

CLA  
#14

# SOUTH-SOUTH COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME

**OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES**

## Democracy as a Hegemonic Political Discourse. Draws on the Issue of Critique

Ana Inés Couchonnal Cancio



---

## CLACSO

Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - Conselho Latino-americano de Ciências Sociais

Av. Callao 875 | piso 5º "J" [recepción] | C1023AAB | Buenos Aires | Argentina

Tel [54 11] 4811 6588 | Fax [54 11] 4812 8459

e-mail <clacso@clacso.edu.ar> | web <www.clacso.org>



# Democracy as a Hegemonic Political Discourse. Draws on the Issue of Critique

Ana Inés Couchonnal Cancio

This paper was originally presented to the Summer Institute on "International Hegemony and the South: A Tricontinental perspective", Havana, Cuba, 2005. The event was organized by "The Africa, Asia and Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Program", supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.

The opinions expressed in this document, which has not been submitted to editorial revision, are the exclusive responsibility of the author and they do not necessarily agree with the position of CLACSO/CODESRIA/APISA.

Copyright 2008 The Africa-Asia-Latin America Scholarly Collaborative Program.

*International hegemony and the south*

ISBN: 978-987-1183-88-3

---

Patrocinado por



Agencia Sueca de Desarrollo Internacional

*La certidumbre de que todo está escrito  
nos anula o nos afantasma*

[Jorge Luis Borges]

To address the subject of democracy as a hegemonic political discourse implies a question that guided this writing, a question that might sound naïve during these times of social conflict and economic polarization, and enunciated by Lenin back in 1917: “But, how to justify the deception, the fooling of the people, the violation of the will of the overwhelming majority of the population?” (Lenin in Zizek, 2002: 28).

Bearing in mind the subject of ideology, I will address the issue of democracy from a perspective that tends to identify the ways in which democracy actually functions as a social relation into social reality. I argue that the ideology of democracy results from the constitutive distance existing between an installed hegemonic democratic discourse and the current democratic practice, and that both instances acquire an ideological reality in what I defined as democratic functioning. From this viewpoint I argue that the ideological efficiency of democracy lies in the possibility of controlling the political potential of society, and in that sense, critique needs to address and revitalize politics as the possibility of change.

In this sense, democracy can be understood as a hegemonic concept/discourse, as a primary significant organizing a given discourse, as the ideological key serving as a *point de capiton*, in the lacanian sense of organizer of a discourse always well ordered, audible: hegemonic.

The discourse of democracy has installed a logic that imposes a concept and makes it circulate despite the possibility of its accomplishment.

Since the end of the Cold War, to speak about democracy is to speak about liberal democracy, with little if not any dispute concerning the validity of this system of government. In any case, it is not my intention to discuss the validity of liberal democracy in terms of its *formal* mechanisms (system of election, representation, etc), but *in terms of its actual ideological functioning as a hegemonic political discourse and practice*. Once the Cold War was finished, the hegemony of the liberal project became incontestable; it meant straight away the triumph of the rule of market in a global level. As Wallerstein describes it: “Capitalism and the modern state- system were not two separate historical inventions (or conceptions) that had to be fitted together or articulated with each other. They were obverse sides of a single coin, they were both part of a seamless whole. Neither is imaginable without the other. They were simultaneously developed, and neither could continue to exist without the other” (Wallerstein in Smith et al., 1996).

I understand discourse in a Foucaultian perspective as “the totalities within which any productions of meanings take place” (Laclau on Foucault in Goodin et al., 1995). This implies discourse as the instance of social production and re-production of meanings.

*When I speak of democratic discourse I mean the ways in which democracy is produced as a social meaning, and therefore reproduced as social*

*reality*. That is to say, the way in which political practices are imprinted in a set of ideas which are, at the same time, a result of these practices as well as their ideological support

From a Gramscian perspective, hegemony can be understood “as the *organisation of consent* -the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion.” (Barret in Zizek, 2000: 239). In order to achieve consent without recourse to -explicit- violence or coercion, hegemony within democratic discourse implies certain legitimacy, justified by the display of a whole set of concepts such as freedom of choice, freedom of speech, representation and so on, that acquire consistence in the rule of law.

The hegemony of discourse on democracy entails the privilege and circulation of concepts that tend to be normative as well as prescriptive. In a political sense, this implies the production of social meanings and values that legitimate a given political order, for they exhaust the *political possibilities* required to attain change. The political entitlement of the democratic discourse is based on a whole system of legitimation that presents itself - to a greater or lesser extent- as lying on the society’s will or, at least, on its benefit. As Drizek<sup>1</sup> presents it: “Because discourses are social as well as personal, they act as sources of order by coordinating the behaviour of the individuals who subscribe to them” (Dryzek, 1999: 34).

Within the democratic discourse, hegemony implies legitimacy as a legal correlate. As a matter of fact, democracy requires a legal framework that organizes its practice and that is imbued with democratic meanings, such as ‘representation’, ‘equality’ and ‘legality’. Hegemony is exercised through these constituents of legitimacy, since, as it has been stated before, the political possibilities of change or contestation are subject to a pre-existing legal framework imposed by democracy as the only chance to deal with social reality. This operation implies the assessment that the current social order is the only possible one, and that its defects are going to be corrected only within its frames.

In this sense it can be argued that the accumulation of economic power cannot be detached from the accumulation of political power and that the relation between these two forces needs to be cooperative, so that one serves to the purposes of the other.

Independently of the whole range of *democracies* deployed in the expanded western world, democracy has been set to be understood as a *desirable* political goal and as a liberal attainment.

Since economic-political liberalism is a hegemonic power, the amplitude of possibilities conveyed by the very historical development of the concept of democracy has been limited to a prescriptive rule of law. In every case, democracy is understood as liberal democracy, or it is disavowed as democracy. As David Held affirms: “democracy bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: laws, rules and policies appear justified when they are ‘democratic’. But it was not always so” (Held, 1995:3). Held explains that democracy has evolved along the conformation of the nation state, and even though democracy, as a political concept, has suffered several changes across time and space, the contemporary hegemony of the concept of democracy is related to the hegemony of the modern state that implies capitalist expansion, efficient war waging and legitimacy.

