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Human Security in Africa: Challenges and prospects

This is a critical moment in the history of African peoples. If I had to suggest one word to characterise their current status, it would be ‘insecurity’

Joseph, 2003

Introduction

The 1990s witnessed radical changes in the nature of conflict around the world. The rapid decline in conflicts between states was matched in the opposite direction by the rapid rise in disputes, conflicts and “emergencies” within states (Leaning and Arie, 2000: 3). The changed situation, it is contended, requires, if not a wholesale shift in the dominant security paradigm, at least some fundamental paradigm adjustment. As the 1994 Human Development Report put it, in the current situation “we need another profound transition in thinking –from nuclear security to human security” (UNDP, 1994: 22).

The traditional conception of security is generally structured around the state –the defense and preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Threats to the security of the state are therefore seen as essentially emanating from a hostile external environment, defined in terms of other states which recognize no other authority beyond theirs. In this anarchic situation, containing such threats relied mainly on self-help and armed military might.

It was this framework of security that underpinned the Cold War. Military alliances, cemented along largely ideological lines, bifurcated the world in an east-west divide into which countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America were often induced or forcibly incorporated. In Africa, the path to independent statehood and the framework of post-colonial economic and social policy became issues in which the major powers in the east-west divide displayed an abiding interest within the framework of an essentially bipolar security framework. In fact, an often necessary dimension of the negotiation of the exit of the colonial master and independent statehood was some form of security treaty with the departing coloniser. These treaties had the effect of ‘constructing’ Africa’s external friends as well as enemies. This of course also meant structuring relations among African countries within east-west dynamics, so that issues such as intra-African cooperation became bogged down in the global bipolar struggle for power. In assimilating the security *problématique* of African states into the east-west divide, a convenient lid was often imposed on various expressive forms in which domestic groups and individuals outside the state sought to air their grievances. While African regimes found the framework convenient for visiting oppression on opponents, regimes that tried to toe independent lines also found their hold on power a precarious matter.

The effect of this, quite often, was to plant the new state firmly within the western security alliance. Within this framework, any specificity or peculiarity was denied to the security needs of these countries. The incorporation of African countries into the east-west security networks meant an automatic assimilation into a conflict relationship among countries which hardly had any historical or material basis for such antagonism. On the other hand, the development of friendly interactions among states was essentially frozen within alliances.

This security paradigm and its practical manifestation during the Cold War meant that the security problems of the east and west were assumed and acted upon as the basic security *problématique* of the countries of Africa. Threats and risks which were hardly theirs nevertheless had decisive implications in shaping politics, economies and society in these countries, with their territories sometimes becoming proxy battlegrounds. State repression, violations of rights and political instability became intricately woven around a framework of security founded on the dominant global geo-political rivalry.

In much of post-colonial Africa, the conception of security as the security of the state took on its own peculiar narrow translation as regime security, or the personal security of the ruler who often increasingly identified himself as personifying the state. Opposition in domestic politics and criticisms of public policies became 'threats' to 'national security'. The result, more often than not, was institutionalised repression of whole regions, groups and peoples. The consequences of the traditional conception of security in Africa have therefore been more keenly felt by way of internal repression than of external hostilities. This is the sense in which "a concept of security grounded on interstate relations" turns the state itself into "a source of citizen insecurity" (Salih, 1999: 127; Abutudu, 2001). Thus, "rather than providing security for their citizens, states are frequently the instruments that destroy the security of their populations" (Wilkin, 1999: 28).

It might have taken the demise of the old Soviet Union and the end of the cold war to bring the new realities to the fore. However, even in its heyday, the dominant security construct did not go unchallenged. For example, major policy responses from Africa and countries of the south culminated in the formation of the non-aligned movement. Related, and perhaps partially arising from this, was the effort by countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America to reconceptualise, based on their own realities, the central contradiction in the global system in terms of the vastly unequal and exploitative economic relations between the north and the south, relations that were seen as fundamentally responsible for shaping life prospects within the third world countries. This effort, which was at its peak in the 1970s, could be seen to contain a hint of a different security paradigm, especially when read in conjunction with the sentiments that inform the economic and social strands of internationalism (the UN ECOSOC mechanism, for example) and some of the intellectual works on peace research which focus on structural violence (Galtung, 1974; Salmi, 1993). These show that, although certain threats may not be war-related, they nevertheless "result in individual human insecurity" (Wanzala, 1996: 87).

