# A Comparison between Asianism and Africanism

## A study of modern legitimizing symbols

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2013

CLACSO

#10

Patrocinado por

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**Agencia Sueca de Desarrollo Internacional**

## Introduction

What is culture? What are the characteristics of East Asian culture?[1] These are the basic questions for those who study Asian development of regionalism from a cultural perspective. Yet, a cultural perspective is not necessary to be an essentialist one, because culture is dynamic in nature, interacting with its social structure and changes. For example, it is difficult for those who consider the communitarian values as the characteristics of East Asian culture to think it in a dynamics fashion. In this paper, the concept of culture will be treated in a dynamic way. On the other hand, it is also important to demonstrate and explain the constant elements of East Asian culture. For these reasons, this research will study the narratives of Asianism, which refer mostly to the characteristics of East Asian culture, and compare them with those of Africanism. A comparison between Asianism and Africanism contributes to our understanding of the role of culture in the regionalist construction of East Asia and Africa, and the cultural characteristics of the two regions. The first demonstrates the dynamics of culture, while the second relates to the constant cultural elements of East Asian and Africa.

Yet, why should we take a comparative approach to study culture, including the East Asian culture? What makes the comparative study capable of going beyond the existing views without considering culture as static? In short, what is the analytical structure of this comparative study? How will this contribute to our understanding of culture in general, and especially the culture of East Asia?

The first section on the ethical and methodological aspects of the article addresses these questions. The second section, the main body of the article, compares Asianism and Africanism in three periods: the imperial period, the developmental period, and the period of globalization.

In the end, this research anticipates three conclusions. First, both regionalist discourses have three symbolic forms, being "polity", "policy" and "political regime". Second, African modernity is centrifugal, and the legitimacy of Africanist discourse is closely related to exogenous forces. Accordingly, the African countries were eager to create African community to liberate themselves from the intervention of outside world. However they failed to make this work as a driving force for the development of the continent. On the contrary, Asian modernity is centripetal, not only because China and Japan play the role of two major inte-

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1    While a significant amount of the Asianist discourses are elaborated in East Asia, and refer to the East Asia, this paper will focus on the Asianism of the East Asia. Therefore, the Asianist discourses represent the cultural characteristics of East Asia. In the other part of Asia, there exists almost no Asianist discourses, and very few in India. For the latter, please see the following two studies. (Deshingkar, 1999; Jaffrelot, 2003)

grating forces, but also because Asian economies are successfully developed, and are relatively independent of interventions of the outside world. The driving forces of Asianism are endogenous. Third, both Asianism and Africanism aim at constructing their respective communities in opposition to the West while seeking moral leadership within the region. Modernity is the critical element in the elaboration of these moral discourses.

## 1. Thematic and structure of analyses

Recent studies emphasize a dynamic approach to explore the role of culture (Lewis, 2002: 3). In order to explain the danger of taking a static approach in the study of culture, this paper will discuss the changes of the perception of Confucian ethics which are usually considered as the core element of East Asian culture. The following pages will demonstrate that the concept of Confucian ethics is fluid since its relationship with economic development changes over time. In this regard, the concept of Confucian ethics, or the existing approaches to study this concept is not scientific. Also, the way the concept of Confucian ethics is perceived is a constant, because it is considered to be the opposition of the West. This leads not only to thinking East Asian culture in a static way, but also to a serious ethical problem as it lead to identity politics, based upon solipsism.

## 1-1. The perceptions of Confucian ethics and its imaginary structure

The Confucian ethics presented here are not about Confucianism itself, but how people and scholars percieve it in modern times in order to explain the cultural base of economic development of East Asia. In contrast to the Protestant ethics which is the spiritual base of capitalism, Weber's thesis of Confucian ethics was elaborated to explain why capitalism failed to develop in East Asia. Not only the Europeans, but also the contemporary Asians of that period attributed the backwardness of East Asia to Confucianism, considering it as the tradition of the region. Fukuzawa Yukichi (Japan) and Hu Shih (China), two famous modernizers of the time, criticized Confucianism, promoting "westernization". The latter was considered not only as the synonym of modernization, but also the key to "enrich the country and strengthen the military". It was a time when Europe overwhelmed East Asia, and the whole world in every aspect: politically, economically, militarily, and culturally.

However, the two World Wars devastated Europe, bringing its world supremacy to an end. The United States and the Soviet Union took its place as the two great powers after the end of the WWII, creating their own blocks against each other. In the meantime, the European colonies struggled for their independence both in Asia and Africa. Starting in the second half of the 1970s, the concept of Confucian ethics was discussed again, in a positive way, to explain the "East Asian economic miracle". It was an age when the rest of the world was trapped in an economic crisis, but East Asia developed steadily and rapidly. Once again Westerners, Herman Kahn and Roderick MacFarquhar, regarded the Confucian ethics as the cultural resource for the economic success of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in East Asia. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997, people again used Confucian ethics to explain the nepotistic capitalism proposing a causal ralationship.

Based on the above discussion, we can see that people's understanding of the effect of Confucian ethics on economic development changes over time, however the way that they imagine Confucian ethics remains constant. This paradox leads to identity politics, because their imagination is based on three rules. First, the concept of Confucian ethics is imagined in contrast to the Protestant ethics. In other words, there exists an "East-West" binary opposition in the elaboration of Confucian ethics, when compared with Protestant eth-

ics. Second, while Protestant ethics are thought to stress individualist values, Confucian ethics are, on the contrary, communitarian. Third, both concepts are elaborated with reference to the value of development. When East Asia fails to develop capitalism, people blame Confucian ethics for its communitarian value. When East Asia develops, the communitarian value is considered desirable, and contributes to the "economic miracle". However, its communitarian value was again thought to be the cause when the financial crisis erupted in East Asia in 1997. In short Confucian ethics were represented as "Orientalism" (Said, 1979), or "reverse Orientalism" (Sadik, 1981; Dirlik, 1996; Hill, 2000) more recently.

However, whether it is "Orientalism" or "reverse Orientalism", the way to imagine Confucian ethics is not cosntructed only by scholars, but by modernity, since its effect to the development of a given time was generally accepted in both the East and the West. The "West-East" opposition is not merely an Occidental imagination, as Edward Said argued, but also a belief system in modern times (Hall, 1992). Also, the concept of development, the criteria to define and judge the role of Confucian ethics, is a modern belief as well (Rist, 2001). Given the fact that modernity plays an essential role in the imagination of Confucian ethics, which is by nature a moral narrative to construct the East Asian community; its meaning and effectiveness in the construction of community and identity can be discussed. This will lead to the elaboration of the problematique and the analytical structure of this research.

## 1-2. The elaboration of the problematic and the analytical structure

This research, will use the notion of totem, a basic concept in anthropology, as the central analytical tool to study how legitimizing symbols contribute to the elaboration of social category. Therefore, "Asia" is considered as a modern totem, while the efforts to identify its cultural characteristics lead to the construction of its community and identity. Since, the discourses about the characteristics of the East Asia culture are presented not only by the Asians, but also by the Westerners, this study will focus on Asianism, a discourse pronounced by Asians themselves, as against the concept of Confucian ethics. Also, we judge it necessary to study Asianism together with Africanism to go beyond the "individualism-communitarianism" opposition, since both are elaborated in contrast to the West. Such a comparative study can explore the relation between the ideas, which are the narratives of the two regionalist discourses, and their respective social structure. Before demonstrating the structure of analysis, this study will first explain how and why this research can go beyond this debate with the help of modernity.

There are two major approaches to the study of the construction of the totem. The first emphasizes the relation between symbols and the social structure, stressing the "structural homology", which was first presented by Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss in their study on the primitive classification (Mauss and Durkheim, 1968); the second focuses on the relation between totems of the same kind, by studying their interactions. This is an approach elaborated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Claude Lévi-Strauss (Merleau-Ponty, 2001; Lévi-Strauss, 2002). Based on these two approaches, one studies the construction of totem from both the "vertical" and the other the "horizontal" dimension respectively. This paper adds a third dimension, that is, their reference to modernity. The concept of modernity serves not only to integrate the other two dimensions and deepen the debate about the constitution of totem, but also to formulate the problematique of this research, since it relates to the "West-Rest" opposition and the concept of development. Thus, this research can avoid identity politics, not by studying what the cultural characteristics of East Asia are, but rather what East Asian culture represents, and who presents these cultural characteristics.

What are the representations of Asia and Africa? How can these representations be understood? The concepts of Asia, Africa and the West are

considered as modern totems which are elaborated in a modern moral hierarchy within which the West is superior to the Rest. Thus, Asianism and Africanism are discourses pronounced respectively by Asians and Africans themselves, and aim at reversing the moral hierarchy.[2] Yet, Asianism and Africanism are far from unitary and monotonic, rather they are plural, not only because Asia and Africa are two complex areas with different cultures and levels of development[3], but also regionalist discourses reflect the struggle for their respective regional hegemony. This is because the interaction exists not merely between totems, but also between sub-totems as well. Accordingly, Figure I shows a system of the modern world with reference to modernity, which is at the same time capable of integrating the other two dimensions of the constitution of totem. On the horizontal dimension, the discourses are separated respectively into two categories, the West and the Rest, or the Higher and the Lower; on the vertical dimension, the West and the Higher are those who are in a relatively advanced social stage, and the Rest and the Lower in a less developed social stage.

