the airfare is not really a problem considering the geographical proximity and the availability of Low Cost Carrier (LCC) tickets like Cebu Pacific and Jet Star. One-way air ticket to Osaka or Tokyo costs Y15000 (or US\$180) during regular season, but it could get cheaper during off-peak periods.

Interestingly, while Brazilian family migration tends to form micro communities because migrant families occupy similar neighborhood, Filipinos tend to be more mobile and dispersed. Except for the cases of couples and families with young children, Filipino migrants initially live with their family or close relatives, but when better opportunities are offered in some other places, they tend

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<sup>7</sup> This informant, who started to work in Toyota two years ago, will welcome his wife and daughter in September 2012.

to move out and explore the job prospect in other geographical areas. Undoubtedly, this kind of “internal” mobility is usually facilitated by other relatives or friends, if not labor brokers.

## **DEEPENING CULTURE OF MIGRATION**

One of the similar elements in the migrant behavior of Filipino and Brazilian Nikkeijin is the “culture of migration.” This means the citizens perceive migration positively, taking into account the benefits it can bring to the household and community. In the Philippines, success stories of OFWs (Overseas Filipino Workers) who used to work in the Middle East, Americas, or East Asia are widely told in local communities. Large houses in the provinces symbolize the years of hardships of those Filipinos who had worked abroad to alleviate their families from poverty. Second and third generation Nikkeijins, who had witnessed how their parents or grandparents financially supported not only the immediate family but also their relatives, were determined to take the same path, keeping in mind how fulfilling it is to help other relatives.

This “positive perception” on migration has been accompanied by a strong state policy to encourage migration. From the perspective of Philippine policymakers, migration is an important component of developmental strategies. Labor migrants have been hailed as modern day heroes not only because of their economic contribution through periodic remittances, but also because of their potential to transfer the skills that they had acquired abroad to the local labor setting. For more than four decades, the government has been supporting and facilitating migration of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to almost all continents in the globe.



Brazil, on the other hand, has no comprehensive migration policy that facilitates migration of Nikkeijins. However, the culture of migration has been fortified by ethnic yearning for “returning” to their homeland. As previously mentioned, Brazilian Nikkeijins had developed their ethnic consciousness since childhood years through the Japanese traditions and norms introduced by their grandparents or parents. Proud of being a part of the positive minority<sup>8</sup>, they have held such identity with a dream of seeing the land of their forefathers. Aside from this patriotic longing, migration became “culturally approved” and valued as an effective strategy to combat economic difficulties and achieve socio-economic mobility. The movement of Brazilian Nikkeijin became prevalent that about 18 percent of the entire Japanese-Brazilian population currently resides in Japan (TSUDA, 1999, p.713).

The destination country, Japan, has been viewed as an affluent state, an industrialized and modern place, a first world. Nikkeijins share those positive perceptions drawn from their images of Honda and Toyota cars, robots, computers and even Japanese food. Japan is supposed to be a place of cleanliness, calmness, and generosity. These positive perceptions are shared by both Filipinos and Brazilian Nikkeijins, with the exception of two female Filipino workers in their late 1930s. One of them, Ms. Ella, recalled that the people from their province think that going to Japan means working in entertainment clubs or being a prostitute. It should be noted that the massive migration of “Japayuki” (in social context, it means an “entertainer”) had been very popular in the 1980s and 1990s before it was criticized by the United States government for its propensity

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<sup>8</sup> Tsuda argues that in the case of Japanese Brazilians, there has been a change from a “Japanese” to a “Brazilian” ethnic minority status, and this is also accompanied by a dramatic shift from a positive to negative minority status.

to promote human trafficking and exploitation. As a young, educated person, she turned down her father's offer to process her document for a Japanese visa. A decade later, after her husband retired from a computer processing company, she had realized that their wages wouldn't be sufficient to enroll their children in good schools. Hence, the couple migrated and both of them worked in a manufacturing factory in Aichi Prefecture.

The culture of migration is a contributing factor in sustaining the migration process of both Nikkeijin groups. Tsuda even argues that there are certain "cultural attitudes and social structures which develop and further advance the settlement process (TSUDA, 1999, p. 716)." This is evident in lifestyle changes and in some cases, a decline in work ethic. Similar to the case of the Brazilians, Filipino Nikkeijins who have been working for more than a year had admitted that they could not stop working due to some "personal wants". Shopping has become their weekend pastime, while socialization with other Filipino friends in *isakaya* restaurants has been a part of the Sunday routine. My Filipino interviewees are worried that quitting their job or going back to the Philippines would dramatically downgrade their social status, preventing them to purchase those things that they "want."

Another aspect of the "culture of migration" is the deeply ingrained perception of pessimism on the prospect of return migration. In the case of Brazilian Nikkeijins, in spite of considerable economic improvements from the sending communities, they still believe that "life would be harder in Brazil." Images of "poor Brazil" and "rich Japan" have been manifesting in Nikkeijin consciousness. Tsuda explains that these are the deeply ingrained cultural pessimism and lack of confidence about the long term prospects of the Brazilian economy.

Filipinos, too, share this attitude. The rise of President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino, for them, has not even changed a little town. There were negative comments on politics and society, and a pessimistic view of the country’s future. Ironically, almost all my interviewees talked about the “happiness” that they used to enjoy in the Philippines. Japan, for them, is a place of work with “no fun”. Everyone has been adapting themselves to the cheerless environment and the *tsumetai* (cold) people. Indeed, they really want to go back home in the Philippines. But at the end of the day, they tend to ask themselves: what will happen to me and my family if I give up my work in Japan? Contemplating on this matter, they end up quitting the nostalgia.

### **ON BEING A JAPANESE: An Identity Struggle**

Although Nikkeijins, in general, are ethnic Japanese by blood, their unfortunate birth outside Japan has made them foreigners. At present, Nikkeijins are not considered ethnic immigrants returning to their home country, but as foreign migrants coming to temporarily work in Japan. Upon entry, they possess a temporary resident status which, in principle, put their status below *zainichi*<sup>9</sup> foreigners but above most other foreigners (SHIPPER, 2008, p. 37). Despite such racial identity, Nikkeijins have limited political and civic rights, with no rights to vote in national and local elections and no legal protection against racism. On the positive side, Nikkeijins, in theory have full access to medical care and public health services (SHIPPER, 2008, p.30). Lamentably, I have interviewed several Filipino Nikkeijins

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<sup>9</sup> *Zainichi* are Japan-born foreigners who have lived in Japan for several generations. There are approximately 460,000 Koreans and 4,000 Chinese who are considered *zainichi* in Japan (SHIPPER, 2008, p.29).

who revealed that they have no health insurance or any medical care benefit from their respective companies.

As repeatedly emphasized, Brazilian Nikkeijins have experienced social rejection on the ground of being a “foreigner” in Japan despite their initial identity as a Japanese in Brazil. Interestingly, although Filipino Nikkeijins perceive Brazilian Nikkeijins as more preferred and privileged in Japanese kaisha, these Brazilians have been emotionally affected by their perceived marginalization. This has resulted to various consequences, ranging from ethnic resistance to an overwhelming effort to achieve assimilation.

The consequences of identity conflicts among Brazilian Nikkeijins may not be underestimated. While some opted to accept the status quo, others have demonstrated anti-social behavior and remarkable deviance. According to Tsuda, some Brazilians wanted to expose their “Brazilianess” to the Japanese public in order to lessen the societal expectation (like the expectation to speak fluent Japanese); thus a form of resistance is done by speaking Brazilian in a loud voice, using Brazilian style outfits, and refusing to study the Japanese language. Those Brazilians who try to act as Japanese are sanctioned by the majority by labeling them as the “ass kissers” and antinikkeijin ethnic betrayers who have switched sides (TSUDA, 2003, p. 338).

The Filipino Nikkeijins, on the other hand, do not take offense with the ascription of being a foreigner in Japan. Of course, the issei or first generation and Nisei or second generation Nikkeijins had historically associated themselves with the Japanese lineage due to the cultural conviction of their parents. As they became economically affluent in the early part of the century, the isseis intended to educate their children in the same way that Japanese pupils were educated in Japan. Japanese parents had prevented assimilation of their children

from the Filipinos and inculcated an attitude of being proud ‘first class nations’ (OHNO, 2007, p. 36). Although there were schools established to mold the Filipino Nikkeijins in Japanese manner, the “Japanization process” had become more problematic especially after the Second World War when the anti-Japanese sentiment had been stirred in the general populace. As years passed by, the second and third generation Nikkeijins had instead become more *Filipinized* than *Japanized* as they adopt the attitudes, religion, and certain facets of the dominant culture. In fact, although they are aware of their Japanese ancestry, they frequently associate themselves with other non-nikkeijin Filipino workers in Japan. For them, they are part of the “Filipino group” in Japan. They do not distinguish Nikkei and non-nikkei Filipino friends; they see themselves belonging to one group. These second, third and fourth generation Nikkeijins participate in Filipino church groups and contribute their time to the religious causes organized by the Filipino groups. As Lola Osawa, a second generation Filipino Nikkeijin said:

I know that my father is Japanese. I still recall those moments when he spoke in Japanese to us. But really, I feel I am pure Filipino and I always have this urge to come back and live in the Philippines. This country is such a foreign place for me. I know, for sure, that I do not belong here.

Needless to say, there are also factions within the Filipino workers in Japan. Most of these conflicting groups are regionalistic: Tagalogs from Manila or Luzon island against the Bisaya groups from Central and Southern Philippines. Conflicts arise when Tagalogs think that Bisayan people spread gossips and make fun of other Filipinos using their regional language (Bisaya), or when Bisayans think that Tagalogs are bragging about their socio-economic status in

the Philippines. Filipino informants also talked about their version of “ass kissers” and crab minded Filipinos who attempt to spread gossip against someone who is economically getting better. Among my educated interviewees, there is also a feeling of discomfort against former Japayukis (entertainers/hostess in clubs) who are working with them at Japanese factories. In short, conflicts are usually caused by the spread of gossips and misunderstanding among fellow Filipino workers. Despite the factions, there was no hatred against those who prefer to naturalize their citizenship. One informant, a Nisei Nikkeijin who has recently embraced Japanese citizenship, has even felt that she has been more respected and admired by fellow Filipinos for championing their labor causes and serving as a vibrant voice in the Japanese management on behalf of the ordinary and powerless Filipino Nikkeijins.

Most Filipino Nikkeijins are satisfied with their ability to speak and understand simple Japanese used in *kaisha* for the simple reason that they are not intending to stay in Japan for a long period of time. Nikkeijin parents are also very cautious about the “Filipino-ness” of their children who are studying in Japanese schools. As much as possible, they want their children to grow up in a Filipino way. They talk to their children using the Filipino language and remind them about their roots and heritage in the Philippines. They also believe that the upbringing of children in Japan does not conform to their values as Filipinos, thus they adopt the Filipino system of raising their children.

## CONCLUSION

As globalization compels the nation-states to open their borders for the economic migrants, Japan remains restrictive and

selective. It refuses to acknowledge the manpower shortages and the massive demand for foreign workers. Instead, Japan took the opportunity to utilize the skills and labor of those Japanese blooded foreigners. After all, policymakers were convinced that they are ethnically Japanese and they would not ruin the notion of societal homogeneity. As Ayumi (2003) claims, “*blood* was a symbol of familial ties... the conflated notion of Japanese race and culture, symbolized by blood, served well to justify the right of Nikkeijin to enter, reside, and work in Japan” (TAKENAKA, 2003).

However, Nikkeijin migration as an ethnic recognition remains a political rhetoric and a lip service. The migrant dynamics of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins reveals the paradox of their status and actual conditions: they are ethnically Japanese, yet they are viewed as foreigners; they are legally documented, but treated as disposable workers; they are privileged and preferred by factories, but still discriminated. Brazilian Nikkeijins who have lived like “real Japanese” in Brazil came as early as the 1980s, laying the foundation for massive chain migration and ethnic clustering. Filipino Nikkeijins, who see themselves as pure *Pinoys*, have started to migrate in the late 1990s after struggling for an official recognition of their Nikkei identity. Since then, they had facilitated the entry of more relatives through generation upgrading.

Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijin migration comes in complex trajectories responding to the conflicting forces of embeddedness and nostalgia. After years of working in Japan, Brazilian Nikkeijins tend to adhere to their Brazilian roots as a general consequence of the experienced ethnic rejection in Japan. The Pinoys, as usual, assert their Filipino identities as they prepare for a permanent settlement in their country. Brazilians and Nikkeijins wish for a homecoming to their sending societies, but the effects of economic wanting,

changed lifestyle, culture of migration, and chain migration have been sustaining the migration process. Furthermore, Nikkeijins realize the possibility that their socio-economic status would be downgraded when they quit their job in Japan. For others who came back to their home societies, permanent settlement becomes even more difficult due to financial uncertainties. This creates a trend of circular migration wherein migrants shuttle back and forth between Japan and their home countries.

The distinguishing factor that strongly differentiates the migration paths of the two Nikkeijin groups is the “Japanese identity” that has been inculcated to the Brazilians prior to their migration. No doubt, the Brazilian Nikkeijins have been raised within an ethnically or ethnic community. This category implies that they have a collective name that symbolize their uniqueness among others: they have myths of common origin, a shared ethno-history, common cultural characteristics, an association with a historic territory (in their case, it is their ancestral homeland- Japan), and a sense of solidarity (SMITH, 1995, p.133). Embracing this sort of identity has significant impacts on Brazilian migrant decisions, from the initial motives of migration to their everyday engagement within and outside the workplace. With strong allegiance to the ancestral culture, they had irreconcilable expectations during the early phase of the migration process. When these expectations had not been met, they resort to various mechanisms in order to rectify the distortion of social identity. The outcome is indeed a crisis of cultural identity manifested by resistance to the prospect of assimilation.

On the other hand, Filipino Nikkeijins do not feel nor even yearn for this sense of “Japaneseness” . Unlike the Brazilian Nikkeijins, Pinoy descendants do not recognize Japan as a homeland, possess no shared memories and myths, and a sense of exclusive



solidarity. Even after several years of staying in Japan, they still see themselves as “Pinoys” who would return to the Philippines soon. Without contesting for an ethnic recognition, such sense of neutrality has actually helped them to overcome the perils of hierarchical social and labor structure.

The behavior of Filipino Nikkeijins is clearly an expression of solid Filipino identity in contrast to the “resistance strategy” as demonstrated by the Brazilians. Prior to migration, Filipino Nikkeijins had already displayed a fervent commitment to Filipino vernacular culture. True enough, the shifts and distortion of identity as experienced by Brazilian Nikkeijins cause deeper emotional difficulties. For Filipinos, assimilation is also a struggle although they attribute such conflicts to the concept of cultural difference. At the end of the struggle, they have realizations that such differences are simply irreconcilable and structured; it will always be there and the Filipinos must simply comply to the social norms. This trait, indeed, is a contributing positive attribute of Overseas Filipinos who have been successfully engaging in various types of work around the globe.

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## RESUMO

Com situação demográfica do Japão, o governo japonês começou a diminuir as políticas de imigração, especificamente para os nikkeijins. Depois de passar por uma série de debates políticos intensos, a Nova lei de Controle de Imigração e Reconhecimento de Refugiados de 1990 solicita a emissão de “vistos de residentes de longa duração” para estrangeiros descendentes de japoneses até a terceira geração e para os não-nikkeijin cônjuges. Com essa lei revista, nikkeijins e seus familiares foram autorizados a participar em trabalhos não qualificados temporários no Japão. Atualmente, nikkeijins da Ásia e da América Latina estão continuamente fazendo parte da escassez de trabalho nas indústrias japonesas. Essa pesquisa compara as experiências dos nikkeijins brasileiros e filipinos, que lutam dentro da estrutura de poder de seus kaishas. Olhando para os processos de migrantes e das condições de trabalho, o estudo revela as experiências semelhantes e contrastantes entre os atuais migrantes nikkeijin no Japão. Este artigo argumenta que a percepção da discriminação, assimilação e condição de migrante, em geral, é formada pelo mecanismo de afiliação étnica. Através de entrevistas de história de vida e estudos etnográficos dos migrantes brasileiros e filipinos, é evidente que

a autoavaliação de sua condição migrante é altamente dependente de seu senso de pertencimento nacional e sua identidade étnica.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Nikkeijin. Migração. Dekasegi. Mobilidade de trabalho.