The attempt at redefining the framework of international relations from the perspective of the south met with strong resistance from the countries of the north, especially its western component. A resurgent neo-liberal economic globalism, largely associated with the administrations of Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret Thatcher in Britain, was to mount a ferocious onslaught that pushed it into the backburners of global policy. This did not result only in the atrophy of the North-South debate, but also in the withdrawal of certain key western countries from some international organisations whose emerging social philosophy was deemed to have imbibed too much of that discourse. This could be taken to have marked a conscious effort to reverse a trend that promised a centering of security on human lives and their qualitative improvement. Yet, human security entrenched itself as a mainstream discourse at a period that also marked the virtual global hegemony of the neo-liberal economic agenda.

However, the end of the Cold War, the economic crises in most African countries since the eighties, and the rash of IMF/World Bank intrusion by way of structural adjustment programmes which attended these crises, the wave of political 'liberalization' and multi-party democracy, various cases of communal, ethnic and religious violence and genocide, etc., have combined to compel an analysis of the implications of a number of platforms, agendas and processes at global, continental and national levels for human security in Africa. This is therefore a very general but critical exploration (in the context of Africa) of the dimensions of a concept that promises so much but yet can be rather slippery and elusive, not only in its expansive scope and 'catch-all' approach, but more importantly by the threat of captivity, an absorption, by a paradigm to which it is presented by some of its advocates as an alternative.

The nexus of security and economic crisis in Africa

The political liberalization process of the 1980s and 1990s "opened opportunities for people" but also opened "new fault lines" (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 2). Defined in ethnic, racial, religious, gender or class lines, it has been customary for conventional explanations to see these fault lines as the resurrection of old animosities, but often missing from this perspective is why the so-called ancient hatreds are given vent at these particular times. A few scholars have sought to explain these in the context of the acute deprivations that have attended the imposition of structural adjustment programs through the instrumentality of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Adjustment policies and neo-liberal reforms in

general are so severe in their impact that they have tended to undermine the basis of the nation-state project in post-colonial Africa, compounding the weakness of the state, engendering mass hostility to it, and undermining its legitimacy (Laasko and Olukoshi, 1996; Ake, 1996; Chossudovsky, 1997; 1999; Osaghae, 1998).

As “structural adjustment became an integral part of the dynamic of crisis in Africa” and increasingly complicated “the economic problems of the continent” (Laasko and Olukoshi, 1996: 19; Ake, 1996), sharp drops in living standards and mass hunger followed. Privatisation, denationalization and the unbridled reliance on market forces invariably compounded the concentration of wealth in a few hands, expanding at a heightened pace the number of the marginalized and excluded. As Ojo (1999: 6) perceptively observed, “nothing can be a greater threat to security than being excluded from life supporting economic activities”. The CHS supports this view by noting that “the exclusion and deprivation of whole communities of people from the benefits of development naturally contribute to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries” (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 5).

The neo-liberal agenda has placed much stress on the necessity to shrink the state while enlarging the purview of the market. Indeed, the market is to be allowed to do its work unhindered. This has in practice meant the systematic effort to reverse those elements of the welfare state that in post-colonial Africa marked fundamental aspects of the nation-building project. Across Africa, policies such as the removal of state subsidies from various social and productive sectors (education, health and agriculture), privatization, denationalization, public sector down-sizing, etc., all of which the standard structural adjustment programme insists upon, have combined to unleash a wave of threats that may not be war-related, but undermine every conceivable idea of a meaningful life.