## Figure 1. The system of modern world with reference to modern moral hierarchy



Moral hierarchy

While the concept of moral hierarchy aims at distinguishing the interacting social groups with reference to modernity, a moral horizon is elaborated to explain the relation between symbol and social structure, according to the principal of structural homology (Chang, 2003: 23). The concept of moral horizon is elaborated also on the basis of modernity, since the way to understand the social structure refers also to it. Moral horizon can therefore be understood as

2    The concept of moral hierarchy is composed of two elements, which are the morality and the hierarchy. While the first is related to the concept of "moral fact", elaborated by Emile Durkheim (Durkheim, 1924), the latter refers to the work of Louis Dumont (Dumont, 1966). Yet, the concept of moral hierarchy, as far as I know, is first elaborated by myself on the base of the two elements on the one hand, and refers to the modernity on the other.

3    While the concept of development is elaborated in the modern time, 'level of development' refers to, firstly, the modernization, not only in the economic aspect, but also in the political, and other possible dimensions. Yet, this research takes a relationalist stand to explore the symbolic struggle between the West and the Rest on the one hand, and within the concerned region on the other. Accordingly, it is not necessary to measure the level of development in an exact/quantitative way, but in a comparative fashion, i.e. someone is more developed than the other. Finally, the related actors will moralize themselves to surpass the other in the struggle of hegemony. Therefore, 'level of development' should be understood in an inter-subjective fashion by referring to the modernity on the one hand, and to the 'moral horizon' favorable to the promoter of specific discourse on the other. As a result, the regionalist discourses contribute to the struggle of hegemony, as well as to the construction of identity.

the "second-degree construction", (Flick, 2009: 77; Schütz, 1962: 58-59) to understand the pattern of the discourses which are pronounced by different groups in the struggle between the West and the Rest, or the Higher and the Lower. Besides these two analytical concepts, it is necessary to establish a common base to compare Asianism and Africanism. The concept of international regime of political economy is thus elaborated separating modern history into three periods. The first is the imperial period, which is based on the laisser-faire liberalism. The second period began with the end of WWII, when the embedded liberalism played a central role in the Breton Woods system. Along with this there is the advent of the "third wave democratization" (Huntington, 1993) and the end of cold war, Asianism and Africanism entered into the globalization period in which the international regime of political economy was constructed on the base of the neo-liberalism.

These concepts serve to compare the moral horizon of Asianism and Africanism during three periods, not just on the general level in order to reverse Western supremacy, but also at the regional level to fight for the leadership of their respective circle. While Asianism and Africanism are elaborated in accordance with their place in the moral hierarchy, the symbols used in these discourses can be therefore separated into two competing moral horizons. By studying these moral horizons synchronically and diachronically, this research can illustrate the configuration of symbols in Asia and Africa, that is, their respective cultural characteristics with reference to modernity. Thus, the cultural characteristics of a region can be understood not only in a dynamic fashion, but also as a moral narrative for the struggle for regional leadership.

## 2. Asianism and the Africanism in the imperialist period

In the imperial period the West extended itself to the whole world by constructing a world system based on market economy and nation-state. Yet, that doesn't mean that this Western civilization didn't encounter other civilizations or any resistance in Asia and Africa, nor were its confrontations with the Asians and Africans the same. The bifurcation of the development of Asianism and Africanism results from their respective relation with the West, which is their "conjuncture".[4] While the triangle of the slave trade, between Africa, Europe and America, was the background for the construction of Africanism in the imperialist era, (Geiss, 1974: 426) the struggle for leadership between China and Japan were the central elements for the elaboration of Asianism.

In other words, there was no slave trade between Asia and the Western world, and no mega-civilization (such as China) before the arrival of Europeans, nor were there rapidly developing countries like Japan in modern Africa. These differences lead us to discern that the discursive form of Asianism is endogenous, and that of Africanism is exogenous.

### 2-1. The birth of Africanism and its transformation

Since Africanism was constructed in the West-Rest opposition, it was elaborated not in Africa, but in the United States, where the first modern constitution was born by pronouncing that men are created equal on the one hand, and the slavery system remained, on the other. This paradoxical situation resulted to the birth of Africanist movement in the United States. Yet, the first wave of "Back-to-Africa", launched in 1787 by Prince Hall, was not a case in point, since it didn't intend to defy the "White-Black" hierarchy (Esedebe, 1994: 8-9). The

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4   The "Conjuncture", together with "longue durée" and "événement" which relate respectively to the modernity and regionalist discourses in this paper, is elaborated by F. Braudel as a central notion of the Annals School.

Africanist movement didn't come into being until the Ethiopianism whose central doctrine was "Africa for the Africans" (Shepperson, 1953).

### 2-1-1. The arrival of high imperialism and the role of Edward Blyden

Edward Blyden played a critical place not only in the Ethiopianism, but also in the development of Africanism as well. Born in 1832 in Saint Thomas, a Danish West Indies of the time, Blyden went to the United States in 1850 to study theology. Yet, his enrollment was refused because of his race. He went to Liberia, with the help of America Colonization Society (ACS), and became editor of the *Liberia Herald* from 1855 to 1856, also in charge of the column, *A Voice from Bleeding Africa*. As the majority of Black intellectuals in America of the time, he was a Christian abolitionist, and maintained close ties with ACS. The West-Africa hierarchy remaining, he promoted the Christianity to "ameliorate" the living conditions in Africa. He went to the United States as a diplomat and spoke to major black congregations to persuade the Black Americans to end their suffering of racial discrimination by returning to Africa, and developing it. In 1869, he published an essay, *The Negro in Ancient History*, to present an Afrocentric view: the Egyptian civilization was established by the Africans, since the nose of Sphinx resembles to that of the Black people (Blyden, 1872). In 1872, he proclaimed *"Africa for the Africans"*, and his most famous work, *"Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race"*, was published in 1887, within which he presented the concept of "African personality" (Blyden, 1908: 10; July, 1964). It was the forerunner of "Négritude", which was pronounced by Aimé Césaire and Léopold Sédar Senghor during the 1930s. Both concepts aim at reversing the White-Black hierarchy.

The intellectual trajectory of Blyden shifted from Christian abolitionism to Afrocentrism as a result of his personal experience, as well as the transition of the international regime of political economy. The high imperialism came along with the increasing conflict between the construction of self-regulating economy and demand for social protection (Polanyi, 1944). In the Berlin Conference of 1884, the European imperialist countries agreed to colonize Africa by establishing their proper sphere of influence to ease the tension of market economy. Against this background, Blyden elaborated the concept of African personality, and promoted the African Federation, which was based on the African nationality (Esedebe, *ibid*: 30-32). These concepts contributed to the defiance of western supremacy, as well as to nourishing the solidarity of the Africans in order to face the modern market economy, within which human beings are individualized. This individuality is the characteristic of modern world, and leads to the birth of a paradoxical "double movement", that is the "We-I balance" (Elias, 1991): individuality bas been constructed on the one hand, and the "We group" is elaborated on the base of organic solidarity on the other. This applies equally to the development of Africanism, which will be separated into two groups. Focusing on the equal rights, and the value of integration, the first is close to the Western society, which tends to emphasize more the individual norm. The second insists comparatively more on the group, be it the class, the race, or the African nation, with an emphasis on independence.

### 2-1-2. The "integration-separation" debate in the United States

The concept of social space, elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu, stands as the way to understand the distinction between the two groups mentioned above (Bourdieu, 1984). For those who are close to the Western society, they stand in a social space (relatively higher up in the moral hierarchy) by highlighting the value of individuality than those who insist on the value of community. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that the first ignores the importance of solidarity, since

both groups belong to the Africanist movement. The We-I balance emphasizes the fact that solidarity and individuality are both the needs for the people of the modern time. However, its balance depends on the space where stands the person who pronounces or accepts certain kind of Africanist discourses – in fact, that is also the case for the Asianism. Hence, a spectrum of modern human value exists, indicating that solidarity and individuality stand respectively at its two ends.

W. E. B. Du Bois was considered as an Africanist figure in high imperialism. In 1868, he was born to a free black family, having long owned land in Massachusetts, the United States. In 1895, he was the first Afro-American who received his Ph.D. in the University of Harvard. Along with Du Bois who played as the critical role in the integrationist group, Marcus Garvey was another Africanist icon who insisted on the separatist strategy. Born in 1887 in Jamaica, he lived in a social space lower than that of Du Bois: as a worker in a printing company in his early year, and participating in a union where he was elected as a leader in a general strike. In 1910, he began traveling throughout Central Africa. In 1916 he arrived at the United States. These two differed not only as regards "social space", but also by the movements that they launched.

In 1905, Du Bois initiated the Niagara movement to call for opposition to racial segregation and disenfranchisement by proclaiming: "We want full manhood suffrage and we want it now ... We are men! We want to be treated as men." (Du Bois, 1968: 250) In 1909, he founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), aimed at promoting the ideas launched in the Niagara movement. Its mission is "to ensure the political, educational, social, and economic equality of rights of all persons and to eliminate racial hatred and racial discrimination."[5] Focusing on civil rights, the NAACP took a different approach from Booker T. Washington who insisted on the harmony and the cooperation between different races, i.e., "compromise of Atlanta" (Washington, 1972: 73-76). Compared with the position of Washington, that of Du Bois was relatively radical because of its immediate demand for the equality of civil rights. It was in this context that Du Bois presented the concept of "*twoness*", meaning that he is an American and a Black at the same time (Du Bois, 2008: 12). Accordingly, his Africanism did not intend to construct a new African nation outside of the America, but a "Negro nation within the Nation" (Du Bois, 1935; Rucker, 2002). Against this background, he thought that "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line." (Du Bois, 2008: 45) And, it is better to stay in America, and to fight the color-line, rather than the "Back-to-Africa" policy led by Marcus Garvey.