## ABSTRACT

With Japan's demographic predicament, the Japanese government has started to ease immigration policies specifically for the Nikkeijins. After going through a series of intensive policy debates, the New Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 1990 prompted the issuance of "long-term resident visas" to overseas Japanese descendants up to the third generation and to their non-Nikkeijin spouses. With this revised law, Nikkeijins and their families were allowed to engage in temporary unskilled work in Japan. At present, Nikkeijins from Asia and Latin America are continuously filling the labor shortages of Japanese industries. However, the issue of Nikkeijin migration is more than an economic concern. Being descendants of Japanese nationals, their destination country is also an ancestral homeland- a place so dear to their great grandparents; a supposedly "home" for all the children of the Japanese nation. The government itself declared that Nikkeijins are preferred because of their ancestry and ability to assimilate to the root culture of their forefathers. With this rationale, do these Nikkeijin workers feel the warmth of ethnic homecoming as they live and work in the land of their ancestors? This research compares the experiences of Brazilian and Filipino Nikkeijins as they struggle within the power structure of their *kaishas*. Looking at the migrant processes and labor conditions, the study uncovers the similar and contrasting experiences of current Nikkeijin migrants in Japan. This paper argues that the perception of assimilation, discrimination and overall migrant condition is shaped by the mechanism of ethnic affiliation. Through life history interviews and ethnographic studies of Brazilian and Filipino migrants, it is evident that the self-assessment of their migrant condition is highly dependent on their sense of national belongingness and ethnic identity.

**KEYWORDS:** Nikkeijin. Migration. Dekasegi. Labor Mobility.



# **LOS CONDICIONANTES HEGEMÓNICOS SOBRE LAS ALTERNATIVAS REGIONALES DE DESARROLLO EN EL SUR. EL CASO DEL MERCOSUR Y LAS PERSPECTIVAS DEL ALBA Y LA UNASUR**

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## **INTRODUCCIÓN**

A mediados del siglo XX, nuevas contribuciones teóricas con influencia gubernamental comenzaron a dar cuenta críticamente del “deterioro en los términos del intercambio” que afectaba a los países latinoamericanos y de la necesidad de transformar el histórico patrón de intercambio comercial promoviendo la industrialización de las economías de la región. En consonancia directa con esas consideraciones, la estrategia de los gobiernos – en aras de aumentar su independencia económica y reducir su vulnerabilidad externa – fue la industrialización por sustitución de importaciones, en el marco de mercados internos protegidos de la competencia exterior. Durante el período de sustitución de importaciones, la integración regional se materializó en distintas iniciativas regionales y subregionales en lo que se dio a llamar regionalismo “hacia adentro” o “cerrado”. Posteriormente, producto de serias dificultades internas de los

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Estados y, sobre todo, debido a la imposibilidad de articular un proceso de integración de gran alcance que abarcara a toda la región, se comenzaron a impulsar esquemas más flexibles que permitiesen a los países miembros asumir compromisos parciales y diferenciales. Fue en ese nuevo marco que, a mediados de la década del ochenta, los gobiernos democráticos de Argentina y Brasil comenzaron a diseñar el proceso de integración del Mercado Común del Sur, más conocido como MERCOSUR. Esperaban que la integración regional contribuyera a consolidar los recientemente conquistados regímenes democráticos, desarticular las hipótesis de conflicto hasta ese momento prevaletentes y superar la marginación política internacional. Asimismo, buscaban que el proceso de integración permitiera alcanzar el desarrollo económico regional y lograr una mayor competitividad a escala mundial, mediante una política de sustitución de importaciones ampliada, con especialización sectorial y apertura limitada.

A pesar de dichas expectativas iniciales, hacia fines de la década de los ochenta ambos países se enfrentaron a una profunda crisis económica, política e institucional, cuya salida fue pensada a partir del endeudamiento externo y el neoliberalismo. Paralelamente, fue ganando espacio una nueva concepción sobre la integración regional. En efecto, la integración dejó de estar instrumentada “hacia adentro”, en sintonía con los esquemas aplicados desde los años sesenta en el marco de la estrategia de sustitución de importaciones, y pasó a contemplar una mayor vinculación con el mercado mundial, de la mano de capitales externos y de conformidad con los postulados de los organismos internacionales, en un contexto general de apertura y liberalización. El Mercosur no escapó a los condicionamientos hegemónicos a las políticas económicas de sus Estados miembros, experimentando muy temprana y rápidamente un sustancial grado de

liberalización comercial en detrimento de los objetivos de desarrollo originalmente planteados. Así, si bien los propósitos inaugurales eran principalmente reducir la vulnerabilidad externa, lograr el desarrollo industrial conjunto y promover la coordinación de las políticas macroeconómicas, las acciones finalmente adoptadas no estuvieron orientadas a tales efectos. De esta forma, subsumido en el “paradigma céntrico”<sup>1</sup> (FERRER, 2004), durante la década del noventa el proceso de integración dejó de lado los objetivos inicialmente concebidos, adoptando y potenciando la introducción del consenso neoliberal en una escala ampliada, en perfecta sintonía con los intereses hegemónicos globales.

Teniendo en cuenta este contexto, el objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar la influencia de los condicionantes hegemónicos en la configuración del Mercosur, principalmente desde mediados de la década del ochenta hasta mediados de los noventa, a la luz de los cambios introducidos por el modelo del regionalismo abierto. A estos efectos, se considerarán una serie de variables explicativas. En primer lugar, las tendencias mundiales en favor de la liberalización del comercio y la articulación específica que se planteó entre regionalismo y multilateralismo. En segundo lugar, la política hegemónica de Estados Unidos y su despliegue en el hemisferio. Finalmente, las mutaciones específicas en la configuración del Mercosur, a la luz de las transformaciones introducidas por el modelo de regionalismo abierto y promovidas por los organismos internacionales.

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<sup>1</sup> Refiere al modelo ideológico contemporáneo a la globalización financiera y al endeudamiento creciente de las economías periféricas, también conocido como reforma neoliberal. Se trata de una panoplia de ideas, reglas y políticas que, desde fines de los años setenta, comenzó a desplazar al keynesianismo y al pensamiento estructuralista de posguerra. Además del cúmulo de preceptos en materia de política económica y financiera, este nuevo paradigma implicó una reformulación de lo que se entendía en materia de integración regional.

Si bien la investigación plantea fundamentalmente el análisis del Mercosur durante el mencionado período de estudio, también realiza un puente con el presente, a los fines de considerar continuidades y rupturas entre distintos momentos. Asimismo, además del Mercosur posterior a la primacía del paradigma neoliberal, se consideran las perspectivas que se introducen a la integración regional latinoamericana con el lanzamiento de dos nuevos proyectos, Alba y Unasur, en el contexto del denominado momento “posneoliberal”.

## **DESARROLLO, INDUSTRIALIZACIÓN E INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA: un breve repaso histórico**

Tras la finalización de la Segunda Guerra Mundial mientras que en muchos pueblos coloniales de otras regiones del llamado “tercer mundo” se desenvolvían cruentas guerras emancipatorias en pos de la liberación nacional, los países latinoamericanos buscaban soluciones a los problemas que comprometían su independencia económica. En ese contexto, en torno a la recién creada Cepal, distintos economistas latinoamericanos conformaron lo que Celso Furtado denominó “orden cepalina del desarrollo”, cuya misión era tratar de liberarse de ideas ajenas para dejar de explicar la problemática de la periferia por analogía con las economías del centro (GUILLÉN ROMO, 2007, p. 296). De esta forma, superando la doctrina *rostowiana* de las etapas del crecimiento económico, la visión histórico-estructural del conjunto de la economía mundial le permitió a la Cepal captar la especificidad del subdesarrollo latinoamericano, a través de la dicotomía entre centro y periferia, y la percepción del sistema de poder subyacente a esa estructura, concentrándose en la tendencia al deterioro de los términos del intercambio de los productos primarios en los mercados internacionales (FURTADO, 1999, p. 30).

Raúl Prebisch junto a otros economistas sostuvieron la idea de una economía internacional partida entre un centro y una periferia, cuya base objetiva era el sistema de división internacional del trabajo instaurado en el siglo XIX, en el que a América Latina le había correspondido producir alimentos y materias primas para los grandes centros industriales. La evidencia empírica demostraba que ese intercambio comercial había provocado una concentración del ingreso en favor de los países de nivel de productividad y de salarios reales más elevados. Esta desigual distribución de los frutos del progreso técnico y el consecuente deterioro de los términos del intercambio engendraban un pronunciado desequilibrio estructural entre las diferentes naciones que permitía refutar las premisas de la teoría clásica<sup>2</sup>. Bajo esas condiciones adversas, la política de desarrollo suponía lograr una nueva forma de inserción en la división internacional de trabajo mediante un proceso de industrialización acelerado que tuviera como base la ampliación del mercado interno. Cómo sostiene Héctor Guillén Romo: “se trataba de definir una estrategia económica de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones capaz de superar lo que los economistas de la Cepal llamaban insuficiencias dinámicas del desarrollo latinoamericano” (GUILLÉN ROMO, 2007, p. 298).

En un primer momento, la industrialización fue impulsada por las circunstancias históricas generadas por la Gran Depresión de los años treinta y las dos Guerras Mundiales, a través de una estrategia gradualista en donde la protección y la acción económica del Estado jugaron un papel central. Se buscaba conseguir una mayor autonomía

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<sup>2</sup> La crítica a la división internacional del trabajo se concentraba en las implicaciones del principio *ricardiano* de las ventajas comparativas, uno de cuyos corolarios sostenía que el comercio internacional no era sólo un motor de crecimiento, sino también un factor de reducción de las disparidades de niveles de ingreso entre países.

frente al centro y construir una base endógena de acumulación de capital que encontrase en la industria su eje principal. Por primera vez en la historia latinoamericana, la economía contaba con un motor interno y con un proyecto nacional de desarrollo (GUILLÉN ROMO., 2008, p. 24). Sin embargo, a pesar de que el llamado desarrollo “hacia adentro”, fuertemente orientado hacia el mercado interno, tuvo en la industria su base principal, la complementariedad intersectorial y la integración vertical de la producción siguieron siendo insuficientes, por lo que muchos bienes industriales permanecieron sin producirse, debiendo importarse. Ese esquema constituyó la principal causa del desequilibrio externo debido a que generó una tendencia a demandar muchos bienes industriales importados, mientras que el crecimiento de las exportaciones de bienes primarios siguió manteniendo serias limitaciones. Por lo demás, sobre ese desequilibrio seguía operando el deterioro de los términos de intercambio, el que a su vez incidía en las restricciones al ahorro y a la acumulación. En el trasfondo existía una cuestión estructural que los mercados no podían corregir. Era necesaria una política industrial articulada, de ahí el énfasis puesto por la Cepal en la planificación y en las técnicas que la facilitaban como elementos nodales del nuevo patrón de desarrollo, a saber, el de la segunda fase de la “industrialización sustitutiva” (RODRÍGUEZ, 2008, p.12).

En el marco del análisis que la Cepal venía realizando sobre los problemas del desarrollo latinoamericano, empezaron a sistematizarse diversas propuestas relativas a la integración regional latinoamericana. Aunque un conjunto de factores estructurales determinaba el insuficiente dinamismo de las economías de la región, uno de ellos poseía especial relevancia, a saber, la restricción externa resultante de los déficits en el comercio exterior y la consecuente limitación que éstos imponían a la capacidad para importar y adquirir

bienes esenciales, tecnología y recursos financieros desde el exterior. En consecuencia, la industrialización – se pensaba– potenciada por la ampliación del mercado, la escala y la complementación resultantes de la integración, permitiría superar esos límites y abriría el camino para la expansión y diversificación de las exportaciones, haciendo posible aumentar los aportes de capital externo necesarios para financiar la ampliación de la capacidad productiva interna. De esta forma, cómo sostienen Tavares y Gomes (1998):

La integración económica regional era concebida, en los documentos originales de la Cepal como un vector estratégico de ruptura del cuadro entonces prevaleciente de insuficiente dinamismo y baja productividad de la economía latinoamericana, proyectándose en tres dimensiones interdependientes: la aceleración del crecimiento, la expansión y diversificación de las exportaciones y el avance de la industrialización. La ampliación del mercado y de la base de recursos productivos, resultante de la integración, permitiría aprovechar las economías de escala y las ventajas de la especialización y complementación industrial, creando las condiciones para aumentar la productividad y dinamizar el proceso de industrialización en el conjunto de los países de la región (TAVARES y GOMES, 1998).

A pesar de los importantes esfuerzos académicos desplegados para sustentar los primeros procesos de integración latinoamericanos surgidos a partir de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, entre ellos, la Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio (ALALC), el Mercado Común Centroamericano (MCCA), la Comunidad Andina (CAN) o el Mercado Común del Caribe (CARICOM), las dificultades políticas y económicas atravesadas por los países de la región hicieron que los mismos resultaran infructuosos. Los factores estructurales y exógenos jugaron un rol de suma importancia en esa

conclusión adversa. Asimismo, los factores políticos, institucionales e instrumentales también poseyeron una importante gravitación a la hora de explicar la relativa ineficacia de los procesos de integración. Siguiendo a Osvaldo Sunkel (1998), “el proceso de industrialización pudo haberse convertido en el instrumento para la creación de un mercado regional si los esfuerzos de integración se hubieran tomado en serio. [Sin embargo] tuvo lugar en compartimentos estancos en que cada nación desarrollaba lazos nuevos y más fuertes con las economías desarrolladas que con los países vecinos”.

Resultado de lo anterior, paulatinamente la integración económica regional fue perdiendo interés y credibilidad. Así, desde fines de los años ochenta y principios de los noventa, en el contexto de la terrible crisis económica sufrida por los países de la región, la concepción “cepalina” de la integración fue secundarizada y progresivamente reemplazada por las propuestas de los países centrales y la acción de las instituciones multilaterales, que pasaron a desplegar concepciones ideológicas compatibles con las nuevas relaciones de fuerza que se consolidaban a escala internacional.

### **NEOLIBERALISMO E INTEGRACIÓN: de la articulación entre multilateralismo y regionalismo abierto**

En el siglo pasado los países en desarrollo iniciaron el camino de la industrialización. Sin embargo, fueron solo unos pocos los que fundaron dicha industrialización en el desarrollo del mercado interno o los que pudieron avanzar en la edificación de un sistema económico con cierto grado de autonomía en la generación de demanda efectiva y en el financiamiento de la inversión productiva. Entre las múltiples y variadas dificultades por las que atravesaron los países en desarrollo se encuentran las vinculadas al proteccionismo



del mundo desarrollado. En efecto, las barreras para acceder a los mercados internacionales no se limitan únicamente a la tendencia histórica declinante de los precios reales de los productos primarios de exportación, sino que también surgen de la propia estructura de los mercados (FURTADO, 1999). El proteccionismo ha mutado, pero no desaparecido. Si bien las barreras arancelarias fueron disminuidas al amparo del Acuerdo General de Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio (GATT), posteriormente se crearon impresionantes mecanismos del subsidio estatal e implementaron múltiples barreras comerciales no arancelarias (RAPOPORT, 2002, p. 34).

Asistimos, entonces, a una “falacia de la liberalización” remozada según cada momento histórico. De este modo, sucesora del GATT, la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) promueve, administra y supervisa el cumplimiento de los acuerdos alcanzados por sus miembros sobre la liberalización del comercio internacional. No obstante, dicha liberalización beneficia fundamentalmente a los bienes y servicios de mayor valor agregado y contenido tecnológico en los que las economías avanzadas son más competitivas. Pese a la defensa a ultranza del libre comercio, las economías centrales consiguen implementar arbitrariamente derechos antidumping, restricciones cuantitativas, y requisitos sanitarios y fitosanitarios – entre otros obstáculos al comercio, con el propósito de restringir el acceso de productos primarios y manufacturas en los que prevalece la mayor competitividad de las economías periféricas. Lo mismo sucede en materia financiera con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), conjuntamente con el Banco Mundial (BM), encargados de establecer normas de manera absolutamente funcional a los intereses de las plazas monetarias de los países centrales. En conjunto, estos organismos han sido los instrumentos para la organización del sistema global desde la perspectiva de los intereses centrales, los principales

promotores de la implantación del *Consenso de Washington* en los países en desarrollo y vulnerables por el peso del endeudamiento externo (FERRER, 2004, p. 19-20).

Bajo la primacía del *Consenso de Washington* los procesos de integración económica latinoamericanos experimentaron importantes transformaciones. Así, durante los años ochenta, aunque más acentuadamente durante la década del noventa, se produjo un notable incremento en el número de acuerdos comerciales regionales suscritos por los países latinoamericanos, incorporando varios de ellos, a iniciativa de los países centrales, compromisos más profundos de los factibles multilateralmente en función de las divisiones del sistema multilateral del comercio. Asimismo, fueron reformados los procesos de integración regionales nacidos en los sesenta y setenta (ALALC, MCCA, CAN, CARICOM) y se crearon otros nuevos, como el caso del Mercosur.