Beyond this, there are reasonable grounds to hold that the environment of scarcity created in the wake of adjustment programmes in Africa has exacerbated people’s insecurity by massively visiting state repression on those who protest their increasing misery. Yet, this environment of deprivation could often directly heighten competition among dominant elites for dwindling state resources, a situation that has often sparked violence among groups, whether communal, ethnic or religious, who are easily mobilised behind their ‘leaders’. Situations like this suggest a link between the “economic genocide” unleashed by structural adjustment programmes and globalization (Chossudovsky, 1997) and communal and ethnic violence in Africa.

The exit option, exercised increasingly by professionals (the brain drain), and the mass exodus by many others, is one response to the threat to livelihood. The exodus of skilled professionals further compounds the crisis as basic services delivery capabilities (in the health care sector for example) face decline. Some respond to the sharp drop in living standards by increasing the intensity of exploitation of the natural environment. The resulting over-exploitation degrades the environment and further compounds the threat to livelihood. In parts of Africa, for example, the end product has been the “lethal dynamics between environmental degradation and violent conflict”, “people fighting government” and “communities fighting communities” (Ojo, 1999: 6). Marginalisation, deprivation and exclusion provide a steady supply of the poor for recruitment as foot soldiers for warlords.

Security and human life

Nearly a decade ago, the UNDP rightly pointed out that “for most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event”. Security, for them, is about safety and protection “from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards” (UNDP, 1994: 22).

The concept of human security approaches security from the point of view of human life. Its starting point is to centre its concerns on those issues that from the traditional conception of national security are not considered as security issues, since they are not seen as posing a threat to the state. Human securities assume that, if they threaten lives, or detract from lives being lived in a fulfilling manner, such issues are considered a security concern. They in fact tend to produce consequences that create instability in the public arena. Thus, even the security of the state itself may be closely bound up with its capacity to meet the security needs of the people. It is precisely for this reason that Jinadu notes that “the problem of peace and security

in Africa is bound up with the nature and character of the modern state and its role and position in national and international society". The broad conception of security espoused in this case casts the state in the role of creating the "enabling environment for self-realisation and for the enjoyment and sustenance of self-development and self-actualisation" (Jinadu, 2000: 3).

How then do we define human security? Various definitions have been offered. The UNDP identifies two main aspects to the concept. In the first place, it means "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression". In its other dimension, "it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (UNDP, 1994: 23).

According to the Human Security Commission, human security is defined by its aims: to protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms –freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4).

For the Canadian Government, the concern of human security is the safety of people "from both violent and non-violent threats" (Government of Canada, 1999: 5).

Essentially, the approach of human security is centred on the person and the community, and it focuses on threats and conditions to peoples' security that are not normally seen as threats to the state. Such threats or 'menaces' would include various forms of economic deprivation, environmental pollution, and widespread prevalence of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 6) or non infectious ones such as malaria. The concept necessarily interrogates the state as a source or potential source of oppression and deprivations, a probable producer or an aid of the 'menaces' that form the threat situations that constitute the condition of human insecurity. Thus, the concept also seeks to empower people against threats to the attainment of quality lives within their environment.

It is clear from the above that the concerns of human security have a wide range, and perhaps universal application. However, it is even more critical to Africa and the south in general, given the fact that the 'menaces' to individuals and group welfare that it seeks to ameliorate are mostly prevalent in these areas. Furthermore, the concept is dynamic, as what various groups may see as core to their attainment of quality life may, in certain respects, be culturally and contextually specific. It therefore aims to liberate, promote human freedom and empower, so as to enhance the capacity of people to make choices.

There is a strong developmental component to the concept of human security. If the conventional notion of security focuses mainly on military might to ward off aggression or contain adversarial states, human security relies on enhancing people's capability to qualitatively improve their lives. It seeks to protect against the 'menaces' that may diminish living a fulfilling life. It aims to be developmental in a holistic sense, recognizing that qualitative improvement to lives must be constructed around not only the notion of people as economic producers and consumers, but also as cultural producers and consumers. Finally, the developmental essence of the concept of human security is further captured in its ability to sensitize us and direct attention to the most "socially disadvantaged", especially "women and children who are particularly vulnerable to violence in its direct, structural and cultural forms" (Wanzala, 1996: 85).