Having existed for a long time, the "Back-to-Africa" movement was accelerated because of the establishment of *Black Starline* maritime company in 1919, managed by Marcus Garvey. In 1914, two years before his arrival in the United States, Garvey founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA) in Jamaica, and creating divisions in Western countries, as well as in Africa. After the WWI, Marcus and the UNIA have become famous worldwide. However, Marcus had nothing to do with the "*twoness*", but concentrated fully on the liberation of the Black in Western societies, by way of establishing a nation in Africa. As a result, he agreed with the Ku Klux Klan, a far-right organization that advocated White supremacy, on the movement of Back-to-Africa. He insisted on separation by proclaiming that "The white man of America will not, to any organized extent, assimilate the [black man], because in so doing, he feels he will be committing suicide."

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5    See http://www.naacp.org/pages/our-mission , Website of NAACP.

(Garvey, 1986: 21) The *Black Starline* was therefore set up to transport the Afro-American descents to Africa.

### 2-1-3. Africanism in Europe and worldwide Africanist organizations

The "integration-separation" debate took place not only in the United States, but also in Europe, which was the other side of the triangle slave trade. While some Afro- descents wanted to integrate into mainstream society, with equal civil rights, others intended to separate from the latter to build an independent state in Africa. Close relationships and cooperation existed between the European integrationists and Du Bois, who came from a similar social space. Studying in King's College, and being a physician in London, Harold Moody was a son of a pharmacist, and born in Jamaica in 1882. He established the League of Colored Peoples in 1931 with the goal of racial equality for its members in all parts of the world. Yet, its members lived principally in Britain, and they made its policy characterize as Pan-African domestic politics (Geiss, 343). In France, another major colonial state, Blaise Diagne and Gratien Candace were the two principal integrationist figures. While the first was the first black African elected to the French National Assembly and mayor of Dakar, the second severed in the French National Assembly from 1912 to 1942, and its vice-president from 1938 to 1942. After the Pan-African Congress of 1919 in Paris, the Pan-African Association has been created. Diagne became its president, and Du Bois was the secretary. The Pan-African Association decided to meet biennially, with the second Pan-African Congress to take place in London in 1921 (Contee, 1970).

Since the Pan-African Association was in the hand of Diagne and Du Bois, the Pan-African Congress took an integrationist position in its Africanist discourses. The third, the fourth, and the fifth Pan-African Congress were held respectively in London (1923), New York (1927), and Manchester (1945). They did not take place biennially, as was expected. This does not imply that the Africanist movement no longer played an important role. On the contrary, the Africanist movement became more and more radical with a strong desire for the pursuit of national independence, and led to the decline of integrationism. In England, the major separatism was pronounced by George Padmore who elaborated close ties with UNIA. Padmore insisted on the worldwide liberation of the Black by launching triangle cooperation among Europe, America, and Africa, in order not only to battle White supremacy, but also capitalist exploitation. Because of the high imperialism that led to the colonization in Africa, nationalism, communism, and Africanism were linked together, especially after the end of the WWI. That was also the case in France. The "*Ligue universelle pour la défense de la race noire*", the "*Comité de la défense de la race nègre*" (C.D.R.N), and the "*Ligue de la défense de la race nègre*" (L.D.R.N) were founded after the 1920s, with close relations with UNIA and the French Communist Party. The idea of self-determination was their central concern, which resulted from the European colonization in Africa, and resulted to the de-colonization after the WWII.

## 2-2. Asianism in the imperialist period

Since there was no transcontinental slave trade between Asia and the Western world, Asianism didn't develop in the same way as Africanism, which is an outside-in trajectory. Nevertheless, it is necessary to pay special attention to the "Hua-Yi order" (華夷秩序), within which China has been put at the centre because it is "civilized", and the rest at the periphery for their "barbarity". It is not only a system different from that of nation-state, but also a worldview challenging the European *Weltanschauungs*, since the Chinese civilization exists and

has been recognized for a very long time. The Hua-Yi order played the role of China's symbolic power to defy Western supremacy, and the counter-hegemonic intention of Japan, which became the only non-occidental imperialist country in the imperial period.

Even though Japan failed to challenge the China's hegemony during the pre-modern period, it did not wholeheartedly recognize China's authority. Its name, Japan, signifies the "origin of sun"(日本), with an intention to challenge China, which means the "country of sunset" instead of the "country of the center"(中國). (Mendl, 1995: 15). During the Qing dynasty, which was governed by the Manchu, a "barbaric people" from Northern China, was established in the 17th century, the idea of "inversion of Hua-Yi order" has been elaborated by the Japanese scholar (Nosco, 2005). However, this idea did not prevail until the 1870s, that is, after the Meiji Restoration (Lin, 2002: 50-51). Since there had long existed a wish to defy China's hegemony in Japan, it is no wonder that the idea of Asianism was first elaborated by the Japanese. Built on the base of the "West-Asia" opposition, the Asianist discourses not only represent the acceptance of a modern world system in Japan, but also aimed at dislocating the Hua-Yi order within which China stood at the center.

### 2-2-1. The role of Yukichi Fukuzawa and the arrival of high imperialism

Yukichi Fukuzawa was a critical figure in the Asianist discourse, even though his famous proposition was "Leave Asia, join Europe", which aimed, on the contrary at disrupting the Asian solidarity. However, this was an idea elaborated in 1885, one year after the *coup d'état* of Gapsin, launched by a progressive group in Korea. At first, Fukuzawa himself was for the idea of Asianism with the hope to construct cooperation between Japan, China and Korea to defy the Western threat, as well as to safeguard national independence. Yet, two events occurred in 1884 that changed his attitude toward the idea of Asianism: Gapsin faction failed to overthrow the conservative government and the arrival of high imperialism after the Berlin Conference. Against this background, the article, "Leave Asia" was published in the Japanese newspaper *Jiji Shimpo*. He wrote,

> Once the wind of Western civilization blows to the East, every blade of grass and every tree in the East follow what the Western wind brings... The spread of civilization is like the measles... In my view, these two countries [China and Korea] cannot survive as independent nations with the onslaught of Western civilization to the East...[6]

The "West-East" metaphor existing as well, the national independence remaining a central theme in Fukuzawa's discourse. He thought that Western civilization was not only superior to that of Asia, but also showed the way for Japan in the future. As he wrote,

> We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbours so that we can work together toward the development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West... Those [who] are intimate with bad friends are also regarded bad, therefore I will deny those bad Asian friends from my heart (*ibid.*).

According to him, China and Korea could not survive as independent nations under the attack of Western countries. As a result, it is better to

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6    See http://personal.ashland.edu/jmoser1/japan/fukuzawa2.htm, Text of "Leave Asia" of Yukichi Fukuzawa.

"Leave Asia" to be away from these "bad friends", and to treat them in the way of European imperialist states. In fact, this was not only a turning point for Fukuzawa's Asianist discourse, but also that of the Japanese in general.

### 2-2-2. From solidarity oriented Asianism to expansionist Asianism

In 1877, the first Asianist association was founded in Japan, called "Society to develop Asia", it was renamed one year later to "Society to promote Asia", its leader, Ōkubo Toshimichi, having been assassinated. Toshimichi was one of the three heroes during the 1868 revolution to make the *shogunate* return power to the Emperor Meiji. The Meiji Restoration brought about a modernization movement in all aspects that led Japan to the way of regional hegemony. To be a hegemonic power, Japan had to conquer Korea in order to defy China's suzerainty in the first place. After the 1868 revolution, there were two factions in Japan's political arena with opposing policies on Korea. The first, assembled and supported primarily by the *shogun* and *samurai* who lost their power along with the modernization, wanted to declare war on Korea immediately; the second, who were principally pro-modernization, thought it too risky to conquer Korea for the time being, because Japan was not well prepared for the war, and could not resist the interference of Western countries and China. This was the debate of *Seikanron*, i.e., "Advocacy of a punitive expedition to Korea".

Toshimichi belonged to the second faction, and played a critical role in policy making. As a result, it was the solidarist Asianism that prevailed in the early period of Meiji by taking a diplomatic strategy with Korea. During this period, Fukuzawa stood for Toshimichi's Korean policy since he was a modernist by nature. Yet, Toshimichi's moderate policy toward Korea led to his death. Both war hawks and doves, agreed on the necessity to conquer Korea, however thy disagreed on timing. The way to formulate Asianist discourse in Japan had a basis in the modern inter-state system to defy the Hua-Yi order. Even if the solidarity-oriented policy was relatively "friendly" toward China in comparison with the expansionists, their Asianism is of its nature against the Chinese hegemony. During the 1880s, the Sino-Japanese relation became more and more tense. The armies of the two countries met in Korea to pacify the Imo revolt in 1882 and Kabo riots in 1884. In 1883, the "Society to promote Asia" changed its name to the "Asiatic Association" to accept foreign members. Instead of using "Society"(社) as its name, "Association"(協會) was adopted because its Chinese members thought the later related to "harmony" and "equality" in Chinese since that the word, "協", means "synergy" (Wang, 2004: 58). It is witnessed that the power shifted gradually from China to Japan, because it was not Japan, but China who asked for harmony and equality in their relationship.