La propagación de acuerdos comerciales regionales no fue solo un fenómeno regional sino mundial y suscitó, en medio del estancamiento de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT, un efervescente debate en torno a la dicotomía “regionalismo *versus* multilateralismo”. De un lado, se encontraban los acuerdos bilaterales o plurilaterales configurados a los fines de pactar preferencias comerciales más allá de las concesiones realizadas a nivel multilateral; de otro, las negociaciones orientadas a la liberalización de los flujos comerciales de bienes y servicios a nivel mundial. No casualmente, ese debate tomó fuerza cuando se produjo un considerable crecimiento en la configuración de procesos de integración y acuerdos comerciales de diverso tipo, llegando a configurar un verdadero *spaghetti bowl* a escala planetaria<sup>3</sup>. En un primer momento, esta multiplicación

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<sup>3</sup> En julio de 2005 sólo había un miembro de la OMC — Mongolia — que no era parte en ningún acuerdo comercial regional.

de acuerdos comerciales regionales generó interpretaciones de lo más diversas, desde aquellas que vislumbraban el auge de un regionalismo abierto y competitivo, en tanto factor que podía influenciar favorablemente la liberalización del comercio multilateral (el regionalismo como *stepping stone* o *building block*), hasta otras visiones que –alentadas por el provisorio estancamiento de la Ronda Uruguay– concebían a los acuerdos de integración como bloques “entorpecedores” de las relaciones económicas y comerciales internacionales (el regionalismo como *stumbling block*) (OMAN, 1994). Sin embargo, pese al vaticinio inicial realizado por algunos teóricos y especialistas en relaciones económicas internacionales, lo cierto es que los acontecimientos finalmente demostraron que en la periferia del sistema las fuerzas del regionalismo y el multilateralismo podían confluír sin entorpecer las negociaciones en sus respectivas arenas. Es decir, si bien regionalismo y multilateralismo podían percibirse como fuerzas opuestas, en el sentido de que uno es un proceso esencialmente centrípeto y el otro centrífugo, siempre que el primero contribuyera a estimular la “competitividad” podía verse como una fuerza complementaria del segundo. El regionalismo así entendido se percibía como respuesta y como prototipo para conducir las fuerzas de la globalización.

Claro que la comprensión cabal de la interacción entre las fuerzas del multilateralismo y el regionalismo no puede allanarse únicamente bajo el supuesto de que este último es un mero reflejo y cauce de la globalización económica. Pero la importancia de analizar el proceso de configuración de espacios regionales en su complejidad y multidimensionalidad no impide reconocer la existencia de patrones diferenciales en relación al fenómeno de la globalización económica. En este contexto, se puede apreciar que no fue igual la proyección adoptada por el Mercosur que por la

Unión Europea (UE), ya que la imbricación entre multilateralismo y regionalismo no actuó de la misma manera en el centro que en la periferia del sistema. Por el contrario, mientras que muchos países en desarrollo liberalizaban sus políticas comerciales y reconvertían sus estrategias de crecimiento con una marcada orientación hacia el mercado externo, la globalización también se alimentaba de fuertes tensiones proteccionistas y barreras no arancelarias en las economías centrales, muchas de ellas articuladas en contra de las economías más débiles, de ahí las dificultades por culminar satisfactoriamente la Ronda Uruguay del GATT y, en la actualidad, la Ronda Doha de la OMC.

Aquí retornamos entonces a la “falacia de la liberalización”, remozada según el orden internacional que se configura tras la finalización de la Guerra Fría y que confirma un vuelco en los niveles de interrelación económica entre las naciones. Paradójicamente, el riesgo de que la integración regional en Europa o América del Norte se convirtiese en un vehículo del proteccionismo, reforzó el interés de los países en desarrollo en fortalecer el sistema comercial multilateral y en promover nuevos acuerdos de integración regional. De esta forma, el regionalismo asumió formatos diversos, no solo en función de las diferencias entre los tres nodos más importantes de la economía mundial (integración *de jure* en Europa; TLCAN/Iniciativa de las Américas/ALCA; integración *de facto* en Asia-Pacífico), sino también entre el centro y la periferia del sistema internacional, promoviendo una regionalización en función del desarrollo desigual y la amplificación de las bases de competencia y rivalidad internacionales.

En este contexto, la institucionalidad multilateral jugó un papel fundamental, condicionando la configuración de acuerdos comerciales regionales por intermedio de diversos mecanismos y

normas, intentando garantizar su coexistencia con la liberalización de los flujos comerciales a nivel multilateral. Teniendo en cuenta que los acuerdos comerciales regionales son considerados casos particulares sometidos al principio general de la liberalización del comercio mundial, vemos que si bien la normativa de la OMC los habilita, al mismo tiempo los considera apartados del principio rector de *no discriminación*, en tanto que excepciones a la cláusula de la Nación Más Favorecida (NMF). Así, según la OMC, los acuerdos comerciales regionales pueden servir de apoyo al sistema multilateral de comercio solo en la medida en que los países negocien normas y compromisos de liberalización más profundos que aquellos asequibles multilateralmente, y allanen el camino para ulteriores acuerdos a nivel multilateral. Son bienvenidos si contribuyen a que los intercambios comerciales entre los países signatarios se desarrollen con mayor libertad, siempre y cuando no erijan mayores obstáculos frente a terceros países.

Resulta entonces ineludible visualizar un sustancial componente normativo que busca convalidar los intereses objetivos de las fuerzas dominantes. Queda claro que la globalización no solo constituye un sistema de redes mediante las cuales se organiza el comercio, las inversiones de las corporaciones transnacionales, las corrientes financieras y el movimiento de personas, sino que es, asimismo, el espacio del ejercicio del poder dentro del cual las potencias dominantes establecen las reglas del juego que articulan el sistema global (FERRER, 2004). Para la OMC, los acuerdos comerciales regionales solo comprenden beneficios para los países signatarios en la medida en que reducen y eliminan las distorsiones en la asignación de recursos. Con ello, se enfatizan los perjuicios derivados de la desviación de comercio o de la multiplicación de normativas comerciales que obstaculizan los intercambios, poniendo

de manifiesto una ambigüedad que alerta contra determinadas formas de integración y que refleja la complejidad de la articulación entre el multilateralismo y el regionalismo, en el cerco de la competencia entre los intereses nacionales de las grandes potencias.

Numerosos acuerdos comerciales regionales surgidos en este contexto fueron funcionales a la ofensiva de los países centrales en pos de la apertura de los periféricos. Asimismo, para el caso de América Latina, los indicadores demuestran que participó muy tempranamente en el juego de fuerzas aperturistas. De un lado, desde mediados de los ochenta a mediados de los noventa, la región redujo unilateralmente el promedio de su arancel externo de más del 40% al 12%, a la vez que tuvo una participación muy activa durante las negociaciones comerciales multilaterales que culminaron en la conformación de la OMC en 1995. De otro lado, en ese mismo periodo, se constituyeron más de una veintena de acuerdos comerciales regionales. De este modo, si bien aparentemente desplazadas en sentidos contradictorios, las fuerzas “centrífugas” de la globalización coincidieron con las “centrípetas” del regionalismo. En los marcos de estas políticas y con esta direccionalidad, la integración regional se convirtió en parte esencial de un proceso global que incluyó también la liberalización unilateral y la multilateral (DEVLIN, ESTEVADEORDAL, 2001).

En sintonía con las connotaciones de este proceso global y su proyección en el plano regional, la integración latinoamericana dejó de estar diagramada “hacia adentro”, tal como había ocurrido con los esquemas aplicados desde los años sesenta en el marco de la estrategia de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones, y pasó a estar configurada –y condicionada – por un contexto general de apertura y liberalización. Si bien en el pasado el centro de gravitación había estado enfocado en el mercado interno, ahora se desplazaba “hacia afuera” en la búsqueda de una mayor complementación económica

con el mercado mundial y una mejor inserción internacional. Así, en la medida en que las tendencias neoliberales de la economía mundial se afianzaban y las barreras comerciales se convertían en un fuerte obstáculo para la acumulación de capital, comenzaron a promocionarse espacios económicos ampliados que permitiesen la transnacionalización de los procesos productivos, en el marco de una cada vez mayor disociación de la esfera financiera en relación a los movimientos comerciales y a las estructuras de producción (RAPOPORT y MADRID, 2002, p. 269).

Conforme se fueron consolidando las tendencias anteriormente señaladas, el llamado “regionalismo abierto” pasó a formar parte esencial de la estrategia asumida por los gobiernos latinoamericanos y caribeños para insertarse en la economía mundial en un contexto de globalización neoliberal. Fue tal el viraje ideológico que se produjo en materia de teoría y praxis que la misma Cepal pasó a definir a la integración regional en los términos de ese nuevo regionalismo (CEPAL, 1994). En un contexto internacional caracterizado por el lento avance de las negociaciones comerciales multilaterales, el fuerte impulso a la integración europea y la creación de una zona de libre comercio entre Canadá, Estados Unidos y México, la Cepal sostuvo que se debía promover el regionalismo abierto a partir del fortalecimiento de los vínculos recíprocos entre la apertura comercial y las políticas de desregulación que se habían emprendido a nivel nacional en todos los países de la región.

### **LA METAMORFOSIS DEL MERCOSUR: de la gradualidad a la automaticidad**

Desde fines de la década del ochenta el contexto regional estuvo caracterizado por profundas transformaciones vinculadas, de

un lado, a la instauración y consolidación de regímenes democráticos y, de otro, al desarrollo de programas de apertura económica y reforma estructural. Los países del Mercosur no escaparon a toda esa metamorfosis, experimentando alteraciones sustanciales en la forma de encarar el proceso de integración regional, el que pasó de la gradualidad a la automaticidad, dejando de lado los mecanismos que lo definían por la búsqueda de una integración más sustentable. En la ejecución de estas mutaciones tuvieron una influencia decisiva el nuevo paradigma analizado en el apartado anterior, así como las presiones ejercidas por los países centrales y los organismos internacionales. De este modo, el pensamiento hegemónico no solo orientó y convalidó el viraje de las políticas económicas adoptadas por los gobiernos de la región, sino también condicionó la misma morfología del proceso de integración.

En noviembre de 1985, los presidentes de Argentina y Brasil, Ricardo Alfonsín y José Sarney, respectivamente, firmaron la Declaración de Iguazú<sup>4</sup> con el compromiso de encausar el hasta entonces casi inexistente proceso de integración bilateral mediante la cooperación económica y la intensificación del comercio. Al año siguiente, ambos gobiernos suscribieron el Acta de Cooperación e Integración Argentino-Brasileña<sup>5</sup>, el Acta de Amistad Argentino-Brasileña y diversas declaraciones, protocolos y acuerdos, mediante los cuales quedó establecido el Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica (PICE)<sup>6</sup>, fundado en los principios de gradualidad, flexibilidad, simetría, equilibrio, tratamiento preferencial frente a terceros mercados, armonización progresiva de políticas y participación del empresariado, principios fundacionales

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<sup>4</sup> Declaración de Iguazú, Foz de Iguazú, 30 de Noviembre de 1985.

<sup>5</sup> Acta para la Integración Argentino-Brasileña, Buenos Aires, 29 de julio de 1986.

<sup>6</sup> Programa de Integración y Cooperación Económica entre la República Argentina y la República Federativa de Brasil, Brasilia, 10 de diciembre de 1986.



que tendrían vigencia en los sectores económicos fundamentales para una integración intraindustrial (FERRER, 2006, p.56).

El Pice preveía un enfoque de la integración basado en políticas sectoriales, mediante negociaciones de preferencias comerciales producto a producto, reglamentadas por medio de protocolos específicos enfocados hacia las áreas consideradas estratégicas para promover el desarrollo industrial de ambas economías. El objetivo era estimular un crecimiento del comercio bilateral equilibrado, estableciendo mecanismos para fomentar la complementación intra-sectorial. La propuesta del PICE suponía “unirse para crecer”, a través de la formulación de una alternativa de desarrollo que fuese, simultáneamente, selectiva (negociaciones por sector y por producto) y multidimensional (excediese los intercambios comerciales), mediante un programa de integración económica y de cooperación frente a los desafíos tecnológicos en puerta, que contemplaba, además, aspectos culturales referidos a la industria editorial, cinematográfica, televisión, entre otros (ALIMONDA, 1992).

El PICE y los protocolos sectoriales contribuyeron a restablecer el intercambio comercial bilateral a los niveles previos a la crisis de la deuda. Este crecimiento fue particularmente importante en los sectores y actividades en las que se negociaron protocolos sectoriales (bienes de capital, equipo de transporte y productos alimenticios). Sin embargo, la implementación del programa no estuvo exenta de dificultades, las que se derivaron, fundamentalmente, de la falta de acompañamiento por parte de los grupos empresarios y el escaso entusiasmo de la clase trabajadora y los sectores medios. Por su parte, la crisis económica tuvo un papel trascendental. La ausencia de una sólida base de sustentación al proyecto de integración (MUSACCHIO, 2007), sumado al agravamiento de las condiciones

macroeconómicas y la inminencia de los recambios presidenciales, hicieron que el programa fuera perdiendo prioridad en las agendas políticas de ambos gobiernos. No obstante, en noviembre de 1988 los mandatarios salientes suscribieron en Buenos Aires lo que sería piedra fundacional del Mercosur, a saber, el Tratado de Integración, Cooperación y Desarrollo (TICD)<sup>7</sup> para la conformación de un espacio económico común entre ambos países. Si bien el tratado y los acuerdos específicos debían aplicarse de acuerdo a los mismos principios que habían inspirado al PICE –para permitir una adaptación progresiva a las nuevas condiciones de competencia y de legislación económica– se estableció que la remoción de todos los obstáculos tarifarios y no tarifarios al comercio de bienes y servicios tenía que alcanzarse en un plazo máximo de diez años. Para lograr ese objetivo, se acordó continuar con la metodología de los protocolos sectoriales iniciada en 1986 al tiempo que se le asignó una mayor importancia a la coordinación de las políticas macroeconómicas.

A pesar de las intenciones manifiestas en el tratado de 1988, lo cierto es que el proceso de integración argentino-brasileño no pudo escapar a las tendencias regionales de fines de la década del ochenta. Así, como consecuencia de las corrientes de apertura externa en las políticas económicas de la región, el *modus operandi* de la integración experimentó una rápida transformación. En este sentido, la crisis de la deuda marcó a América Latina de modo severo, cambiando radicalmente no solo la concepción de las políticas públicas sino los mismos objetivos e instituciones erigidas en el pasado. Tal fue el caso de la integración económica, cuyos fines y metodología fueron testigos de una gran metamorfosis (SALGADO, 1993).

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<sup>7</sup> Tratado de Integración, Cooperación y Desarrollo entre la República Argentina y la República Federativa de Brasil, Buenos Aires, 29 de noviembre de 1988.

De esta forma, en sintonía con el recambio presidencial en Argentina y Brasil, las nuevas orientaciones de política económica y el realineamiento de las relaciones exteriores de ambos Estados, los criterios y las modalidades para llevar adelante el proceso de integración regional fueron sustancialmente modificados. Tal como lo refiere el Acta de Buenos Aires<sup>8</sup>, suscripta en julio de 1990 por los flamantes presidentes Carlos Menem y Fernando Collor de Melo, se decidió adelantar la fecha para el establecimiento de un mercado común al 31 de diciembre de 1994, poniendo especial énfasis en las rebajas arancelarias generalizadas, lineales y automáticas, como metodologías primordiales para la formación del mercado común. Y aún cuando el acta contemplaba la posibilidad de continuar utilizando los protocolos sectoriales, “en la práctica el núcleo de proceso integracionista pasó a ser el desmantelamiento de las barreras al comercio recíproco” (FERRER, 2006, p.57).

De la mano de estas transformaciones, sumados al proceso de integración Paraguay y Uruguay, en 1991 se firmó el Tratado de Asunción, por medio del cual se creó formalmente el Mercosur. Allí, los cuatro países acordaron el establecimiento de un mercado común al cabo de un período de cuatro años, incluyendo la libre circulación de bienes, servicios y factores productivos a través de la eliminación de los derechos aduaneros y restricciones no arancelarias y de cualquier otra medida equivalente; el establecimiento de un arancel externo común y la adopción de una política comercial común frente a terceros Estados o agrupaciones de Estados, así como la coordinación de las posiciones asumidas en los foros económicos comerciales regionales e internacionales; la coordinación de las políticas macroeconómicas y sectoriales (de comercio exterior, agrícola, industrial, fiscal, monetaria, cambiaria y de capitales, de

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<sup>8</sup> Acta de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 6 de julio de 1990.

servicios, aduanera, de transportes y comunicaciones, entre otras) a fin de asegurar condiciones adecuadas de competencia; y el compromiso de armonizar las legislaciones de los Estados partes en las áreas pertinentes, para lograr el fortalecimiento del proceso de integración<sup>9</sup>.