The capitalist necessity of expansion can be resumed in the concept of globalization as the stretching of economical relation across the globe. This pro-

1 I do not follow Dryzek in considering that a discursive change will allow a political change, but instead that political change is the result of the *operationalization* of the contradictions that animate a given hegemonic discourse, of the desestabilization of any hegemonic discourse.

cess entails democracy as the privileged political discourse of globalization, and it can be related, in turn, to the fact that democracy has installed the paradigm of diversity as a central political issue. *But this paradigm, while representing itself multifariously and plural, leaves untouched the core centre of capitalist production, where the unity of the whole process lies. That is to say, the accumulation of capital, whose political counterpart is the accumulation of power.*

Classically (and briefly), the logic of accumulation that rules capitalism implies the social production of surplus value appropriated by the owner of the means of production, in detriment of the producers, the owners of the labor force. Likewise, this can be stated when it comes to the way in which the world system actually operates. As Wallerstein explains, there is a relationship of core-periphery that despite being mostly relational can be -to a certain extent- geographically visualized, implying the transfer of surplus value from the periphery to the core, in every different level of the capitalist chain of production and reproducing, too, the same relationship. "A core periphery relation is the relation between the more monopolized sectors of production on the one hand and the more competitive on the other, and therefore the relation between high-profit (and generally high-wage) and low profit (low wage) production activities. [...] Coreness and peripherality, being relational, are not necessarily or always geographically separated. The two kinds of activity may well coexist within the same square mile. But there are a number of good reasons why, in practice, there has tended to be a high degree of spatial segregation, with a heavy concentration of core activities in a few places, with others housing primarily peripheral activities" (Wallerstein in Smith et al. 1996: 88).

Regarding democracy, the logic of accumulation of capital is translated into the accumulation of power. Likewise, democracy recognizes core and peripheral areas that acquire different denominations, first-third world, developed-developing countries, high and low intensity democracies and so on.

The expansion of capitalism in its need of consumption has turned almost every sphere of life into a commodity. Under the rule of capitalism, everything is susceptible of being integrated into the logic of circulation of commodities and in their own logic of exchange implying, in the last instance, accumulation as the result of the logic that conducts the whole process.

The end of the Cold War *opened up* the markets and the circulation of commodities became global, hiding and forgetting -globally- the very foundations of the current order. Actually this can be understood considering that financial capital produces nothing; therefore, it is fundamental that it should circulate in order to acquire surplus value in this circulation mechanism. In this sense it can be argued that the mechanism of accumulation and exclusion that dominates and sustains the capitalist mode of production has its political correlate in the liberal democratic discourse, since democratic discourse is valued and presented as the only legitimate political discourse resulting from the assessment of an ideological operation that detaches it from its historical conditions and development, as well as from its performing into reality.

I speak about democratic discourse by understanding that it is possible to distinguish -analytically- two levels to conform social reality. There is a level of enunciation, a justificatory discourse of the system, and there is the level of the performance of this discourse into social reality. The way they co-operate is one where the discourse allows *only* certain practice, and at the same time, this *only* practice reinforces the enunciation that justifies it. It is in this interaction where the ideological operation takes place.

In this era of neoliberal hegemony, the democratic paradigm operates ideologically overshadowing its inherent contradictions and exhausting the political capital, which in turn implies an accumulation of power for one side in detriment of others. In this process, whatever might appear as a malfunctioning

of democracy is in fact constitutive of the democratic functioning as a contemporary power strategy.

As Marx has already stated, the labor force was “liberated” in such a way that there was no other option but to integrate the market (Marx, 1976). In my opinion, there is a similar situation with democracy. I would argue that in a global scale, societies have been democratized for the same reason that labor force was liberated, that is, as a process of accumulation of power in which what remains obscure is the political fact of the alienation of political power: in other words, the process behind the appearance that the democratic discourse installs; that is to say, the contradictions that determine the political possibilities of every concrete social situation. Therefore, within democratic discourse the democratic function is *alienated* from its historical determinants.

Susan Marks (2000) in her book *The Riddle of all Constitutions* addresses the relationship between democracy and ideology. She defines ideology as “the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination”, a conception developed from John Thompson’s critical perspective, that emphasizes the power relations within the sphere of representation, a perspective very close to the Althusserian one, where what matters is the imaginary relationship of individuals to their material conditions of existence, in the sense that it reproduces social structures.

This conception of ideology is drawn from Marx writings on the mystification process. From this perspective, ideology is understood as a mechanism engaged in the production of social reality at the level of the production of meanings that “serves thereby to bolster up individuals and groups who occupy positions of power” (Thompson, 1990: 56).

These ideological operations can be understood within the theoretical framework of the fetishism of commodities as a theoretical model. I argue that a kind of fetishism of democracy can be identified within social reality, where the value attributed to the democratic discourse appears as a natural value, detached from its historical and political determinants, and detached from the use value of the democratic discourse. The use value of democratic discourse would lie in democratic practice, while its exchange value would lie in the democratic discourse, understood as how certain meanings are imposed on social reality, in an imaginary dimension.

What has been said before defines the ideology of democracy as the system whereby certain meanings establish a discourse into social reality that operates reproducing a given state of things, that is, relations of domination. This discourse is the democratic discourse as a contemporary hegemonic political discourse.

Democratic discourse has its counterpart in democratic practice, and the ideology of democracy is played in the gap that simultaneously reunites and separates both levels, which I define as the democratic functioning.

*The democratic functioning is the actual democratic practice pervaded by democratic discourse.*

The democratic discourse installs a social imaginary of what democracy is. This social imaginary can be understood as the *meanings* that society places on the concept of democracy. The democratic imaginary implies the sphere of production of social meanings related to the democracy concept. It assumes the way in which the individuals identify democracy as a valuable political discourse, despite the structural historical determinants of the non-democratic situations that actually shape social reality. Therefore, the political possibilities implied in the democratic discourse are not being exercised but delayed and retained in the spectral appearance of the democratic discourse. As Pierre Jean Josue puts it: “It is not difficult to understand up to what extent such an idea makes the market prevail against politics. The hegemonic logic is now conceived as

a pursue (if not a pure and simple substitution) of politics by the economy. The power of seduction of this neoliberal ideology is essentially based on the attempt to supplant politics in its own field, accomplishing by other means the promise of a global justice” (Latinité et identité haïtienne, 2005: 279).