In 1885, a new Asianist organization, called the "Federation of States of the Great Asia", was founded by Tarui Tokichi, aimed at building an institutional alliance between Japan and Korea. Meanwhile, Fukuzawa changed his solidarity-oriented stand, and pronounced "Leave Asia". In fact, the Meiji Restoration had transformed Japan into an imperialist country at the end of 1870s. In 1879, Japan took over Ryukyu Kingdom, and renamed it as Okinawa. After the victory of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan gained control of Taiwan, and made China recognize Korea as an independent country. In 1904, Japan won the Russo-Japanese war, and pushed the Russians out of Korea. One year later, Japan made Korea its protectorate, annexing it into Japan in 1910. Thereafter China took the place of Korea as the primary target of Japanese Asianism. The change of Asianist discourses coincided with the increasing nationalist sentiment in Japan. In 1905, Okakura Tenshin pub-

lished a book, titled "The idea of the East", and proclaimed "Asia is one", so as to criticize the Western civilization on the one hand, and glorify the Eastern civilization on the other. According to Tenshin, Japan represented the spirit of Eastern civilization, because:

> The unique blessing of unbroken sovereignty, the proud self-reliance of an unconquered race, and the insular isolation which protected ancestral ideas and instincts at the cost of expansion, made Japan the real repository of the trust of Asiatic thought and culture (Okakura, 1920: 4-6).

The Japanese culture is not only the highest in Asia, but also superior to the European culture. The expansionist Asianism of Japan intended not only to glorify the Asian culture, downgrading at the same time that of West, but also to highlight the superiority of Japanese culture vis-à-vis the other Asian cultures using the principle of nationalist discourse (Mucchuelli, 2003: 30). However culture was not the only way to elevate Japan, its economic development was important too, as it was the most modernized country in Asia. In 1924, the United States promulgated the Johnson-Reed Act, which was seen by the Japanese as against their immigration to the US. Anti-American sentiment increased after the WWI, since Japan and the United States have taken the place of the European imperialist countries in Asia-Pacific, as the new regional hegemonies. In 1931, The Japanese army entered into Manchu, with an end not only to invade China, but also to prepare for the "final war" against the United States. Kanji Ishiwara who was the initiator of the "Manchurian Incident", and the founder of the "Union of East Asia", published an "Essay on the final war", according to which the world is separated into two, between Japan and the U.S. Both countries are respectively considered as leaders of the East and the West (Ishiwara, 2001).

In 1937, Japan announced its "Great war of East Asia" with an end to liberate the Asian countries from the dominance of the Western imperialist countries. At the end of 1930s, Rōyama Masamichi, Professor of International relations at the University of Tokyo presented the idea of "Cooperative Community of East Asia", as the base for the elaboration of "New order in East Asia", pronounced by Fumimaro Konoe, who was then the Premier Minister of Japan. In 1940, Konoe announced the term, "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", which was the apogee of Japanese Asianism, as the way to seek "co-prosperity" and "peace" for Asian countries.

### 2-2-3. The Asianism of other East Asian countries

In the face of the Japan's rise, the other East Asian countries, China and Korea, elaborated their respective Asianist discourses. Their Asianist discourses were diverse as China and Korea held different position in the Hua-Yi system. Yet, their discourses were similar because both countries suffered invasion at the hands of imperialist states, including Western countries, and Japan.

Situated between Japan and China, Korea held a sensitive and awkward position regarding the Asianist discourse. One the one hand, Korea was apt to accept the idea of Asianism to confront Western countries. On the other, Asianism was a trap, since it aims not only to construct Asian community, but also a hegemonic discourse for the struggle within the Asian community. Korea was not a hegemonic power, but China and Japan were. China was the centre of the ancient Hua-Yi order, while Japan became the regional hegemony in the modern international system. Since the Asianism was firstly elaborated by the Japanese with an end to "integrate" Korea, the Korean Asianist discourse replied to the Japanese menace, as well as to

elaborate and represent Korean nationalism. Being a legendary champion for Korea's independence, Seo Jae-pil proposed a development strategy to face Japan by placing Korea under expert foreign tutelage. Korea could learn directly from the Western expert, without the help of Japan, because the modernity of the later was not "authentic", according to him (Tikhonov, 2005: 64). However, it was still necessary to strengthen, and institutionalize commercial relations with Japan to elaborate an Asian community. Being the first Korean to become a naturalized citizen of the U.S., Seo moralized on western modernity, advocating its superiority to that of Japan. Unlike Seo, Lee Yongku chose to develop Korea accepting Japanese tutelage to compete with the Western countries (*ibid*: 64-65). As a result, the later has been considered as a collaborator and traitor, while the first is a noted champion of Korea's independence.

In China, Wang Jingwei was considered as collaborator and traitor as well, for his formation of a Japanese-supported collaborationist government, and revision of Sun Yat-sen's "Great Asianism" to echo the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, Wang Jingwei's position was different from that of Lee Yongku in Korea, because it came from a "social space" relatively more modern than the other Chinese Asianists such as Sun Yat-sen and Li Dazhao. Wang belonged to the right wing of the Kuomintang, (KMT, i.e., Chinese Nationalist Party), which was established by Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China. Yet, it is not the intention of this research to adjudicate on whether Wang was a traitor, or whether he wrongly interpreted Sun's Asianism. Based on his Asianist discourses, this paper aims at comprehending the legitimizing symbols of his discourse with reference to his social space on the one hand, and on the other hand the moral struggle for the leadership in China (and East Asia).

Wang's discourses represented the value of a social space for those with higher modernity, because he belonged to the right-wing KMT, and the Nanjing government stood in a relatively developed area in China. Also, Wang did not only echo Japan's New Order in East Asia to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in an equal, cooperative, and peaceful way, but also fight with Generalissimo Chiang Kai- shek's KMT, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the leadership in China. Li Dazhao, one of the major founders of CCP, formulated his Asianist discourses after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. With the collapse of the Qing dynasty Chinese nationalism was fast developed. Consequently, Li's Asianism was intensely intertwined with Chinese nationalism to glorify China, and to challenge the hegemonic place of Japan of the time. According to him, China is the greatest country in Asia, not only in the geographic sense, and at the level of population, but also because of its civilization, which is the base of all the cultures in Asia (Li, 2006: 106). Therefore, it is impossible to develop Asianism without taking Chinese civilization as its core, since the later occupies the centre of Asia. After the end of the WWI, he stressed the self-determination, and criticized the imperialist character of Japanese Asianism by highlighting its danger to the world peace and stability (Li, *ibid*: 269).

There was no class conscience in Li's Asianism, even though he was one of the founders of CCP. The nationalism was the central element of his Asianist discourses, and that was also the case for Sun Yat-sen. During the Qing dynasty, he concentrated on the establishment of the republican government, and distanced himself from the Asianist discourses (pronounced principally by the Japanese.) Seeing the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, he wrote a letter to his Japanese friend, Torazo Miyazaki, a solidarist Asianism, to express his worry that the Japan would thereafter conquer China (Sun, 1981: 149). When he visited Japan in 1913, Sun gave a lecture in the East Asia Common Culture

Association, and said: "Asia is for the Asians…The Chinese and the Japanese have the obligation to protect the peace of Asia, since China is the biggest country in Asia, and Japan is the most powerful. If these two countries can help each other, they can protect the peace of Asia, even that of the whole world (Sun, *ibid*: 136). His Asianist discourse aimed at persuading the Japanese from the expansionism. In 1924, when the Johnson-Reed Act was promulgated, Sun gave his famous lecture in Kobe, a Japanese port-city near Osaka, entitled "The Great Asianism". Based on the Hua-Yi order, Sun urged that Japan should make a wise decision by following the "royal way" to be the soldier of Asia, instead of taking a "hegemonic way" to be the lackey of the West (Sun, *ibid*: 409).

## 2-3. A Comparison of Africanism and Asianism in the imperial period

To tell the differences between Africanism and Asianism, this paper will firstly lean upon the "exogenous-endogenous" metaphor. By way of this metaphor, not only can this study explain their respective trajectory, but also their own characteristics in the imperialist period. Africanism was elaborated initially in the United State, which is not only far from Africa, but also a relatively modern nation at the time. However, Asianism was elaborated right in Asia with the aim of facing Western invasion. Accordingly, their fundamental difference lies at their relation with the modernity. Born in a modern society, the Africanism has been deeply intertwined with the modern values, and accepted the modern moral hierarchy in the first place. Yet, that was not the case for the Asianism, while the Hua-Yi order was the base for the Chinese Asianism on the one hand, but that which needed to be eradicated for the Japanese who elaborated their Asianism based on the nation-state system. Accordingly, Figure II demonstrates the discursive structure of Africanism and Asianism in the imperialist period.