Si bien hubo continuidad entre el Pice y el Mercosur, existen marcadas diferencias en cuanto a la filosofía, los instrumentos y la metodología implicados. Así, mientras que el Pice buscaba la complementación industrial y comercial mediante la especialización en nichos y líneas de productos por medio de protocolos sectoriales, el Mercosur aspiró a crear un mercado ampliado que permitiera atraer las corrientes de inversión y de comercio global en un contexto internacional signado por las dificultades de la Ronda Uruguay del GATT. Mientras que en el primero, la gradualidad en los cambios y la flexibilidad en los tiempos aseguraban un recorte en el universo de bienes mediante la conformación de “listas positivas”, en el segundo se puso en marcha el Programa de Liberalización Comercial (Anexo I del Tratado de Asunción) con el objetivo de liberalizar todo el comercio de bienes intrazona de manera automática, lineal y progresiva (BOTTO y QUILICONI, 2007, p. 209). Mientras que en los albores del Mercosur se plantearon mecanismos que contemplaban la creación de comisiones sectoriales y modalidades de trabajo para coordinar el proceso y evitar efectos perjudiciales sobre los sectores menos preparados para enfrentar los desafíos de un mercado regional, con el Tratado de Asunción el proceso de integración se orientó sobre la base de criterios generales, buscando acelerar el ritmo de la integración y tratando de imponer una

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<sup>9</sup> Tratado para la Constitución de un Mercado Común entre la República Argentina, la República Federativa del Brasil, la República del Paraguay y la República Oriental del Uruguay, Asunción, Paraguay, 26 de marzo de 1991

condición de mercado generalizada e indiferente a muchas de las necesidades de empresas y sectores específicos. En suma, a partir de 1990, la integración pasó a tener un plazo determinado y perdió su carácter selectivo, al tiempo que los Estados nacionales restringieron su función reguladora y se limitaron a generar las condiciones para dejar actuar libremente a las fuerzas de mercado. Esta adhesión, o sumisión, al “paradigma céntrico” provocó cambios decisivos en la estrategia de integración a favor de un nuevo criterio afín a las corrientes ideológicas que predominaban en los nuevos gobiernos que habían llegado al poder tanto en la Argentina como en Brasil, y que acompañarían el proceso de las reformas neoliberales.

De esta forma, se buscó crear un mercado regional sin más herramientas que los acuerdos de política global, que en una primera etapa fueron básicamente de orden arancelario. Este retiro del Estado fortaleció el poder de negociación de los grandes oligopolios y redujo el de los agentes más pequeños (SCHVARZER, 1999). En un contexto internacional de posguerra fría y de la Iniciativa para las Américas, la propuesta de integración se redujo a la más pura tradición ortodoxa, marginando el interés original de buscar alternativas conjuntas de desarrollo. El proyecto del Mercosur terminó reafirmando la opción neoconservadora del Estado mínimo, impuesta a nivel nacional y reproducida en la integración regional, constituyéndose en un dispositivo de armonización de espacios económicos de cara a su integración en el área de hegemonía comercial de Estados Unidos (ALIMONDA, 1992). Así, quedaba en evidencia que “el avance de la integración no era pensado como un proceso de desarrollo interno y de reestructuración competitiva frente al avance de otras regiones, sino como un proceso que acelerase la vinculación con las grandes potencias de manera articulada y subordinada” (MUSACCHIO, 2007, p. 11).

El Mercosur nació, formalmente, en un contexto signado por el impulso de las reformas neoliberales de principios de los ochenta propuestas por los gobiernos conservadores de Margaret Thatcher y Ronald Reagan. Si bien al comienzo había sido concebido como un instrumento destinado a promover una política de sustitución de importaciones a escala ampliada, con especialización sectorial y apertura limitada, posteriormente, la búsqueda de complementación en la que se afirmó el interés de grandes grupos económicos y empresas transnacionales, sobre todo europeas, se combinó con las políticas de apertura generalizada a las inversiones extranjeras y al mercado mundial. Como sostienen Rapoport y Spiguel (2005, p. 81), “restringido en lo esencial a una zona de libre comercio y sobre la base de estos condicionamientos políticos y económicos, el Mercosur podía quedar reducido a un ámbito amplificador de pugnas transnacionales a través de las alianzas extra-regionales de los países miembros y erosionado frente a la política hemisférica de Estados Unidos y su iniciativa sobre la Asociación de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA)”.

Consiguientemente, conforme se fueron consolidando las políticas de apertura y desregulación de los mercados, se fue imponiendo un Mercosur de “baja intensidad” como área de preferencias comerciales transitorias. La integración sectorial intra-industrial originalmente propuesta terminó siendo reemplazada por la liberalización lineal y automática de los intercambios comerciales y los intereses del sector privado asumieron la conducción principal del proceso de integración, el que pasó a convertirse en un fenómeno esencialmente comercial. Por su parte, amparadas en la desregulación de los mercados que facilitó la reorganización espacial de los procesos productivos a escala regional, las firmas multinacionales provenientes de países industrializados, adquirieron

un rol protagónico y sus filiales especializaron su producción basándose en el comercio intra-firma, logrando un elevado grado de complementación productiva en el contexto de sus estrategias mundiales. Tal fue el caso, por ejemplo, de la industria automotriz (RAPOPORT, 2007, p. 820).

Si bien las políticas de liberalización del comercio regional hicieron que durante la década del noventa el mismo adquiriera un gran dinamismo, producto de las deficiencias en materia de coordinación macroeconómica y de la ausencia de un verdadero proceso de integración productiva, la devaluación del real de principios de 1999, primero, y la política de estímulo productivo aplicada por distintos estados brasileños después, generaron una enorme fisura en el Mercosur. Pese al intento por relanzar y respaldar el Mercosur, el cuadro anterior se vio agravado con la crisis de la economía argentina, que encontró su punto más álgido en el año 2001.

## **EL MERCOSUR Y LOS CONDICIONAMIENTOS HEGEMÓNICOS DEL RÉGIMEN MULTILATERAL DE COMERCIO**

Tal como se pudo observar en los apartados anteriores, desde la suscripción de los primeros acuerdos de cooperación e integración argentino-brasileños de mediados de la década del ochenta hasta la constitución formal del Mercosur, el 1 de enero de 1995, el proceso experimentó una importante transformación en la filosofía, los instrumentos y la metodología para encarar la integración regional. De cara a las nuevas corrientes ideológicas ligadas al “paradigma céntrico” y al regionalismo abierto, dicha metamorfosis terminó ubicando al Mercosur de espaldas al proyecto de desarrollo regional.

Lejos de un modelo de “integración sostenible” (FERRER, 2006), el Mercosur reflejó las exigencias de apertura de los países centrales y del sistema multilateral de comercio sustentado en los acuerdos GATT/OMC.

Aunque en su génesis el proceso de integración había sido incorporado al sistema de la Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) por intermedio de la figura de los acuerdos de complementación económica y de la mano de las disposiciones multilaterales relativamente más flexibles previstas para los países en desarrollo por la denominada “Cláusula de Habilitación”<sup>10</sup>, posteriormente, en parte por iniciativa regional y en parte por presión de las economías más desarrolladas, tanto el diseño como la construcción final del Mercosur se terminaron ajustando a los requerimientos de liberalización más estrictos del régimen GATT/OMC previstos por el artículo XXIV. En conjunto, y traducidas al *modus operandi* del proceso de conformación del Mercosur, estas exigencias se vieron fundamentalmente materializadas en: la composición de “listas negativas” de bienes excluidos de la integración; la liberalización de “lo esencial” de los intercambios comerciales; la reducción de los niveles de protección determinados por el arancel externo común; y la premura de los tiempos para conducir la liberalización, tanto intra como extra regional.

La utilización de la “Cláusula de habilitación” por parte del Mercosur no había sido un fenómeno arbitrario. Durante la década de 1980 los países miembros de la Aladi utilizaron dicha cláusula para la suscripción de acuerdos de preferencias arancelarias que, mediante “listas positivas”, cubrieran una cantidad reducida de

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<sup>10</sup> “Decisión sobre el trato diferenciado y más favorable, reciprocidad y mayor participación de los países en desarrollo”, GATT, Decisión de 28 de noviembre de 1979 (L/4903).



productos sin comprometerse a necesariamente liberalizar “lo esencial” del intercambio comercial. En términos generales, estos acuerdos son de alcance parcial, ya que no participan la totalidad de los Estados miembros de la ALADI sino dos o más países de conformidad con el artículo VII de la Asociación. Gran parte de ellos han adoptado, asimismo, la forma de acuerdos de complementación económica, fórmula prevista en el artículo XI. Estos últimos suponen la configuración de zonas de libre comercio y uniones aduaneras entre distintos Estados de la ALADI.

El motivo por el cual los Estados en desarrollo prefieren hacer uso de la “cláusula de habilitación” se debe a que la misma implica compromisos más flexibles que los que se imponen mediante el artículo XXIV. En primer lugar, en lo que hace al alcance de la liberalización del comercio entre las partes de un acuerdo, la cláusula permite el intercambio de preferencias sobre un subconjunto de productos y la reducción parcial de los obstáculos al comercio, en vez de prescribir su eliminación para “lo esencial” de los intercambios comerciales. En segundo lugar, la cláusula no requiere un plan indicativo del tiempo para la liberalización del comercio, mientras que el artículo requiere que todo plan para formar una unión aduanera o área de libre comercio debe demostrar que será completado en un plazo de tiempo “razonable” que, en 1994, a partir del “Entendimiento Relativo a la Interpretación del Artículo XXIV”, no debe exceder los diez años, excepto en circunstancias excepcionales. En tercer lugar, en lo que se refiere a la notificación y evaluación del acuerdo, también existen diferencias considerables entre lo que prescribe el artículo XXIV y la “cláusula de habilitación”. Así, para el caso de ésta última, se requiere la notificación del acuerdo, el suministro de la información necesaria y la posibilidad de consultas por parte de los miembros de la OMC. La notificación del acuerdo, acompañada

de una descripción acerca de su contenido, se hace ante el Comité de Comercio y Desarrollo (CCD) de la OMC, en cuyo marco también se desarrollan las consultas y debates que puedan surgir en torno al acuerdo en cuestión. Este procedimiento difiere del correspondiente a los acuerdos establecidos de conformidad con el artículo XXIV en cuyo caso el órgano designado es el Consejo de Comercio de Mercancías (CCM), a la vez que se requiere un examen “en profundidad” del acuerdo a la luz de las normas y disciplinas de la OMC.

Tal como se pudo apreciar en apartados anteriores, en un principio el PICE preveía un enfoque de la integración gradual, basado en políticas sectoriales y negociaciones de preferencias comerciales “producto a producto”, reglamentadas por medio de protocolos específicos enfocados hacia aquellas áreas consideradas estratégicas para promover el desarrollo industrial de ambas economías. Las preferencias comerciales resultantes de este programa se insertaron en el marco de la ALADI, quedando por tanto ligadas al GATT por intermedio de la “Cláusula de habilitación”. Posteriormente, hacia fines de los ochenta, con los cambios producidos en los gobiernos de Argentina y Brasil, los criterios y las modalidades para llevar adelante el proceso de integración regional fueron modificados. Así, como se detalló inicialmente, bajo el sesgo de las nuevas administraciones de Menem y Collor de Melo, se abandonó el enfoque de integración selectivo y gradual por una nueva modalidad de liberalización comercial a través de rebajas arancelarias automáticas, generalizadas y lineales. Estos cambios quedaron plasmados en el Acta de Buenos Aires de julio de 1990 que, en el marco de la ALADI, dio lugar a la suscripción del Acuerdo de Alcance Parcial y Complementación Económica (AAP.CE) N° 14 en diciembre de ese mismo año. Dicho acuerdo establecía, entre otros, el objetivo de crear las condiciones

necesarias para el establecimiento de un mercado común –por entonces solo entre Argentina y Brasil – al 31 de diciembre de 1994 mediante un programa de desgravación progresivo, lineal y automático.

En sintonía con estas transformaciones, una vez concluido el proceso de ratificación parlamentaria del Tratado de Asunción, en noviembre de 1991 los cuatro Estados miembros fundacionales del Mercosur suscribieron ante la ALADI el AAP.CE N°18, notificando el proceso de integración ante el GATT por medio de ese acuerdo y, en consecuencia, por intermedio de la “Cláusula de habilitación”<sup>11</sup>. No obstante, si bien las características que terminó adoptando el Mercosur lo ajustaron a los requerimientos de liberalización más radicales determinados por el artículo XXIV, su notificación sobre la base de la “cláusula de habilitación” –y no del artículo XXIV– generó gran controversia. Así, por ejemplo, Estados Unidos sostuvo que la cláusula no sustituye al artículo XXIV y que el Mercosur, por su mayor grado de desarrollo relativo, no podía ser considerado en el contexto de las preferencias otorgadas por la norma de 1979, por lo que requería que se notificase según el artículo del GATT<sup>12</sup>. En esa dirección también estuvieron los planteamientos europeos. Asimismo, para el gobierno nipón “era importante que se redujeran al mínimo los efectos negativos de los acuerdos comerciales regionales para terceros y que se compartieran las ventajas resultantes de la expansión consiguiente del comercio. [Asimismo] se debía comprender que la Cláusula de habilitación, si bien permitía un trato preferencial entre los países menos adelantados,

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<sup>11</sup> GATT, “ALADI. Cláusula de Habilitación. Información relativa a las acciones concluidas entre los países miembros de la Asociación al amparo del tratado de Montevideo 1980 durante el año 1991”, L/6985, 5 Marzo, 1992.

<sup>12</sup> L/7029 “Request by the US for notification under Art. XXIV and for the establishment of a WP.

no atenuaba los requisitos del Acuerdo General con respecto a los acuerdos comerciales regionales. Resultaba claro que el Acuerdo del Mercosur trataba de establecer un AEC y suprimir los aranceles entre las Partes; el Grupo de Trabajo debía examinar si el Acuerdo cumplía los requisitos establecidos en el artículo XXIV”<sup>13</sup>.

Por su parte, a tono con los condicionamientos hegemónicos enunciados desde Ginebra, los representantes del Mercosur argumentaron que el proceso de integración satisfacía las disposiciones del artículo XXIV por varias razones. “En primer lugar, la unión aduanera comprendía lo esencial de los intercambios comerciales entre las Partes, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 del artículo XXIV. En segundo lugar, el Programa de Liberación Comercial estaba orientado a la eliminación de aranceles y la supresión de los demás obstáculos al comercio entre las Partes a partir del 1º de enero de 1995 (con excepción de un número reducido de partidas que, como se había señalado, quedaban sujetas a un proceso de adecuación encaminado a la eliminación gradual y automática de los actuales gravámenes en un plazo determinado), de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 7 del artículo XXIV. En tercer lugar, a partir del 1º de enero de 1995 había entrado en vigor el AEC (con las excepciones antes señaladas), de conformidad con los párrafos 7 y 8 del artículo XXIV. En cuarto lugar, el promedio ponderado del AEC era sustancialmente inferior a los promedios ponderados de los aranceles que las Partes habían aplicado con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor del AEC, como se estipulaba en el párrafo 5 del artículo XXIV; las legislaciones comerciales armonizadas eran sustancialmente menos restrictivas que las que regían con anterioridad al inicio del proceso de integración, de

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<sup>13</sup> “Examen del Acuerdo del Mercado Común del Sur. Nota sobre la Reunión de los días 10 y 11 de octubre de 1995”, OMC, Comité de Comercio y Desarrollo, WT/COMTD/1/Add.9, 28 de abril de 1997.

conformidad con lo dispuesto en los párrafos 5 y 8 del artículo XXIV. Por último, la reducción arancelaria se había llevado a cabo de acuerdo con el calendario establecido. En resumen, la integración aumentaba la dimensión del mercado, favoreciendo mayores economías de escala y una mayor especialización del trabajo y alentando la inversión y el desarrollo tecnológico. También promovía los objetivos del sistema multilateral de comercio, al ser abierto, predecible y transparente. Así pues, el Mercosur constituía una condición necesaria para la plena participación de la región en el comercio<sup>14</sup>.

