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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | De Silva, Shakthi | - |
| dc.date | 2022-12-05 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-27T17:37:01Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-27T17:37:01Z | - |
| dc.identifier | https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/8418 | - |
| dc.identifier | 10.18601/16577558.n37.05 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/230352 | - |
| dc.description | China’s economic resurgence augurs the possibility of a recalibration in the global balance of power. Many contend that this process is already underway in East Asia – specifically in relation to the South China Sea. In other parts of the world, China’s growing footprint is discernible through infrastructure projects, under Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative. Does China leverage its economic power to realise its interests by forcing smaller nations to accept conditions and agreements which are not in the latter’s interests? This paper examines whether evidence to this effect is visible through a case study of Sri Lanka. The island’s geographic location – astride the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication – continues to draw the attention of regional and extra-regional powers. Sri Lanka’s constraints in size and poor pace of economic development also grants leeway for India (the regional hegemon) and China to leverage bilateral ties in their interest. Is there evidence to suggest that China has utilised port infrastructure to realise its national interests at the expense of Sri Lanka? Or, has Sri Lanka managed to thread a fine line between the two Asian powers: the neighbouring regional hegemon – India; and the resurgent great power – China? Does the truth lie somewhere in between? This article delves into these questions by examining the approaches and stances which Sri Lanka has adopted towards both nations, particularly during President Gotabaya Rajapakse’s government, from 2019 leading up to the end of 2021. By doing so, it aims to shed light on how Sri Lanka handled bilateral ties with both Asian powers as well as the degree of Sino-Indian competition visible within the island’s port infrastructure landscape. It concludes that the decisions reached with regard to port infrastructure projects represent a mixed picture. A key finding is the ability of domestic interest groups to shape Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during this period, which has significantly dented the island’s ties with other regional allies such as Japan. | en-US |
| dc.description | El resurgimiento económico de China augura la posibilidad de una recalibración en el equilibrio de poder global. Muchos sostienen que este proceso ya está en marcha en el este de Asia, específicamente en relación con el mar de China Meridional. En otras partes del mundo, la creciente huella de China se puede observar a través de proyectos de infraestructura, bajo la iniciativa de la franja y la ruta de Beijing. ¿Aprovecha China su poder económico para satisfacer sus intereses al obligar a las naciones más pequeñas a aceptar condiciones y acuerdos que no son de su interés? Este artículo examina si la evidencia es visible a través de un estudio de caso de Sri Lanka. La ubicación geográfica de la isla, justo sobre las vías de comunicación marítimas del océano Índico, continúa atrayendo la atención de los poderes regionales y extrarregionales. Las limitaciones de tamaño de Sri Lanka y el bajo ritmo de desarrollo económico también otorgan un margen de maniobra a India (la hegemonía regional) y China para utilizar los lazos bilaterales para sus intereses. ¿Hay evidencia que sugiera que China ha utilizado la infraestructura portuaria para satisfacer sus intereses nacionales a expensas de Sri Lanka? ¿O Sri Lanka ha logrado trazar una fina línea entre las dos potencias asiáticas: el vecino hegemón, India, y la gran potencia emergente, China? ¿La verdad se encuentra en algún punto intermedio? Este artículo profundiza en estas preguntas al examinar los enfoques y las posturas que Sri Lanka ha adoptado hacia ambas naciones, particularmente durante el gobierno del presidente Gotabaya Rajapakse desde 2019 hasta fines de 2021. Al hacerlo, pretende dar luces sobre cómo Sri Lanka ha manejado los lazos bilaterales con ambas potencias asiáticas, así como el grado de competencia sino-india visible dentro de la infraestructura portuaria de la isla. Concluye que las decisiones tomadas con respecto a los proyectos de infraestructura portuaria representan un panorama mixto. Un hallazgo clave es la capacidad de los grupos de interés nacionales para dar forma a la política exterior de Sri Lanka durante este periodo, lo que ha afectado significativamente los lazos de la isla con otros aliados regionales como Japón. | es-ES |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales | es-ES |
| dc.relation | https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/8418/13011 | - |
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| dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2022 Shakthi De SilvaII | es-ES |
| dc.rights | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 | es-ES |
| dc.source | OASIS; No. 37 (2023): Enero-Junio; 47-68 | en-US |
| dc.source | Oasis; Núm. 37 (2023): Enero-Junio; 47-68 | es-ES |
| dc.source | 2346-2132 | - |
| dc.source | 1657-7558 | - |
| dc.subject | Sri Lanka; | en-US |
| dc.subject | Foreign Policy; | en-US |
| dc.subject | Small States; | en-US |
| dc.subject | India; | en-US |
| dc.subject | China; | en-US |
| dc.subject | South Asia | en-US |
| dc.subject | Sri Lanka; | es-ES |
| dc.subject | política exterior; | es-ES |
| dc.subject | pequeños Estados; | es-ES |
| dc.subject | India; | es-ES |
| dc.subject | China; | es-ES |
| dc.subject | Asia del sur | es-ES |
| dc.title | Tightrope Balancing in a Time of Rising Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Sri Lanka’s Relations with India and China | en-US |
| dc.title | Tightrope Balancing in a Time of Rising Great Power Competition: An Assessment of Sri Lanka’s Relations with India and China | es-ES |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | - |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Centro de Investigaciones y Proyectos Especiales - CIPE/UEXTERNADO - Cosecha | |
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