Africanism can be separated into two categories, integrationism and separatism. While the first stood in a comparatively higher place in terms of a moral hierarchy, and intended to integrate itself into the mainstream society, the second was frequently supported by those who lived in a lower position, wishing to build an independent nation. To be or not to be independent, that is the central question for the Africanism. Accordingly, the concept of "polity" played a vital role in the elaboration of Africanist discourses in this period. That was also the case for the Asianism of the time, but in the way that the "polity" was so deeply embedded in their elaboration that all the Asianist discourses were closely related to the nationalism. It is because there were clear borderlines between the Asian countries, even if the tributary system was still there when the Asianism was elaborated. Both in Japan and in Korea, the Asianist discourses were elaborated principally by the reformist groups, because they were not only more conscious of the Western menace, but also hoped to be free from the Hau-Yi order. Resorting to the Western modernity, that is the economic development, Japanese Asianism aimed at constructing Japanese superiority to defy China's hegemony in East Asia. Having taken the place of the latter (after the first Sino- Japanese war) Japan's leadership was accepted by Lee Yongku in Korea, and Wang Jingwei in China. Yet, they represented different social spaces in their respective country.

**Figure II. The discursive structure of Africanism and Asianism at the imperialist period**



Lee Yongku stood in a social space less modern than that of Seo Jae-pil in Korea, leading them to choose different strategies to counter Japanese hegemony at the time. However, it was not the Chinese "authenticity", but that of the West that Seo used to depreciate Japan. Contrasting the Korean case, those who reinforced the Chinese hegemony vis-à-vis Japanese superiority highlighted the greatness of China in Asia. There were two moral hierarchies in East Asia, one was based on the Hua-Yi order, within which China occupied the centre, and the other was constructed on the base of modern interstate system. This is the critical difference between the Africanism and Asianism, that made the first exogenous, and the later endogenous. However, being it Africanism or Asianism, the "polity" occupied the centre of their discourses, which is the moral horizon of the imperial period.

## 3. The Africanism and the Asianism after the WWII

While decolonization took place both in Africa, and in Asia in many cases between WWI and WWII, the power of the European imperialist countries was further damaged after the end of the WWII. Furthermore, the European hegemony was jeopardized because of the transformation of the international political economic regime. By establishing the Bretton Woods System, states from all over the world were recognized institutionally on the one hand, and the laisser-faire liberalism was no longer accepted as its core value. Also, the United States and USSR took the place of European countries as the central actors in the world politics by constructing a bi-polar system: the United States and the capitalist bloc on the one side, and the Soviet Union and its communist bloc on the other. Besides, most of the African and Asian countries belonged to the "Third World", that is non-aligned, and under-developed. That was the period of cold war when the international regime of political economy was based on the embedded liberalism which favouring the building of developmentalist state in the Third World (Ruggie, 1982). Yet, the developmentalist state encounters more and more difficulties for the coming of the third wave of democratization from within, later at the end of cold war from without.

Therefore, a new international regime of political economy was constructed based on the doctrine of neo-liberalism, promoted by US president Ronald

Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This was combined with the technological innovations of financial markets. Both Reaganism and Thatcherism were elaborated at the beginning of 1980s based on Monetarism whose central themes were the resolution of the economic crisis and stagflation of the 1970s. In contrast with Keynesianism (which stood as the central doctrine of the embedded liberalism) Monetarism focused on monetary policy to vitalize the economy by reducing the role of the state. In addition, with the help of technological innovation of the financial market, people live in an ever more interconnected world within which there is a process of a separation of time from space. This "time-space distanciation", stands as the central characteristic of the globalization. (Giddens, 1994)

Therefore, the moral horizon of Africanism and Asianism changed over time, from "polity" to "policy" in the developmentalist period. It was because the place of state has been recognized as the institutional base of international regime, and the essential mission of the state was to develop the country. Yet, the "political regime" entered into the discourses as a new constituent of moral horizon in the globalization period, because of the demand for the democratization in the Third World.

## 3-1. Africanism after the WWII

Africanism became more and more radicalized after the end of WWII, with an aim to promote decolonization. Yet, there existed a fundamental tension between Africanism and the decolonization, in that the former intended to construct a political community to unify the whole continent, while the later was based on the nation-state. In fact, that was also true for the Asianism, before and after the WWII. However, the Africanism was exogenous before the War, and the African states were newly built after the War. As a result, this tension was all new in the elaboration of Africanist discourses, and it led to the principal conflict between the different groups. Therefore, federalism and functionalism were the two major perspectives for the Africanist discourses, in the developmentalist period, as well as in the globalization period.

### 3-1-1. Africanism in the developmentalist period

The two strategies in the developmentalist period could be concretized as the "Big Africa plan", and the "Small Africa plan". Based on federalism, the first approach highlighted the urgency to unify the whole Africa, and thereafter to develop the individual state. On the contrary, the later chose to develop the state at the outset, and the African continent subsequently by taking a functionalist view. The Big Africa plan was launched by Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first President of Ghana after its independence in 1957. His Africanism can be best illustrated as follows:

> The freedom and independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the whole of Africa (Nkrumah, 1976: 111).

Nkrumah has participated actively in the Africanist movement during his study in the United Kingdom. He was a secretary in the 5th Pan-African Congress that took place at Manchester in 1945. Right after the Congress, he gathered the representatives of the West Africa to create the "West African National Secretariat", which was the first Africanist institution organized by Africans themselves. One year after the independence of Ghana, he launched the first Conference of Independent African States with Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, and Mohammed V., the King of Morocco. As a result, the Africanist movement was no longer monopolized by the Black, but also linked with the Arab world. Yet,

the Arabism has been initiated before Nkrumah's Big Africa plan, not only for the "Israeli problem", but also for the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. As said Nasser:

> We cannot, in anyway, stand aside, even if we wish to, from the sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the heart of the continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot do so for one principal and clear reason – we ourselves are in Africa (Nasser, 1959: 74).

However, the convergence between Arabism and Negroism led to the enlargement of Africanism and an increasing struggle for leadership among the African states. Besides, while the Suez Canal crisis manifested the replacement of the pre-war imperialist structure by the cold war system, the integration of Arabism to Africanism signified the acceleration of the struggle for the decolonization. Therefore, Nkrumah proposed, in the first Conference of Independent African States, taking a neutral position vis-à-vis the two great powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and to fortify the economic cooperation among the African States. In addition, the conference passed some resolutions: against all kinds of racism, the reaffirming a neutral foreign policy, and the condemnation the imperialist domination in Africa. Yet, even though the conference took a universal stand to demand the independence for all the colonial territories, the resolutions were much harsher against France, than Britain. It was not only because most of the participant countries of the North Africa were French colonies, but also that these two countries governed colonies in different ways: the French took a republican approach, while the British used a pluralist way.

Hence, the African nationalist encountered a rather difficult situation in the French colonies, since the pluralist governance made the native groups more autonomous and led to a relatively uncomplicated and friendly ethnic relation. As a result, the British colonies were placed in a relatively higher place in the moral hierarchy, because of its liberal policy. Moreover, it is also witnessed that the decolonization and nation-state building were relatively pacific in the British colonies. On the contrary, the French encountered not only a violent independent movement in Algeria, but also a bloody civil war in Congo. As a result, the states of the ancient French colonies favoured even more the concept of sovereignty than those of the old British colonies. This led to their different strategies about the Africanist discourses, as well as the birth of two blocs, which were the "Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc", and the "Casablanca bloc". Even though both blocs agreed with the founding of an African Union, they took different strategies to integrate Africa. While the Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc insisted on the sovereignty, and took a functionalist integration policy, the Casablanca bloc adopted a more ambitious policy by using federalist strategy to integrate Africa.

In 1959, three former French colonies (Mali, Togo, and Madagascar) participated lukewarmly in the second Conference of Independent States. In 1960, all the French colonies in Africa have been independent, and organized the Brazzaville Conference to reinforce economic cooperation among the Francophone countries. Meanwhile, the civil war was happening in Congo. A communiqué was issued after the conference by rendering thanks to Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General of UNO, who, respecting the spirit of the Charter, had striven to prevent the cold war from extending to the African continent (Legum, 1962: 180). Most of the Anglophone countries were gathered at Casablanca in 1961, and expressed their will to establish a Consultative Assemble of Africa by the delegates of all African countries. While the Assembly was designed to take charge of all cooperative aspects, the Joint African High Command would be established to take charge of military affaires, including the peacekeeping of the Congo crisis (Ajala, 1973: 31-32). Seeing the diversification of Africanist movement and their opposing strategies to the regionalization, the President

of Senegal, Léopold Senghor, organized a conference at Monrovia for all the independent African countries in 1961. Those who participated in the Casablanca conference agreed to attend at the beginning, but were absent in the end.

As a result, two opposite blocs were formed in the name of Casablanca, and Brazzaville/Monrovia, which related to their policies on African integration, as well as their place in the moral hierarchy. Those who belonged to the Casablanca bloc, stood in a relatively higher place in that they were more liberal, and inclined to take federalist policy. Yet, those who belonged to the Brazzaville/ Monrovia bloc, insisted more on sovereignty, and preferred the functionalist view to integrate Africa, since they were relatively less liberal in the sense of the state-society relation. Being the leader of the Casablanca bloc, Nkrumah wanted to establish a federation of all the African countries. This is what is defined as Big Africa Plan in this paper. Yet, Julius Nyerere, who was then the President of Tanzania, insisted the spirit of the Monrovia bloc, and chose the Small Africa Plan. Thus, when the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was founded in 1963, it was a compromise of the two opposite blocs, by stressing the importance of cooperation among the African states on the one hand, and dedicating to the eradication of all forms of colonialism on the other. In other words, there were some cooperation plans launched by the OAU, with the agreement of the African states. Sovereignty was respected among the African countries, and the Small Africa Plan worked in this regard. Yet, the OAU also established the Liberation Committee in order to overthrow the sovereign power of the colonial states in Africa. It was the Big Africa Plan that mattered in this kind of situation.