Durante el proceso de control y supervisión realizado en la OMC, la cuestión más sensible fue el nivel de protección externa del arancel externo común (AEC) del Mercosur. En este sentido, sus miembros manifestaron que el AEC respondía al objetivo de apertura de sus economías, situándose como promedio ponderado a niveles arancelarios inferiores a los que aplicaban anteriormente los países suscriptores del Tratado de Asunción. En esa misma dirección, también se informaron aquellos datos comerciales que daban cuenta del crecimiento comercial intra y extraregional, y se destacaron los resultados obtenidos de estudios realizados en materia de creación o desvío de comercio, los que le permitían arribar a la conclusión de que la creación de comercio había tenido lugar paralelamente a la fuerte expansión del intercambio intra-regional<sup>15</sup>. En consecuencia, los Estados del Mercosur salvaguardaban que: “Si se tiene en cuenta el objetivo de mantener economías abiertas y de que los niveles arancelarios comunes no exceden en conjunto los efectivamente aplicados por los Estados Partes con anterioridad a la firma del Tratado de Asunción, resulta evidente que el Mercosur cumple con

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, página 5

<sup>15</sup> OMC, Comité de Comercio y Desarrollo, WT/COMTD/1, 2 de mayo de 1995, Anexos I y IV.

las condiciones generales fijadas en el GATT 94 para las uniones aduaneras [...] Los Estados Partes del Tratado de Asunción se fijaron desde el inicio, como objetivo primordial, insertar al Mercosur dentro de las corrientes de comercio mundiales. El Mercosur es un proceso flexible y abierto, opuesto a la idea de “fortaleza” que reedite, a escala cuatripartita, viejas concepciones aislacionistas<sup>16</sup>.

De los diversos textos documentados y citados resulta significativa una constante, a saber, la forma en la que los representantes del Mercosur dieron cuenta de las características que revestía el proceso de integración, enfatizando su propensión hacia el regionalismo abierto y destacando el abandono de cualquier política regional contraria a la filosofía del *laissez faire* global. Por los resultados de las evaluaciones de la OMC se puede inferir que el Mercosur fue un alumno bien disciplinado, ya que si bien en sus orígenes había sido legítimamente notificado al sistema multilateral mediante la “cláusula de habilitación”, posteriormente, por iniciativa gubernamental, pero también por imperio de las presiones externas, buscó satisfacer los requerimientos de liberalización estipulados en el artículo XXIV. Así, subordinado por los condicionantes hegemónicos y haciendo caso omiso de los efectos de las políticas de apertura adoptadas, el proceso de integración regional liberalizó “lo esencial” de los intercambios comerciales. Pero si la existencia de regímenes especiales y la experimentación de ciertos obstáculos llevaron a muchos a caracterizar al Mercosur como zona de libre comercio “incompleta” o unión aduanera “imperfecta”, existe un condicionamiento cumplimentado a rajatabla, a saber, que “los aranceles y otras barreras comerciales con terceras partes no deben ser en su totalidad más altos o más restrictivos que la incidencia

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<sup>16</sup> Ibídem, página 17.

general de los aranceles y regulaciones vigentes en los territorios constitutivos de la unión antes del establecimiento de ésta”.

Durante el periodo de transición hacia la unión aduanera (1991-1994) los flujos intraregionales de comercio crecieron muy rápidamente, profundizando la interrelación económica, especialmente entre Argentina y Brasil. Si bien la apertura unilateral jugó un rol importante en el aumento de dichos flujos, las preferencias comerciales desempeñaron un papel destacado. Al finalizar el período de transición, de los tres compromisos principales asumidos en el Tratado de Asunción: implementación de un Programa de Liberalización Comercial mediante reducciones automáticas, lineales y generalizadas de aranceles; negociación y adopción de un AEC; y coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas y sectoriales, el Mercosur solo había encarado las dos primeras, eliminando “lo esencial” de las barreras arancelarias al comercio intraregional y generando un AEC, en promedio inferior al prevaleciente con anterioridad a la conformación del Mercosur. En este esquema, la coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas y sectoriales –materias para las que en Asunción no se había establecido ningún mecanismo– no registró progresos significativos. Resultaba entonces evidente que, “la idea que gobierna el tratamiento del tema es procurar dar prioridad, en los esfuerzos de coordinación, a los mecanismos de política macroeconómica más directamente ligados al comercio”<sup>17</sup>.

El balance sobre la inscripción del Mercosur en el sistema multilateral de comercio, sumado a las voces que surgen de parte de sectores ortodoxamente fieles a la ideología del paradigma neoliberal, arroja así algunos supuestos. No solo en términos de la doble vara que reviste la argumentación de los países centrales en materia de liberalización comercial –aquí denominada “falacia

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<sup>17</sup> Op. Cit., WT/COMTD/1, 1995.

de la liberalización”– sino porque lo requerido por los organismos internacionales y los intereses que se esconden detrás de las reglas multilaterales ha supuesto consecuencias de enorme perjuicio para los países de la región, en materia de desindustrialización, desempleo y pobreza. Nuestras consideraciones no pueden entonces evadir el interrogante acerca de por qué o para qué los países en desarrollo deben liberalizar indiscriminadamente sus flujos comerciales y adaptarse a las disciplinas de la OMC, aun cuando éstas vayan en contra de los intereses de sus propias naciones. La única respuesta nos remite entonces al carácter dependiente de la región, mediatizado por la histórica falta de equidad en los intercambios comerciales internacionales y las relaciones de fuerza que la consagran, en el plano económico, político y en las ideologías.

En el Mercosur, la relación entre globalización, desarrollo nacional e integración planteó graves dilemas, poniendo de manifiesto las tensiones acerca del lugar que ocupaban sus miembros en el mundo, así como de las fuerzas determinantes de su desarrollo económico y social. En el epicentro de esas tensiones estuvo la visión fundamentalista y el supuesto de que en un mundo globalizado la identidad y la dimensión endógena de los espacios nacionales y regionales debían fundirse en el mercado mundial. Este enfoque redujo la integración regional a la liberalización del intercambio comercial y a un simple proceso en el que “la integración es con el mundo y solo marginalmente dentro del espacio subregional” (FERRER, 2006, p. 74). Siguiendo a Claudio Spiguel (1996, p. 214), “en el discurso oficial las proclamas no alcanzan a disimular el verdadero carácter de esa presunta ‘integración’ en marcha. Está, lejos de los planteos de unidad latinoamericana de tantos patriotas y revolucionarios de nuestro continente a lo largo de dos siglos, hecha a medida de las ambiciones “globalistas” de captura y disputa de



un mercado ampliado cautivo para las ‘multinacionales’ de diverso origen imperial. El Mercosur no es un bloque de naciones dueña de su destino, no es un mercado sujeto sino objeto. Por eso cuanto más avanza esta integración más se desarticulan los mercados internos de los países miembros, desde el norte brasileño hasta la Patagonia argentina, más ajuste y despojo del patrimonio común, más retroceso social, más penetración imperialista, también en el plano cultural”.

La metamorfosis del Mercosur, desde los primeros pasos fundacionales hasta su concreción a principios de los noventa, no fue un fenómeno aislado sino que formó parte de una mudanza de mayor alcance registrada, sobre todo, en las políticas económicas y exteriores de sus Estados miembros. En este sentido, la Argentina fue un caso extremo. Las fenomenales transformaciones registradas en su estructura económica, social y de poder –reforzadas por una inserción dependiente y periférica en el sistema internacional – determinaron la evolución de su sistema político y de su política exterior, incluyendo el diseño de las políticas regionales. De este modo, si bien vimos que el Mercosur se acomodó a las características requeridas por el *Consenso de Washington*, dicho acomodamiento no estuvo exento de matices, marchas y contramarchas. Así, más allá del consenso acerca del rumbo general del bloque de conformidad con el regionalismo abierto, muchos de los vaivenes registrados en la evolución de la integración reflejaron decisiones y posiciones divergentes de parte de los dos principales socios del Mercosur, sobre todo, en función de sus estrategias nacionales de desarrollo y de sus mecanismos diferenciados de inserción internacional. Estas asimetrías, se sabe, en reiteradas ocasiones también involucraron la actuación disonante de Estados Unidos que, a partir de la Iniciativa para las Américas y del lanzamiento del proyecto del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA), intentó desplegar con gran

fuerza en el hemisferio la máxima *divide et impera*. De allí en más, la debilidad del Mercosur se traduciría en la fortaleza del proyecto hegemónico hemisférico.

Las asimetrías dentro del Mercosur no fueron solo materia de debate económico sino que terminaron generando los dilemas inherentes a una división regional del trabajo que, por ausencia de mecanismos de coordinación macroeconómica y falta de promoción a la integración sectorial e industrial, terminó reproduciendo los patrones asimétricos del comercio mundial, a saber, la histórica ruptura centro-periferia. A pesar de que durante los años noventa los efectos de este patrón asimétrico pudieron ser relativamente encapsulados, la vulnerabilidad externa y las dificultades internas de los socios del Mercosur, hicieron eclosión hacia fines de la década, agudizando las contradicciones no encaradas y, por ende, no resueltas, y poniendo de manifiesto las dificultades de avanzar en un proceso de integración sin la coordinación de las políticas macroeconómicas y sectoriales, así como los riesgos de caer en una espiral sin freno de represalias y medidas proteccionistas.

## **ITINERARIOS E INTERROGANTES DEL MERCOSUR A PRINCIPIOS DEL SIGLO XXI**

El armado del Mercosur se desarrolló entre el modelo de integración según los primeros postulados de la Cepal y el regionalismo bajo la primacía del “paradigma céntrico”. Así, los cambios experimentados en los fundamentos y en la metodología para conducir el proceso de integración nos impiden hablar de un único Mercosur. Por un lado, encontramos un primer Mercosur que, si bien con dificultades en su implementación y metas moderadas, contenía un fundamento similar al de los primeros esfuerzos latinoamericanos

que plantearon a la integración regional como instrumento para resolver problemáticas estructurales derivadas de la frágil inserción en la división internacional del trabajo de raigambre decimonónica. Por otro lado, observamos un segundo Mercosur, acoplado al *Consenso de Washington* y a los requerimientos establecidos por el régimen GATT/OMC y los condicionantes hegemónicos de los países centrales. Este segundo Mercosur, con el tiempo puso de relieve la debilidad de una estrategia de integración sustentada casi exclusivamente en intereses comerciales, alejada de mecanismos de coordinación macroeconómica y de una política productiva e industrial común. El despliegue de ese rumbo y sus consecuencias, fundamentan las críticas al regionalismo abierto en general, y a este segundo Mercosur, en particular.

El regionalismo abierto comporta una lectura limitada y reduccionista del verdadero alcance de los procesos de integración, según la cual estos se deben restringir estrictamente a gestionar la liberalización de los flujos comerciales en tiempo récord y a mejorar *a priori* la inserción de las economías nacionales en los mercados globales. Sin embargo, la falta de respuestas de este modelo a los desafíos que comprometen el desarrollo y el bienestar regional ha sido notable. En la práctica, esa falta de respuestas redundó, por ejemplo, en la ausencia de políticas orientadas a promover la integración productiva y sectorial de las respectivas industrias nacionales, o a morigerar las asimetrías estructurales de las economías de la región. Por otro lado, a las limitaciones intrínsecas del modelo, se agregó el despliegue de una enérgica estrategia geoeconómica de parte de la potencia hegemónica hemisférica que, aunada al comportamiento “intermediario” de la elite política local, alimentó fisuras erosionando posicionamientos estratégicos comunes para incrementar los márgenes de la autonomía regional.

Un párrafo aparte requiere el balance sobre la inscripción del Mercosur en el sistema multilateral de comercio. No solo en términos de la hipocresía del doble discurso que reviste la interpelación de los países centrales, sino porque lo requerido por el sistema GATT/OMC ha tenido efectos muy dañinos para los países de la región. La configuración de procesos de integración regional entre países en desarrollo debiera contribuir a la búsqueda de alternativas conjuntas para superar las dificultades socioeconómicas más apremiantes, por no mencionar el acervo político, social y cultural que le da sustento y legitimidad a dichas iniciativas, de lo contrario, la integración no tiene sentido como política de Estado y, en última instancia, se ve limitada a aspectos parciales y convertida en un elemento de agudización de las vulnerabilidades y deformaciones económicas de sus integrantes. En parte, dicha búsqueda fue el *leitmotiv* de los acercamientos argentino-brasileños de mediados de la década de 1980. Posteriormente, los objetivos iniciales quedaron trancos al amparo de las políticas de apertura, desregulación y liberalización promovidas por el sistema GATT/OMC e implementadas por los signatarios de Asunción.

En este punto coincidimos con Theôtonio Dos Santos (2007) en que el debate actual sobre los procesos de integración no puede hacerse dentro de un plano exclusivamente económico, y menos aún, estrictamente comercial. Es también a partir de consideraciones históricas, políticas, culturales y estratégicas que se debe reflexionar sobre las propuestas regionales. Si se considera el pensamiento neoliberal puro, se debiera aceptar que la única integración correcta es la del libre comercio generalizado. Tal como surge del abordaje de la inscripción del Mercosur en el sistema GATT/OMC, las integraciones regionales son evaluadas en tanto que intervenciones artificiales que imponen límites perjudiciales a las zonas no integradas. Sin

embargo, lo cierto es que detrás de esas argumentaciones en contra del proteccionismo siempre subyacen consideraciones estratégicas y geopolíticas que indican las preferencias de los tecnócratas y teóricos por una u otra alternativa. Así operaron, por ejemplo, los partidarios del Alca quienes, mientras resaltaban la importancia del mercado norteamericano y reclamaban la desregulación al movimiento de capitales, proponían una apertura limitada en los sectores de mayor importancia para los países latinoamericanos, introduciendo la problemática multilateral del proteccionismo agrícola en el ámbito hemisférico.

Teniendo en cuenta que uno de los principales mecanismos de dominación radica en la construcción de teorías y visiones, no fue casual que en los umbrales del Mercosur se difundiera una imagen fundamentalista de la globalización caracterizada por fuerzas ingobernables cuyo curso era imposible de alterar por la acción pública colectiva. No obstante, lo cierto es que los países pueden desarrollar respuestas que mejoren, de manera concertada su inserción en el orden global. Sin embargo, parafraseando a Ferrer, una división equitativa del trabajo intraregional para generar fuerzas dinámicas de crecimiento compartidas, dependerá de la convergencia de los enfoques fundamentales sobre los problemas del desarrollo en un mundo global (FERRER, 2006, p. 73). De esto se deriva que aún existan interesantes márgenes de maniobra para el Mercosur. En este sentido, al igual que Waldo Ansaldi (2007) cuando se refiere a la construcción de la democracia en América Latina, podemos decir que hay condiciones “de posibilidad”, no necesariamente “de realización”. Efectivamente, deben existir condiciones endógenas – no solo estructurales sino también de índole política- que posibiliten la adopción de las estrategias necesarias para lanzar procesos de

acumulación, alcanzar el progreso científico-tecnológico y su difusión e integración en el tejido productivo y social.

Durante la *belle époque* del neoliberalismo las fuerzas hegemónicas pugnaron por modelar los procesos de integración regional en ciernes o directamente introducir una variedad de acuerdos comerciales regionales afines a sus intereses, según sus respectivas áreas de influencia, prometiendo el crecimiento del comercio y las inversiones, a cambio de que los países liberalizaran el intercambio comercial de bienes y servicios, entre otras demandas de apertura y desregulación. En este contexto, si bien los gobiernos de la región terminaron por hacer una apuesta a favor del Mercosur, ello solo ocurrió después de un periodo de grandes oscilaciones. Por otro lado, el mismo proceso de integración quedó sujeto a los condicionamientos impuestos por el regionalismo abierto y adoptó las modalidades acordes a la corriente neoliberal en boga, cumpliendo las regulaciones internacionales del sistema GATT/OMC, haciendo exclusivo énfasis en la liberalización comercial y desatendiendo otros aspectos fundamentales de la integración regional, como la coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas, la resolución de asimetrías estructurales, la complementación productiva, o la armonización jurídica, política y social. Los resultados de esta elección no tardaron en hacerse sentir y, hacia fines del siglo pasado, los países miembros del bloque experimentaron fuertes crisis económicas, políticas y sociales. Como correlato directo, el mismo proceso de integración se vio jaqueado por la precariedad que le era inherente. El Mercosur, sin haber desarrollado herramientas autónomas e iniciado el camino de una integración “profunda” facilitó la introducción del consenso neoliberal en una escala ampliada, en perfecta sintonía con los intereses hegemónicos globales.