From these three definitions, human security can be conceptually disentangled both as a condition and a dynamic process aimed at achieving a certain state of affairs. As a condition, it is epitomized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or their livelihoods. As a dynamic process, it implies the measures, the policies emplaced to realize the state of existence characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to the rights, safety and livelihood of people. As a condition, its catch-all character becomes apparent. This all-encompassing character is summarised under the categories of economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24-33). This apparent all-inclusiveness creates difficulties in efforts to analytically distinguish it from concepts such as human development and human rights, a situation that gives the term the dubious character of one "which can mean all, and nothing" (Ogata, 2000). However, this relationship can also be read as one that helps to

establish the human centeredness of security and brings home quite clearly the fact that the issues that define security for the average person relate concretely to everyday issues in which survival and a meaningful life are predicated. Human security is therefore a condition typified in sustainable human development, and a framework of guaranteed group and individual rights.

It is in the process dimension that the major contradictions and challenges to human security in Africa are most critically visible. Here the most crucial factor lies in the policy environment. In most African countries, this environment has been dominated over nearly two decades by structural adjustment programmes imposed and enforced by the Bretton Woods Institutions. The contradictions and challenges which this framework of economic and social policy impose on the process are highlighted in terms of the working of the neo-liberal agenda in Africa, the political liberalization and democratization processes in the continent, and the current dominant position of US foreign policy or the global 'war on terrorism'.

Human security, globalization and the neo-liberal agenda in Africa

Human security as a concept has a history that suggests a latent, if not an obvious tension with neo-liberal economism. The re-emergence of this ideology as the major platform of contemporary economic reforms globally has also set in motion consequences that are associated with growing human insecurity in Africa.

In focusing on the issue of security around people, it is necessary to pay attention to certain elements in the conceptual makeup of human security as possible sources of ambiguity in its operationalisation. For example, terms such as 'freedom' or 'enabling environment' may be suggestive of efforts to sustain and provide a rationale for neo-liberal economism. It is clear, for example, that as put forward by the Human Security Commission, this framework is taken as given. It does not critique policies which generate 'deprivations and oppression', since such policies only become threats or 'menaces' when they generate 'long term deprivations and oppressions'. The debt crisis in Africa is a case in point. Nigeria borrowed US\$ 3 billion between 1978 and 1983.

That debt has become a US\$ 32 billion albatross by 2000, even after about US\$ 10 billion has been used in servicing it in the intervening period. Servicing this debt annually in current terms requires about the principal sum originally borrowed.

Replicated among most African countries in varying degrees, this situation is an obvious 'menace' to the ability of African states to deploy resources to tackle ravaging diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS on the continent or make meaningful progress in eradicating illiteracy.

The ideology of neo-liberalism constitutes a serious impediment to the provision of social safety nets in Africa. The way the neo-liberal agenda has played itself out in several African countries suggests a serious need to interrogate it as a fuel for human insecurity on the continent. The linkage between economic crisis, IMF/World Bank sponsored reforms and varying degrees of political violence in Africa has been noted.

In Rwanda, the economic deterioration that followed in the wake of the collapse of the international coffee market in 1987, and the imposition of the IMF/World bank reforms, inflamed ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of economic collapse (Chossudovsky, 1997, 1999). The Rwandan (ethnic) genocide of 1994 was actually preceded, and its foundation laid, by what Chossudovsky (1999) referred to as "economic genocide" in that country.

In Somalia, an economic system based on exchanges between pastoralists and small agriculturalists, and virtually self-sufficient in food production up to the late 1970s, was disrupted when the Bretton Woods reform programme was introduced in the early 1980s. The periodic devaluation of the Somali shilling which came as part of this package in 1981 led to price hikes in the cost of farm inputs, even as the purchasing power of urban dwellers plunged. The livestock economy itself became a victim of the privatization of animal health, the commercialization of water and the neglect of water and rangeland conservation. Cattle exports, and therefore foreign exchange earnings, fell drastically. The basis of exchange between

pastoral and smallholder agriculture was undermined, and the foreign exchange earning capability was unhinged at the same time as the efforts to roll back the state were to unfold through the retrenchment of 40% of the public-sector work force (Chossudovsky, 1997; 1999).