As a result, the "polity" remains critical in the Africanism in the developmentalist period, not only because some colonies remained as underachievers in their independence, but also that there were different stands on sovereignty for regional integration. By one means or another most of the African countries have become independent, and focused on the way to develop their own countries. Therefore, the establishment of OAU contributes to the liberation of Western domination, as well as to the development of Africa. Thus "policy" was also a central element of Africanism in this period.

### 3-1-2. Africanism in the age of globalization

With the coming of the period of globalization Africanism changes its central element too. During the "African Renaissance", pronounced in 1996 by Thabo Mkebi, the then Vice-President of South Africa, may manifest the evolution of Africanist discourses where freedom plays a critical role. In his famous Africanist discourse, "I am an African", he said:

> I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our native land. Whatever their own actions, they remain still, part of me….I come of those who were transported from India and China, …who taught me that we could both be at home and be foreign, who taught me that human existence itself demanded that freedom was a necessary condition for that human existence.[7]

In this regard, the African renaissance is not elaborated by opposing the West, but tries to include the Europeans, as well as those who came from Asia. He mentioned,

> The constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes and unequivocal statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender of historical origins. It is

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7    See http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/consulate/speeches/adoption_of_constitution.htm., Speech of MKEBI Thebo, "I am an African".

> a firm assertion made by ourselves that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white… ( *ibid.*)

It echoed the concept of "Rainbow country", which was the slogan after the end of apartheid in order to establish a liberal democracy in South Africa. Furthermore, the African Renaissance serves not only to build a harmonic multi-ethnic society within, but also to promote South Africa's position on the world scene. As he addressed in another speech:

> What we have spoken of before, of the restoration of the dignity of the peoples of Africa itself, demands that we deal as decisively and as quickly as possible with the perception that as a continent we are condemned forever to depend on the merciful charity which those who are kind are ready to put into our begging bowls. Accordingly, and again driven by our own painful experience, many on our continent have introduced new economic policies which seek to create conditions that are attractive for domestic and foreign investors, encourage the growth of the private sector, reduce the participation of the state in the ownership of the economy and, in other ways, seek to build modern economies.[8]

Being isolated from the world during the cold war because of the apartheid, the policy of South Africa highlighted the importance of openness inside and outside the country at the same time. That was not only because the values of liberal democracy and the neo-liberalism were placed at the centre of the globalization period, but also because South Africa is the most powerful and advanced country in Africa. Thus, the African Renaissance was meant to be the strategy for South Africa to struggle for its leadership in Africa (Crouzel, 2000). Yet, the liberal democracy jeopardizes the functioning of developmentalist state, and contradicts the operation of market society. Even if South Africa is relatively developed in Africa, the paradox between political legitimacy and accumulation of capital remains critical for their political leaders. Less developed than South Africa, other African countries have to deal with the same problem, but in a situation much more complex and difficult. It is in this regard that this paper explains the reason why the African Union came into being in 2002, and its role to compete with the African Renaissance for the leadership in Africa in the globalization period.

The African Union has been established to replace the OAU, which represented the compromise of the Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc and the Casablanca bloc. Yet, the opposition of the two blocs was not the major cause explaining the inability and failure of the OUA to carry out African integration. Definitive differences and conflicts exist in all kinds of regionalization. Rather, it is because the African countries were so eager to establish an African community that they focused on the issue of sovereignty while remaining underdeveloped and without a desire to share their sovereign power, one with the other. However, the African Union has to face not only this extreme contradiction, but also an even more complicated and difficult situation: the demand for democratization from within, and globalization from without. Thus, the Africanist discourses refer to the "policy" to develop Africa, as well as to the "political regime" in the face of democratization, by insisting on the civic participation to their "polity" in a time of globalization.

Yet, even though liberal democracy has been a central element in the Constitution of the African Union, not all of its members can properly implement these values. In other words, liberal democracy can be better realized in

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8    See http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/mbeki.html, Text of MKEBI Thabo, "The African Renaissance, South Africa and the World".

developed countries, such as South Africa, but would encounter many difficulties in most of the African countries which are less developed, and remain as authoritarian regimes. Also, we witness that the African Union remained silent as the Jasmine Revolution took place in North Africa from 2010. The African Union did not promote democratization, nor take any measure to stop the civil war. Put bluntly, it doesn't work as it ought to (according to its Constitution) and remains in stasis as did the OAU during the developmentalist period.

## 3-2. Asianism after the WWII

While the Africanism became radical after the WWII to promote national independence, Asianism made nationalism taboo because it was associated with Japanese imperialism. The end of the WWII was not only the end of the imperialism, both Western and Eastern, but also the beginning of the bipolar world system, which transformed both Africanism and Asianism. This is the reason the Afro-Asian Conference took place at Bandung in 1955, to promote the economic and cultural cooperation, as well as to oppose neo-colonialism. While the cooperation signified that the "policy" was the central element of a moral horizon, the opposition against neo-colonialism represented the arrival of bipolar system. This lead to the crystallization of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Afro-Asian Conference was held later in Cairo (1957), and Belgrade (1961). In later years, however, conflicts arose among Third World members which eroded the principle of solidarity expressed at Bandung. The establishment of supranational organization was easier said than done, and rather difficult to make it function during the developmentalist period when the newly established states were eager for national development. Thus, the Afro-Asian Conference experienced the same fate as that of the OAU. But that was not the path of Asianism of the same period, because it was elaborated firmly on the basis of nation-state, and only barely related to regional integration.

### 3-2-1. Asianism in the developmentalist period

While the Africanism changed its central element from "polity" to "policy" after the massive decolonization in the 1960s, new Asianist discourses came into being in the 1970s. This was however not due to decolonization, rather because the East Asian economy was rapidly developed as a counterexample to the under-development theory. Based on the experiences of Latin America and of Africa, the theory of underdevelopment considered that external capitalist countries to be the cause for the failure of development in the Third World. Yet, that was not the case for the "Four Asian Tigers", which are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Thus, two major perspectives were elaborated, which represented two approaches to formulate the Asianist discourses of the developmentalist age.

The first took a *culturalist* view to explain the "Asian miracle" highlighting the role of Confucian ethics in the development of East Asian economy. In 1979, Herman Kahn presented the concept of neo-Confucian ethics by reversing the original thesis that Confucian ethics prevented the development of capitalism in ancient China by stressing the feudalistic ties of personal relations in social life. With the rapid economic development of these "neo-Confucian societies", Kahn suggested that "societies based on the Confucian ethic may, in many ways, be superior to the West in the pursuit of industrialization, affluence and modernization" (Kahn, 1979: 121). The Confucian ethics that he has in mind are "dedicated, motivated, responsible and educated individuals and enhanced sense of commitment, organizational identity, and loyalty to various institutions" (Kahn, *ibid*: 128). The communitarian values having been highlighted to describe the meaning of neo-Confucian ethics, Kahn added another two essential ele-

ments: *complementarity* and *hierarchy*. The first manifests the relation between opposite components, for example the elites and the masses, the employer and employee etc…, while the second explains the organizing fashion of these components. Thus, Kahn explained the reason why the economy of East Asia has been rapidly developed, and how an organic, harmonious and disciplinary society was organized. Against this background, the concept of "Asian values" was elaborated and promoted by Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore.

In an interview with the *New York Times* in 1986, for the first time, Lee associated Singapore's economic success to Confucian ethics (previously considered harmful to its economic development.) According to him, Singapore's success results from the fact that most Singaporeans think that the social interest is more important than that of the individual. And, this is the fundamental idea of Confucian ethics (Chen and Chen, 1995: 156). However, the evaluative inversion of Confucian ethics to economic development was due not only to Singapore's economic performance, but also and more importantly, to its political change, since the economic success had been in place since the 1970s. However the People's Action Party lost two seats in the election of 1984, losing its parliamentary monopoly. It is in this context that the Confucian ethics was called, and reformulated to highlight the importance of social interest in the development of Singapore's economy. The Confucian ethics turned into Asian value in the fallowing years to meet the general need of Singapore's multi-ethnic society, and to contrast the "Western values", within which individualism is considered essential. As he said:

> The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy (Zakaria, 1994: 112).

Individualism is not only the central value of the West, but also the result of individualization, as such the *We-I* balance becomes the fundamental mechanism of modern world. However, the way to form the We-identity is quite different between a democratic society, and an authoritarian one as the first is based relatively on the principle of equity, and the second on hierarchy. Thus, he elaborated the concept of "Asian democracy" to uphold Singapore's authoritarian regime by insisting the respect for the hierarchy and authority on one hand, and criticizing the "Western-style democracy" on the other. According to him, too much democracy, and too many individual rights lead to homosexuality, moral decadence, inter-ethnic intolerance, economic recession, and the rise of single-parent families (Canberra Times, 31/5/1993). In other words, he didn't think that the democracy contributes necessarily to economic development, but that discipline does (Manila Chronicle 19/11/1992). In this regard, he thought that economic development was more important that the democracy, and considered that in the East, "the ruler or the government does not try to provide for a person what the family best provides." In other words, he thought this self-reliant, family-oriented culture as the major cause of East Asia's successes and ridiculed Western government for allegedly trying to resolve all of societies problems (Jung, 2002: 268). As a result, the family plays an important role as provider of welfare in order not to jeopardize the autonomy of the developmentalist state in the face of the demand for democratization on the one hand, and the rise of the external competition (from globalization) on the other.