A comienzos del siglo XXI, con posterioridad a la colosal crisis que vivieron los Estados de la región y en el contexto de una etapa de revisión crítica de las políticas económicas adoptadas durante los años noventa, la integración latinoamericana pareció adoptar un nuevo orden de prioridades y una nueva agenda directamente relacionada a los cambios políticos en distintos países de la región (da Motta Veiga, 2007). En ese marco, al interior del Mercosur, el llamado “Consenso de Buenos Aires”<sup>18</sup> buscó simbolizar el inicio de una nueva era para la integración regional. Posteriormente, durante la Cumbre de Mar del Plata (2005) vinieron los acontecimientos que marcaron el ocaso del ALCA. También se creó el Fondo para la Convergencia Estructural del Mercosur (FOCEM)<sup>19</sup> y se aprobó el Programa de Integración Productiva del Mercosur<sup>20</sup>. Estos cambios habilitan a plantearnos nuevos interrogantes, fundamentalmente, aquellos orientados a descifrar la incógnita sobre si estamos (o no) ante la aparición de un tercer Mercosur, instancia superadora y síntesis. Ahora bien, pese a que en conjunto estas medidas se constituyeron en elementos notables de una nueva era “posneoliberal” (SADER, 2008)<sup>21</sup>, aún permanecen

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<sup>18</sup> Declaración Conjunta de los Señores Presidentes de la República Argentina y de la República Federativa del Brasil, Buenos Aires, 16 de octubre de 2003, MRECIC, Información para la prensa nro. 238/2003.

<sup>19</sup> “Fondo para la Convergencia Estructural del Mercosur”, Mercosur/CMC/DEC. N° 45/04, Belo Horizonte, 16/XII/04. El fondo está destinado a financiar programas para promover la convergencia estructural y desarrollar la competitividad y la cohesión social, en particular de las economías y regiones menos desarrolladas.

<sup>20</sup> “Programa de Integración Productiva del Mercosur”, Mercosur/CMC/DEC. N° 12/08, San Miguel de Tucumán, 30/VI/08. El programa tiene como objetivo fortalecer la complementariedad productiva, el incremento de la competitividad y el mejoramiento de la inserción externa de los sectores productivos de los Estados parte.

<sup>21</sup> Siguiendo a Emir Sader (2008, p. 81), denominamos *posneoliberalismo* a una categoría descriptiva que designa diferentes grados de negación del modelo neoliberal, sin llegar a configurar un nuevo modelo, al mismo tiempo que un conjunto híbrido de fuerzas compone las alianzas que están en la base de los nuevos proyectos.

vigentes los análisis que reivindican reformas esenciales y urgentes para garantizar la sustentabilidad del bloque. De esta forma, y a modo de hipótesis preliminar, se podría sostener que, si bien esta nueva etapa de la integración regional advierte modificaciones respecto al pasado, las características estructurales que aún reviste el proceso de integración no habilitan a considerarlo en los términos de un nuevo modelo de integración. Dicho de otra manera, si bien los cambios experimentados en la región denotan una negación del paradigma anterior, aún no permiten expresar con precisión la aparición de un nuevo modelo de integración para el Mercosur. Mucho dependerá entonces del grado de afianzamiento de los lazos regionales y de la consolidación de proyectos nacionales en aras de preservar la soberanía de los pueblos.

## **NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS DE LA INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA: ALBA y UNASUR**

La introducción a las nuevas perspectivas en materia de integración regional en América del Sur no puede omitir la mención al proceso de transformaciones económicas y políticas de comienzos del Siglo XXI. Este proceso de innovaciones encontró su punto de partida en la fenomenal crisis por la que atravesaron los países de la región a fines del siglo pasado, como prueba del rotundo fracaso de la aplicación de las recetas neoliberales y de la vigencia del paradigma céntrico. Dicha crisis, más o menos radical en función de la impronta obtenida por el neoliberalismo, dio lugar a la emergencia de cambios en los procesos económicos y en las configuraciones políticas de países como Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay y Venezuela, impactando asimismo en los procesos de integración



regional de los que forman parte.

Aún con diferencias y matices políticos e ideológicos según el caso nacional del que se trate, vemos que dichos países pueden ser agrupados en el fecundo terreno del posneoliberalismo (SADER, 2008) en función de sostener tres grandes rasgos comunes, a saber: prioridad de las políticas sociales por sobre los ajustes fiscales; prioridad de los procesos de integración regional y del comercio Sur-Sur por sobre los tratados de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos; y existencia de Estados activos en la promoción del crecimiento económico y la consolidación de políticas sociales, por encima de cualquier mandato acerca del “Estado mínimo” prescripto por el neoliberalismo y las políticas del *Consenso de Washington*. En este esquema de nuevas relaciones económicas y políticas regionales es que pueden inscribirse las nuevas políticas -aún tibias- del Mercosur y la aparición de nuevos procesos de integración regional, tales como la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA) y la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR).

Si bien los orígenes del Alba en el plano de las ideas pueden remontarse históricamente a los exhortos de distintos próceres latinoamericanos realizados durante el siglo XIX en pos de la liberación nacional y social y contra la opresión colonial, vemos que el contexto que inspira su surgimiento se encuentra en nuestra contemporaneidad, precisamente, en la mencionada crisis del neoliberalismo y en la génesis de su rechazo. En un sentido más específico, el Alba surge de las relaciones de cooperación solidaria entre Venezuela y Cuba<sup>22</sup>; del auge de los movimientos populares y de partidos de izquierda que acceden al poder en varios países de

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<sup>22</sup> El 14 de diciembre de 2004 se realizó en La Habana, Cuba, la Primera Cumbre del ALBA. En dicha oportunidad, Hugo Chávez y Fidel Castro, firmaron la “Declaración Conjunta para la creación del ALBA” y el “Acuerdo de aplicación del ALBA”.

América Latina y el Caribe; y del estancamiento y la fuerte oposición al Alca y a los tratados de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos (ESPINOSA MARTÍNEZ, 2007). Desde su conformación en el año 2004 hasta el presente, una de las Cumbres más importante se produjo en abril de 2006, cuando se incorporó la República de Bolivia y se suscribió el Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos (TCP)<sup>23</sup>.

Los TCP son una de las principales herramientas con las que cuenta el Alba para conducir el proceso de integración. Son, básicamente, tratados para el intercambio de bienes y servicios destinados a satisfacer las necesidades de los pueblos, sustentados en los principios de solidaridad, reciprocidad, transferencia tecnológica, aprovechamiento de las ventajas de cada país, ahorro de recursos y facilidades crediticias. Los TCP del Alba fueron ideados en franca oposición a los TLC impuestos por Estados Unidos y considerados como responsables del desempleo, la marginación y la destrucción de las economías nacionales de los países de la región. A ellos se agregan los denominados Proyectos y Empresas “Grannacionales” que abarcan distintos planos y van desde lo político, social y cultural, hasta lo económico, científico e industrial. Asimismo, a principios de 2012 fue lanzado el proyecto para la constitución en un plazo de dos años de un “Espacio Económico del ALBA-TCP” (ECOALBA-TCP-TCP), en tanto que “zona económica de desarrollo compartido interdependiente, soberana y solidaria, destinada a consolidar y ampliar un nuevo modelo alternativo de relacionamiento económico para fortalecer y diversificar el aparato productivo y el intercambio comercial, así como establecer las bases para los instrumentos de carácter bilateral y multilateral que Las Partes suscriban en esta

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<sup>23</sup> En la actualidad el ALBA-TCP se encuentra integrado por los siguientes países: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Ecuador, Antigua y Barbuda.

materia, con miras a la satisfacción de las necesidades materiales y espirituales de nuestros pueblos”<sup>24</sup>.

La creación del Alba recogió muchas de las críticas al modelo de integración según el regionalismo abierto. De este modo, si se tiene en cuenta la integración fogueada por el paradigma céntrico en los noventa, resulta mucho más evidente su contraposición con los principios que buscan guiar el accionar de la alternativa bolivariana. Así, para los ideólogos del Alba, el comercio y la inversión no son fines en sí mismos, sino instrumentos para alcanzar un desarrollo justo y sustentable. La verdadera integración “no puede ser hija ciega del mercado”, sino que requiere una efectiva participación del Estado como regulador y coordinador de la actividad económica. En contraposición al principio de “Nación más favorecida” y de “no discriminación”, el Alba propone un “trato especial y diferenciado que tenga en cuenta el nivel de desarrollo de los diversos países y la dimensión de sus economías, y que garantice el acceso de todas las naciones que participen en los beneficios que se deriven del proceso de integración”, buscando promover una especialización productiva eficiente y competitiva que sea compatible con el desarrollo económico equilibrado, la lucha contra la pobreza y la preservación de la identidad cultural de los pueblos. Según esta concepción de la integración, los principios de “solidaridad y cooperación”, “desarrollo integrador” y “sostenibilidad del desarrollo” adquieren un papel estratégico y nodal en la promoción del bienestar de los pueblos de la región, así como en la defensa del patrimonio cultural y la identidad latinoamericana y caribeña. Finalmente, la estrategia bolivariana recoge la premisa de unidad en contra de la máxima

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<sup>24</sup> “Acuerdo para la constitución del espacio económico del ALBA-TCP” (ECOALBA-TCP), XI Cumbre del ALBA, Caracas, Venezuela, 4 y 5 de febrero de 2012.

*divide et impera*, buscando la concertación de posiciones en la esfera multilateral y en los procesos de negociación con países y bloques de otras regiones, no solo en el ámbito económico, sino también político, social y humanitario. En la búsqueda de unidad, y a diferencia de la integración según el paradigma neoliberal, el Alba otorga a “los pueblos de Nuestra América” un papel principal, garantizando su intervención y participación directa a través del “Consejo de Movimientos Sociales”.

Tras la aparición del Alba, la línea divisoria fundamental en el continente pasó a ser la que separaba aquellos países que habían suscripto o se encontraban negociando TLC con Estados Unidos (México, Chile, Colombia y Perú) y aquellos otros que privilegiaban la integración regional. Dentro de este segundo grupo se encontraban, a su vez, los países que - con mayor o menor radicalidad - defendían opciones de oposición al modelo neoliberal (Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia y Ecuador, de un lado, y Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, de otro), trabajando en pos de un mundo multipolar y poniendo trabas al despliegue de la hegemonía norteamericana en la región (SADER, 2007). Ahora bien ¿cómo articular todas las voces de América del Sur considerando el complejo mapa de la integración latinoamericana, en donde conviven remozadas las estrategias del pasado con un presente que aún busca consolidarse? Aquí es donde adquiere importancia la existencia de la Unasur y su papel en el complejo entramado de proyectos nacionales y regionales, diferenciados pero yuxtapuestos.

Los orígenes de la Unasur datan del momento de mayor vigencia del regionalismo abierto en América Latina, cuando la estrategia de Brasil – a diferencia del “realismo periférico” argentino – era evitar que el Mercosur fuera eclipsado por la extensión del TLCAN hacia América del Sur. Así, buscando revertir la presencia de los intereses norteamericanos en la región, el gobierno brasileño

mostró sus preferencias por ampliar el MERCOSUR al resto de los países sudamericanos y propuso la constitución de un Área de Libre Comercio Sudamericana (ALCSA). Los intereses de Brasil buscaban constituir un segundo círculo concéntrico al Mercosur, a partir de la configuración de acuerdos de libre comercio entre el bloque y los restantes miembros de la Aladi, en los términos de una “plataforma sudamericana”, demostrando que las divergencias con Estados Unidos no eran solo comerciales sino también políticas y estratégicas (RAPOPORT Y MADRID, 2002, p. 273-274).

Si bien en sus comienzos la Unasur fue pensada fundamentalmente en términos económico-comerciales<sup>25</sup>, posteriormente, dichos temas fueron perdiendo protagonismo en beneficio de la mayor jerarquía adquirida por los asuntos estratégicos, políticos e ideológicos. No obstante, independientemente del peso relativo de los distintos componentes al interior de esta organización intergubernamental, en su interior se pueden encontrar distintos aspectos o agendas. En materia comercial y económica, a pesar de las grandes dificultades existentes para concretar este tipo de integración o del retraimiento observado en los últimos años, sobresale la búsqueda una de unificación comercial en América del Sur a partir de la conjunción entre la CAN y el Mercosur. En materia financiera, prevalece el proyecto para configurar el Banco del Sur, en tanto que opción alternativa a la oferta financiera proveniente de las instituciones internacionales ligadas al modelo neoliberal (FMI, BM, BID). En lo que refiere a infraestructura y energía, más allá de las fuertes protestas

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<sup>25</sup> Otros antecedentes de la UNASUR serían: el lanzamiento de la Iniciativa de Integración de la Infraestructura Regional de Sudamérica (IIRSA) en el año 2000; la propuesta en la Cumbre Sudamericana de 2004 de crear una Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones; el posicionamiento conjunto de Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela en la Cumbre de las Américas realizada en Mar del Plata en 2005; la propuesta del Banco del Sur en 2006; y la creación del Consejo Energético Sudamericano en 2007, entre otros.

sociales en contra de proyectos considerados como “extractivistas”, la Unasur sostiene la Iniciativa de Integración de la Infraestructura Regional de Sudamérica (IIRSA). Finalmente, en lo que hace a la resolución de conflictos regionales e internacionales, la Unasur ha tenido un papel protagónico y definitorio, haciendo una clara apuesta por la democracia y la gobernabilidad de los países de la región y debiendo actuar en el marco de escenarios complejos y del alta conflictividad política, restringiendo la actuación de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) y, en ocasiones, el probable accionar de los Estados Unidos en América del Sur (KERSFFELD, 2012).

Considerando las fuertes asimetrías y contradicciones existentes entre los distintos perfiles políticos e ideológicos detentados por sus Estados miembros, así como las persistentes injerencias externas registradas en los asuntos domésticos de los países de la región, el papel internacional desplegado por la Unasur introduce un destacado componente de equilibrio para Sudamérica. De ahí la necesidad de consolidar el accionar económico, político y diplomático de este actor regional aún en proceso de gestación. En su carácter embrionario y en la adecuada articulación de su ecléctica composición se dirime el futuro de los procesos de integración que cohabitan en su interior (ALBA, MERCOSUR y CAN) y el manejo de los condicionantes hegemónicos sobre las alternativas regionales de desarrollo en América del Sur.

## **CONSIDERACIONES FINALES**

Estas palabras se escriben en un momento crucial para la región, cuando se están produciendo cambios que tendrán un fuerte impacto en los países de América del Sur. En este sentido, la muy reciente incorporación de Venezuela como miembro pleno

del Mercosur, después de una demora de años ocasionada por sectores parlamentarios opositores –primero de Brasil y luego de Paraguay– abre una gran incógnita sobre el futuro de la integración regional en América del Sur en general y del Mercosur en particular. En términos geopolíticos, resulta clara la implicancia estratégica de la incorporación de Venezuela al bloque regional, no solo por la importancia que reviste dicho país como potencia energética de reconocida solvencia petrolífera de escala planetaria, sino también por incrementar la fuerza del conjunto del espacio subregional hasta ubicarlo después de gigantes como China, India, Estados Unidos y Japón. Asimismo, la adhesión de Venezuela refleja una era de gran sintonía política entre los mandatarios de los países del Mercosur. Los reflejos post golpe destituyente del presidente paraguayo Fernando Lugo sirvieron no solo para hacer un efectivo y rápido uso de la Cláusula democrática – emanada del Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre Compromiso Democrático en el Mercosur – suspendiendo temporalmente al país mediterráneo del bloque regional, sino también para hacer efectivo el dilatado ingreso de Venezuela al Mercosur. Esta correlación política, inaugurada abiertamente años atrás en ocasión de la Cumbre de Mar del Plata –garante del ocaso del proyecto ALCA– logró prolongarse en el tiempo y defender algunas de las históricas premisas emancipatorias latinoamericanas, sobre todo, en contra de tendencias hegemónicas y disruptivas. De alguna manera, esa ha sido también la política de la Unasur.

El análisis resulta menos contundente a nivel intramercosur, sobre todo, en función de una trayectoria regional reciente que reclama mayor prudencia en los pronósticos y el reconocimiento de grandes asignaturas pendientes. De ahí que, si bien la nueva incorporación incrementa la potencia del conjunto del espacio regional, sus reales implicancias económicas reclamen mayores esfuerzos y decisiones

políticas y económicas, también del conjunto. Se requieren consensos entre los Estados parte –y al interior de los mismos- sobre aspectos fundamentales del proceso de integración que necesariamente remiten a cuestiones endógenas ligadas a las estrategias de desarrollo nacional. Y aquí es dónde quizás resida el principal desafío. Se trata de armonizar los itinerarios y proyectos nacionales, con sus matices y diferencias, en un patrón regional del conjunto que no escatime en decisiones trascendentales allí donde sea necesario. En este contexto, las potenciales aristas económicas, políticas y estratégicas del Mercosur, tan devaluadas por el pensamiento globalizador y el regionalismo abierto, han vuelto a mostrar su relevancia y llaman a realizar nuevas ponderaciones sobre los nuevos alcances y desafíos del proceso de integración.