On the other hand, the democratic practice is the way in which the democratic discourse acquires social reality, that is to say, the way democracy actually works. The democratic practice belongs to the sphere of the way whereby meanings acquire social expression, the way in which they exist, their real possibilities, or, to put it in almost classical words, their material conditions of existence. From this standpoint, it becomes necessary to rescue some concepts from the hegemony of neoliberalism. In that sense, it is important to distinguish the expression of a concept from its logic. Politics must be revived as well as consciousness, because a discourse is installed as hegemonic and therefore, it exhausts its contents, its meanings. The ideological effect of the above mentioned can be seen as the primacy of a meaning that has not been placed in social reality, or that cannot be placed. The very possibility of undertaking the content of a given hegemonic concept is *disavowed* by its circulation as hegemonic discourse.

The relationship between practice and discourse within the hegemonic democracy is a relation of *reflection*. It is in the intersection of these two levels, in what I have called the democratic function, which the essence of ideology, that is to say, the reproduction of the relations of domination, lays. Ideology implies the hegemony of certain meanings that *appear* as the expression of social reality. There is a social reality that appears as the reflection of the democratic discourse; therefore, it places democratic discourse at the level of reality, whereas the fact of domination is what is being put aside in this operation. Marx himself puts this operation in terms of reflection: “Such expressions of relations in general, called by Hegel reflex-categories, form a very curious class. For instance, one man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is the king” (Marx in Žižek, 2000: 309).

This implies that it is in the functioning of democratic discourse as a practice that social reality is produced and sustained, because of the existing correlate between the imaginary field of meanings and the symbolic field of practice. The practice perceives itself as reflecting the discursive conditions, while it reproduces the social structure and consequently, the distance separating the reality of practice from the promises of discourse, reinforcing, thus, the relations of domination. As Susan Marks puts it, when referring to Žižek’s viewpoint, ideology lies in “the imaginary resolution of social cleavages, the repression of social conflict” (Marks, 2000: 20). This means that the conflict that sustains a given social order is put beyond any question by being integrated to the symbolic frame of *reality*.

It is in any case the persistence of the relations of domination that are the stakes of the ideological operation. In the case of democracy, I argue that this task is accomplished by setting the limits of the political under the rule of law, prescribing the political limits and at the same time presenting these limits as natural, exhausting, accordingly, what is supposed to be the wide panoply of political choices.

As Žižek observes, very sharply: “Fidelity to the democratic consensus” means the acceptance of the present liberal-parliamentary consensus, which precludes any serious questioning of the way this liberal-democratic order is complicit in the phenomena it officially condemns, and of course, any serious attempt to imagine a *different* socio-political order” (Žižek, 2002: 167).

The type of democracy that rules a country varies according to the international division of labor and also goes along with the relations of hegemony between the different states. From this standpoint, it is self evident that the

states that occupy privileged places in the economic distribution of power, also have the *highest* performances in the democratic functioning scale. By contrast, those countries or states, which struggle within the last positions in the distribution of political economy, endure democratic regimes that are reduced to mere formal mechanisms such as elections, constitutional order, et cetera. This reduction is not due to an early stage of democratic development but to the result of the monopolization of power; it is hegemony, in the sense of political consent that sustains relations of domination what becomes the kernel of the globalised democratic discourse. Democracy has been globalised as a way of exercising control over the political forces of the emerging economies across the globe. For Professor Prabhat Patnaik “the caprices of international finance capital therefore find spontaneous expression in the policies being imposed all over the world by the leading capitalist economy of our time. This action of the latter on the other hand is not a whimsical or capricious one. It is to preserve the value of the wealth of a vast number of wealth holders” (Patnaik, 2005).

The paradox of the so called *low intensity* democracies lies in the existing gap between democracy, as a political discourse, and the critical social situation of the countries subjected to it. Such disruption becomes salient, nowadays, with the ever-increasing use of violence and force as mechanisms for keeping the safety of *democracy*. This shows that, when hegemony loses its balance, force and violence appear as the very foundations of the political, democratic order (e.g. the case of Iraq). As Cristovam Buarque expressed it: “One should not tolerate the barbarity of a world that produces US\$ 40 trillion per year and has created a universal communication system, through which one may watch the death of millions of children due to starvation, as well as children labor due to their parent’s poverty; and does not prepare their children to face the challenge to understand and change the world” (Cristovam Buarque, 2005: 335).

This implies that the democratic discourse reproduces its effectiveness at a global scale; the globalisation of the democratic discourse affords the greatest opportunity for financial capitalism to develop. If there is a link between democracy and capitalism, it lies precisely in the privileged way that democratic discourse offers to the development of capitalism, because they both assume the task of regulating the monopolization of capital and, consequentially, of power under the *rule* of consent. The so-called low intensity democracies must be understood under this logic of the accumulation of power. They are the political possibilities of struggle against a given state of affairs, kept under control with the maintenance of these low intensity democracies. Democratic discourse is therefore installed as a *concession*, as if it implied taking into account the differences and the promotion of universal values such as equality, freedom, etc.; and at the same time, setting the framework for the assessment of these concessions.

The economical alienation means straightforward political alienation as an ideological necessity that, in contemporary democratic societies, takes the form of the impossibility to question the given political order. The hegemony of democratic discourse is, therefore, set in its ideological function because the ideology of democracy lies, precisely, in the circulation and installation of the democratic discourse and in the social meanings conveyed by this discourse despite the actual existence of democracy. In what can be identified as an ideological movement, these social meanings are detached from their real applications, from the way they develop in social reality; that is to say, they are detached from the way in which these social meanings acquire symbolic efficacy and reproduce themselves, sheltered in the imaginary promises of the democratic discourse. Even if these promises are only about possibilities, it is the exhaustion that the prescription of these- though not others -possibilities conveys what defines the ideological efficacy at the level of the social practices.



