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dc.creatorCorres-Illera, María-
dc.date2020-07-01-
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-22T19:56:29Z-
dc.date.available2022-03-22T19:56:29Z-
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259-
dc.identifier10.15446/frdcp.n18.79259-
dc.identifier.urihttp://biblioteca-repositorio.clacso.edu.ar/handle/CLACSO/102534-
dc.descriptionApportionment laws have both mathematical and political components framed by law. In order to conduct an appropriate analysis, it is necessary to examine how apportionment laws are negotiated, passed and turned into legally binding documents. The reason for choosing the United States of America’s current apportionment legislation as the object of this study, is due to the fact that in the process of discussion and passing of said legislation we can observe a great dichotomy between mathematics and politics. While the aim of mathematics is to find the most equitable form of seat apportionment, the political justification for choosing this or another solution will be simply based on furthering political interest. Additionally, in this particular case, the legislative processes are mirrored by academic discussions on the subject matter, that influence the decision-making process. This inquiry also focuses on how constitutional techniques can interfere in the proportional representation system, thus producing an inherent bias in the applied method of apportionment, whichever this may be. These findings can be extrapolated to any modern democracy.en-US
dc.descriptionLas leyes electorales tienen un contenido matemático y político delimitado por el derecho, y para su correcto análisis es necesario examinar cómo se llega a la aprobación de dicha legislación. Para ello, se ha seleccionado la legislación electoral vigente en los Estados Unidos de América como objeto de este estudio, puesto que, en su tramitación parlamentaria, y en el caso que nos concierne, también académica, puede observarse una gran dicotomía entre argumentos matemáticos sobre el reparto más equitativo de escaños, contra explicaciones políticas que justifican la aplicación de otras alternativas para el beneficio de intereses partidistas que, de un modo u otro, forman parte de toda ley electoral. También este estudio se fija en cómo la aplicación de técnicas constitucionales extrapolables a la mayoría de las democracias modernas, con independencia del método de prorrateo escogido para el reparto de escaños de su cámara, suponen una injerencia de la representación igualitaria en la representación proporcional, y por ende producen un sesgo en el método de prorrateo aplicable.es-ES
dc.formattext/xml-
dc.formatapplication/pdf-
dc.languagespa-
dc.publisherUniversidad Nacional de Colombia - Sede Medellín - Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Económicas - Departamento de Ciencia Políticaes-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259/81421-
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/forum/article/view/79259/76734-
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2020 Forum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Políticaes-ES
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceForum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Política; No. 18 (2020): July-December, 2020. Migration: Old and New Patterns, Old and New Discourse; 166-195en-US
dc.sourceForum. Revista Departamento de Ciencia Política; Núm. 18 (2020): Julio-diciembre de 2020. Migración: viejos y nuevos patrones, viejos y nuevos discursos; 166-195es-ES
dc.source2216-1767-
dc.source2216-1775-
dc.subjectapportionmenten-US
dc.subjectelectionsen-US
dc.subjectelectoral systemen-US
dc.subjectelectoral reformen-US
dc.subjectproportional representationen-US
dc.subjectdemocracyen-US
dc.subjectparticipationen-US
dc.subjectpoliticsen-US
dc.subjectleadershipen-US
dc.subjectelectoral studiesen-US
dc.subjectelectoral lawsen-US
dc.subjectapportionment methodsen-US
dc.subjectprorrateoes-ES
dc.subjecteleccioneses-ES
dc.subjectsistema electorales-ES
dc.subjectreforma electorales-ES
dc.subjectrepresentación proporcionales-ES
dc.subjectdemocraciaes-ES
dc.subjectparticipaciónes-ES
dc.subjectpolíticaes-ES
dc.subjectliderazgoes-ES
dc.subjectestudios electoraleses-ES
dc.subjectleyes electoraleses-ES
dc.subjectmétodos de prorrateoes-ES
dc.titleApportionment Laws and Constitutional Seats: Mathematics vs. Politicsen-US
dc.titleLeyes electorales y escaños constitucionales: matemática vs. políticaes-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
dc.typeEstudo de casoes-ES
dc.typeCase studyen-US
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