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## RESUMEN

Desde los años ochenta y principalmente durante los noventa, los procesos de integración regional en América Latina y El Caribe sufrieron importantes transformaciones, abandonando su tradicional orientación “hacia adentro” y emplazándose “hacia afuera”, en un marco general de apertura y liberalización. El Mercosur nació formalmente en ese contexto, condicionado por el nuevo paradigma hegemónico de la integración denominado “regionalismo abierto”. De este modo, pese a haber sido originalmente (a mediados de los ochenta) concebido para promover una estrategia de industrialización por sustitución de importaciones a escala ampliada, posteriormente (a principios de los noventa), en sintonía con la metamorfosis regional y las recomendaciones de los organismos multilaterales –particularmente la OMC– el Mercosur recibió el impacto de las políticas de apertura radical a los mercados internacionales y a las inversiones extranjeras, las privatizaciones y la reducción de la esfera pública. Pese a este trasfondo perjudicial, desde principios de este siglo, algunos cambios comenzaron a producirse en el paisaje de la integración latinoamericana. Consecuentemente, un nuevo y provocativo escenario posneoliberal afectó favorablemente el Mercosur y permitió la emergencia de perspectivas innovadoras en los procesos de integración y cooperación regional, tales como el Alba y la Unasur.

**PALABRAS CLAVE:** Integración regional. Mercosur. Alba. Unasur.

## RESUMO

Desde os anos oitenta e principalmente durante os anos noventa, os processos de integração regional na América Latina e no Caribe sofreram importantes transformações, abandonando sua tradicional orientação “para dentro” e situando-a “para fora”, em um marco geral de abertura e liberalização. O Mercosul nasceu formalmente nesse contexto, condicionado pelo novo paradigma hegemónico de integração denominado “regionalismo aberto”. Assim, A pesar de ter sido originalmente (em meados dos anos oitenta) concebido para promover uma estratégia de industrialização por substituição de importação ampliada (início dos anos noventa), alinhado a transformações regionais e recomendações de agências multilaterais – particularmente a OMC – o Mercosul recebeu o impacto das políticas de abertura radical para os mercados internacionais e os investimentos estrangeiros, a privatização e a redução da esfera pública. A pesar desse transtorno, no início deste século, algumas mudanças começaram a acontecer na paisagem da integração latino-americana. Em consequência, um novo e provocativo cenário pós-neoliberal afetou favoravelmente o Mercosul e permitiu a emergência de perspectivas inovadoras nos processos de integração e cooperação regional, tais como o ALBA e a UNASUR.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Integração regional. Mercosul. Alba. Unasul.

# REVISITING DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

José Maurício Domingues \*

## INTRODUCTION

*Dependency and Development in Latin America*, called as DDLA (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1969, 1979) is, certainly, the book published by Latin Americans that has had ever the greatest impact in the social sciences and in social and political thought across the world. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, one of the book authors and former president of Brazil, along with Enzo Faletto, has recently offered in the pages of *Studies in Comparative International Development* a reassessment of the book (CARDOSO, 2009). He has also, by way of showing how the method of analysis they drew upon – historical-structuralism – is still valid for analyzing the contemporary world, provided an overview of the global situation, with special reference to Latin America.

In the following pages, I will argue, however, that Cardoso's reassessment of the book conceptual scheme is partial and that this has to do with his present conceptual and political views, as shown in the very same article. This is deeply connected to the

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angle from which he sees globalization and especially present-day Latin America. Although he argues for a “global social democracy” and rejects the view that his government implemented neoliberal reforms, attacking also what he names “populism” in a new guise, this former argument is hardly true, while the second is far too much tributary of a view that there would be “two lefts” in Latin America: a good, rational, democratic one and a bad, demagogic and at least potentially authoritarian other. I shall proceed without and beyond polemical intentions, thus avoiding as much as more specific political discussions, as well as sticking basically to *DDLA* and Cardoso’s recent formal assessment. Nevertheless, this is not entirely possible insofar as an analysis of Latin America is at stake, with reference specifically to those concepts. Those issues must be, however, taken up for both an assessment of the book’s present possibilities and of Latin American and global realities. It is true that it might be simply argued that dependency theory is no longer relevant. Conversely, it can be argued that dependency theory has to a great extent vanished from sight, but the problems it addressed remains as pressing as ever (cf. PECAUT, 1985). That is the path this article will take, pointing out why this is so.

I will proceed by, first, pointing out the limitations of Cardoso’s reconstruction of his own argument. Next, I will relate this to his view of globalization and to an approach I find more adequate. I will, then, deal with the Latin American predicament, summoning also evidence that corroborates the usefulness of the concepts originally presented in Cardoso and Faletto’s book. I shall finally make a last point, insofar as in the Latin American context *DDLA* worked very much as a critical theory, questioning mainstream views of development, although it refused the idea of absolute and

inevitable stagnation. How that would work now is something that needs, at least, to be briefly addressed.

## ***DDLA'S CENTRAL CONCEPTS***

Although Cardoso affirms the validity of his former framework to an analysis of the contemporary world, he does so very selectively. In fact, the main stress of this contention is on the political element that was present in *DDLA*. That was a very key achievement, which did represent a break from the usual theories of dependency, mainly Frank's (1967) definition of development as necessarily creating underdevelopment, regardless of whatever else happened, short of socialist revolutions, of course. Not that Frank was entirely wrong from a descriptive standpoint, as I will argue below. He had, however, turned in many cases an empirically verified situation into a teleological necessity, theoretically dressed. Cardoso and Faletto did not accept this sort of point of view, though how much the book was a reaction against it or an independently crafted contribution should be open to scrutiny, since the first draft of *DDLA* is of the same year as Frank's publication. It is probably the case that the book had much to do with Latin American debates about the insurmountable stagnation that seemed to have come about in the early 1960s of the regional economies (SERRA, 1976).

The fact is that Cardoso and Faletto argued, in variance also with modernization theory (which Cardoso nevertheless partly embraced before and to which he occasionally returns<sup>1</sup>), that developmental paths are not, so to speak, divinely ordained. According to a widespread conviction, worldwide and in Latin America, including in particular the United Nations Economic Commission

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<sup>1</sup> See Cardoso, 1967.

for Latin America (ECLA), the state would mobilize society and to a great extent assume the task of promoting development, when that succeeded (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p. 3-4). But countries differed according to the coalitions that would come to power in each of them and make use of the state, within structural constraints that were not, however, insurmountable (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p. 3-5). To use a current social science jargon, path dependence was crucial, yet it did not determine outcomes, which were mediated by human agency. Dependence was both an external relationship and internally structured as “a particular type of relationship within underdeveloped nation” (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p.15). In fact, they went as far as observing, in the 1979 “Post scriptum” to the English edition of the book, that they did not intend to measure “degrees of dependency”, but to enquiry into whom and which classes and groups development served (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p. 201-212) – missing, however, an opportunity to grasp what below will be focused upon as the “semiperipheral” situation. It is curious also that Cardoso pays no attention to the theme of coalitions in his recent commentary of the classical text, consisting this in an issue that must be explored, since it may tell us a lot about development and even Cardoso’s perspectives.

Central as political underpins were, the structural elements of the book were of paramount importance in the analysis too. I would like specifically to underline the definitions of dependency, center and periphery, development and underdevelopment. Although he mentions, in passing, “underdevelopment” as characteristic of the Brazilian economy in relation to the US, as well as the idea of center and periphery (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 301), these plays basically no role in his recent discussion. Furthermore, he does not actually dismiss the idea of “dependency”, but underplays its importance,



underscoring “development” instead as the core of the book (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 298). This seems not to withstand comparison with the actual text by Cardoso and Faletto, though.

They defined very clearly and carefully these different and key concepts. While dependency would imply the relative lack of power of Latin American countries vis-à-vis the powerful countries of the world – the US and Europe, of course –, those whose state and other economic agents had the means to autonomously engage in economic and political decisions, the ideas of centre and periphery referred to the roles which each country played in the international economy. These were, up to them, basically of two kinds: commodities producers and exporters, on the one hand, and manufactures producers and exporters, on the other. Development and underdevelopment were characterized by the relative level of differentiation of the economies at stake, comparatively – which, at that point, related to the industrial level of development which had been achieved in each of them (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p.16-24). Of course, there was an overlap of these categories, which formed two main, self-reinforcing clusters. Moreover, although Cardoso (2009, p. 297) dismisses now the vulgar theories of imperialism (without telling us which exactly they were), he explicitly included the conceptual apparatus of his own dependency theory, which would be no theory at all, he argued then, within Lenin’s theory of imperialism. It was, he added, merely complementary (CARDOSO, 1975). It is within this sort of perspective that we should place one of the great innovations of the book: “dependent development” (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1979, p. 6). Although there is some warrant to speak of it as the first sparks of what is usually misleadingly called “globalization” (too vague a term, in fact) and especially the affirmation that it is after “development”: dependent development meant the continuation of

the lack of autonomy that beset those countries, the mere mitigation of their peripheral position, as well as a relative diminution of their underdeveloped character. The core of Raúl Prebisch's and the ECLA strategy to overcome the problems that beset the periphery and industrialization was becoming a more complex phenomenon.

To be sure, a lot has changed since the book was originally published in 1969 and it would make no sense asking the authors that they remain absolutely consistent with their former argument, in particular at a moment when the world has changed so much. But one could perfectly argue that, in fact, the structure of the global economy to a great extent reproduces such patterns, however, with greater variability, introducing ever greater complexity. Hence a more faithful reading of the book may be totally warranted.

Two main elements have been crucial for changes in relation to the 1970s. The first is the third industrial or techno-scientific revolution, with all the accompanying changes in patterns of production and consumption (post-Fordism, micro-electronics, flexible accumulation and pluralized consumption, etc.), as well as the further financialization of capitalism (CASTELLS, 1996, 2000). On the other hand, the rise of a number of countries which have managed to industrialize and to some extent emulate the patterns of the now so-called "North" economies has also been a feature of the same period. The first issue has led to a great leap forward for capitalism, inaugurating an entirely new pattern and period of accumulation, which left behind precisely most of the countries in the then "Third World" which were apparently catching up, in a more dependent (like Brazil) or independent (like India) way (AMSDEN, 2001). These were relatively successful, in any case, in producing manufactures with reasonable levels of added value, partly surpassing the mere commodities producing phase. The

differentiation this entailed in the global economy led indeed to what some authors would call “semiperiphery”, although often the state, rather the country, were the unit of analysis in such conceptualizations (WALLERSTEIN, 1974, 1980, 1988).<sup>2</sup> While the existence of a capital good sector (or Department I of the economy, in a Marxist view) may be seem as differentiating these industrialized countries among themselves, as suggested by the French Theory of Regulation (BOYER; SAILLARD, 2000), due to their – relative – technological prowess, countries such as Korea (and Taiwan, we might add) hardly fit the definition, as Evans (2009, p. 333) observed. But the concept seems to describe the rise of a number of countries in the last fifty years or so, although in itself it has remained rather imprecise.

That double, techno-scientific and finance capital, revolutions have in any case pushed most of those countries strongly back into their position. In this regard, development had indeed empirically generated underdevelopment in a relative scale (although areas such as Africa in particular, but also parts of Latin America, have experienced it in absolute terms). To be sure, a mix of path dependence, especially the US, much more prepared to make that leap, and political possibilities answers for this disjunction and the locations of countries within the new configuration. The differentiations in trajectory are too big to be treated here, even if we do not take Korea and Taiwan, in consideration. But even Brazil and India, whose unfolding would be relatively similar in many respects (PEDERSEN, 2008). In this regard the theory seems therefore still to hold water, since its main concepts – dependency, centre and periphery (plus semiperiphery), and development and underdevelopment – can do a good job in framing contemporary

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<sup>2</sup> This is however probably reductive, being therefore a better idea to keep the focus on whole countries rather than merely on states.

realities. The issues, as well as the overlap between such categories, remain real enough. In addition, realist political assumptions about size, population, resources, weaponry, citizen allegiance, effective government, diplomacy, etc. (MORGENTHAU, 1949, 1967) also must, as usually, be seen as relevant to define the power of states in the global arena as well as their interplay, including therein market size, which stands out in the cases of China and India.

This is no mere globalization, though. Either countries remain agrarian (as just too many in Latin America, where many were actually totally, as Chile, or partly, as Argentina, “reprimarized”, losing much or entirely its industry – even Brazil suffering somewhat from this syndrome), or they took mostly the path of *dependent development* (the cases of Korea and Taiwan being, as already pointed out, more complicated, demanding perhaps a category that could make more relative their position within the global “South”). While multinational or transnational corporations, as well as finance capital, have their own interests, they remain firmly tied to the central countries of the West and Japan. China has had indeed much more autonomy, which has to do with its revolutionary past, but even in this case it is still to be seen how it will develop, without prejudging its future stand in the global society, even though the sheer size of its economy is absolutely overwhelming.

Kohli (2004, 2009) has insisted on the role of the state, but on its relation to social classes too, for an understanding of the patterns and potentialities of development in the “South”. In this regard, although his excessive stress on the virtues of the “cohesive capitalist state” is problematic, working mainly for small countries and specific geopolitical conditions, he shares with Cardoso and Faletto’s book the correct understanding that coalitions are crucial for the outcomes of development. In fact, Cardoso and Faletto pointed

out that success cases were those in which “elite” coalitions with some pro-development slant had been able to create legitimacy and some stability insofar as they sorted out problems above, between “elites”, but also below, that is, attracting also the “masses,” the popular classes to the dominant coalition (CARDOSO; FALETTI, 1979, p. 5).

This much is very relevant and, although logical issues, such as the “embeddedness” of an autonomous bureaucracy (EVANS, 1995) must be taken into account the decision to analyze social forces in relation to the state helps capture a great deal of the history of economic development, if not carried out in a reductive and determinist way. Nevertheless, coalitions should also be more strongly inserted within geopolitical and broader cultural-political frameworks. This would lead us to a better comprehension of the different paths globalization has assumed in the “South”. In his discussion, Cardoso (2009) does not really address this sort of question in analyzing the recent changes that occurred in Latin America’s relations with the US government, the international financial institutions and the transnational corporations. These agents have had an enormous sway over Latin America, which has constituted its direct, albeit not particularly relevant, zone of influence. More seriously, Cardoso mentions just in passing the alliances that have been internally established in order to steer “development” (or its contrary) in a direction or another (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 306). Everything is resolved thus a confrontation between good global social democracy (whose definition begs the question) and populism. No social movements (unions are dismissed as irrelevant in the Brazilian case in particular), no social classes, no left-right alignments, have room in his analysis. This is entirely contrary to the method and the actual demarche of *DDLA*. In fact, as Evans (2009, p. 323ff) pointed out,

as to the relation with so-called globalized forces, Cardoso seems to merely accept as inevitable sheer “adaptation” (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 300-1, 306).

These are the main points that a less skewed reading of Cardoso and Faletto’s *DDLA* may present. They make, I believe, the book even more contemporary. Its concepts are, to be sure, in need of adaptation, but appear as widely relevant for an understanding of the global society that the twenty-first century carries on building.

## **LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER SEMIPERIPHERAL AND PERIPHERAL AREAS**

For someone who has so strongly criticized enclave economies and embraced the Prebischian standpoint that is sticking to commodities export, could not be good for a country in the long-run (*DDLA*: passim), Cardoso’s (2009, p. 309-10) support of the Chilean model (only partly transformed since the end of the military dictatorship) may come as a surprise. Argentina paid dear for its failure to industrialize further, in some part due to its being a very rich meat and wheat export country in the first half of the twentieth century, despite, as his book had shown, it being included in those dependent developing which he and Faletto had newly identified. Chile is not even like that. But, insofar as his is, a perspective which embraces, at the economic level, a rather passive adaptation to globalization, which in fact continued to a great extent during the first Luís Inácio Lula da Silva government (DOMINGUES, 2007), this is perfectly understandable.<sup>3</sup> It is hardly understandable how he can see México, with its skewed development of export goods for the

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<sup>3</sup> However, it is true that Brazilian diplomacy has been very active, although variations can be found in the Cardoso and Lula governments.

US in its Northern region, as a success case, except if we also grasp his statement that seizing opportunities in the global market is the only way possible in the contemporary world (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 310-13) – in Mexico’s case, indeed regardless of very problematic consequences (especially in what concerns dependence, which he seems now to frame rather as “asymmetric relations” – a point that should not detract from the issues raised by dependency theory, as noted by KEOHANE; NYE, 1977, p. 9-11).