Thus, social practice is framed by certain hegemonic meanings that forge into reality. In liberal democracies these meanings are supported by a legal framework that exhausts the possibilities of any practice, therefore disallowing political practices, changing practices. It is in this sense that there is a discourse that is installed as a social imaginary through which symbolic efficacy is acquired. These values have an imaginary efficiency because as stated above, they are detached from the *real conditions of its existence*.

The democratic discourse sets the meanings that define democracy beyond their actual accomplishments within democratic practice. It is this constitutive impossibility of the democratic functioning what implies the reproduction of the relations of domination and constitutes ideology. Ideology reproduces social reality as relations of domination; it is in that sense that, as Jameson explains, “the ideological dimension is intrinsically embedded within the reality, which secretes it as a necessary feature of its own structure. That dimension is thus profoundly imaginary in a real and positive sense; that is to say, it exists and is real in so far as it is an image, marked and destined to remain as such, its very unreality and unrealizability being what is real about it” (Jameson in Zizek, 1994: 280).

The ideological dimension of the democratic functioning can be understood as a structural movement whereby the *real possibilities* of attaining social reality are disavowed by a hegemonic circulation of a concept, hegemonic in the sense (Gramsci) that it reproduces dominant ideas by using this paradox. In other words, it presents what it should be achieved and the ideological mechanism that discards this possibility lays in this presentation. This ideological movement can be understood through the logic of circulation of commodities. In words of Celso Furtado, as an organised fantasy.

The hegemony of a concept is replaced by another carrying the unachieved promises of the previous one, and this can be seen in the shift occurred from development to democracy, as the main pillar of social thinking, and in some cases of social sinking as well.

For Carlos D. González Torres: “The complex results of the social engineering, omitting every reference to their real purposes, are originated and structured with the external financing, the political and academic merger and corruption. The objective or teleology of a capitalist sociopolitical technology is not ensuring ‘freedom’ and achieving ‘progress’ or ‘democracy’. By using a very general term, there is a concealment of a political mimesis that omits any reference to its real objective: contributing to the stability of capitalism. The use of the term tries to represent a meaning as a ‘political symbol’ of the bourgeois social order. The implementation of the ‘political symbol’ tries to explain, by itself, the alleged purposes of the projects they identify, encouraging the promotion of a complete redefinition of social sciences concepts which contribute to rule out the solutions suggested by the progressive and Marxist thought. Thus, the image of capitalism ‘as a society with no alternative’ is consolidated (Frank Hinkelammert). The teleology that offers, by means of ‘political symbols’, the social conservative reflection, tries to place itself above every ‘classist’ approach by encouraging a ‘neutral’ or ‘apolitical’ treatment with respect to any manifestation of social conflict. (Reflexiones sobre la ‘Transición democrática’” (González Torres, 2001: 205)

If we understand that democracy is installed as a hegemonic discourse, this implies that there are certain relations of domination that are exercised through consent, and consent within democracy is placed and exhausted in the mechanism of election, or in a wide sense, in the legal framework that defines liberal democracy.

Besides the legal framework that constrains the extension of politics, the ideological function of democracy also displays another series of strategies that subjects the individual to the rule of democracy, and therefore, to the distance

that divides democratic aims and meanings, on the one hand, from democratic accomplishments and practice, on the other hand

Within liberal democracy, this ideological distance is set as a step to be taken, as a task to be completed and in this sense it denies the very logic of its functioning. Ideology itself is presented and understood as lying outside the democratic paradigm, which is set as a universal truth.

This also implies avoiding the structural dimension that inclusion takes in the democratic practice, in the sense previously exposed: that is, allowing different discourses, as well as the discourse of difference, to circulate globally and *democratically*, avoiding, therefore, the point whereby 'difference' is reproduced as inequality. Slavoj Žižek radically opposes the political correctness within democracy by relating it to a strategy of inclusion of everything but critique: "Indeed, since the 'normal' functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today's model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse, etc., posing as humanitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am therefore tempted to reverse Marx's Thesis 11: the first task today is precisely *not* to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul-de-sac of debilitating impossibility: 'What can we do against global capital?'), but to question the hegemonic ideological co-ordinates" (Žižek, 2002: 169).

In that sense it could be argued that the problem is still attached to an idealist (ideological?) point of view because it does not take into account the problem regarding the relations of production. So the solutions proposed by both sides, and besides the question on the preeminence or not of the nation state, are subject to the same criticisms that Marx has already made to the Proudhonist. As Jameson puts it, comparing the Proudhonist with the political realism: "It is a question of the attitude of the Proudhonist to this reversal, and of their miscomprehension of the ideological dimension of the exchange system and how that functions -both true and false, both objective and delusional" (Jameson in Žižek, 2000: 279).

A retrospective regard of the subjects developed here, puts the accent on the question formulated by Lenin and quoted at the beginning of this section. The actuality of the answer provided by him in terms that might not appear appropriate within the frames of the political correctness proves to reveal the current state of things: "By slandering the people- the old but eternally new method of the bourgeoisie" (Lenin in Žižek, 2002: 28).

### **Critique as radical politics**

*"Radical es aquel que va a la raíz.  
A la raíz va el hombre verdadero"*  
(José Martí)

Considering that the functioning of democracy sets the limits for what is to be allowed or disallowed, and legitimates this frame by a consensus ideologically installed by the democratic discourse, I believe that critique should open the possibilities of politics to transcend the hegemony of certain historical relations presented as universal truths.

I argue that the mechanism displayed by the ideological operation has its *raison d'être* in the unfeasibility of politics. This unfeasibility is attained in the ideological functioning by setting (and therefore controlling) the extent to, and the way whereby politics are to be exercised. The essence of politics, as the capability of contestation to power, is withheld within democratic discourse because the hegemony of democracy implies the legitimacy of the means

(and meanings) that install the democratic function. This entails that the extent to which politics can contest the given structures of power are set within the democratic rules.