In brief, the economic success of East Asia led first to the evaluative reversal of the Confucian ethics, which turned into Asian values and Asian democracy thereafter to uphold the developmentalist state, as well as to oppose liberal

democracy. Yet, it doesn't imply that these concepts are nothing but political propagandas. They were all elaborated with reference not only to the West-East opposition, but also to modernity. The political elites do have power and access to construct the "We-image", but that is by no means elaborated in vacuum. It was also the case for Japan's Asianism after the WWII, within which the flying geese theory was the most famous. Centering on the economics, the flying geese theory was capable of preventing mistrust of the neighboring countries on the one hand, and stressing the leading role of Japan in East Asia on the other. In this regard, the We-image of Japan can be moralized without irritating those nations that suffered from their invasion, or their colonization during the Japanese Empire. Yet, the idea of flying geese theory has been in fact elaborated before the WWII, in order to justify the supremacy of Japan and its proposition for the establishment of the Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The original idea of flying geese theory was first elaborated in 1932 by Kaname Akamatsu in the *Journal of Developing Economies*. It was a model for international division of labour in East Asia and based on the dynamic comparative advantage, his ideas postulated that Asian countries could catch up with the Western world by way of establishing a regional hierarchy. Accordingly, the underdeveloped countries in East Asia could be "aligned successively behind the advanced industrial nations in the order of their different stages of growth in a wild-geese-flying pattern."(Akamatsu, 1962) Along with the rapid economic development after the 1970s, the flying geese theory was therefore mentioned again. Japan was thought to be the leading goose, while the second-tier of countries consisted of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, which are the Four Asian Tigers in the 1980s. The main ASEAN countries came after these two groups in the 1990s, while the least developed major nations in the region were China and Vietnam (Kasahara, 2004).

Aside from the flying geese theory, Japan also initiated the concept of Asia-Pacific in the 1950s, to institutionalize the dialogue between Japan and Australia. However, one can question why this was not the concept of Nippon-Australia in formulation but that of Asia-Pacific? It was yet again because the Japan took an economic oriented strategy to re-establish its relation with the other East Asian countries after the "Great East Asian War", and in an antagonistic Cold War environment. However, the economic oriented strategy was not without regard for power, but rather it manifesting Japan's most powerful tool, that of its economic supremacy in East Asia. In 1962, the Liao-Takasaki agreement was signed as the first official treaty to promote the commercial relation between China and Japan. In 1967, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Takeo Miki gave a talk, entitled "Asia-Pacific Diplomacy and Japan's Economic Cooperation", from a point of view of the "North-South opposition". According to him, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States were the Pacific countries which belonged to the developed countries, and so were obliged to help the developing countries, i.e., the Asian countries. Since Japan was the most developed country in Asia, it is therefore its moral obligation not only to bridge the North and the South, but also to aid the South from the South itself. As a result, the development assistance program became an important pillar of Japan's foreign policy after the WWII.

However, the development assistance program was not only a form of reparations for the wartime damages that Japan had inflicted upon the Asian countries, but also a strategy to realize the flying geese theory. Therefore, the regional organization has been elaborated step by step, and based on the concept of Pacific or Asia-Pacific. The Pacific Basin Economic Council was established in 1967, and the Pacific Trade and Development Conference took place in 1968. In 1980, the East Asia played an equal role as that of the Pacific nations in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council for the rapid economic

development in the region (Yeung, 2001: 143-145; Tadahiora, 2004: 3). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been established in 1989, as the realization of Japan's *Asianist* ideas after the WWII.

### 3-2-2. Asianist discourses in the age of globalization

Except for the establishment of APEC, the "ASEAN+3" has been founded to institutionalize the economic relation between the ASEAN and the three countries in Northeast Asia, which are Japan, South Korea, and the China. The rise of China has been critical for the development of Asianism in the globalization period. Yet, it is rather difficult to identify when the age of globalization began, witnessing the elaboration of Asian values and Asian democracy with its impact on the developmentalist state of Southeast Asia. However, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 did reinforce the conscience of globalization for the nations involved, and lead to the formulation of new Asianist discourses. This new Asianism includes "Asian consciousness", "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity", and the East Asia Summit.

Before analyzing the symbolic elements of these Asianist discourses, this paper emphasizes firstly the fact that they relate closely to the Asianism mentioned above, i.e., the Asian values, the Asian democracy, APEC and the ASEAN+3. The first two aiming at justifying the developmentalist state of the authoritarian regime, and the latter two organizations tending to facilitate regional cooperation, their central concern was to face globalization. Nevertheless, the role of sovereignty has been highly respected by the ASEAN and its member states, because its consensus-based decision-making and policy of non-interference have created a state-centric approach to regional integration. While China, South Korea and Japan cherish their sovereignty as well, they constructed institutional mechanism by way of ASEAN+3, instead of joining ASEAN. Accordingly, ASEAN countries can profit from their closer ties with Northeast Asia on the one hand, and remain autonomous in the face of these advanced Asian nations on the other. Compared with the ASEAN, APEC is more open to the Western Countries, for example the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. However, it is also an organization designed to face and to profit from globalization, without compromising their sovereignty for regionalization.

However, the financial crisis of 1997 has changed what globalization means to the Asian people, as well as their strategies to confront it. While some countries who suffered from the crisis become more sceptical of globalization and took less adventurous policies, others became more ambitious to create their road to regional hegemony. That was the case for China and Japan, not only because both countries were less damaged in the crisis, but also for the fact that they were aware of the necessity to strengthen their regional cooperation to face the instability of the globalization. During the crisis, the Chinese currency stayed stable without taking depreciation, while the Japanese government kept monetary policy loose and interest rates extremely low. These measures contributed to stabilizing the economy without worsening the financial turmoil. However, these measures went against that of the IMF, which was based on the "Washington Consensus". Yet, differing from the IMF's neo-liberal doctrine, i.e., fiscal discipline and market fundamentalism, the policies adopted in these countries highlight the role of the state, as well as the cooperation among the Asian countries. In this regard, the idea of "Asian Monetary Fund" has been proposed by the Japanese government, while the Chinese government upheld a stabilizing exchange rate policy without depreciating Chinese RMB and the HK dollar.

The founding of Asian Monetary Fund would strengthen the leadership of Japan on the one hand, and jeopardize the hegemony of the United States on the other, since the later played a critical role in both the IMF and East Asia. As a result, the Asian Monetary Fund was rejected by the United States. The

Chinese government opposed to the Washington Consensus by highlighting the developmentalist state, and rejecting the liberal view of state-society relations. Yet, the Washington Consensus stresses the neo-liberalism which is the central element of the international regime of political economy in the globalization era, and harmful to the developmentalist state. After the financial turmoil, the "Boao Forum for Asia" (BFA) was initiated in 1998 by Fidel V. Ramos, former President of the Philippines, Bob Hawke, former Prime Minister of Australia, and Morihiro Hosokawa, former Prime Minister of Japan. Yet, the establishment of the BFA was driven by China and founded by 26 states of 27 February 2001. Even though it hosted high-level leaders from governments, the BFA remains a non-governmental organization, with an end to protect the autonomy of the participant states, as well as to strengthen their cooperation. Thus, the BFA meets the need for the developmentalist states, and mostly for China, which is the most energetic and fastest developing economy in the globalization period.

In contrast to Chinese Asianism where economic cooperation lies at the heart in the globalization period, the Asianist discourses of Japan highlights the political aspect for the first time in its Asian policy. When Asian democracy was presented to oppose the Western-style democracy in the 1980s, the Japanese government announced, in 1991, that it would take human rights into consideration as a critical criterion for its foreign aid policy. When the "US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security" was signed, both countries affirmed that "their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy; and respect for human rights."[9] In 2006, Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" (AFP), at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. He said,

> I will work to ensure that in the future, in this sweeping arc stretching from Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, Japan will serve as an "escort runner" to support these countries that have just started into this truly never-ending marathon.[10]

According to him, the "truly never-ending marathon" means the way to "peace and happiness through economic prosperity and democracy." (*ibid.*) Thus, the AFP not only highlights the value of democracy, which is different from China's Asianist discourses, but also takes China as Japan's potential opponent, since the Arc is constructed around China. In the globalization period, China and Japan are the two major actors for the elaboration of Asianist discourses, which represent respectively their social condition in reference to modernity, and demonstrate their strategies for the regional leadership. While the central value of these two Asianist discourses are not only quite different, but rather also antagonistic, the establishment of East Asian Community has evidently encountered a lot of difficulties since its appearance in 2009.

## 3-3. Comparing Africanism and Asianism after the WWII

After the end of the WWII, the place of nation-state has been recognized as a vital element in the international regime of political economy. Accordingly, Africanism and Asianism change their moral horizon from "polity" to "policy" in order to develop their respective nations. However, that does not mean to imply that these discourses followed the same path in their respective region, since Africa remained underdeveloped, but Asia has developed rapidly after the

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9    See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html Text of "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Alliance for the 21st Century".

10   See http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html Speech of Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons"

1970s. As a result, there was no such thing as Asian value or Asian democracy in Africa. Consequently, the Africanist discourses can hardly oppose the liberal democracy, even though most African countries stay as an authoritarian regime. Thus, the comparison between Africanism and Asianism will be separated into two sections: the first focuses on the developmentalist period, and the second on the globalization period. However, it is important to note that there is no clear-cut demarcation line between these two periods.