Over the past two decades, various forms of communal and religious violence have been the hallmark of many an African country. Civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, etc., have been the more extreme expression of a process that has seen economic crisis and IMF/World Bank reforms pitching the state against its citizens, and community against community, in shooting wars.

Security, political liberalization and democratization

Liberalization and the democratization of the political terrain have been felt across much of the African political terrain in the last two decades or so. Of course, this has narrowly translated into written constitutions, plurality of political parties and periodic elections. For a continent where one-party rule and military dictatorship was the norm in the not too distant past, this transformation may indeed be seen as revolutionary. There is no doubt that the premise of democratic governance has been a major peg of human security, and that the institutional framework on which it is predicated, whether at the national or international level, assumes that a political system that is founded on the free choice of the people and is responsive to their needs is a prerequisite of human security. Indeed, at the international level, it will not be out of place to say that the relative ease with which most African leaders accepted a new initiative on intervention and the peer review mechanism of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) owes much to an emerging consensus of norms on the political sphere visible at the domestic level across a broad spectrum of African states.

This broad agreement refers to an idea, the idea of democracy: not its practice, not its reality, or least of all, the 'democracy dividends', whose absence has become a major source of mass disillusionment in many African countries. It is a discontent that threatens to undermine the idea itself. Many factors are at play, but we note two of the most critical. First, democracy as crafted in many African countries had the strong input of the IMF/World Bank group and other donors through the conditionality attached to structural adjustment programmes. Thus, in spite of the consensus that emerged on the idea, the democratic regime was constrained from the outset in economic and social policy. Its mandate in these respects generally discounted the needs of the voters in favor of implementing harsh adjustment policies, or at best, 'economic growth'. Secondly, democracy has come to typify, in Africa, a ritual of plural political parties and periodic elections. But the liberal democracy that supposedly arose from this has reduced democracy to multi-party elections, which are no longer threatening to African despots. It provides them with international respectability without constraining their absolutism, authoritarianism, corruption and ineffectiveness. It does not need to address the problems of the poor such as poverty, ignorance and disease, which keep them from effective participation in multiparty elections (Nnoli, 2003: 17-18).

As the state's ability to address issues of poverty, illiteracy and disease declines, the resulting mass disillusion creates problems of legitimacy for regimes, which may try to maintain themselves in power through repression and election rigging.

Human security and the "war against terror"

The point of view of human security does not necessarily always pose itself as an alternative to the traditional conception of security. It may even be complementary in a progressive sense if its concerns help to foster an international climate that aids the process of delegitimising interstate or transnational wars and the human sufferings associated with them. However, the main threat is that of capturing and annexing a globalised concern for human security to the re-ordered priorities of major powers in a post-cold war world. As security is given new meaning in the post cold war world by the major powers (as security from acts of terrorism), the liberation of the concept of security from its Cold War clutches may be short-lived. East-West rivalries may now be replaced by the so-called "clash of civilizations". The "global war against terror" may lead to the kind of presence in which the domestic politics of many African countries will once again be dominated by the leaders of the 'war against terror' in the manner of the Cold War era.

This is aptly noted by Joseph when he opines that “Once again, following the lead of the United States, global security is defined, especially since the incidents of September 11, 2001, as security from acts of terrorism. In the post-Cold War world, counter-terrorism has replaced anti-communism as the major preoccupation of American foreign policy. In the same way that relations with African countries before 1989 were determined by East-West rivalries, they will now be greatly influenced by the global struggle against terrorist groups and governments considered to be directly or indirectly assisting such groups. African oil producers figure centrally in this new strategy as industrialized countries seek to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil” (Joseph, 2003: 11).

This will concentrate ‘aid’ on military assistance to fight ‘terrorists’, who for example in the context of the Nigerian oil producing Niger Delta can easily translate into local people protesting environmental pollution by giant oil multinationals, or demanding a fair share of the proceeds from oil revenue from the Nigerian state.