Critique in political sense emerges to cover the existing gap that sustains the democratic functioning and, in that sense, it can be argued that critique has a reflexive movement towards its object: its process of abstraction from the object of experience (in this case, the democratic functioning) points to represent the historical system that allows this object of experience to emerge as truth. Therefore, relations of domination within a given system of power are consolidated. In the current situation of social and political hegemony, it can be argued that this relation of reflection that sustains critique has been replaced in the main stream theory and academy for a Dorian Gray model<sup>2</sup>, that is to say: no reflection has been allowed, there is no return from the object of experience to the object of knowledge. The object of knowledge is trapped in the consistence of its own image. The financial illusion reproduces this movement and it is from this illusion that a continuous process of capital accumulation takes place despite thousands of people. If we are able to reveal the false image of the portrait, then, the social relation that supports it will be weakened. It is important to challenge supremacy and anything presented as “state of things”. This is also a battle of consciousness, and a battle for words to be recovered, as exemplified by the case of hegemony of the liberal concept of democracy.

It is in this sense that critique should tend to point out that “actuality is not the vessel into which thought empties itself, although it is this striving towards the unity of thought and actuality that gives philosophy its *raison d’etre*. This aporia must not be abandoned, but continually practiced and revived through negative dialectics. Adorno himself names his critique one of ‘dissonance’. It is the dissonance between thought and actuality, concept and object, identity and non-identity that must be revealed. The task of the critic is to illuminate those cracks in the totality, those fissures in the social net, those moments of disharmony and discrepancy, through which the untruth of the whole is revealed and glimmers of another life become visible” (Benhabib in Zizek, 2000:87-88)

The exercise of critique implies that truth arises less from ontology than from a genealogy, understood as “the account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework” (Foucault in Gordon, 1980: 17). Nevertheless, critique as political critique needs to shift this analytical proposal from the quite individualistic level in which Foucault places it to a collective level, where the concept of politics lies.

If we consider hegemony as a power factor, it becomes clear that critique should tend to reveal the mechanisms whereby hegemony rules social reality, displaying meanings that sustain a given order. It is in this sense that theory can contribute to the development of *dissonant* perspectives that might allow change to emerge.

This revelation needs to be a radical one in order to avoid the trap of being integrated to the all-inclusive logic of capitalism. I would say that, because the current social and economical situation of the people in the world is one of radical poverty and exclusion, it is necessary to maintain radicalism as opposed to mediocrity. Radicalism needs to be an attitude towards the halfway solutions offered and organized by the establishment to maintain the status quo.

The search for the structures and mechanisms that produce and reproduce hegemonic relations lies at the heart of the critical approach. Therefore, a political critique must tend to develop an understanding of social phenomena, not as empirical facts that will reveal a hidden truth, but as the revelation of a re-

---

2 I should thank Professor John Saxe Fernandez for the Dorian Gray metaphor.

lationship system leading to the comprehension of the hegemonic functioning of democracy. The capacity to apprehend the mechanisms that install hegemonic practices will lead, in turn, to the development of the possibilities of change.

As Cristodoulidis explains: "Political freedom ultimately lies in the freedom to contest the meaning of political conflict, action and collective or communal identity" (Christodoulidis, 1998: 68). This implies the aim of allowing change to emerge by a continuous practice of interpellation.

This fact has led to the notion of politics as the possibility of exercising critique and, in this sense politics will imply the possibility to transcend the way in which democracy is structured into the symbolic field of society and, at the same time, to allow the imaginary registry to be permeated by the gap created in the symbolic field. This will constitute the mechanisms that continually re-create democratic practices within the paradigm of critique and thus, hegemony will be contested.

It is necessary to point to a radical theory that should include critique as a tool for social change. If critique is taken as a continuous practice, this criticism might be replied from the possibility of a non finished process of interpellation to any practice taken as hegemonic: "It is in the state of tension between different realized ideas and practices on the one hand, and alternatives to these on the other that it becomes possible to avoid getting caught by established ideas and institutions" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979; Marcuse, 1964). By negating the existing order, it becomes possible to see in a different and seminal way" (Alvesson et al., 2003: 138).

Radicalism needs to recover the sense of tragedy to avoid the repetition of history as a comedy (in the sense pointed by Marx that history happens twice); this sense implies illusion, will, and pain, as a deep compromise to ourselves, in order to avoid getting caught in nihilism, conformism or mediocrity. These are the ways that ideology offers, concealed in a variety of theories deployed by academy.

Radical critique also needs to revive poetry as deepness, as what lies at the heart of the search, because art, as politics, needs to be detached from the market, and the sublime needs to be recovered and disengaged from the banality of consumption strategies.

Susan Bucks Morss poses it in this way: "What if every time that the consciousness of individuals surpassed the confines of present constellations of power in perceiving the concrete meaning of freedom, this were valued as a moment, however transitory, of the realization of absolute spirit?. What other silences would need to be broken? What un-disciplined stories would be told? (Buck Morss, 2005: 234)

In this sense, it is important to introduce the notion of modernity as a non-concluded process and, therefore, rescue the necessity of a project as the recovery of utopia beyond the limits of what is set as possible. This is also the sense of tragedy, as stated above, against the uncompromised ways of postmodernism.

Critique needs to cope with the insistence of the residues and the excluded, pointing to what the *really existing* world is in its links and structural determinants.

As Enrique Rodríguez Larreta wonders : "La construction de modernités alternatives est-elle possible (Taylor, 2004) dans un monde dominé par des hégémonies impériales, avec des régions entières dévastés par la guerre et par le somnambulisme de l'anomie, parmi des îles de prospérité et de richesse ? Ou bien devons- nous accepter les stimulants narcotiques de la philosophie gothique, en regardant par la fenêtre de notre hôtel de l'abîme avant que ses murs ne s'écroulent ? Voici un des défis de ce nouveau siècle : la construction de nouveaux langages qui conduisent à de nouveaux langages qui conduisent

à de nouvelles pratiques pour un changement de nos sociétés. Les succès éphémères de nombreuses révolutions et leurs coûts humains énormes nous préserveront peut-être du recours simpliste à la révolution, ce mot d'ordre d'un XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle qui s'éloigne déjà et nous oblige à penser sérieusement aux conditions spécifiques de transformations qui demeurent indispensables dans l'ensemble du monde eu qui vont exiger l'imagination et la participation de bien des voix et de bien des perspectives aujourd'hui oubliées et englouties" (Rodríguez Larreta, 2005: 167).