It is true also that Brazil has a much bigger and much more diversified economy, with indeed a capital goods sector, only comparable to India’s in the former “Third World.” This provided more leeway, yet the country took indeed a neoliberal route, although later and with lesser depth than most of its neighbors. Cardoso was instrumental in this respect, ahead of a coalition of center and rightwing forces, including the main old oligarchies, rejecting any alliance with social movements and socially organized forces (even with industrial businessmen relationships were at best shaky; finance capital and new entrants in the privatized markets, especially telecommunications, were much more highly regarded). Also poverty alleviation programs were initiated during his presidency, but in their form and extent were part of the neoliberal agenda. Along with, but also beyond the needs of macroeconomic stability, the political use of the “exchange rate,” pushing semi-parity with the dollar – although never as absurd as what Carlos Menem did in Argentina – made possible the stability of his government and in fact his reelection, leading to a currency crash just after the latter (KOHLI, 2004; LAUTIER; MARQUES PEREIRA, 2004).

Let me make it clear: I do not mention these issues with a polemical intention, but two points must be made. First, while fighting over words is surely useless, it seems just too obvious that the

goals of the Cardoso's governments were exactly the same as those imposed everywhere by the US government and the international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank): commercial opening, privatization, fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, even the poverty alleviation schemes, etc. But the widespread effect of the monetary stabilization can hardly be exaggerated either. It had two aspects. If the attempt at curbing inflation for good was at its core, a political feature soon became at least as important (in fact it became the key issue, along with the interest of stakeholders in the newly globalized Brazilian financial market): bringing along the "poor" of the country, not through their organizations, with which Cardoso's government had no dialogue, but as individuals who were desperately in need of economic security. Cardoso showed thereby that he had learned the lessons of his own book: a coalition of "elites" had been put together, including foreign capital, that could also cement an alliance with the popular sectors, but, in this case, regardless and indeed to a great extent against social movements and popular organizations. To be sure other Latin American countries took this much further – culminating in particular in the Argentine tragedy of 2001 – in what may be called the "transformist" path taken by the subcontinent in the last decade of the twentieth century, changing in order not to change much. The model is the same, with differences of degree and emphasis (LAUTIER; MARQUES PEREIRA, 2004; BOYER; NEFFA, 2004; DOMINGUES, 2008: ch. 2; 2012a: Part II; 2012b). And so is Cardoso's acceptance of the rules of the global, neoliberally steered global economy, as Evans, as mentioned above, stresses.

Within the present order Latin America's situation is not good at all. If Brazil seems to make some progress, although its economic growth has picked up with greater sustainability only very



recently and its economic structure is underdeveloped in relation to that of the central countries (US, Europe, Japan – maybe also Korea and Taiwan and, possibly soon, China, too), in relation to which it is a rather dependent and semiperipheral country, most other countries are even in a worse position (DOMINGUES, 2008: ch. 2; 2012a: Part II; 2012b). Chile is trapped in its primary export pattern, Argentina has suffered industrial involution and Mexico was caught up in the “maquiladora” pattern of assemblage of products of low value-added production. The other countries of the region have had very limited industrialization. They export oil, making the richness of a rentier state, as in Venezuela’s regular pattern, or agrarian and pastoral commodities – or else, cocaine. Investments in science and technology, research and development, were raised recently, but do not surpass one percent in Brazil, and 0,5 percent in Argentina and Mexico, Chile trailing behind, while the other countries in the region invest almost nil in this key area for contemporary economic development (data for 2008, from RICYT, 2008). Innovation clusters, also key to contemporary development, practically do not exist in the region, with the exception of just a handful in Brazil (BOTAGARAY; TIFFIN, 2002). That much can be easily accommodated within *DDLA*’s conceptual framework.

Yet, a different path has been trod by democracy, implying a complicated and tense disjunction in the subcontinent’s recent history. Cardoso (2009: 304-08) recognizes that much, although duly qualifying some aspects, such as problems with the rule of law, and mistakenly framing others, especially the absence of a democratic culture – which does not need to be Protestant and individualist, contrary to what his curious outburst of modernization theory demands. A true “molecular democratic revolution” was staged throughout Latin America, led by popular movements in the

1980s-1990s. It implied far reaching changes in political culture, institution building, with shortcomings in particular in what concerns the civil citizenship of the popular classes (albeit not with regard to the property of the upper ones, for two centuries always safely protected above anything else), popular participation, in a situation of increasing social complexity, pluralism and a changed pattern of social movements, they themselves also very pluralized (ÁLVAREZ; DAGNINO; ESCOBAR, 1998; AVRITZER, 2002; O'DONNELL et al., 2004; DOMINGUES, 2008, ch. 1). Cardoso glosses over these developments and is wont to concentrate on one issue, which falsifies this unique process of democratic development: the opposition of the bad populists to the good global social democrats. In this way rather right-wing, authoritarian governments, such as that of Colombia, also disappear from view, with attacks focused only on the anachronistic armed struggle of the country's guerrilla forces.

Cardoso clearly draws upon the division of the “two lefts” crafted by Castañeda (2006). For this author, populists, like Chávez and Morales, are backward, while modernizers such as the Chilean socialists and democrats, as well as Lula, are the way forward. But this characterization does not correspond to reality: the Latin American left is much more diversified and, besides, to lump Chávez and Morales together, for instance, is to totally misunderstand different processes, one based on the status apparatus in Venezuela (a sort of “Cesarism” oriented to the poor) and a far-reaching process of democratization from below carried out by social movements under the leadership and influence of Bolivia's indigenous population (a point Munk, 2009, makes in a different way).

It is hard to see in what Evo Morales could be characterized as a populist (DOMINGUES; GUIMARÃES; MOTA; PEREIRA DA SILVA, 2009), let alone the vacuity of the concept, problematic

in the past and at best totally unspecified today (at worst it may work more as a term of abuse than an interpretive category). As to Lula, Cardoso does speak of populism, albeit in a milder way. It is difficult to see how he could be classified as a populist, by any means. It is true that the Lula government has been, since his re-election, changing course toward what some have been calling a “new developmentalism” (BOSCHI; GAITÁN, 2008), which is in any case still a far-cry in relation to what we can find in other areas of the planet, especially in China and the East Asian countries. If there are no strong departures in economic policy, investment in science and technology has grown, as noted above, and social policies supporting the poor, especially the Bolsa Família, have led to a strengthening of the internal market. New links with business and labor, as well as with social movements more broadly, have been crafted as well (PEDERSEN, 2008, p. 156). Whether this will come to configure a new policy pattern and a new developmentalism remains to be seen.

The social democracy issue could lead us far afield and I do not want to go in any depth in this regard. Suffice to note that in this specific coordinates such a label is more likely to confuse than to enlighten. First due to its being based on that false distinction between the “two lefts”; but also because the context, the social bases and especially the policies of social democracy used to be very different from what has been put in practice. This obtains especially in relation to the focused social grants that have come to characterize so much of Latin American welfare (HAGGARD; KAUFMAN, 2008), as well as to a myriad of new questions, raised by new social movements, which have been at the forefront of the political agenda. We need indeed to look at such issues with fresh eyes, but confronting then would lead us into a discussion also about definitions that cannot be carried out here.

Let me expand the argument by comparing Brazil and India economically, countries which Evans (1995) and Kohli (2004), in fact, due to their ideal-typical method, did not even recognize as “developmental” states, although the latter was more hopeful that a more capitalist-class oriented state could be emerging in the late 1990s in South Asia.

Both Brazil and India have important industrial infrastructures. These were originally partly developed by the state. The former was always much more open to transnational capital. As is well-known, it has faced in particular enormous difficulties in building any sort of inroad into high-technological areas. The latter has been much more closed and has banked much less on transnational capital, with a state-based economic framework until the present, but has been growing much faster. While other issues may account for its recent high rates of growth, this has happened also with the considerable impulse of its software and call-centre sectors. If Brazil has found difficult to develop high-technology areas, India’s software sector remains also tied mainly to the low-value operations of international business: its firms are to a great extent basically subcontractors for foreign companies. Call-centers limitations speak for themselves (DOMINGUES, 2008, ch. 2, 2012a; Part II, 2012b; PEDERSEN, 2008, p. 94-7; LIMA, 2009). That is, neither of them has been able to breakthrough to a position of control over the main technologies and patterns of accumulation of the center of the global capitalist system and their economy remains largely underdeveloped in relation to those of the US, Europe and Japan. India seems to be less dependent, but both remain firmly within the semiperiphery, for the sort of production they are actually able to accomplish, except for some more or less important niches they manage to occupy, which are sometimes anecdotally presented as

proof of their achievements. While, as argued above, other countries in Latin America embraced an involutory path, with Mexico being caught in the “maquiladora” trap, the other countries in the South Asian region having remained mainly agrarian (Pakistan) or developed only light industrialization (Bangladesh) (ZAIDI, 2004; MILAM, 2009). They remain underdeveloped, dependent and peripheral.

China poses more complex problems. Nolan (2004), for instance, observed that China is in fact, despite its size, a backward, underdeveloped country, increasingly dependent, and faces tremendous challenges for its development. Others authors stress the push for development of the Chinese economy, its build-up of more sophisticated industrial products, as well as its embrace of network forms of production, including alliances with transnationals, which have been in the forefront of recent advanced economic developments everywhere. This is true in particular in the information technology industries, which Evans (1995, p. 7-11) pointed out as the sector from which a “conspiracy for development” might gather strength and where the relative fortunes of Korea and Taiwan were made, indeed. Others still stress China’s great autonomy in relation in particular to the US. Although development is now the key theme of Chinese life, and China’s present and future remain rather controversial, most would not deny that it may become a main – that is, a “central” – economy in the next decades, for some even dislocating the US as the most powerful country in the world, which is likely to be a very far-fetched view (NAUGHTON, 2007; ARRIGHI, 2007; MACNALLY, 2008; BRANDT; RAWSKI, 2008).

In contrast, other former socialist economies traverse the opposite route. Russia, which world-system theorists have considered in any case, as always, a semiperipheral country, has been stuck in

this rank, despite efforts to move forward: all indicators, especially, it could be argued, its backwardness in terms of technological innovation, bog it down in a less favourable position than its leadership might desire (LANDE, 2009).<sup>4</sup> In Eastern Europe, in turn, many differences emerged. Some countries, especially in the Visegrad region (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic), managed to thrive to a considerable extent, becoming however dependent on foreign corporations, seemingly advancing perhaps close to a central position, in any case maintaining a semiperipheral one. Most other countries, such as Estonia, have been turned into big “sweat shops” and export-platforms for transnationals aiming at the West European market, with very little internal differentiation (BOHLE; GRESKOVITS, 2007).

In all these cases of course path dependence counts a lot. The situation in which these countries faced the new phase of capitalist accumulation and, more generally, “modernity”, which began basically in the 1990s, namely, their degree of previous development, as in fact indicated by Cardoso (2009, p. 300-315) as to Latin America, has been crucial for their further development. In addition, however, the internal coalitions, different political systems, how ruling groups not only agree among themselves but also bring along the population in a “hegemonic” project, cultural traits, the sum of which result then in their distinct options, is pivotal. It answers for what could be called distinct and contingent “modernizing moves” (more or less centered, that is, with a clearer or less clear intentionality and direction course), which are responsible for the specific forms and

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<sup>4</sup> Along with, but against too, Wallerstein, who stated that the semiperiphery is merely a transitory position (to the center or the periphery), Lande, with reference to Russia, stresses that it is also a fixed one. It would probably be better to look at the issue in a more open perspective: the semiperiphery might be then seen as usually very stable, but allowing for a lot of dynamic change.

contents that development – or lack thereof – has assumed in all of them. China in particular seems to be taking advantage of a number of propitious elements, but these have been politically mobilized, even though its future remains open, due to its internal dynamic as well as to its relations with the outside world.

Be that as it may, these new questions do not by any means turn the framework of *DDLA* obsolete, although they require more subtlety indeed, as Cardoso (2009, p. 296) himself demands, considerable updating. This is true in both theoretical and methodological terms. Very much heir to classical political economy, via the old *ECLA*, and Marxism, that book was not really concerned with culture and had not therefore properly made an argument against modernization theory, nor sketched a different theoretical framework in this regard. This may certainly be useful to analyze different developmental paths, without “culturalisms” and, even less, essentialisms – what I have called modernizing moves above replacing the teleology of modernization theory. Greater social complexity, due to internal pluralism and globalizing pressures need to be dealt with too, since they imply, for instance, different social movements and orientations to consumption. More empirically, the global economic situation, rules of global trade, investment and intellectual property, democracy and social mediations between state and society, military power and geopolitical issues, new social movements, human development indexes and social policies, just to name a few, in and outside Latin America, are topics to be tackled in a renewed analysis. In fact, contemporary sociological, political and social theory in general must be brought to bear on such a renewal.

However, *DDLA* is still a vigorous classic, which speaks to the present, not merely as a good exemplar of social science, but as a theoretical statement whose underlying social reality, unfortunately,

has not changed as much as its authors had hoped. New elements in the debate about development must be also addressed, which do not necessarily fit well within this sort of theory as it exists at present, without however losing sight of their main trust, that is, inequality of wealth and power within and between nations, which is the clear consequence of dependency, center-periphery relations and underdevelopment, as well as unequal internal structures.

## CONCLUSION

This article has proposed a broader reading of Cardoso and Faletto's 1969 classic, emphasizing some different aspects in relation to the appraisal of one of its authors. That is just natural: a book as important and rich as it is, albeit not very large, allows for different readings and interpretive selections and weights. Beyond that, *DDL*, although usually absent from discussion about development, appears as a very useful conceptual tool for analyzing the contemporary, globalized world. Its main contributions must, however, as I have tried to show, resume Cardoso's discussion of Latin America, but also pointing to the situation of countries in Asia and Eastern Europe, need to be recovered and more strongly underlined. Political agency is important, but so is the "structural-historical" analysis that the authors provide. In particular Latin America, along with Africa, seems to be far from overcoming the questions and problems that gave rise to dependency analysis and specifically *DDL*. If internal questions must be addressed, it is also true that the global environment for development must also be challenged, agency returning to the fore, although very careful and clever strategies must be mobilized to accomplish this task.



Democracy in Latin America at least has continuously developed and this may lead to a new breakthrough, whatever other paths to development may be found in other regions. It is impossible to imagine that authoritarian states might be able today to mobilize its populations towards this goal, probably the democratic mobilization of its citizenry being the only way instead to resume such sort of effort. In Brazil, at least development is becoming a more debated issue, concentrating thoughts and energies across political and ideological differences. Latin America may follow suit. Once again, this classical book is may have an important role to play in the debate.

Finally, a word on critique. *DDLA* and its counterparts in dependency theory were very important for the development of critique in Latin America, seeping into other critical approaches elsewhere in the world. Two issues stand out here. The first is that the concept Cardoso and Faletto developed in the book, completed by the idea of semiperiphery, are much more precise, although perhaps less rhetorically effective, than the vague idea of the “global North” and the “global South”. Secondly, this is directly connected to the unequal global power and unequal material conditions that featured in the book’s description and conceptualization of Latin American history, its present and futures prospects. This is so regardless of some ambivalence about the meaning of “dependent development”. It may receive a more positive signal as just the beginning of current “globalization” (CARDOSO, 2009, p. 298-315) recent appraisal, caveats about different possibilities for the several countries in the world notwithstanding) or a more negative one, as for instance especially in the 1979 “post scriptum”, where they stated that socialism alone was the solution to the issues at stake in the book (*DDLA*, p. 216). How to escape the peripheral (or semiperipheral)

predicament they pointed out remains in any event very much a question for Latin America and indeed the whole world. A basis for a critique of modernity as it actually exists remains therefore valid today as it was before, from a peripheral or semiperipheral standpoint. After all freedom, equality, solidarity, and responsibility, at the individual and the collective levels, along with the benefits of material development, were at the heart of the modern project (DOMINGUES, 2002, 2006). They seem to remain so as well as inscribed in the contemporary conscience of the human species.

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### **ABSTRACT**

This article revisits the main thesis of Cardoso and Faletto's classic *Development and Dependency in Latin America*, confronting the re-evaluation Cardoso himself has recently made of the book. It revises and updates some of its theses, relating them to global changes, in variation also with Cardoso's newly found perspective. Development is thereby revisited in the third, contemporary phase of global modernity. The article closes with a brief discussion of critical theory.

**KEYWORDS:** Cardoso. Development. Global changes. Latin America.

### **RESUMO**

Este artigo revisita a principal tese de Cardoso e Faletto sobre o desenvolvimento e dependência clássicos na América Latina, enfrentando a reavaliação recentemente feita, de Cardoso, do livro. Ele revisa e atualiza algumas das suas teses, relacionando-as às mudanças globais, em variação também com a perspectiva recém encontrada pelo autor. O desenvolvimento revisita na terceira fase contemporânea da modernidade global. O artigo termina com uma breve discussão da teoria crítica.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE:** Cardoso. Desenvolvimento. Mudanças globais. América Latina.





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