That the above scenario is increasingly playing itself out in Africa is captured in two major current foreign policy planks of the United States. The first is the failure of the United States to sign the treaty of the International Criminal Court of Justice, the first genuine global effort to impart an impartial, non-partisan, non-victor-induced outlook to crimes against humanity. In opting out of the jurisdiction of this court, the United States absolves its citizens of responsibility to a global authority for war crimes and crimes against humanity in any part of the world where its personnel may be involved in military operations. It may be argued that some countries have well developed domestic laws and traditions of dealing with issues of this nature, but it has to be noted that the operative national laws may lack an impartial outlook, and in any case, what is bound to crop up as an invocation of patriotism, ‘national interest’ and ‘national security’ would invariably remove any pretence at impartiality in the national handling of such cases.

But the United States has gone further than this. It has energetically sought to co-opt many countries in Africa and elsewhere into ousting their prosecutorial jurisdiction in any international court of criminal justice in cases of crimes that may be committed by American personnel within their national jurisdiction. Some implications of this development for African countries and their people point to the provision of a platform for the ‘menaces’ to human security to flourish. This will necessarily mean the return of that conception of security that effectively subordinates the security concerns of African countries and their peoples to the narrow insistence that security must not only be national and a function of military-economic power, but also that it must be attained by a country at the expense of others. Finally, the US action restates a commitment to ‘regime security’, as long as such regimes remain ‘friendly’ to US interests, and irrespective of commitments to human security induced by the euphoria of the 1990s. This “close relations for strategic reasons with repressive regimes” (Joseph, 2003: 11) will be one more plank on which the retreat from human security to regime security (Baimu and Sturman, 2003) finds support in Africa.

Concluding comments

One major advantage of the approach of human security to countries of Africa is the manner it unifies domestic policy with foreign policy in protecting the lives of individuals and securing the lives of communities and groups. It puts not only the right to life but also the right to a decent life as its core, and in so doing, compels governments to observe some minimum standards in their dealings with their people. The observance of these minimum standards is not only part of the foundation for internal legitimacy; their violation could also form a basis for external humanitarian intervention. In Africa, where the state often bears direct charge for violating people physically, it is noteworthy that the African Union (AU) has institutionalised the right to intervene in member states not only in situations of unrest or external aggression, but also in cases where ‘crimes against humanity’ are being committed. This power of multilateral humanitarian intervention is complemented by the peer review mechanism of NEPAD, in which a continental authority oversees certain minimum standards of ‘good governance’ and accountability, including observance of human rights in member states.

The adoption of these initiatives at the continental level in Africa during the past decade is perhaps best exemplified in the metamorphosis of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). If the former symbolised the conventional security paradigm, the latter indicates a transition that recognizes the core objectives of human security. In defining the

scope of external intervention in humanitarian terms, it places the preservation of people's lives on a pedestal that overcomes the notion of national sovereignty under certain circumstances. The multilateral basis of intervention also implies a commitment by member states to a code of conduct in the treatment of their citizens whose breach calls for collective condemnation and collective action.

The notion of human security necessarily indicates that there are dimensions of peoples' lives that need to transcend national laws, or should be subject to laws in which national authorities need not hold final powers of arbitration. These are commendable in various ways, but as this paper tried to show, the climate of economic and social policy that currently dominates the continent is necessarily antithetical to the realization of important dimensions of the objectives of human security. Furthermore, there is no assurance that the national governments in Africa or the international community can hold liable those large multinational corporations whose production practices lead to consequences that have proved harmful to the environment and people's livelihoods as well as their physical wellbeing. There is also the 'war on terror'. This 'war' as defined and prosecuted with reference to Africa and other countries in the south (in a manner that constitutes security in terms of the 'national interest') may actually act to undermine a people-centered approach to security.

Finally, in spite of democratization, the context of the neo-liberal economism in which it is invariably pursued has meant the virtual grant of absolution to the state from any commitment to combating poverty. As this responsibility increasingly devolves on the humanitarian instinct (of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 'civil society'), the pursuit of security centered on people in Africa and elsewhere in the south finds itself consigned to the uncertain machinery of charity, which, however, answers to no one.

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Note

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