## Conclusion

This paper is originated in the current paradox of a progressively productive world and, at the same time, increasingly poor due to a concentration process that leaves behind any attempt of change. "Globalisation and democratisation were one side of the general process. Concentration of the production and of the income, centralization of capital, unemployment and social exclusion, were the other" (Theotonio Dos Santos, Johannesburg)

I argue that hegemony in this world has been set as the complete control and domination of social forces. Alienation has the form of consumption, as an efficient sell of illusion that has installed what Guy Debord once called *the society of spectacle*, where everything that is desirable is brilliant on the stage despite the darkness of every day life, submitted to the logic of commodities, and slaved to accumulation.

In this context, political life has become part of the spectacle and democracy has been deployed everywhere as *the* political solution. It is actually presented as a desirable goal as long as it is understood as liberal democracy. The liberal democratic order frames the expansion of financial capital by disavowing the emergence of politics, by setting the means to control critique, making it functional to the requirements of capitalism. Even if sometimes it is self evident that discourses are detached from their social reality, the illusion remains and is reproduced in the various channels of the system, including academy and even critical theory, often regarded isolated in the so called *cultural studies*, as an apartheid of criticism from the classical disciplines, which are also, by the way, the ones taken into account when considering decision making jobs or places.

It is in that sense that I pointed out the necessity of reviving politics as a radical position, as opposed to the softness of functional thinking. Critique should be ceaseless, accurate and radical to avoid being integrated to the logic of circulation that rules financial capitalism, and should set means and ends as a project of emancipation from a perspective that reintroduces passion as humanity.

As an appendix, I will consider the Paraguayan situation from the viewpoint of the theory previously exposed.

## Appendix: The Paraguayan situation.

Here, I would like to introduce the case of Paraguay as to present an empirical evidence of how democracy can work as hegemonic political discourse.

Paraguay has a recent political history of authoritarianism deeply rooted in the social function. The inauguration of the democratic period was state-led and conducted by people who had, during the 35 years of dictatorship, an active participation in the regime.

The independent political life of Paraguay started in 1811, after breaking out the Spanish colonial rule and it has been marked from the beginning by the succession of different types of government, from a triumvirate to a more liberal government with a consolidated economy, that lasted until the bloody war of the *Triple Alianza* (1875-1870) in which the country fought against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

“In the *Triple Alianza* war, little was missed to complete exterminate Paraguay. The population that was over 1.300.000 inhabitants before the conflict, was reduced to 200.000 people, from which approximately 10 per cent were men, and in its majority children, elderly people and foreigners” (Vasconcellos, 1974: 85). The territory was reduced and the political life was under control of Brazil and Argentina.

After the war, the process of political reorganization meant the conformation of a more liberal and institutional political life, with the creation of the two main political parties, the Colorado party and the Liberal party as well as other institutions. Nevertheless, the Paraguayan economy never recovered from this war, and until today industrialization and modernisation of the productive structures have not taken place at a significative level.

The beginning of the XX century was marked by a political instability, which was to last until the war held between Paraguay and Bolivia, known as the Chaco war (1932-1935).

Even though the Chaco war is considered to have consolidated a Paraguayan national identity, the period that followed it was characterized by political turmoil and a cruel civil war, in 1947, between the Colorados and an alliance of several parties, including the *Liberales*, *Febreristas* and Communists, a conflict whose latest aftermaths resulted in the rise and government of the General Alfredo Stroessner in 1954, a member of the Colorado Party and the Army.

From 1954 to 1989, Stroessner ruled the country. I will now draw on the consequences that the 34 years of dictatorship had and continue to have in Paraguayan political and social life.

To understand the so-called *democratic transition* in Paraguay, it is necessary to look backwards to the structures that Stroessner's era built up and left. This will allow visualizing and highlighting which factors *function* in the democratic Paraguayan practice.

The complete military support and the backing of the Colorado Party, as well as a foreign policy respondent to the anticommunist principle of Washington meant a very narrow frame for political and social change inside the Stroessnian model. The level of social control exercised by this powerful political articulation –the US support, the Government, the Colorado Party and the Army– gave the dictatorship a wide margin of action well consolidated on the basis of the precedent political instability and the promise of *peace and progress*.

Stroessner's policies implemented social control, which was the basis of the very structure of the regime design. This represented, on the one hand, the complete cooptation of the state apparatuses and the control of the Army; and the repressive use of force in a selective way, on the other. Thus, the authoritarian machinery knew, even when reaching peaks of social repression, how to maintain a bearable tension at the social level, since the factors of disturbance were very well controlled through the development of works of infrastructure, the expansion of the agriculture frontier and the migration process to Argentina.

The period from 1962-1977 was the axis that permitted the model to expand itself until the end of the eighties. “This is the phase of the greater splendor of General Alfredo Stroessner's regime. Its political legitimacy came from the addition of a considerable part of the opposition to the political system, the absence of pressures in the international sphere, the economical consolidation with important works of infrastructure and in the seventies, the boom produced by the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam and the distribution of state owned lands that decompressed the tensions in the rural area” (Arditi, 1992: 28).

The modernization boosted by Stroessner and supported by the help of the United States, meant for the population an important growth in the amount of infrastructure, bridges, roads, schools and public services. Nevertheless, these

facts must be seen through the filter of a corrupt public administration that acted as a core to which the different elements of modernization were being added.

The privileged context of the resources originated from Itaipu, the international market for the soy and cotton, as well as the support of the foreign powers started to decay around 1985. The former privileged joint could not be transformed into a more or less permanent economic structure because “the state was not able to combine growth with development or to set an equilibrated economy, and it became a source of generalized corruption. The country could not enter a phase of industrialization. At the beginning of the eighties, 4 of every 5 enterprises had less than 4 employees and almost half of the employees (44,7%) had no remuneration at all. The index of installed capacity unemployed was of 40 to 50% in 1984” (OMora,1993: 103).

In 1987, the national Colorado Party Convention marked the existing differences inside the political elites. The division between *Traditionalists* and *Militants* meant the fall of Stroessner, though not of the Colorado Party, who knew how to manage the demands that would ensure the continuity in power and how to manage this continuity as a political strategy.

It is in this sense that what has been called *transition to democracy* was initiated and conducted by old elements constitutive of the dictatorship, and now accommodated to the new discursive exigencies of the political momentum.

