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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Arévalo Pachón, Guillermo | - |
| dc.date | 2021-02-22 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-20T15:55:11Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2023-03-20T15:55:11Z | - |
| dc.identifier | https://reviberopsicologia.ibero.edu.co/article/view/rip.13301 | - |
| dc.identifier | 10.33881/2027-1786.rip.13301 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/215564 | - |
| dc.description | Based on a theoretical background on the modular conceptions of the mind of Fodor (2001) and Pinker (2005), the objective of this text is to qualitatively analyze the strength of the experimental evidence from a sample of experimental articles published between 2002 and 2017 that support the thesis of cognitive penetrability in early visual perception. The study is justified by the implications that the results of these investigations may have for the different conceptions about mental architecture in perceptual functions, intra and intermodular information processing and isomorphism between mental and brain architecture. The methodology used to carry out this study involved establishment of the thesis and the inclusion criteria of the articles to be reviewed, final selection of the most representative articles on the selected subareas, analysis of the methodological quality and the results of the these, identification of specific contributions of each study to the proposed thesis and interpretation and synthesis of the findings. Of 26 articles reviewed on the subject, 7 are reported and analyzed, which are considered representative of 4 subareas: penetrability of expectations, color perception, facial features and object recognition. It is concluded that there is broad and solid convergent evidence (perceptual and neurophysiological) in favor of penetrative phenomena in early vision, which would indirectly support Pinker's hypothesis of permeability of mental modules. Recommendations are made on aspects to be investigated and variables to control in experiments on this topic. | en-US |
| dc.description | Con base en un trasfondo teórico sobre las concepciones modulares de la mente de Fodor (2001) y Pinker (2005), el objetivo del presente texto es analizar cualitativemente la solidez de la evidencia experimental de una muestra de artículos publicados entre 2002 y 2017 que apoyan la tesis de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana. El estudio se justifica por las implicaciones que pueden tener los resultados de estas investigaciones para las diferentes concepciones sobre arquitectura mental en funciones perceptuales, procesamiento de la información intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitectura mental y cerebral. La metodología que se utilizó para realizar este estudio implicó establecimiento de la tesis y de los criterios de inclusión de los artículos a revisar, selección final de los artículos más representativos sobre las subáreas seleccionadas, análisis de la calidad metodológica y de los resultados de éstos, identificación de aportes específicos de cada estudio a la tesis planteada e interpretación y síntesis de los hallazgos. De 26 artículos revisados sobre el tema, se reportan y analizan 7, que se consideran representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidad de expectativas, de percepción del color, de rasgos faciales y de reconocimiento de objetos. Se concluye que hay amplia y sólida evidencia convergente (perceptual y neurofisiológica) a favor de los fenómenos penetrativos en la visión temprana, lo cual apoyaría indirectamente la hipótesis de permeabilidad de los módulos mentales de Pinker. Se formulan recomendaciones sobre aspectos por investigar y variables a controlar en experimentos sobre este tema. | es-ES |
| dc.description | Com base no referencial teórico sobre as concepções modulares da mente de Fodor (2001) e Pinker (2005), o objetivo deste texto é analisar qualitativamente a força da evidência experimental de uma amostra de artigos publicados entre 2002 e 2017 que sustentam a tese da penetrabilidade cognitiva na percepção visual inicial. O estudo justifica-se pelas implicações que os resultados dessas investigações podem ter para as diferentes concepções de arquitetura mental em funções perceptivas, processamento de informação intra e intermodular e isomorfismo entre arquitetura mental e cerebral. A metodologia utilizada para a realização deste estudo implicou estabelecimento da tese e os critérios de inclusão dos artigos a serem revisados, seleção final dos artigos mais representativos nas subáreas selecionadas, análise da qualidade metodológica e seus resultados, identificação das contribuições específicas de cada estudo para a tese proposta e interpretação e síntese dos achados. Dos 26 artigos revisados sobre o assunto, 7 são relatados e analisados, os quais são considerados representativos de 4 subáreas: penetrabilidade de expectativas, percepção de cores, características faciais e reconhecimento de objetos. Conclui-se que há ampla e sólida evidência convergente (perceptual e neurofisiológica) a favor dos fenômenos penetrativos na visão inicial, o que indiretamente apoiaria a hipótese de Pinker de permeabilidade dos módulos mentais. São feitas recomendações sobre aspectos a serem investigados e variáveis a serem controladas em experimentos sobre o tema. | pt-BR |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language | spa | - |
| dc.publisher | ĬbērAM | es-ES |
| dc.relation | https://reviberopsicologia.ibero.edu.co/article/view/rip.13301/1659 | - |
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| dc.rights | Derechos de autor 2021 Corporación Universitaria Iberoamericana | es-ES |
| dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 | es-ES |
| dc.source | Revista Iberoamericana de Psicología; Vol. 13 Núm. 3 (2020): Revista Iberoamericana de Psicología; 1-11 | es-ES |
| dc.source | 2500-6517 | - |
| dc.source | 2027-1786 | - |
| dc.subject | visual cortex, early vision, cognitive penetrability, mind modules, expectations, facial recognition | en-US |
| dc.subject | córtex visual, visión temprana, penetrabilidad cognitiva, módulos mentales, expectativas, reconomiento facial | es-ES |
| dc.subject | córtex visual, visão precoce, penetrabilidade cognitiva, módulos mentais, expectativas, reconhecimento facial | pt-BR |
| dc.title | Cognitive penetrability in early visual perception: Empirical evidence in humans | en-US |
| dc.title | Penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual temprana: Evidencia empírica en humanos | es-ES |
| dc.title | Evidências empíricas sobre a penetrabilidade cognitiva na percepção visual inicial em humanos | pt-BR |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | - |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | - |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Facultad de Educación, Ciencias Humanas y Sociales - Iberoamericana - Cosecha | |
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