### 3-3-1. The developmentalist period

The Afro-Asian Conference was a milestone in the evolution of non-alignment movement which was an essential basis for the Third World solidarity (Thomas, 2001: 73). Yet, the social base of the Third World solidarity was rapidly eroded after the 1970s, since Asia and Africa have experienced different trajectory of development.

**Figure III: The Africanism and Asianism in the developmentalist period**



Integrating into  ----->
Separating into  ——>

In Africa, most countries became independent during the 1960s. However, they remained underdeveloped, even if development had become their central concern and the fundamental value for the Africanist discourses, both for the "Big Africa Plan", and the "Small Africa Plan", pronounced respectively by the Casablanca bloc and the Brazzaville/Monrovia bloc. The first bloc was organized mostly by the Anglophone countries, which stood at a relatively higher place in the moral hierarchy, and took a federalist view to the African integration. Being at a lower position, the second bloc was composed mainly by the Francophone countries, and took inter-governmentalist strategies for the integration, since they highlighted the doctrine of sovereignty after independence. While sovereignty stood at the centre of debate between the two blocs in Africa, the Asianism of the same era took sovereignty as the starting point for its elaboration. The flying geese are grouped on the base of a single goose, while the concept of Asia-Pacific remains as a forum for the regional cooperation without ceding or mentioning the concept of sovereignty. Neither Asian values or Asian democracy,

have anything to do with regional integration. Yet, both kinds of the Asianist discourses represent their own place in the moral hierarchy. During the developmentalist era, Japan was the only developed country in the region, and promoted the economic cooperation within and without. For the other Asian countries, the major concern lay in how to reinforce their authoritarian regime of developmentalist state.

At a first glance, the major difference between the Africanism and the Asianism of the developmentalist period is that there was a supranational organization in Africa, but that was not the case in Asia. However, the OAU didn't work well, and therefore the socio-economic development of Africa had little to do with the OAU, since Africa remains underdeveloped. On the contrary, East Asia has experienced the economic miracle, which made the concept of Asia highly moralized, and with the effect to moralize the Asian things, such as Asian values and Asian democracy. In this regard, even though the Africanist discourses have led to the institutionalization of the OAU, they remain underdeveloped from a moral aspect, not only because they referred to the "polity", which is the moral horizon of the precedent period, but also that they contributed rarely to the development, which is the central value for the "policy". Yet, "policy" was the moral horizon of Asianist discourses, which took the nation-state as the base for their elaboration.

### 3-3-2. The globalization period

Asian values and Asian democracy were the transitional Asianist discourses from the developmentalist period to the globalization era. After the financial crisis of 1997, the newly developed Asianist discourses were elaborated to provide a way to face globalization. Those nations with authoritarian regimes and developmentalist states, preferred a similar stand to that of the Chinese government by insisting on state intervention in the economy, and sovereignty in the political domain. These are the states standing at a relatively lower place in the moral hierarchy, and China is considered as the *port-parole* in this regard. Besides, China is the most energetic economy in the globalization era, making it capable of hosting the BFA in order to reinforce its access to world markets without compromising its autonomy. Being the major competitor against China in Asia, Japan presents the AFP to contain China by highlighting the value of democracy. Japan stands at a relatively higher place in the moral hierarchy, because it not only accepts liberal democracy, but also takes human rights as the central element of foreign policy. In order to face the volatility of the globalization, regional cooperation still matters for Asian countries. Nevertheless, there are still many difficulties for the establishment of East Asian Community, because the Asianist discourses of the two major countries in the region, i.e., China and Japan, are quite different, or even contraposed. That represents not only the sharp difference about their modernity, but also their competing nature in regional politics.

## Figure IV: The Africanism and Asianism in the globalization period



As far as the Africanism to be concerned, they can be basically separated into two categories, which are the African Union on the one hand, and the African Renaissance on the other. Since there was no such thing as Asian values in Africa as the African continent was underdeveloped in the preceding period, neither of the Africanist discourses can deny liberal democracy in the globalization period. However, the liberal democracy and the globalization contradict each other, especially in the newly democratized countries, since they are not strong enough to face them both at the same time. Therefore, liberal democracy has been realized with great variation in Africa. Some have achieved meaningful democratic reform, and constructed consolidated democracies, while others remain as an authoritarian regime. South Africa is not only the most developed, and modernized state in Africa, but also truly democratized in the globalization period. (Solomon and Liebenberg, 1999; Habib and Taylor, 1999) After the end of apartheid, it has been accepted in the African community, and takes great strides to become the hegemony in the continent. In this regard, the African Renaissance not only represents the position of South Africa in the moral hierarchy, but also plays as a tool to justify its regional leadership.

After WWII, it was impossible to elaborate Africanism or Asianism without taking the sovereignty into account, since it has been essential in these discourses, as well as critical in the international regime of political economy. Yet, that doesn't mean that the sovereignty encountered the same experience in the passing decades in the two continents. The concept of sovereignty was perfectly respected as an undisputable condition for the Asianist discourses, but that was not the case in Africa. That is the reason why there are so many difficulties for the establishment of East Asian, even if the economic interdependence is pretty high between Asian nations. At the same time, the African nations were less interdependent, but extremely dependent after their independence on the outside world (on the capitalist or the socialist blocs.) Thus, the Asianism was centripetal, because it was not only endogenous in the preceeding period, but also elaborated on the region with huge, energetic, and highly interdependent

economies. Asianism not only represents their respective modernity, but also plays as moral discourses for the struggle of regional leadership.

In fact, that is also the case for Africanism which is centrifuge because it was exogenous before the WWII, and elaborated in an underdeveloped continent with little capacity to be autonomous, and to liberate itself from the dominance of outside world. Therefore, it is witnessed that there exists strong desire to create supranational organizations, such as the OAU, and the African Union in the Africanist discourses. Yet, these regional organizations failed to promote the regional cooperation, and brought little effect about the socio-economic development of the continent, because it was the developmentalist state that mattered in the political economy. As a matter of fact, the developmentalist state played a critical role also in East Asia after the end of WWII. That said, the Asian countries did not demonstrate a strong will to establish supranational organization taking the nation-state instead, as the basis for the elaboration of their Asianist discourses, be it the flying geese theory, the Asian values, Asian democracy, the Asian consciousness of the BFA, or the AFP. In contrast to underdeveloped Africa, Asia has experienced economic prosperity, which made not only the concept of Asia a highly moralized symbol, but also the modern values accepted in the region after the WWII. Thus, the nation-state system has taken the place of Hua-Yi order, and been the starting point for the elaboration of Asianist discourses. Based on the nation-state, these two regionalist discourses aimed at developing their respective country in the first place. The "policy" was the major moral horizon until the coming of a third vague democratization when these discourses have needed to take the "political regime" into consideration.

## Conclusion

By comparing Asianism and Africanism, this research aims to study the factors that differentiate the legitimizing effect of symbols over space and time in terms of two analytical concepts: moral horizon and moral hierarchy. The Asianist and Africanist discourses are considered as moralizing symbols, in order to construct their own community by challenging the moral hierarchy, within which the Occident stands on the top, and the Rest on the bottom. This hierarchy has been elaborated and reinforced not only by the Occidental, but also by modernization. At the same time, the modern values are used to moralize the Asianism and Africanism to defy the West, as well as to struggle for the leadership in their respective circles. Thus, modernity plays a critical role not only in order to understand the symbolic effectiveness of Asianism and Africanism, but also a third classification dimension. The first two dimensions concern the vertical and horizontal classification. On the vertical axis we stress the structural homology between the idea and the social structure, while the horizontal axis takes a symbolic interactionism to the study of classification by focusing on the "Self-Other" relation. On the time axis, this paper differentiates modern history into three periods: the imperial, the developmentalist, and the globalization period.

This paper reaches three major conclusions, which are 1): Corresponding to the configuration of the international regime of political economy in the three periods, the symbolic form of Asianism and Africanism focuses respectively on "polity", "policy" and "politics"; 2). African modernity is centrifugal, and the legitimacy of Africanist discourses is weakened by exogenous forces, which make African community highly desirable for the Africans to liberate from the dominance of the West on the one hand, but hard to function effectively on the other; 3). The Asian modernity is centripetal, and its driving forces are endogenous, within which China and Japan play the major roles. It is because the states in East Asia are not only relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the West, but they are also respected as the starting point for the regional cooperation. Thus, it is more likely that the desires for Asian community and for the national independ-

ence stay in a dynamic equilibrium on the one hand, and the East Asia and the West stand on a relatively equal place to cooperate and negotiate on the other.

Both the Africanism and Asianism are by nature moral narratives structured in the "West-Rest" opposition on the one hand, and with the structuring power to reverse the moral hierarchy on the other. Thus, this comparative study can surpass the existing researches that concentrate on the Asianism or Africanism, and consider these two discourses to be "communitarian". Opposite to the West, Asianism and Africanism are spontaneously thought to be communitarian. Yet, they are communitarian in different level. For those who occupy a relatively higher place in the modern moral hierarchy, they accept more the individualist value; those who stand at a lower position, they are more communitarian. Accordingly, the regionalist discourses are dynamic in nature, not only because they represent their respective social space which changes over time, but also for the reason that they are elaborated to compete within and without the region. Playing the role for the struggle of regional leadership, these discourses are considered therefore as legitimizing symbols of the modern time.

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