“In general, in the final phase of the Stroessnian regime, there was a growing consensus at least in one issue, that the overcome of a state of things which morphology was imminently political was related to the democratic question” (Arditi, 1992: 67).

“In the tradition of the democratic thinking, democracy is understood as a political regime opposed to oligarchy, that is to say, a government of minorities. Now, if the representative democracy points to a collective well being and its representatives are compromised to secure the liberties and equalities of the citizens, how can it be understood that the democratic idealism that the representatives of the people say to profess is depriving the majority of the Paraguayan population of the minimum necessary for their subsistence?” (Lara Castro, 2003).

This question provides the shift to inquire the Paraguayan *democratic* process and demonstrates that the current situation is rooted before 1989 and the *coup d'état* that took Stroessner from power.

I consider that one of the particular elements of this case is the fact that in Paraguay there has been a transition to democracy instead of a democratic transition, and this means a discourse of democracy that acts as a promise, detached from its social and historical process. This is a fundamental factor in the Paraguayan case that converges in the maintenance, at a low cost, of the pre-existing situation of distribution and political functioning. As Jorge Lara Castro (2003) puts it: “It is a successful model”, in the sense that it works perfectly and reproduces itself beyond the eloquence of its social failures. This state of things meant, once the democratic period was open in 1989, a concealed continuation of the former situation under the title of democracy, accompanied by deterioration in the economy figures.

Under this state of things, democracy has proved its hegemony, with a gradual growth in electoral participation, as well as with the improving of the vote mechanisms in terms of accountability and transparency. At the same time, there has been a growing institutionalization and a legal reform that assures the democratic rule.

This poses the question of to what extent law allows social conflict to appear, as Christodoulidis (1996) points out, law “by allowing only certain conflict to register, it is not containing but instead selectively privileging and suppressing. And if that is so, then our legal democracy, is prejudicial and deaf to genuine

aspirations expressed in civil society – aspirations which are manifest in political conflict but not in legal argument”.

In the abovementioned context, the way out is presented as the deepening of the democratic practice in the terms already set out in the formal agenda of democracy, though there are several factors, which I consider constitutive rather than functional, that guarantee that democratic practice should remain where it is, with an occasional concession related to the establishment of a more perfect legal framework. The beginning of democracy in Paraguay meant as well the disarticulation of the political forces, who were mainly engaged in democratic discourse, abandoning its former position of contestation and rejoining together in democratic discourse.

I consider that the Paraguayan case offers a clear picture of the way the democratic discourse operates as a doctrine for political development rather than as a social historical process. At the same time, it means that the historical process is hidden by a formal discourse operating at the imaginary level. Susan Marks exposes clearly this ideological functioning by asserting that “a third set of ideological strategies legitimates low intensity democracy by means of an imaginary resolution of social and political antagonisms. Through strategies of unification the various cleavages around which relations of domination are articulated are made to seem non-existent, with the consequence that efforts to transform those relations come to appear unnecessary [...] The universalisation of civil and political rights thus serves to confer an illusory wholeness on the divided social body, universal suffrage, together with universal civil rights, appear as the hallmarks of political institutions that are impartial and inclusory. The gap between low intensity democracy and popular democracy is imaginatively closed. In this way, societies engaged in democratic reconstruction are encouraged to start by putting in place certain institutions and constitutional guarantees, and leave for later questions about how to provide the conditions in which those guarantees can be made meaningful for all citizens” (Marks, 2000: 65).

The ideological function opens up a gap between an installed imaginary register and the current symbolic practices that result from this imaginary. The plus, understood as what is left in this operation, is the very essence of the social reality and is also what constitutes the object of knowledge, becoming, therefore, the object of power itself.

This leads to the search of critique in the sense pointed by Christodoloudis (1998) of “re-politicise all the assumptions behind conflict, action and identity that the law takes for granted. What is ‘stilled’ by law here becomes contested terrain again, and as such, political”.

In this context, Paraguay still has to face several issues related to its position in the world system, the privatisation of the public services being the first point of agenda. Given the disappointing results of these operations in neighbouring countries, especially Argentina and its neo liberal boom, the question immediately arises as to whether the democratic order is something else than a politic strategy imposed by the international in order to establish a formal and legal frame of legitimisation of control. It is a kind of subjectivation of the power and domination structures.

For a country whose economy is based in the informal market and in the extraction of natural resources, with a minimal cultural development, the future situation appears quite blurred. Nonetheless, the democratic mechanism has already been set and has the health of a ten year-old baby to cope with the growing gap that situates the country in the international order.

I do not want to understand the Paraguayan process in terms of its particularity, but in terms of the strategies previously described. I consider that, despite the singularities of any process, democracy as a hegemonic contemporary politi-



cal discourse efficiently sets the means for capitalism to develop and this implies straight away the deepening of the social and political crisis in the world.

Within crisis, I argue, it is important to assert the necessity of conflict as the emergence of the contradictions that sustain and reproduce a given state of things, and political critique is set to be an essential tool in this struggle.

The purpose of this paper was to show that the way in which the historical facts, that shape the Paraguayan political and social situation, have been integrated to the logic of the democratic function has contributed not only to worsen the already critical economical and social situation but also to bring about a general passivity through contemplative attitude towards the current situation. At the same time, democracy is installed as *the* political option with the concurrent exhaustion of developing politics as contestation. In that sense, and in what might be considered as a prescription, I understand the necessity of developing and reinforcing social critique in a level that should situate Paraguay in its particularity, as part of the unity of the capitalist mode of production in its financial stage.

## References

- Academie de la Latinité et identité haïtienne: entre la tradition et la modernité* 2005 (Rio de Janeiro: Educam).
- Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max 1979 *Dialectic of enlightenment* (London: Verso).
- Alvesson, Mats and Skoldberg K. 2003 *Reflexive Methodology in New Vistas for Qualitative Research* (London, Sage Publication).
- Arditi, Benjamín 1992 *Adiós a Stroessner* (Asunción: CDE).
- Benhabib, Seyla 2000 "The Critique of instrumental" reason Žizek, S. (ed.) *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso).
- Borón, Atilio A. 2004 *Estado, Capitalismo y Democracia en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: CLACSO).
- Buarque, Cristovam 2005 "Alternatives to barbarity" in *Latinité et identité haïtienne: entre la tradition et la modernité* (Rio de Janeiro: Educam).
- Bulmer, Martin (ed.) 1977 *Sociological Research Methods* (London: Macmillian Press).
- Buck Morss, Susan 2005 in "Hegel and Haiti" *Latinité et identité haïtienne: entre la tradition et la modernité* (Rio de Janeiro: Educam).
- Christodoulidis, Emiliós 1998 *Law and Reflexive Politics* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
- Démocratie et Marché 1999 *Cahiers Trimestriel. Alternative* (Bruxelles: L'Harmattan) Sud. Vol. VI..
- Denzin Norman K and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) 2004 *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications).
- Dos Santos Theotonio 2000 "World Economy System: On the genesis of a concept" in *Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein* (Santa Cruz, California) Volume XI. Number 2, summer, fall.
- Dos Santos Theotonio *Neo Liberal Economic Doctrine: a critical approach. (essay in honour of Samir Amin)*. Script provided for the Summer Institute by CLACSO.
- Dos Santos Theotonio 2004 "State Liberalism and Globalisation". Paper presented to the conference on *Development Societies* (New Delhi) April.
- Dos Santos Theotonio "Democratic Transition and Market Economy. The case of Brazil". Paper presented to the *Conference of South Africa: Overcoming- Development in SA'S Dual Economy* (Johannesburg) 28 – 29 October.
- Dryzek, John S. 1999 "Transnational Democracy" in *The journal of political philosophy* (Oxford) Volume 7, N° 1.

- Dryzek, John S. 1990 *Discursive democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Filizzola Serra, Rafael *Una década de democracia* in *Revista Jurídica CEDUC* (Asunción) N° 11.
- Foucault M. 1980 "Truth and Power" in Gordon, C. (ed.) *Power/Knowledge*. Harvester.
- García Alfonso, Juan Cecilio 2004 "Proceso de Privatización. Transformación medular de la reforma económica neoliberal". Paper presented in *II Conferencia Internacional "La Obra de Carlos Marx y los desafíos del siglo XXI"* (La Habana).
- Gibson, Hill and Molinas, Jose 2000 *Liberalización del sector externo en Paraguay. Efectos sobre el crecimiento, la distribución del ingreso y la pobreza*. Mimeo (Asunción).
- Gills, B. Rocamora J. & Wilson R. 1993 *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order* (London: Pluto Press).
- González Torres, Carlos Daniel 2001 "Reflexiones sobre la transición democrática" en *Revistas Temas* (La Habana) N° 24 25, enero junio.
- Goodin, Robert E. and Philip Pettit 1995 *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Held, David 1995 *Democracy and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Jameson F. 1994 *Postmodernism and the Market* in Zizek, S (ed.) *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso).
- Lara Castro, Jorge 2003 "Que Democracia" in *Correo Semanal* (Asunción) 12-13 julio.
- Marcuse, Herbert 1969 (1964) *El Hombre Unidimensional* (Barcelona: Seix Barral).
- Marks, Susan 2000 *The riddle of all constitutions. International law, democracy and the critique of Ideology* (Oxford: University Press).
- Martini, Carlos. *Crónica Ilustrada del Paraguay*. Buenos Aires, 1998.
- Marx, Karl 1988 "On the Jewish Question" in Blaug, R. & Schwarzmantel J. *Democracy: a reader* (Edinburgh: University Press).
- Marx, Karl 1996 *Later Political Writings* Edited by Terrell Carver (Cambridge).
- Marx, Karl 1976 *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*. Vol 1. Translated by B Fowkes. (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Newspaper *ABC Color* Digital. Asunción, 17 de abril de 2004. In: [www.abc.com.py](http://www.abc.com.py)
- Newspaper *Última Hora* Digital. Asunción, 3 de julio de 2004. In: [www.ultimahora.com.py](http://www.ultimahora.com.py)
- Nikson, Andrew and Lambert, Peter 2002 "State Reform and the 'Privatized State' in Paraguay" in *Public Administration and Development Dev.* 22.
- O Mora F. 1993 *Política Exterior del Paraguay 1811 - 1989* (Asunción: CEPES).
- Patnaik, Prabhat 2005 "The economics of the New Phase of Imperialism" Paper presented at the international conference *Acts Of Resistance from the South against globalisation* (Ankara) 5 – 7 September.
- Patnaik, Prabhat "Capitalism in Asia at the end of the millenium" Document provided by CLACSO for the Summer Institute.
- PNUD *Informe Nacional sobre Desarrollo Humano 2003* (Asunción, DGEEC).
- Rodríguez Larreta, Enrique 2005 "Au delà de la philosophie gothique. Généalogies de l'émancipation et horizons de la transformation" in *Latinité et identité haitienne: entre la tradition et la modernité* (Rio de Janeiro: Educam).
- PROPARAGUAY. Legal Framework of Paraguay. Website: [www.proparaguay.gov.py/e\\_marco\\_juridico-I.html](http://www.proparaguay.gov.py/e_marco_juridico-I.html)
- Thompson JB. 1990 *Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Toussaint, Eric 2005 "Your money or your life. The tyranny of global finance. Updated edition." (Canadá: Haymarket Books).
- Torres, Server 1997 "II Conferencia de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Privatización" mimeo.
- Vasconsellos, V.N. 1974 *Lecciones de Historia Paraguaya* (Asunción: Comuneros).

- Wallerstein I. 1996 "The inter-state structure of the modern world-system" in Smith, S. Booth, K. and Zalewsky, M. (eds.), *International theory: Positivism and Beyond*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- World Bank 2002 *World Bank Development Report 2001/2002*. In: [www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/](http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/wdrpoverty/report/)
- Zizek, S, 2002 "Afterwords: Lenin's choice" in Zizek S (ed.) *Revolution at the gates. Selected writings from Lenin from 1917* (London: Verso).
- Zizek, S. 2000 How did Marx Invented the Symptom? in Zizek, S. (ed.) *Mapping Ideology* (London: Verso).
- Zizek, S. 1989 *The sublime object of ideology* (London: Verso).

